The Ethics Of The Hindus

The Asiatic Society

1, Park Street, Calcutta*700 016
Book is to be returned on the Date Last Stamped

Date Voucher No.

THE ETHICS OE THE HINDUS

THE

ETHICS OF THE HINDUS

By

SUSHIL KUMAR MAITRA, M.A.

Premchand R<qrchand Research Sdiolar ' and Lecturer in
Philosophy, Caleutta (jiuversity.

CALCUTTA UNIVERSITY PRESS

1925

fPsiNTED BT BhUPBNDRALAL BaNERJI AT THE OaLCDTTA UNIVERSITY PrRSS,
Senate HbusE, OAtmiA

0. U. Pross— Reff. No. 11 B.— 3-12-25-600.

PREFACE

The present work embodies the results of several
years of close study of Hindu Philosophy and particularly
of that part of Hindu Philosophy which deals with Hindu
ethical and spiritual life and its underlying principles.
The work was undertaken in 1916 at the suggestion of
Dr. Brajendra Nath Seal, then George V Professor of
Philosophy of Calcutta University. It was also under
Dr. Seal’s close personal supervision and guidance that
the research was carried on. Two chapters of the work
were subnoitted for the Premchand Roychand studentship
of Calcutta University as a first instalment. The award
of the studentship for 1916 necessitated the continuation
of the work on the lines originally proposed till 1920.
The author has since altered his previous presentation,
rewriting and elaborating some of the chapters and
adding two new ones. He has also departed from the
original plan rearranging the chapters in three parts in
accordance with the main divisions of Hindu spiritual
life. For the same reason he has added the chapter on
“ Moksha and Mokshasadhana ” as constituting the
culmination of Objective and Subjective Hindu Ethics
and forming an integral part of the Hindu ethico-spiritual
scheme.

As will appear from the presentation, the author
has had to rely almost wholly on the original sources.
Though many works on Indian and Hindu Philosophy
have appeared since the author’s particular undertaking,
yet he has not been able to utilise any for his own
special purpose. The author has tried to give a
philosophical exposition of Hindu ethical ideas, while most

vi

PREFACE

works on Indian Philosophy are disquisitions on chronology
rather than philosophy.

As the author’s method has been the occasion for
some comments, the following explanations may be of
some help to the reader. What he has attempted in this
work is an analytical exposition of Hindu Ethics as
distinguished from the historical. The History of Indian
Philosophy, in the author’s opinion, is as . much an
interpretation of significance as an enquiry into sequence.
It therefore supposes two different kinds of enquiry —
(1) a chronological enquiry into time-order, and (2) an
analytical enquiry into meaning and value. The author’s
aim throughout has been to concentrate on the analytical
and philosophical question proper. He has avoided
chronology as a rule not only because he does not feel
competent to tackle the chronological issues but also
because he does not believe chronology to be of much
use in a philosophical valuation of ideas. The necessity
of accurate chronology for the History of Indian
Philosophy need not be denied, but it is possible also to
exaggerate its value and to glorify mere chronology into
the History of Indian Philosophy. This seems at least
to be a tendency of recent times, it being almost a fashion
now-a-days with certain Indologists to make everything
of the question of dates and to condemn even philosophy
because it is not chronological. Dates have no doubt
their use and value, but a mere assortment of dates
of philosophical works, philosophers and schools of
philosophy is no more the History of Indian Philosophy
than a similar arrangement of names and dates the
History of European Philosophy. An interpretation of
the content is as much necessary for the genetic study
of thought as it is for the genetic study of plant or
animal life. To study the development of thought one
has to depend on the analytical knowledge of thought*t^P0S

PREFACE

vii

quite as much as to study the evolution of plant and
animal life one has need of accurate special knowledge
of plant and animal types. It need not .be denied
that genetic studies have considerably modified our old
ideas of forms as fixed types and of the species as eternal
and immutable. It may even be conceded that they will
succeed at last in reducing nature’s variety to complete
unity and in deriving its manifold forms from the
variation and modification of a few elementary types.
But this is hardly a good argument against the validity
and the value of analytical studies. To prove the conti-
nuity of divergent forms is not to eliminate differences,
but merely to show how types, apparently unlike, may
yet have a common origin. Continuity is not identity,
nor does the mere fact of sameness of origin annul
essential specific differences. Analytical studies have thus
their use and value despite all that genetic studies may
hereafter establish or evolutionists claim for themselves.
And even if science succeed at last in resolving
being into pure becoming and land us on a fluid,
mobile world of pure flux (as Bergson hopes), it will not
have dispensed with the need of analysis for all our
practical purposes.

Exception has also been taken to the author’s
method on the ground* that he has indulged in.,
comparisons with European and Modern Thought while
explaining concepts and ideas which are peculiar to the
Hindus. The author’s reply is that these comparisons
are an essential part of the enquiry he has undertaken
and could not be avoided without prejudice to his work
of analysis and interpretation. To explain the Hindu
view-points to modern man he must needs use the
langu^e of modern man without which he cannot possibly
make himself intelligible. The author cannot conceive
of any really useful enquiry into meaning and

Vlll

PKEFACE

signilicanco except their resolution into the familiar and
easily recognised modern equivalents : by interpretation
he means simply this bringing out of agreements and
differences with the ideas that obtain to-day. To assume
at the outset that the Hindu is so far removed from
the European that it is impossible to interpret him
to the European mind is to prejudge the very question
at issue. If the author had ever been of this persuasion
he would never have undertaken to write his book
in English.

The author has not been able to consider either
Bauddha or Jaiua Ethics in the present work except
only incidentally in some places more by way of contrast
than as an elaboration of the Hindu view-points. One
reason for this is the heterodox standpoint of these two
Indian schools, repudiating as they do not only the
authority of the Vedas but also the particular injunctions
and prohibitions which the Vedas prescribe. This has
necessarily altered the character of Jaina and Bauddha
Ethics which start from the ethical as distinguished
from the ceremonial conception of duty which is the
orthodox Hindu view. There is also an essential difference
of ideal and aim, a difference which characterises the
Bauddhas and Jainas as radically distinct schools of
thought with an altogether new outlook on life and its
ultimate aim. It is true that the reasons which apply
in these respects to Bauddha and Jaina Ethics also hold
good in respect of Vaishnavika Ethics and the Bhakti
School generally. Here also there is a fundamental
departure from the Hindu standpoint which would seem
to require a separate and independent treatment. But
the Vaishnavas do not repudiate Hinduism nor place
themselves in a position of conscious antagonism and
opposition as the Jainas and Bauddhas do. They no doubt
assimilate in their systems muc^ that is foreign and

PREFACE

IX

even opposed to the spirit of Hinduism, but they do
All this as synthetic philosophers seeking to liberalise
Hinduism by enlarging its boundaries rather , than as
rivals emulating with it and contesting its right to the
pedestal of Truth. They push Hinduism beyond the
traditional limits, but they do it to meet its ctitics and
save it from the assailants. They are Hindus who go
beyond Hinduism, not anti-Hindus who renounce or
disclaim it.

Before concluding the preface, the author begs
to apologise to the reader for the unsatisfactory
transliterations and misprints in this edition. Owing to
the numerous demands on the small University Press,
the printing, oven in this form, has taken nearly two
years. As a better get-up would have postponed the
publication almost indefinitely, the author was obliged
to be reconciled to a less satisfactory, earlier appearance.
The author hopes however to make up for these deficiencies
in the next edition. The author begs here to acknowledge
his obligation to Babu Kshitish Chandra Chatterjee, M.A.,
Lecturer, Calcutta University, for the list of errata and
corrigenda.

CONTENTS

INTRODUCTION

Social Ethics, Psychological Ethics and the Philosophy
of the Absolute — the three divisions of Hindu Ethics.

Pages I — 6

PART I

THE OBJECTIVE AND SOCIAL ETHICS OF THE HINDUS :
CLASSIFICATION OF THE DUTIES

Manu’s classification — sddhdranadharmas and varud-
shranmdharmaa. Prashastapdda’s classification — s&m&nya^
dharmm and maheshadharmas. Mimdmsaka classification —
nityanaimittikaka/rmaa and kdmyakarmaa. Edmdnujist
classification — the duties as deductions from the perfec-
tions of the Lord as the Absolute Person.

Pages 7 — 26

PART II

THE SUBJECTIVE OR PSYCHOLOGICAL ETHICS
OF THE HINDUS

Page 26*

CHAPTER I
ANALYSIS OF VOLITION

I. Distinction between voluntary and non- voluntary
action. Prashastapdda’s view — jivanapurvakaprayatna and
ichchhddveahapurvakaprayatna. The view of the “Dina-
kari ” — krti as pravrUi^ as as jivanayoniprayatna.

xn

CONTENTS

II. Analysis of volition. A. The Prdbhdkara view.
The steps in a voluntary action — (1) kdryatdjndna,
(2) ckikirahd, (3) pravrtti or krti, (4) cheshtd^ (6) kriyd.
Analysis df kdryatdjndna. Relation of Kdryatdjndna to
Krtisddhyatdjndna, B. The Nydya view. Kdryatdjndna
^ishtasddhanatdvishayakakdryatdjndna. Absence of deter-
rents {valamdanishldnannbandhitva) a negative condition.
The moments in Kdryatdjndna — (1) Krtisddhayatdjndna^
(2) lahtaaddhanatdjndna, (S) Valavndanishtdnanuhandhit-
vajndm. The meaning of (3). Whether the deterrent
mere dvishtajndna or a feeling of dvesha as well. The
conditions of dvesha or aversion. The conditions of
volition according to Vishvandtha — Chikirshd^ Krtiaddhya^
tdjndna, ishtaaddhanatdjndna, updddnapratyakaha. In
the absence of Krtisddhyatdjndna no volition — no will
to vrshiikarana or chandramandaldnayana. Krtisddhya-
tdjndna ^taddnimkrtiaddhyatdjndna — no sex-cravings, e.g.,
in the sexually immature child. Ishtaaddhanatdjndna^
taddnimishtmddhanatdjndna — food disgusts after appease-
ment. Psychology of suicide and temptation — lapse of
isktaaddhanatdjndna. The view of the Neo-Naiydyikas —
no original krtisddhyatdjndna — acts only imitation of
similar acts in the first instance. The comments of the
Dinakari"* Conscious and self-conscious volition. The
Frdbhdkara view contrasted. Direct and Transferred
Aversion. In what sense the absence of the deterrent
a condition of volition. The Nydya view of the effective-
n€^ of an effective deterrent. The conditions of arrest.
No arrest where loss uncertain and problematic. War-
psychology. Prdbhdkara, Nydya and Ghdrvdka views
compared. The question of freedom — determinism, self-
determinism and indeterminism. The meaning of Ishta
iaishtasddhanatd.

Pages 27-88

CONTENTS

Xlll

CHAPTER II

ANALYSIS OF CONSCIKNCK OR CONSCIOUSNESS

OF DU 1 Y

Meaning of dfinrwa : Tlie relation of dharmato karma.
Silnkhya, Bauddlm, Nvaya, Bhaitn. and Fnlbhakara views.
The views of Shankara and Ramanuja. The meaning
ot chodand, Vidhlcdhin or N eilic Prescription. Genesis
of Vidhiprotyaya-. The relation of the Imperative to the
agent’s consciousness of obligation. The ve\i\\,um-=Kt'iyd-
karttt'sambandha or causation — Bhalta view. The rela-
iion’^zpraishapraisliymuiiibandh'i or authoritative sugges-
tion — Prabhakara view. Moral impulsion a form of
phalechchhd — Nyaj a view. VidhitxH Personal Command —
Nydya. Vidhi as Impersonal Imperative — Purvami-
mdmsti. Vidhi as a compelling moral force — Bhatta.
Vidhi as Law-revealing — Prabhakara. Analysis of
Pr(?;Ym4 or obligation. Nyaya, Blisltta and Prabhdkara
views on the following questions — distinction between
the Imperative as impelling and the agent as impelled —
the nature of the Imperative as impelling —the agent’s
subjective moral prompting — the relation of the command
{djnd) to the act commanded (omis-hfhet/a) — the subjective
and objective implications of old.gation or sense of duty.
The Imperative in Rdtiiynkarmas and in Kdmyakarmaa
involving himsd. The Imperative as or negative

prescription — Prdbhakara and Bhattii views. The question
of subjective and objective rightness.

Pages 84-191

CHAPTER III

CLASSIFICATION OP THE SPRINGS OF ACTION

I. Vaisheshika classification. (A) Analysis of sukha
or pleasure. (B) Analysis of dukha or pain. (C) Analysis

CONTENTS

xiv

of ichohhd, desire, sv&rtha and pardrtha ichchhd. (D) The
Springs of Action under desire. Kdma, Abhildsha, Rdga,
Sankalpa, Kdrunija, Vairdgya, Upadhd, JBhdva,
Chihirshd, Jihirshd, etc. (E) Analysis of dvesha, aversion.
The springs of action which are forms of aversion —
Krodha, Droha, Manyu, Akshamd Amarsha. II. Nydya
Classification. (A) Vatsyayand’s view. Moha the original
source of rdga and dvesha. The passions, forms of rdga
and dcesh'i, the causes of righteous and unrighteous
action. (B) Jayanta’s view. Moha the source of rdga
and dvesha. Mithyd yndna^ vichikitsd, mdna and pramdda
— the forms of Moha. Kdma, maisyara, spfhd, tfshnd
and lohha — the forms of rdga. Krodha, irshyd, asuyd,
droha and amarsha — the forms of dvesha. III. Pdtanjala
classification, Lohha, Krodha and Moha — the three
roots of the passions. Violent, mild and feeble passions.
IV. A Vedanta classification. Sanskdras and vdsands
produced by habitual past indulgence the roots of the
pure, the shubhd, as well as of the impure, the ashubhd,
passions. Loka-vdsand, shdstravdsand, deha-vdsand,
mdnasa-vdsand — the evil passions. Distinction between
appropriated and unappropriated desires. MaitH,
kdmvnya, mtiditd, upekshd, shama, dama, titikshd, sanydsa —
the shubha~vdsands. Impure passions unrefiective and
spontaneous. Judgment and reflection in pure incli-
nations.

Pages 192-235

CHAPTEE IV

CLASSIFICATION OF THE VIRTUES

A. Vatsydyana’s classification. Sharira, Vdk and
Manas — the three sources of dharma as well as adharma.
Himsd, Steya, Pratisiddhamaithnna — the kdyika adharmas
Mithyd, parusha, suohand, asambaddha — the vdchika

CONTENTS

XV

cidharmaa. ParadrohUy paradravydbhipady ndatihya — the
m&nmiha adharmaa. Dana, paritrdna, paricharana —
the hdyika dharmaa. Satyavachana, hitamcpana, priya-
mchana, avddhydya — the vdchika dharmaa. Dayd, Aaprhd,
ahraddhd — the mdnasika dharmaa. B. Patanjali'a
claaaification. The virtues =yrt»ias or restraints that
prepare for yoga. Ahimsd, Satya, Asteya, Brahmacharyya
and Aparigraha — the five yogika virtues. The conception
of yogika virtue as admitting of no exception as to
deaha, kdla BMdjdti. G. Jaina classification. A Buddhist
classification. Distinction between conscious and sub-
conscious moral tendencies. The conception of institu-
tional morality and posthumous responsibility.

Pages 216-36

CHAPTER V

SPECIAL FEATURES OF PSYCHOLOGICAL HINDU

ETHICS

Volition and non- voluntary action. Will as selection
and will as rejection. Prudential and moral action.
Consciousness of good. Consciousness of freedom.
Analysis of the deterrent. Psychology of temptation and
suicide. The relationistic conception of willing. The
subjective and objective conception of morality.
The conception of Apurva. Duty as an ontological
verity of the moral order. Morality as relative and
empirical. Recognition of evil in shdstriya himsd.
Synthesis of ethical disinterestedness with prudential
morality, of consequentialism with moral purism.
Synthesis of externalism with the ethical conception of
duty. Objective and subjective rightness.

Pages 236-45

CONTENTS

jtvi

PART III

THE ETHK'O-SPnilTUAL IDEAL (MOKSHA) AND ITS
IIEALI AllON (MOKSHASADHANA)

I. Dortrim of Moksha. Vai.sheshika view. Ny^va
view. Sankliv.i view. Purvaininiatnsa view. Shankara’s
view. Hainan «jja’s view. I [. Dodrine of Mokslias&dhana.
Ihe organisation of the personal life. The doctrine of
Samucchava — whether the lines of Karma. Jndna and
bhakti to be co ordinated in the personal life. Sdnkhya
view — futilitv of works. Tlie view of the NvAva-Vaishe-
shikasand the llani.tnnjisls — disinterested works necessary
besides knowledge. Sliaiikara’s view — doctrine of karma-
sanydsa. Nyaya refutation of the conception of Moksha
as a pragmatic fietion. Freedom from anubandhas not
impossible. JPraripaks((hhdmiid. Cancellation of error
according to Nyaya and Shankara-Vedanta compared.
The Rainanujist view.

Pages 2-l<6>98

APPENDIX

THE MORAL STANDARDS IN HINDU ETHICS

I. The Standard as Custom and Tradition. Loka-
prOfSiddhi, loka-upadesha. II. The Standard as a Social
Category. Loka-sthiti, loka-siddhi, loka-pdlana, loka-
shreya. III. The Standard as Knd. Chdrvaka hedonism.
Criticism of Charvaka hedonism and sensualism. Bauddha
and Nydya pessimism. The Transcendental Eudsemonism
of Shankara compared with the Phitonic, Aristotelian and
Hegelian Eudminonisra. Ananda and Sukha distinguished.
The Standard as the ‘ Golden Mean.’ The Standard as
Vishuddhyangdbhisandhi. IV. The Standard as Vidhi
Qr Law. A. The Standard as Personal Law or command,

CONTENTS

xvii

Ghdrvdka, Bauddha-Jaina, Nydya-Vaisheshika and Kama*
nujist ’/lews. A Veddnta view. Shankara’s conception
of a gradation of moral standards. Conception of grades
of unreality, B. The Standard as Impersonal Law.
Purvamimdrasd.

Pages 299-331.

The Ethics of the Hindus .

Introduction

The ‘ Ethics of the Hindus ’ is based on a three-fold
scheme of the spiritual life comprising the steges .jo£
j^Mciality, (subjective morality and the life absolute and
transcendental,) Hindu Ethics is thus social ethics and
psychological ethics and culminates in the philosophy
of the Absolute which is the consummation of the
Spiritual life.

The social Ethics of the Hindus is represented in a
scheme of Yarndshramadharmas, i.e., duties relative to
one’s Varna or social class and one’s Ashrama or specific
stage in spiritual discipline. (^The duties of Varna and
Ashrama together constitute the code of relative duties,
the duties of station in life, the duties obligatory on the
individual in consequence' of social status, temperament,
specific powers and capacities.^ They are to be distin-
guished from the sddhdranadharmas,/ the common duties
of man, the duties that are^bligatory on all men equally,
irrespective of individual capacity, social status,
nationality, or creed. \

The Varnnsramauharmas thus represent a code of
relative duties and constitute the relativistic ethics of
the Hindus. It ^comprises the ethics of sociality as well
as the ethics of individual capacity an^ is thus fuller
and more comprehensive than the P laton ic joheme which
^s the ethics of sociality ohly^N The basis of the classi-
fication according to Ashfaraa,Mt will be seen, is the
genetic view^ of the moral life, and the importance,
psychological as well as ethical, of such a view cannot
be too much emphasised.

2

S. K. MAITRA.

The Varnashvamadliavmas, as will he seen, constitute
the sphere of the hypothetical i mp erative, but this does
not imply that(they ar<5 conditional on a subjective choice
of tlie individual .3 On the contrary£they are all obliga-
tory without condition in their respective spheres/^ ( Thus
the duties of the Brahmin are obligatory without
condition on whoever is a Brdhmin^ and the duties of
the married life on whoever has married and has a family.
Only the duties of one class or of one stage of life has
no authority over another class or over another stage.)
Some however think that there is room here for indivi-
dual freedom specially in regard to the order of the
several Ashramas. Thus it is urged that thougl£the order
from Brahmacliaryya tltrough Gdrhastya to the later
stages is true for the majority yet there may be excep-
tional cases, men with special powers and capacities, who
may attain to the later stages without going through the
earlier. )

These relative duties however do not constitute the
entire field of the moral life. • Resides these there is also
a. code of common duties or Sddhdranadharmas which
every man must observe whatever his social position or
individual capacity.,; ^^Ihe Sadbaranadharmas are thus the
duties of universal scope and validity and are to be
distinguished from the merely relative duties.) The idea
underlying this classification is that two kinds of service
are obligatory on every individual for the protection and
help spiritual as well as material accorded to him by his
fellow beings. -,ln the first place it is necessary that he
should pay off his debt to his particular community)in
a specific way according to his capacity for the special
advantages and opportunities- of life it provides for. ..But
this is not all. ( Besides his community he is also indebted
to mankind in geneva^ by w'hose culture and experience
through the trials of life he hourly profits in his career

THE ETHICS OE THE HINDUS

3

through the world. It is therefore necessary that he
should pay ofE this larger debt, in however small' an
amount, by assisting the cause of humanity in general
and seeking the common good as distinguished from- the
good of his own community. This is the inner signifi-
cance of the scheme of Sddbdranadharmas which is thus
a check to communal egoism seeking as it does an
equitable adjustment of the relative claims of commu-
nities in a larger ethics of humanity. ^

From what has been already stated it is clear that the
^ Sddhdranadharmas constitute the foundation of the
Varndshramadharmas,ythe limits vyithin which the latter
are to be observed and obeyed. For example the Brahmin
in performing his religious sacrifice must not appropriate
another’s property for the purpose, non-appropriation
being one of the common and universal duties. In this
way he serves his own community as well as, though in a
negative way, the cause of humanity as a whole. It
should be noted however that the Varndshramadharmas
are not directed merely to the good of the community — •
they also, though in an indirect way, subserve the
purpose of the common good of humanity. Thus the
individual of a specific community who observes the
duties of his class does not serve his own community
merely, but also and in the same process, all other
communities according to their deserts and needs and. in
this way tile whole of humanity itself. This, it will be
seen, is also the view of Plato whose virtue of justice is
the common good which is to be realised by each class
through its specific duties, but this is to ba distinguished
from the common good which constitutes the object of the
Sddhdranadharmas of the Hindu classification. The end
in these common and universal duties is not the common
well-being which is being concretely realised in specific
communities, but the common good as tbe pre-coiiditioh'

4

S. K. MAITRA

and foundation of the latter ; it is not the good which is
conimon>in>the-individual but coramon-as-the-prius-of-
the-individual. Hence the Sddhdrana duties are obliga-
tory eqmllp on all individuals, irrespective of their social
position or individual capacity.

The SAdhdranadharmas and the Varndshramadharmas
together constitute the objective moi’ality of the Hindus,
i.e.f morality as represented in a code of external acts and
requiring outward conformity. But objective morality is
not sufficient by itself and it is necessary that the indivi-
dual after a period of discipline in objective co-operation
and self-restraint, should look inwards into himself and
aim at subjective purity and inner excellence of the will.
This constitutes subjective morality and gives us the
psychological ethics of the Hindus. It is assumed that
Chittasuddhi or purification of the mind is an indispensable
condition for the higher stages of the moral life. Ob-
jective morality represents the stage of the moral tutelage
of the individual after which however he must be left to
his own freedom. But even then it is necessary that he
should not be led away by the mere intensity of the im-
pulse of the moment. A certain equanimity of the mind,
a sort of mental equilibrium and impartiality is the pre-
condition of the proper and righteous use of one’s free-
dom. It is only in this impartial md undisturbed frame
of mind that tlie rival claims of competing impulses aiid
moral values can be rightly appreciated and adjudged.
To this end it is however necessary that the natuial man
should be purified and spiritualised and should learn
through a proper understanding of his inner nature, to
subordinate the lower to the higher impulses and to inainT
tain the balance and tranquillity of the soul which are the
pre-conditions of proper ethical valuation. This constitutes
the problem of the Psychological Ethics of the Hindus
which thus includes not merely the analysis of the will

THE ETHICS OF THE HINDUS

and its inner springs and their psychological as well as
their ethical classiftcatipn, but also a part of their prac-
tical ethics as embodied in the various practical schemes
of Ghittasuddhi through external and internal bids.

Even subjective morality however is not the highest
stage of the spiritual life. It is itself a means like
socialitv which together with the latter must lead to the
ultimate end or goal which is the life absolute and
transcendental. Here sociality as well as subjective
morality must be merged in the end thereby either to be
annulled and transcended or to re-appcar in a new light
and charged with absolute significance. This is the
underlying intent of Patanjali’s Scheme of Yoga, Shan-
kara’s view of Moksha, Ramdnuja’s doctrine of Bhakti
and the Buddhist theory of Nirvdna. All these agree in
recognising the transcendental as the limit of the
empirical life, the timeless as the truth of all that is in
time. This timeless, transcendental life is therefore the
culminating stage of the spirit, the sphere of its consum-
mation and fruition. It is in a certain sense a supermoral
plane of being, a level of Spiritual life in which the
individual as consciously participating in the eternal
reality of the Absolute, is free from the sense of nqere
striving as well as from that of mere duty or obligation.
It is the stage of the spirit, in short, in w'hich the good
is not presented as something to be accomplished but as
an accomplished fact from eternity which the individual
thcrefbre does not realise but merely reveals in his own
life as participating in the life of the Absolute.

This absolute life however has itself been variously
conceived by the Hindus, being in some systems regarded
as the negation of all that is empirical (Nyaya), in
some as a kind of intuition (Shankara), in some again as
intuition culminating in devotion, worship and love and
enriching and enlivening the empirical life of activity and

S. K. MAITRA

thereby filliag it with absolute sigHiheance and worth
(Bdmdouja). This intuition again is *conoei red either as
the intuition of the Self, or as the intuition of Purusha as
well as Prakriti, or again as pure intuition or knowledge
without either locus (Jndtd) or object (Jneja) which is
the philosophy of pure experience.

One special point of interest in this connection is the
difference between Shankara and Ramanuja in the
dgnificance they respectively attach to the empirical
life of Duty after the emergence of the intuition of
the Absolute. According to Shankara the moral life is at
an end at this stage and there is Karma-Sanydsa or
freedom from the bond of Karma or duty in consequence
of the lapse of the individual into the eternal reality of
the Absolute. The moral bond here falls off as do other
bonds and a state of absolute freedom is reached which
is the Freedom of Reality itself. Accmding to Ramanuja
however the moral life is not annulled in this mediating
proem of absolute intuition, but only transfigured, shorn
of its character of mere subjectivity, and filled with
absolute significance and value. The sense of duty
therefore persists even after the intuition of the Absolute
and the obligations of the empirical life continue to be
binding in all stages of the spirit; only at this plane
they cease to appear as merely empirical or snbjf^tive
and are recognised instead as the self-revelation of the
transcendental roality, the temporal manifestation of
what is itself timeless and eternally real. The moral
life therefore receives now an entirely new meaning :
it is ho longer the service of man merely, but also of God
as revealing Himself in suffering humanity, the Eternal
Absolute as accomplishing itself in time through the
temptations, the struggles, the successes and failures of
men, that is, through the history of the world.

PART I

The Objec'iivb and Social Ethics of the Hindus :

THE CLASSIFICATION OF THE DUTIES.

The objective morality of the duties is the ground-
ETork of Hindu Ethics. As constituting their concrete
moral life it furnishes the positive basis of Hindu ethical
concepts and norms. It also is preparatory to the higher
morality of self-puridcation 'which necessarily presup-
poses the mediation of an objective code of right and
wrong actions. We shall therefore first consider the
Objective Ethics of the Hindus, i.e., their enumeration
and classification of the Dharmas in the objective sense
of ‘ duties.’

j^.B . — The term ‘Dharma’ is also used in the
subjective sense of virtue as well as in the sense of
religiovs merit. Here however we are concerned only
with its objective meaning of ‘ duty.’

Manu's Claasification of the Duties.

Manu’s classification of the Duties is one of . the
earliest attempts at a sj^stematic treatment of tlfis
subject. Manu distinguishes between relative du^s
(VarDfi8hramadharma8),i.4?., duties relative to one’s station
in life, and , common duties (Sddhdranadharmas), i.e,,
duties of universal scope and validity. The relative
duticV; are the specific duties relating to one’s station in
life, i.e., one’s station as ‘ determined by one’s varna or
caste and one’s dshraina or particular stage of life. The
universal duties are the duties irrespective of one’s age,
caste or creed, i.e., duties obligatory on man as man an d

8

S. K. MAITRA

not as a member of a pai'ticular community or social
class or as being at a particular stage or period of life.

Under the class of the SAdhAranadharmas or common
duties Mailu enumerates the following ten : —

Steadfastness (Dhairya).

Forgiveness (Kshamd).

Application (Dama).

Non -appropriation, i.e.. Avoidance of theft (Chouryd-
bhdva).

Cleanliness (Shoucha).

Repression of the Sensibilities and Sensuous appetites
(Indria-nigraha).

Wisdom (Bhi).

Learning (Vidyd).

Veracity (Satj'a).

Restraint of Anger (Akrodha).

A glance at the above list shows that nearly all the
duties have reference to the attainment of the individual’s
OAvn perfection. There is practically no recognition of
the social duties proper, i.^., of the duties of social service
in a positive sense as distinguished from negative tolera-
tion (Kshama) and non -appropriation (Chourydbhdva).
Even veracity does not necessarily imply positive social
service in this sense : it aims at negative non-interference
rather than positive service and it may be practised
purely as a diahoetic virtue of self-culture, i.e , as
absolute self-dedication to Truth. In any case there is
no necessary implication of any positive social service in
veracity any more than there is in the other enunoieira-
tions under the common duties. It follows therefore that
Hindu morality primarily aimed at the autonomy of
the* individual, i.e., at making him self-sufficient and
self-dependent and free from all external bonds, physical
arid social. This is the underlying purport of the ascetic

THE ETHICS OP THE HINDUS

9

virtues of steadfastness, application, repression and self-
“ restraint. The dianoetic virtues of wisdom, learning and
veracity have also this end of self-culture in view, and
the omission of the virtues of positive social service
from the lists is also significant when viewed in the light
of this ideal of a non-social self-autonomy and self-
sufficiencv. In fact, it is this ideal which dominates the
Hindu Doctrine of the Law of Karma — the Law which
apportions to each individual what he has himself earned
by his own deeds or karma. According to the Hindu
idea there can be not only np vicarious sin and punishment
but also no vicarious redemption. No man can help
another in the attainment of his end: just as he cannot
reap what another has sown so also he cannot help
another to his fruition. A free spirit is a law unto
himself and is arbiter not only of his own natural lot but
also of his hi jiher end or destiny as spirit. There are
thus no duties which are not strictly speaking duties to
self, and duty in the sense of positive moral aid to others
is self-contradictory in its very conception. One’s natural
lot is itself a result of one’s karma or freedom, and one
can no more conduce to the betterment of another’s
natural life than one can conduce to his moral life.

Prasastapdda’s Classijioation of the Duties.

Prasastapdda also classifies the duties, like Manu,
into common, generic or Sdmjlnyadharmas and relative,
specific or Visheshadharmas. Thus the Duties (Dharmas),
according to him, are : —

(i) either generic, sdra^nya, i.e.^ common to all
dshramas or stages of life and all varnas or
social classes and communities ;

(n) or specific, vishesha, «.<?., relative to one’s
particular station in life as constituted by one’s

10

S. K. MAITRA

particular varna or social class and one’s

dshrama or particular stage of life.

I. The Generic or Samanya Duties are : —

Moral Earnestness, Regard for the Spiritual
(Dhann6 Shraddhil, Dharrae ManahprasAdah).

Refraining from injury to living beings
(Ahimsd).

Seeking the good of creatures (Bhutahitatva).

Speaking the truth (Satyavachana).

Refraining from theft (Asteya).

Sexual continence (Rrahmacharyya).

Sincerity, Purity of Motive (Anupadhd).

Renouncing or restraining anger (Krodha
varjana).

Ablution, Personal cleanliness (Abhisechana,
Sndna).

The eating of linseeds and other specified
substances on special occasions for the object
of shuchi or purification of the body (Shuchi-
dravyasevana).

Devotion to the Deities recognised by the
Vedas (Vishishta-Devata-bhakti).

Fasting on specified occasions (Upabasu).

Moral watchfulness (Apranudda), the

unfailing performance of the unconditional
duties (nitya-nairaittikdnam karinandm
avashyambhdvena karanam)

It is pointed out that in every case the agent’s positive
resolve (samkalpa) must be an antecedent condition of
the accomplishment of the duty as in mere external
cessation or forbearance (nibrtti) there is only avoidance
of sin (adharma), but no positive virtue (Nibrtteh adharmo
na bhavati, na tu dharmo jdyate. — The “ Nyaya-Kandali ”

THE ETHICS OK THE HINDUS 1 1

on Prasastapada’s Bhashya on Vaishesijikadarshana).
Hence

Refraining from injury (Ahimsa) is a duty^ not simply
in the negative sense of mere cessation from harm or
injury (himsabhava) but also in the positive sense of a
definite resolve not to hurt a living being (bhutdndm
anabhidrohasamkalpah).

Similarly, refraining from theft (asteya) as a duty is
not the mere cessation from appropriating what belongs
to another but implies, besides the outward cessation, an
internal samkalpa, resolve or attitude of the will, viz,, the
resolve to disapprove and disdain all acts of misappropria-
tion as unrighteous (Ashastrapurvakam parasvagrahanam
may a na karttavyam iti samkalpah, na tu parasvdddnani-
brttimdtram).

Thirdly, Brahmacharyya as a duty is not the mere
refraining from the outward act of sexual indulgence,
but also implies the internal resolve of the will not to
long for such indulgence oven in thought (Brahmacharyya
strisevdparivarjanam tadapi samkalparupam).

Again sincerity (Anupadhd) in the sense of bhava-
shuddhi or purification moans puriheation of the motive,
i.e.^ the resolve to be free from all impure feelings of pride,
self-esteem, <;tc., in the diseharge of one’s duties in the
consciousness that duties done only with a pure motive
are conducive to morality (vishuddhena abhiprdyena
krtdndm karmandm dharmas^dhanatvat).

This holds good also in the case of restraint of anger
(krodliavarjana) which is to be observed not merely
outwardly but also as regards the inner will (Sa api
samkalparupah).

II. The Vishesha or Specific Duties are

(1) The Duties relative to the different castes or
social classes (Varna), and

12

S. K. MAITIIA

(2) The Duties relative to the dilFereut stages of
/

life (Ashrama).

(1) The Duties of the castes are divisible into : —

(a) The Duties common to the three castes of

Brahmin, Kshatra and Vaishya. These are : —
Sacrificial ceremonies (Ijyd, yagddi). Acqui-
sition of knowledge by study (Adhyayana).
Charity (Dana).

(b) The Duties obligatory on the Brahmin only.

These are ; —

Acceptance of gifts (Pratigraha).

Teaching (Adhyapana).

Performance of ceremonial sacrifice (Yajana).

The way or mode of life prescribed for a
Brfih mi n (S vavar navihita-samskara) .

(<?) The Duties obligatory on the Kshatra only.

These are : —

Protecting people from external aggressions
and internal disturbances, as well as govern-
ing them with a view to peace and prosperity
(prajdpdlana).

Chastising the wicked (asadhunigraha).

Not retreating from battle (Yuddheshu
anivartana).

The way or mode of life prescribed for a
Kshattra (Svakiyasamskara).

(d) The Duties obligatory on the Vaishya only.

These are : —

Buying (kraya), i.e., procuring commodities
from others after paying their proper price
(mulyam dattvA parasmd,t dravyagrahanam).

Selling (vikraya), ».<?., bartering away commo-
dities to others after realising from them
their legitimate price (mulyam dddyaparasya
svadravya ddnam).

THE EtHlCS OE TlHi HINDUS

):i

Agriculture (krshi).

lireedirig and roaring of cattle (Pashupalana).
The way or mode of life prcscrib(‘d for a Vaishya
(svakiyasamskjira). •

(e) The Duties obligatory on the Shudra only.
Tliese are : —

Being subservient or in .sul)jection to tbe other

three castes (Purva-varna-pdratantra^,

Observing such rites as do not require the

utterance of the sacred mantras or inctinta-
✓

tions (Amantrika Kriya).

T^iie above are the (Ive divisions of the Duties of Varna
or Social class. These Varna or caste duties constitute
only one of the two main classes of the specific Duties.
The Duties of Ashrama or different stages of life constitute
the other class of these specific duties.

(2) These Duties of Ashrama or different stages of
life are likewise divisible into several sub-classes. These
are :

(a) The Duties of the unmarried student (Brahma-
charin) practising sexual abstinence. These
are ; —

Serving, and attending to the comforts of, the
preceptor (Guru-shuslirusha).

Collecting fuel (Indhana-aharana).

Offering incense fo the sacrificial fire (agnou
homah).

Collecting alms (Bhaikshya).

(/}) The Duties of the married person living with his
family (krtaddra grhastha). These are : —

Performing the five sacrificial ceremonies or
Yajnas (bhuta-manushya-deva-pitr-brahma-
yajna) every morning and evening by means of

S. K. \r AIT 11 A

It

one’s own earnings. (Uparjitairarihaiibhuta-
jnanushyadeva-pitrbrahmakliydndm panchA-
nam yajndndm sayampvdtaranushthdnam).
Bhuta-yajna is the offering of sacrifice to the
bhutas or elements (blmtebhyah valipraddnam
bhiitayajnah). Mannshyayajna is the
serving and entertaining of guests (atithi-
pujanam inanushyayajnah). Devayajna is
tfie offering of incense to the sacred fire
(homafi devayajnah). Pitryajna is paying
respect to the dead by observing the funeral
rites and other allied ceremonies (Shrdddham
pitryajnah}. Brahmayajna is the reading of
tlie sacred texts, i.e., (he Vedas (Vedapdthah
Brahmayajnah).

Those ar(! the five yajnas (panchayajna) presoribed
for the married person and their observance is binding
oil him only if lie has the necessary strength or capacity
(shakti) to undergo the hardships involved.

Over and above these sacrificial ceremonies it is also
the married man’s duty to beget children by co-habitation
with his wife, but it should be in proper season, /.«?., there
must be periods of abstinence after cohabitation and
procreation of a child (Rtvantari'shu brahmacharyyara
apatyotpddanam ) .

(«) The Duties of the Ileeluse (Vdnaprastha) and
of the Brahraacharigrhasta, i.e., of the house-
holder who after having completed the duties
of his married life is living a life of conjugal
abstinence or celibacy at home. These
are : —

AV earing the bark of trees (Valkaladidhdrana)
lietting the hair, etc., grow (Keshadidhdrana)

Living on the roots and the fruits of the jungle
(Vanasya phalamulasya bhojanam).

THE ETHICS OF THE HINDUS

15

Dining on the surplus of the meal after entertainment
of all the guests (atithishesha-hliojanarn).

(d) The duties of the Yati. A Brahmachari-grhasta
or Vdnaprastba becomes a Yati or mondicant-seer on the
attainment of Sraddh:i or chittaprasada, i.e., mental
serenity and equanimity. Such a man is known not only
by his self-possession and serenity of mind but also by
his gentleness and barmlessness to all sentient creatures,
by the destftuction of his Karmas and their potencies,
by the absence of any lapse through carelessness in the
performance of the acts of self-discipline as laid down
in the Yamas and Niyamas, and the Yogik trances which
he produces in hims(ilf by meditation on his knowledge
of the six categories of the Vaisheshikas. Shraddhdvan
(shraddha-ehitta-prasdda), sarvabhutebhyo nityam abha-
yam dattva svdni karmdni samnyasya yamaniyameshva-
pram at tasy a shat pad arth a-prasam k hy an ddy ogaprasad h a-
nam (yogaprasddhanam =sainadhivisheshasya utpdda-
nain).

'I'he Yanias are :

11 armlessness (Ahimsd).

Veracity (Satya).

llefraining froni theft (Asteya).

Sexual abstinence (Hrahmacharyya).

'I'he Niyamas are : —

Cleanliness (Shoucha).

Contentment (Santosh),

Arduous application and devotion (Tapas).
Reciting A^edic texts (Svddhydya).

Meditation on the glories and the perfections of
the Lord (Isvarapranidhana).

The Yamas are thus duties of self-restraint, even
veracity implying restraint in this sense, i.e., restraint of
the self’s tendency to exaggeration and misrepresentation
in the interest of momentary self-advantage. The

16

S. K. MAITRA

Niyaraas on the contrary are rules of self-realisation,
i.e., the realisation of the self’s true essence as Spirit.
Thus while the Yamas are negative and restrictive, the
Niyarnas are positive and objective rules of self-expansion
and development.

Comparing now Prasastapdda’s list of the Generic or
Sdmlinya duties with Manu’s enumeration of the
sadharana dharmas we notice that Prasastapada adds
Moral earnestness (dharni6 shraddhd). Refraining from
Injury (Ahimsa), Goodwill to creatures (Bhutahitatva)
and Moral Watchfulness (Apramdda) to Manu’s list,
while he omits Steadiness (Dhairya), Forgiveness
(Ksliama), Endurance of Physical pain (Dama), Wisdom
(Dhi) and Learning (Vidyd;. As regards Prasastapada’s
additions it will be seen that Ahimsa and Bhutahitatva
are not the equivalents of Manu’s Kshamd (Forgiveness).
Forgiv(moss as a duty is not incompatible wdth the ethics
of self -autonomy which aims at individual self-sufficiency
and independence as the highest ideal of the moral life.
Ahimsa (Harmlessness) and Bhutahitatva (seeking the
good of creatures) however represent the negative and
positive aspects of a more inclusive and humanitarian
ideal of life in which the individual can achieve his
moral end only hy going beyond himself instead of
remaining confined wdthin the stone walls of independent
neutrality. This is a relieving feature in Prasastapdda’s
view' of the moral life which appears also in his treatment
of the Springs of Action. Similarly the addition of
Moral Earnestness and Moral Watchfulness and the
omission of Learning (Vidya) and of Wisdom (Dhi) are
significant as emphasising the ethical in place of the
dianoetic virtues and thus teaching a non-intellectualistic
view of morality as distinguished from the intellectualism
of Sankhya and Shan K ara -Vedanta. Thus Moral Watch-
fulness and Moral Earnestness represent respectively the

THE ETHICS OF THE HINDUS

17

negative and positive aspects of the ethical training of
the will, the first of which consists in the cultivation of
that alertness of moral consciousness which will prevent
a moral lapse through mere carelessness or inadvertence
and the second in that earnestness of moral feeling and
impulse which is inconsistent with levity or frivolousness
of any sort.

Secondly, as regards Prasastapdda’s classification of
the duties into generic and specific, it is to be observed
that while it provides a basis for the distinction between
conditional and unconditional obligations, on the other
hand it brings out the close connection between the
moral life and its positive basis as constituted by social
status and individual psychological capacity of the moral
agent. In this respect the Hindu classification is fuller
and more complete than the Platonic classification of the
virtues according to the different social classes only. In
the latter we miss not only a list of sddhdrana or common
duties but also the distinctive Hindu classification accord*
ing to Ashrama or moral capacity relative to one’s
particular stage of life. There is indeed a common duty
even according to Plato, viz., the virtue of Justice which
is to be realised by the soldier, the artisan as well as the
legislator, but it is not an independent duty which is to
be realised in itself but is only a function of the proper
discharge of its specific duties by each particular social
class. Thus the soldier realises justice by protecting the
State while the legislator realises it by wise legislation
and administration, i.e., each realises it in specific form
through the discharge of his specific duties. Hence
justice is a common duty only in the sense of being
comraon-in-the-specifie. But the sddhdrana or common
duties of the Hindus are common in a different sense.
They are common as being independent duties of all the
social classes alike. Thus aohourya or non-appropriation

3

18

S. K. MAITRA

is an independent duty to be discharged by every man, be
he a Brahmin, Kshatra, Vaishya or Sudra, it being
obligatory on him as man and not as a member of a
community. It is laid down that the common duties
cannot be transgressed in the discharge of the speciho
duties, the idea being that tiiere are certain general
relations between man and man which cannot be dsicarded
in the interests of particular communities. The common
duties are thus the preconditions of the specific duties,
i,e,i they are not the coinmon-in-the-specific such
as Plato’s Justice, but the common-as-the prius-of-the
specific. In this sense the sd'thdrana dharmas of the
Hindus are a safeguard against communal egoism and
intolerance. They provide, through a code of universal
duties, a basis for a much more humanitarian treatment
of the Shudra than the Platonic scheme would permit in
respect of the barbarian and the helot who lack civic
status. For Plato the I)arbarian is without any moral
standing ; there are not only no duties bo be fulfilled by
him but also no duties to be fulfilled in respect of him.
The Hindu however, inspite of the social degradation of
the Shudra, does not exclude him altogether from moral
protection, but shelters him from persecution through a
code of universal duties which are obligatory on man as
man. These duties are to be observed by all alike, being
the duties obligatory on everybody in his dealings with
everybody else. They are thus to be observed nob merely
by the Shudras but also by members of the higher castes.
The Hindu classification is also fuller as we have said in
another respect, viz., in respect of the classification accord-
ing to Ashrama or spiritual capacity of the different
stages of life. It implies a genetic view of the moral life
and anticipates a genetic ethics with an ascending scale
of moral codes corresponding to the progressive unfolding
of spiritual pow:era. The far-reaching import of this

THE ETHICS OP THE HINDUS 19

classification when considered in this light of a progres*
sive morality of ascending stages cannot be too much
emphasised.

•

The Mimdmsaka classification of the duties.

The Mimdmsakas also classify the duties, but not into
generic and specific as Prasastapada does, but on an
entirely new principle. According to the Mimdmsakas
the duties (karmas) are divisible in the first instance into
secular (laukika) and script ural or transcendental (Shdstrika,
Pdramdrthika). The secular duties are the drstdrthaka
duties, i.e.^ duties of sensuous or empirical import while
the scriptural duties are the adrstdrthaka duties,
duties of non-sensuous or non-empirical import. The
sanction in the secular duties is merely human. While
the sanction in the scriptural duties is religious or divine.
The secular duties therefore have not the evidential
value or validity of the scriptural duties. The latter are
the duties of unquestionable moral authority while the
former have only a derived authority depending on
human experience.

The scriptural duties again fall into the two classes
of (1) kdmyakarmas or duties conditional on subjective
desire and (2) Nityanaimittikakarmas or duties of uncon-
ditional validity. The kdmya or conditional duties are
scriptural injunctions that are authoritative only when
there is desire for a particular end. Hence they are
scriptural duties presupposing a subjective prius of a
pathological motive. The unconditional duties on the
contrary are obligatory in themselves independently of
any pathological motive. These again fall into two classes,
ttiz.i (1) the nityakarmas or duties which are uncondi-
tionally obligatory for all time and (2) the naimittika-
karmas or duties which are unconditionally obligatory
only when their nimittas or special occasions arise. Thus

20

S. K. MAITRA

the daily prayer (sandhyA) is an unconditional, nitya
duty: it must be done every morning and evening
without fail. Bathing in the Ganges in a solar or lunar
eclipse, hqwever, is an unconditional naimittika duty : it is
unconditionally binding only on the occasion of the eclipse.
In either case, however the duties are unconditionally
binding, /.<?., obligatory independently of any pathological
motive of the agent.

The scriptural duties are also either negative or
positive in significance, /.<?., are either Vidhis, positive
injunctions, or Nishedhas, mere prohibitions. The
injunctions which are conditional suppose a prius of
subjective desire in the agent. The object of such
injunctions is to define the agent’s duty or proper course
for the realisation of his desire. The negative prohibi-
tions also imply a subjective prius, viz., a forbidden
impulse in the agent, but the object in this case is to
indicate the means of checking or subduing it.

This therefore is a classification of the duties on an
entirely new principle, being based in the first instance
on the presence or non-presence of a sci’iptural sanction.
The significance of the classification consists in its
insistence on a non-natural sanction of the duties and the
consequent separation of the moral life proper from the
merely natural life. The secular duties are only induc-
tions from experience as to what is beneficial or injurious
and as such inductions are not infallible, only a proble-
matic and relative authority attaches to these laukika
or human institutions and conventions. The scriptural
duties however are of unquestionable and absolute
authority. They thus constitute a morality which is
specifically distinct from the problematic and relative
morality of human creation. It is assumed that morality
truly so-called must be of indubitable authority and
must therefore have a non-empirical source or origin.

'THE ETHICS OF THE HINDUS

Sence there must be a radical diiferenoe between the
indubitable morality of the scriptural duties and the
doubtful morality of the customs of men.

Within scriptural morality itself a further division is
recognised in accordance with the presence or non-
presence of a non-scriptural motive as a conditioning
factor. Thus the kamya or conditional duties are the
duties that arise in consequence of the agent’s choice of
particular ends. They are duties conditional on his
desiring particular ends, though the desiring itself is not
a duty, but a result of free choice. It is assumed that
there are ends which are not in themselves morally
authoritative, but they arc to be accomplished in the
proper way so that whosoever chooses these ends is also
under specific obligations to seek them in the proper
manner. As distinguished from these we have the
unconditional obligations of the nitya-naimittika duties :
these are authoritative in themselves irrespectively of
the subjective desires of the moral agent. The idea, is
that there are some obligations that arise from the very
nature of man as imin and these do not admit of excep-
tions or limitations. There are other obligations however
which arise only in relation to a contingent situation,
and these are relative to the subjective freedom or choice
of the agent. In the latter case the duty is not to seek
the end which is freely chosen, but to see to the proper
seeking of it, i.e., to seeking it by the right means. (It
is to be observed that this category of non-morally
conditioned moral duties raises an important ethical
question, »*«., the question of the possibility of moral
motivation in spite of a non-moral or pathological
impulse. A rigorist like Kant cannot admit such non-
moral • motivation and therefore cannot recognise any
conditional duties. The Priibhdkara School of the
Mimdmsakas also comes to a similar conclusion from the

S. K. MAlTltA.

2ii

standpoint of ethical disinterestedness, but the Bhdtta
School finds a place for them in the moral life by the
distinction of contingent and truly moral ends as
explained^ above.)

The Ramamijiat clnsaijioatiou of the duties.

There is also another classification of the Duties in
Hindu Ethics which deserves notice here, the classifica-
tion or rather deduction of the duties obtaining amongst
the school of the Baraanujists. The Duties according to
this classification or deduction are to be regarded as
representing certain perfections which must be ascribed
to God as the Moral Ideal. From the nature of these
perfections in God man’s duties are to be derived or
deduced ; i.e., the latter are to be defined as being
ontologically implied in these ideal perfections of the
Divine Personality.

Now the conception of God as the Moral Ideal
includes the ascription of certain auspicious qualities
(Kalydna-guna) to the Lord. God as Bhagavdna or
Lord is conceived fis akhila-heya-pratyanika, i.e.., as
actively cancelling or removing all evil and imperfection
of finite Ijeings evtui as light cancels dai’kness. In this
consists the life of God which is a personal life in
incessant and inseparable relation to other persons.
Thus knowledge conceived as absolute knowledge in God
means the active enlightening of his creatures who are
ignorant of their own good and evil (Jndnam ajndndm
cheshtandndm hitdhitanirupanopayogigunatvdt — Lokdchd-
ryya’s “ Tattvatraya ”). Similarly might in the Almighty
consists in enabling creatures in their weakness to eschew
evil and attain the good. (Shakti Ashaktdndm hitahita'
prdptiparihdropayogigunatvdt.) Forgiveness in the Lord is
again for the sdparddha or person guilty of lapse who has
since repented and seen the error of his ways. Compassion

THE ETHICS OF THE HINDUS 28

in the Lord is likewise for suffering creatures, just as
* straightforwardness (drjavam) is for the crooked, gentleness
(mdrdavam) is for the shy and the timid, etc. (Jndnam
ajndndm, shakti ashaktdndm, kshamd sdparddhdndra,
krpd dukhindm, vdtsalyam sadoshdndm, shilam mandd-
ndm, drjavam kutildndm, souhdrdyam dushtahrdaydndm,
mdrdavam vishleshabhirundm.) These are the ideal or
absolute perfections in the Divine Person. The human
virtues are to be conceived after the pattern of their
absolute archetypes. It is these latter that represent the
natural human powers in their ontological nature and
the right use of these powers in man must therefore
consist in exercising them according to their ontological
essence, i.e., as they are exercised by God. For example
absolute knowledge consisting in enlightenment of
ignorance, all human knowledge can have no other end
or goal than the enlightenment of ignorant fellow-
creatures. Similarly, power in the Absolute Person being
only an enablement and furtherance of the weak, human
power can have no other meaning or justification than
putting the weak in the . way of achieving their own
good. Clemency (kshamd) similarly is the proper
attitude towards the morally guilty (sdparddba), tenderness
(vdtsalya) towards the imperfect and deficient (sadosha),
straightforwardness (drjavam) towards the crooked
(kutila), etc. The exercise of these powders, it is to be
noted, implies certain moral conditions in the persons
towards whom they are directed ; e.g.^ repentance in the
moral delinquent is a neces.sary condition for the exercise of
forgiveness, humility in the uncivil (maitda) for the exercise
of civility (shila), etc. It may be further added that in the
Ramanujist view, the success of finite creatures conduces
to the success of God’s purpose and of God himself.

This therefore is an ethico-theological classification
or deduction of the duties as ontologically implied in the

24

S. K. MAITRA

perfections of the Divine Personality. It is distinct
alike from the socio-ethical classification of Manu and
Frasastapada and the ethico-psychological classification
of the Mimdmsakas. Man in this view is the image of
the Divine Person and his highest destiny is to realise
his true being as an image of Grod and as an essential
factor in God’s personal life. The duties of man are thus
the realization of the divine perfections in him, i.e., the
accomplishment of himself in God and of God in himseif.

Considering now these various classifications of the
Duties we find that a special feature of the Hindu
treatment is the recognition of a list of common or
transcommunal duties as distinguished fi’om the commu-
nal duties or the duties of self-culture in the various
stages of life. Hero we have therefore the foundation of
a universal ethics of humanity as the prius of an ethics
of communal good and mere self-culture. The idea of a
common human life as being the basis of communal as
well as individual life, of every co nmunity beipg itself a
differentiation of Universal Humanity, is the reason
which underlies this conception of the common or
universal obligations as distiiiguislmd from the obligations
to one’s community. The latter arise from Pitrrna or
Kularna, i.e., from our indebtedness to the socio-plasm
from which we have emerged into being. The former
arise from rshirna, i.p., from our debt to humanity, i.e.,
to the larger experience of the race whereby we profit
in the struggle for life. This is a much larger and
therefore more important debt which must not be
ignored in the fulfilment of the narrower obligations to
oneself or to one’s community. This is however not
itself everything : it constitutes only the general frame-
work which must be concretely filled in by the communal
and individual duties. Through the education of the
Ashrama duties the individual becomes a useful member

THE ETHICS OF THE HINDUS 26

of his society or community and as there is a progressive
' unfolding of the powers of the individual, the code of
self-education also varies in the different stages. This
therefore is not only an abstract ethical scheme* of merely
general duties which apply nou’here because they seem
to apply to every case, but also a plan of the concrete
moral life of specific diities within a framework of
common or universal obligations to humanity. This
tridimensional classification of the Duties thus represents
the attempt at a synthetic scheme of the moral life which
combines in itself the individual-genetic, the communal
and the universal aspects of morality in organic unity.
The distinction between scriptural and secular duties
and between conditional and unconditional ones is also
characteristic of this synthetic spirit of reconciliation of
different aspects. While it represents the attempt at a
reconciliation of the ethical life proper with the stand-
point of ceremonial morality and formalism, it also seeks
to combine ethical cousequentialism with ethical disinter-
estedness in a complete scheme of conditional as well as
unconditional morality. Recognising the value of
ethical purism on the one side in its code of unconditional
duties, it also seeks to provide through the conditional
duties a m -ral significance for those interested actions
which lead to fruition without entailing any evil. It
thus embodies in one synthetic scheme the admissibility
of non-moral motivation alongside of the need of disinter-
estedness’. (It must be remembered however that Hindu
morality primarily aimed at self-autonomy. Even the
communal duties have in fact this end of self-autonomy
in view : they are debts to the community by the dis-
charge of which the individual gradually qualides for
freedom and self-sufficiency.)

PART II.

Thk Subjective or Psychological Ethics
OP THE Hindus.

The Objective Ethics of the mediation of external
duties constitutes the foundation or groundwork on
which is raised the Subjective, Psychological Hindu Ethics
of chittasuddhi or purification of the mind. The latter
is a neces.sary supplement to Objective Ethics as being
the treatment of the moral life from the internal stand-
point of the spirit as a free moral agent. A free spirit
is moralised only through his freedom and not by
compulsion or external conformity. The inwardisation
or subjective realisation of the external moral content
is thus a necessary sequel to the objective morality of
the duties. We shall therefore consider now the
Psychological Ethics of the Hindus as the explication
of the conditions and principles of self-purification.
Our exposition will comprise:

I. The Analysis of Volition.

II. 'I'he Analysis of Conscience.

III. The Analysis and Classification of the Springs
of Action.

IV. The Classification of the Virtues.

We shall consider each of those topics in a separate
chapter and we shall consider the general trend of
Psyohologit al Hindu Ethics on the basis of their treat-
ment of these topics in a chapter of concluding remarks.

CHAPTER I.

The Analysis or Volition in Hindu liiiiics.

The analysis of prabrtti or volition constitutes the
psychological basis of Hindu Ethics. Of particular
ethical slijiiificance in the analysis is the interpretation
of^ the psychological motive with reference to considera-
tions or absence of considerations of utility or advantage.
The distinction between voluntary and non-voluntary
actions is also ethically significant : it raises the vexed
question about the moral significance of unintentional
and accidental actions. Lastly, the analysis of the
consciousness of freedom in willing furnishes the psycho-
logical basis of the ethical treatment of responsibility and
obligation.

The psychological analysis of the will, is a spechd
feature of the Nyaya-vaisheshika systems of Hindu
philosophy. The subject is treated not only by Prasasta-
pada in his commentary on the Vaisheshika Philosophy, but
also by Vishvandtha and the Neo-Naiydyikas. Prasasta-
pada’s treatment is confined merely to a presentation
of the essential differences between voluntary and non-
voluntary action. The Neo-Naiydyika treatment however
goes far beyond Prasastapada in its analysis. It not
only distinguishes between volition proper and actions
which are automatic and retlex but also enters into the
most acute analysis of the motive from the utilitarian
and non-utilitarian standpoints. In the following exposi-
tion we shall first consider the distinction between
Voluntary and Non-voluntary Action from the standpoint
of Prasastapada and of the Neo-Naiydyikas. We shall
next consider Vishvaudtha’s analysis of volition in the
Siddhdntamuktdvali along with the notes, the explana-
tions and comments of the “ Dinakari ’’ thereon.

'28

S. K. MAITRA

I. Voluntary and other forms of Activity.

The easeiitial dilfereuce between volition or ethical
action proper and non-moral or automatic action
was noticed by the Hindus as early as the time of
Frasastapdda.

Vrmastapada' s distinction between Volition proper
and the Automatic Activities of the organism.

Thus in the Guinigrantha of his commentary on the
Vaisheshika Sutras Prasastapada classifies prayatna or
conation into —

(1) Jivanapurvaka, i.e., having the life of the
organism as its cause or antecedent condition, and

(2) Ichchhadveshapurvaka, i.e., having ichchhd desire
and dvesha, aversion as the cause.

Hence Jivanapurvakaprayatna designates the organic
activities proper, i.e., the reflex and automatic activities
of the organism, while Ichchhddveshapurvakaprayatna
represents voluntary action or action with conscious
foresight and choice. It is pohited out that each of
these kinds of activity has its proper effects. Thus the
organic activities serve certain specific ends (kam
arthakriyam karoti), i.e., the ends of the organism.
Similarly voluntary action serves a definite purpose,
viz., selection of the good (hitapnlti) and rejection of
the evil (ahitaparihara) besides shariravidhdrana or
maintenance of the erect posture of the body.

It is to be seen that in the above analysis of conation
organic activities are not only attributed to the life of
the organism as their antecedent condition or cause but
are also regarded as subserving the ends of the organic
life. This teleological conception of activity is extended
also to voluntary action where the purpose or end is
regarded as being consciously aimed at and chosen. The
ascription of shariravidharana to voluntary effort becomes
significant when, viewed in the light of this essential

THE ETHICS OF THE HINDUS

29

character of volition as conscious aiming and choice, for
the physical straining of innervation represents this
self-conscious direction of the will in its psychophysical
aspect as alertness of the body and the mipd as the
necessary pre-requisites of conscious action. This will
be clear when we remember that with the lowering of
consciousness (as in reverie or sleep) there is a corres-
ponding relaxation of attention as well as the bodily
posture.

The “ ]ymaka7’i ” on Ihe Distinction between Voluntai'ij
and Automatic Action.

The “ Dinakari ” (commentary on VishvamUha’s
“ Siddhantamuktavali ” by Mahadeva and his son
Dinakara Bhatta) also distinguishes between volition or
voluntary action and automatic and reflex actioils of
the organism.

Thus Kvti which in the wider sense is identified with
prayatna or conation in general, includes, according to
the “ Dinakari,”

(1) Prabrtti, i.e., volition in the positive sense as
conscious selection of the good,

(2) Nibrtti, i.e., volition in the negative sense as
rejection of the evil, and

(3) Jivanayoniprayatna, i.e., activities arising from
the life of the organism, in other words the automatic
and reflex activities proper. But krti in the narrower
sense stands for prabrtti, volition or voluntary action
including willing in its positive and negative aspects,
i.e., including nibrtti. This excludes Jivanayoniprayatna,
the organic activities, from volition proper : there is no
volition in these organic activities (prduasanchdra)
because they are not svechchhAdhinamatkrtisddhya, i.e.,
cannot be brought to pass by my free will.

It is to be seen that by insisting on Svechchhddinatva
or freedom as a necessary condition of volition the

30

S. K. MAITRA.

Dinakari excludes from volition proper not only the
automatic and reflex activities of organic life but also
all actions under blind impulse. It also follows from
Uinakara’s^ analysis that to constitute volition it is not
suflicient that the action should be determined by con-
scious choice, in volition proper there being not merely
conscious choice but also the consciousness that the
choice has been free (SvcclichliAdhina), i.e., undetermined
by anything except my own will.

II. Analysis of Voiiiion.

In the foregoing we have considered the distinction
between voluntary action and non- voluntary and
automatic actions. In this section we shall consider the
Hindu analysis of volition itself as set forth in the
Siddhantamukt^vali, the Dinakari and other works.

Analysis of Volition in the Skldhdntanmktdoali oj
Vishvandtha :

The Siddhdntamuktdvali of Vishvanatha is of particu-
lar interest in this respect. Its analysis of volition and its
conditions from the Frdbhdkara and the Nyaya stand-
points is remarkable at once for subtlety and acuteness.

(a) The view of Prahhdkara.

The Prdbhdkara view of the will otherwise known as
the Gurumata is set forth in the Siddhdntamuktdvali as
follows :

The consciousness of something to be done (karyata-
jhana) together with the desire for it (chikirsha) as the
auxiliary condition (sahakari) causes volition (prabrtti,
krti). The volition produces the organic reaction (chostd)
which produces kriyd or the act regarded objectively.
Hence the steps are : —

(1) Kdryatdjndna, the consciousness of something to
bo done,

THE ETHICS OF THE HINDirs

31

(2) Chikirsha, the defsire to do it which implies
krtisadhyat^jnana or the consciousness that it can he
done,

(3) Prahrtti, krti, the act of volition,

(4) Chestd, the motor impulse in the organism,

(5) Kriyd, the act regarded objectively.

As regards the nature of karyatdjndna, it is pointed
out that it is not the bare consciousness that something
is to be done but the consciousness of something to be
done as produced by the representation (pratisandhdna)
of the thing as svavisheshana, /.<?., as specifying the self.
This it will be seen implies a distinction between
appropriated and unappropriated ideas it being assumed
that the idea of an act does not of itself stimulate the
will except in so far as the self has ideally appi'opriatcd
or identified itself with the as-yet-unrealised objective
content represented by the act. Hence we may have
what may be called the bare idea of something to be done
and this is incapable of inciting to active decision, but
we may have also the consciousness of the thing to be
done as produced by the representation of its being
appropriated by the self and in this ease there is desire
and choice.

This distinction between the bare idea of an act and
the idea of it as specifying the self and thus inciting
to will is very clearly brought out by Gdgd Bhatta in
the “ Bhdttilchintsiniani.” Gdgd Bhatta distinguishes
two kinds of kdryatajndna. Thus I may have kdryata-
jndna, the idea of a thing to be done simply in the
form of the consciousness that it lies in my power to
accomplish it if I choose. But I may also have
kdryatdjndna in the more peremptory form of the
consciousness that I must do it. The first of these
according to Gdgd Bhatta has reference merely to
the inherent practicableness of the net in question

82

S. K. MAITBA

(padarthanishthdyogyata) and is thus not the determinant
of volition, but the second being itself the effect of the
anticipation which is strengthened by the consciousness
of the good being unassociated with , any serious evil
consequences is the cause of volition through the desire
(which it arouses), and it is this specific form of
consciousness — the form which takes this peremptory
character of must — which is signified by svavishena-
vattapratisandhanajanyakAryatAjndna, i.o., by the cognition
of duty as produced by the representation of the act
as qualifying the self. (Kdryatdjndnain dvividham.
Mayd idam kartum shakytd ityevam rupam ekam.
Mama idam avasbyam kartavyam, ityevam rupam
dvitiyam. Tatra adyam padarthanishtha-yogyatdgamyam
iti naprabrttim prati hetu. Dvitiyam tu sveshtasddha-
natvavalavadauishtdnanuvandhitvajndnajan yam iti

chikirsha dvdrd prabrittim prati hetuh. Idameva
svav ishesha na va t til pra tisa ndhana j a ny at vam . )

It is to be seen that kdryatajndna in the first form as
explained by Gdga Bhatta in the foi’egoing analysis is
only the consciousness that the thing can be done and
is therefore identical with the krtisddbyatajnana which
in the Prdbhdkara analysis is I’egarded as implied in
desire or chikirsha. Hence according to the Frdbhdkaras
kdryatdjndna is always to be taken in the second sense,
*.<?., in the sense of the consciousness that something
must he done, while kdryatdjndna in the first sense as the
bare consciousness that the thing can be done is
nothing but the krtisddhyatdjndna Avhich is an implicate
of chikirsha or desire for the thing. It is to be seen also
that while Gdgd Bliatta will not recognise the bare
consciousness of the act as capable of being accomplished
as a determinant of volition (na prabrttim pratihetu), the
Frdbhdkaras by making it an implicate of desire include
it among the con4itions of willing.

THE ETHICS OP THE HINDUS

33

Some however explain ks1vyat4jnana as the bare
cognition of an act, and tliey interpret krtisadhyatajn<4na
as signifying not only the consciousness of bare subjective
capacity but also the cognition that it is to be done.
According to them, karyatajnana as well as krtisadhya-
t/ijnana in both senses are involved in desire.

The significance for psychology of the distinctions set
forth in the foregoing analyses cannot be too much
emphasized. In the first place the cognition which
constitutes the conscious antecedent of a volitional process
is distinguished from the simple cognition of a fact. It
is the cognition of an act and not of a given matter of
fact, the consciousness of something to he clone and not
of something which simply is. Again within this active
consciousness of an act the distinction is recognised
between the bare consciousness of its practicableness and
the more active consciousness of self-determination with
reference to it, i.e., the consciousness that it is to be
accomplished by me. 'The validity of thes(i distinctions
is obvious enough though they may appear overnice and
scholastic to superficial critics.

(5) The meaning of chikirsha.

K4ryat4jnana, the cognition of duty l(‘ads to prabrtti,
will, through chikirsha, desire which is defined by the
siddhan tamuktdvali as krtisadhyaprakdrikfiki'tisfidhyd-
kriydvishayinichchhji, i.e., as the desire which has the form
(prakavii) of something to he accomplished by the null
or krti — the something to be accomplished being an
act (kriya) which is capable of being accomplished by
the will. Hence chikirsha is the desire to accomplish
an act which is cognised as capable of being accomplished
by the will.

It will be seen that among the conditions of chikirslnl
the Pnlbhdkaras recognise krtisadhyatajnana, i.e., the
5

34

S. K. MAITRA

consciousness that the act is to he, implying also that
it can 1)6 accomplished hy the will, but not ishtasddha*
natfijnana, *.<?., the consciousness that it is conducive to
my good. It is in this respect that the NyAya analysis
differs from that of the Prdbhdkaras, the Naiydyikas
insisting on ishtasadhanatdjnana as being an indispensable
condition of all desire. It is to be noted also that
chikirsha is the ichchha, *.c., the wish to do what I
recognise as krtisadhya, *.<?., as I am to, and therefore as
what is in my power to, do or accomplish. Hence it
is something more than mere krtisMhyatfijndna, i.e.,
something more than the cognition that something
is to he or can be done. The latter is a necessary
condition of chikir.sha but is not itself chikirsha which
is conative and not merely cognitive in nature.

(3) Prabrlli or hfil.

Hence in kvti or volition we have according to the
Prabhdkaras —

(«) Svavisheshanavattdpratisandhana, the representa-
tion of something as svavisheshana, specifying the self.

(A) Karyatdjnana or the cognition of it as something
to be done implying krti-sadliyatdjnana or the cognition
that what is to he done, can be done.

{(i) ChikirshA or the desire that it be done.

It will he seen that the Prabhdkara analysis does not
recognise it to be necessary for volition that the action
should be represented as ishtasadhana, i.e., as conducive
to the good of the agent. In place of ishtasddhanatd,
conduciveness to pleasure, happiness or satisfaction, the
Prdbhdkaras will merely have svavisheshanavattdprati-
sandhdna, i.e., the representation of the act as purusha-
visheshana, specifying the self or appropriated by it. This
implies that the real motive to volition is not anything
external, but the self itself as specified by or identified

35

THE ETHICS OE THE HINDUS

with something to be done. According to the Prdbhdkaras
this holds good not only in the case of the nitya-karmas,
i.e., acts which are always binding (such as ablution, the
daily prayer, etc.) and the naimittika-karnias, i.e., acts
which arc obligatory only when their nimittas or specific
occasions arise (such as river-bath on the occasion of an
eclipse or expiation for one who has sinned), but also
in the case of the kdmyakarmas or acts from sensuous
inclination or material motives of gain. It is to be seen
that the distinction between nitya-naimittika karraas and
kdmyakarmas lies in that the former are non-dependent
on the agent’s subjective desire for pleasure, happiness or
felicity while the latter imply such subjective motive
as their necessary condition. Hence the nitya-naimittika-
karmas may be described as the unconditional duties or
acts non-conditioned by subjective or empirical motives
while the kdmyakarmas may bo designated hypothetical
duties or acts constituting the content of the empirical
will. According to the Prdblidkaras however even in the
sphere of the kdmyaicarmas the real motive is not the
sensuous inclination or desire for the external pleasure,
but the self itself as qualified by or identified with this
desire or inclination. In other words though in empix’ical
willing we have ishtasadhanatd or the material motive of
gain as a necessary condition for the desire or kdmand,
this desire is an incentive only as svavisheshana, i.e., as
specifying the self and appropriated by it. In the case
of the ditya-naimittika or unconditional duties on the
other hand, the acts (ablution, prayer, etc.) as enjoined
by the imperative imply no material prompting or
ishta-sddhanatdjndna and arc motives to will as purely
determining the self without reference to anything
extrinsic to themselves.

It is to be noted that the kdmyakarmas or conditional
duties may be either Vaidika, i.e., of scriptural origin,

3() S. K. MAITRA

or Laukika, i.e., of social origin. The scriptural duties
are adrshtarthaka, i.e., of noti-sensuous or non-empirical
consequence, while the Laukika duties are drshtdrthaka,
i.e., of sensuous or empirical import. Thus there arc
religious sacrifice.s and the like (yagddi) enjoined in
scripture on persons desiring non-natural objects such fus
happiness in heaven, etc. These constitute the kdmya
duties of non-sensuous import. Similarly cooking and
the like (pakadi) are recognised as being required to
ensure specific empirical results. These constitute the
kdmya duties of sensuous import. In either case there
is kdraand or desire for a consequence, i.e., for a con-
sequence other than the act itself, but this desire moves
the will only as svavishoshana, i.e., as specifying the self.
There is thus ishtasddhanatajndna, i.e., an extraneous
purpose in all empirical volition \vhether enjoined by
sci’ipturo or recommended by society, but this extraneous
purpose moves the will by being identified with the self
and appropriated by it for the time being.

The material motive implied in kdmyakarma has a
negative as well as a positive side. Positively it is the
consciousness of the act as being conducive to a specific
good of the agent, but this positive consciousness of a
prospective good is incapable of inciting to will except in
so far as it is unaccompanied by the apprehension of any
serious undesirable consequences spoiling the value of the
anticipated good in question. It is the absence of these
deterrents such as the anticipation of any serious loss or
injury (valavadanishtananuvandhitva) that constitutes
the negative side to the positive consciousness of
ishtasddhauata or material advantage, in the motive in
empirical willing.

If we compare the Prdbhakara with the Nyaya view
we shall find that the essential dillerencc arises from the
Prabhdkara insistence on the element of self-reference

THE ETHICS OF THE HINDUS ‘67

in all motive which the Naiyayika does not consider to be
. necessary. Thus for the Naiyayika what is essential
in the volitional process is ishtasadhauatdjjiana or
consciousness of the object desired as being conducive to
my good, and there need not be any representation of this
as specifying or enriching the self. With the Pnibhakaras
however it is this self-reference that constitutes the
essential part of the motive while the consciousness of
good may or may not be present. As a matter of fact
such consciousness exists only in empirical willing which
implies kilma'hji or desire for pleasure. Even here
however the consciousness of good is a motive only
as purushavisheshaua, i.e., as being referred to and
appropriated by the self. In nityakarma however there
is no material motive involved and the act moves the will
as determining the self, *.<?., in so far as the self

identifies itself with it. The Pnibhakaras contend that what
is anugata, present in « / cases of volition, is kAryatdjndna,
the consciousness of a thing to be done — the consciousness
which is produced by the representation of the act as
specifying the self. Hence this consciousness being
present in all cases, while ishtasadhanatajnana or con-
sciousness of good being sometimes present and sometimes
not, the hypothesis of the former being the true cause
of volition has the merit of simplicity (Idghava) : — evam
cheshtasadliaiiat va-valvad-anisht duanuvandhitva-shu-
chitatkalajivitva-jn Anajanydnam k a r y a td j n a n andm

kdryatdjndnatvena anugatdnam prabrttau hetutvam iti
Idghavam (“ Jihdttachintamani ”).

It will be seen that the Prdbhakara analysis of the
will constitutes a very important and substantial contri-
bution to the ethics of rigorism. While the Kantian
rationalism does not provide us with an adequate
psychological basis of rigorism, the merit of the
Prabhdkaras lies in removing this serious defect by

88

S. K. MAltRA

founding moral theory on the positive basis of our
inherent psychological constitution. Kant no doubt
admits at least one feeling which is not pathological,
viz., love of duty or reverence for the Moral Law, but
he does this at the sacrifice of pure ethical rationalism.
Hut the Prdbhdkaras point out that the element of
self-reference is the only essential part of an act of
will, and the desire for an extraneous end ''as in
kamyakarma or empirical willing) appeals only as
identified with the self and appropriated by it for the
time being. The psychological basis of rigorism has
been developed in this line by Green who holds that
the motive is not the strongest desire but the desire
which the self has identified with itself. While with
Green however the motive as determining the self and
determined by it is always presented as a good, with
Prabhakara and his followers the act is presented as
ishtasadhana, good or advantageous to the self only in
the case of empirical willing or kdmyakarma. In the
case of the nityakarmas or unconditional duties, the agent
is impelled by no such consciousness of anticipated good,
but is prompted to action merely from the sense of
prerand, duty or obligation. Thus while Kant ineonsis-
tently admits a non-rational factor, dz., reverence for
the Moral Law which makes the realisation of the
Law psychologically possible, the Prabhdkaras avoid
such inconsistency by their psychological theory of
volition which they explain independently of feeling
and of the consciousness of good.

The Prdbhdkaras go beyond Kant also in another
important point. With Kant it is the nature of the
Moral Law that procures certainty for the idea of
freedom. The “Ought,” the imperative character or
obligatoriness of the Law establishes the power, the
freedom in the agent to obey it. Hence the idea of

THE ETHICS OF THE HINDUS 89

freedom is implicated in the idea of the Moral Law,
and the reality of freedom follows from the validity of
the latter. With the Prdbhdkaras however krtisddhya-
tdjndna or the consciousness of power is a psychological
implicate in ecery act of will and therefore also in the
desire for duty. The Prdbhdkaras generalise into a
necessary psychological condition of every desire what
Kant would confine to the mere desire for duty, viz.,
krtisddhyatdjndna or the consciousness of freedom.
Hence with the Prdbhdkaras the proof of freedom lies
in the psycfiological conditions of volition — it is
psychological. With Kant freedom is an ethical implicate
of our consciousness of the Mural Law : hence its
reality stands or falls with the ultimate validity of the
consciousness in which it is implied. The proof of
freedom with Kant is therefore ethico-metaphysical and
not psychological. It may he remarked however that
the Prdbhdkaras also give what may be called the
moral proof of freedom as arising from the obligation
implied in the imperative character of the Moral Law,
but they develop this proof in connection with the code
of V^edic injunctions and prohibitions which they regard
as constituting the Moral Law. The Vedic prescriptions
they argue are of an impelling character and this
establishes the power, the freedom in the moral agent
to accomplish them :

Prabartandrupo hi vidhih arthdt samihitasddhanashak-
tim vodhayati (Pdrthasdrathi Mishra’s Shdstradipikd.’*)

J5. The Nydya Vieto,

In the foregoing exposition we have confined ourselves
to the Prdbhdkara analysis of the will as set forth in
the Siddhdntamuktdvali. We shall now deal with the
Nyaya view as presented in the same work — the view
which we may note is also accepted by tbe Bhdttas

40

S. K. MAITRA

and the Shankara-Vedantists as regards the psychology
of volition.

A special merit of the Nysiya analysis lies in tlie
fact that it analyses will not merely in its positive
aspect as chikirsha, desire or attraction for the good
but also in its negative form as dvesha, aversion and
avoidance of the evil. While with the Prdbbakaras
with their doctrine of the pure will and self -reference
the consciousness of good or evil is of no consequence
and therefore the distinction between the two kinds
of will is immaterial, with the Naiyayikas with their
hedonistic theory of the motive this is a very essential
distinction which cannot he psychologically insignificant
as the Prahhakaras hold.

(rt) 'I'he conditions of Chikirsha, Ichchhd or Desire
according to ^ydya

The conditions of chikirsha, ichchlui or desire
according to the Nyaya are : —

KrtisadhyatAjnana or the cognition that something
can be done and Valavadanishtananuvandhishtasadha-
natAjndna, or the cognition that this thing is not only
conducive to my good hut is also incapable of causing
any serious loss or harm outweighing the good to
which it leads.

Hence chikirshfi implies

(1) Krtisadhyatdjnflna or the consciousness of a thing
as capable of being done by me.

(2) Ishtasudhanatajnana, or the cognition that this
thing is my ishtasadhana or conducive to my good.

(3) Valavadanishta - ananuvandhitva - jnana or the
consciousness of this good being unaccompanied by a
stronger evil.

About the exact nature of the third of the above
conditions thei*© has been divergence of views.

THE ETHICS OP THE HINDUS

41

(1) According to VishvanjUha it is not the conscious-
ness of the absence of evil but the absence of the
consciousness of evil. Thus according to Vishvandtha’s
interpretation Valavadanishta-ananuvandhitva-jndna is
something negative and means anishtajanakatva-jndnd-
bhdva, i.e., the absence of the knowledge of its being
anishtajanaka or productive of evil.

(2) Others hold however that Valavadanishta-ananu-
vandhitva as a condition of volition cannot be something
negative. To say that it is the mere ahseme of the
consciousness of evil is to make it psychologically un-
intelligible as a condition of willing. The absence of the
deterrent can be psychologically operant only as the
positive consciousness of absence. Hence it is Valavad-
anishta-ajanakatva-jnana, i.e., the positive cognition of
its being unpi’oductive of a valavat or deterrent evil.

Vishvandtha however rejects this latter interpretation.
His objection to this view is that if desire (chikirshd)
follows immediately without vilamva or interval where
there is consciousness of good (ishtasddbanatdjndna)
together with the absence of the deterring consciousness
of evil (valavadanishta-janakatva-jnandbhava), then an
intervening consciousness of the absence (anishta-
ajanaktva-jndna) is not necessary.

The question raised here is : What is the precise
significance of the absence of deterring motives which is
said to be presupposed in every act of volition ? Some
hold that as a psychological determinant of volition it
must be* of the nature of a positive consciousness of the
absence of a stronger evil. This however raises the
difficult question about the nature of this consciousness
of absence as distinguished from the simple absence of
the consciousness of evil. Moreover Yishvandtha’s appeal
is to the actual experience of men which certainly
supports his contention that in a great many cases at

6

43

S. K. MAITRA

least there is nothing of this positive consciousness
of absence though there is volition. Vishvandtha’s
contention seems therefore to be that an absence of the
consciousness of deterrents, or, if this is unintelligible as
a psychological condition, an indefinite subconscious sense
of the absence, suffices for volition, though also in special
oases it may become a positive consciousness of the
absence.

In this connection there is also an interesting
discusssion as to the nature of the pratibandhaka or
deterrent. The question is raised whether the deterrent
is to be conceived as the cognition that a certain thing is
injurious or productive of undesirable consequences
(dvishtasddhanatajndna), or whether it is to be conceived
as the feeling of aversion or dvesha which arises from
this cognition of injury or harm. Some hold that mere
cognition is sufficient Avhile others contend the cognition
must produce the feeling of aversion before it can act
as a deterrent. It will be seen that the dispute is about
the significance which is to be attached to our emotional
and instinctive life in the causation of volitional process.
Those who consider the bare cognition to be sufficient
are accused of underrating the affective and emotional
life while over-estimating the importance of thought.
As against these it is contended by others that the idea
itself cannot move the will except as infiuencing feeling.
The far-reaching import of this psychological controversy
will be obvious if we remember that it is on similar issues
with regard to the emotional life that the philosophy of
life has opposed itself at the present day to the abstract
intellectualisn of Hegelians.

(i) The conditions of Dvesha, Aversion.

Just as in the case of Ghikirsha or Desire there is
not only a positive but also a negative side consisting

TiJE ETHICS OE THE HINDUS 43

respectively of the consciousness of a good and the
absence of the consciousness of a stronger evil, so also
in the case of A. version or Dvesha there are the corres-
ponding positive and negative factors. Thus Aversion
implies as a positive condition the consciousness of evil
or harm and as a negative condition the alisenee of the
consciousness of a greater good. Thus dvishtasddhanata-
jnana* or the cognition of a thing being conducive to
injury or harm together with valavadishtasddhnnatd-
jnanabhdva or the absence of the consciousness of a
compensating good produces dvesha or aversion to an
object. It is significant that in this case there is no
mention of krtisddhyatajndna or the consciousness of
power as a condition.

VV^th reference to the precise nature of th(!
negative —

(1) While Vishvanatha holds fhat it is merely the
absence of the consciousness of a compensating good
(valavadishtasddhanatdjnandbhdva).

(2) Others contend that a mere absence is psycho-
logically unintelligible and that there is here a positive
consciousness of the absence of good and not merely
the absence of the consciousness of good.

The question of the pratibandhaka or deterrent to
aversion is also discussed in this connection. It is
pointed out that the absence (abhdva) of the consciousness
of a compensating good being the negative condition
of aversion, a positive cognition of such good will
act as a deterrent. Others however hold that such
cognition by itself is not sufftcient ; the cognition
of good must lead to desire (ichchhd) in order to
counteract the aversion, it being assumed that a feeling
is overcome only by the opposite feeling and not by
mere idea.

44.

S. K. MAITRA

(o) The Gonditioiis of Volition (Prabftti, kj-ti)
according to Vishvandtha.

After discussing the conditions of Desire (and Aversion)
VishvandtHa next considers the Conditions of volition
(Prabrtti). Prabrtti or volition in the positive sense
implies, according to Vishvandtha,

(1) Chikirshd, desire to do something.

(2) Krtisddhyatdjndna, the cognition that it.*can be
done.

(3) Ishtasddhanatdjndna, the cognition that it is
conducive to my good with valavadanishta-anuvandhitva-
jndndbhdva or the absence of the cognition of a
stronger evil.

(4) Updddnapratyaksha, the perception of the updddna,
matter or stuff out of which the thing is to be produced.

It is pointed out that since every one of these is a
condition of volition, therefore any one being absent,
volition will not follow. Hence

(1) Where krtisddhyatdjndna or the confidence in
one’s power is lacking, there is no volition. This is
why there is no willing of impossible things such as
producing rain (vrshtikarana) or bringing the moon
down to make it serve the purpose of a lamp (chandra-
mandaldnayana). There is no volition for such things
for they are recognised to be beyond the agent’s power.
While however the consciousness of power is thus a
necessary condition of willing, this consciousness must
exist at the time of the loilling or there will be no
volition. Thus the krtisddhyatdjndna, or consciousness
of power, must be taddnimkrtisddhyatdjndna, must exist
at the occasion of the willing : there will be no volition
if this consciousness is lacking at the time of willing
though it may exist before or after it. This is why
the sexually immature boy does not care for^ the future
pleasuree of youth: bhdvi yauvardjye bdlasya na

45

THE ETHICS OP THE HINDUS

prabrtti. The boy is lacking in the capacity of indulging
4 . in these pleasures though he may acquire it in a
maturer age. Hence it is that as a boy he does not
care for what as a young man he will desire (Afterwards.
This it will be seen implies that our powers and capacities
unfold themselves in a certain order, which appear
not all at once but each in its proper time and
circums'tances, and as our freedom is itself dependent
on the exercise of these powers and capacities it is also
a thing that grows with ourselves and expands and
deepens with the broadening and deepening of our lives.

(2) Similarly where ishtasadhanatdjndna or the
consciousness of good is lacking, there is no volition.
How, then, are we to account for acts of self-injury
such as suicide ? What is the motive to suicide ?
What can be the consciousness of good in these acts
of self-destruction ? The answer is, even in these there
is ishtasMhanatdjndna or consciousness of good, for
what happens in such circumstances is this. On account
of abnormal mental conditions there is lapse of judgment
for the time being and the individual resolves on
taking poison under the erroneous consciousness that
suicide is not a great evil : roga-dushitachittah vishadi-
bhakshand pravartate taddnim-valavadanishtananuvan-
dhitvajndnat. According to another view the abnormal
conditions induce the act of suicide not through any
positive consciousness of the act being not an evil but
only through the absence of the consciousness of its
being an evil, i.e., by suppressing the consciousness of
evil which Avould be present in normal conditions—
rogadushita-chittah vishddibhakshane pravarte taddnim-
valavadanishtanuvandhitvdjndndt.

The difference between the two interpretations centres
round the way in which the deterring motives are to
be conceived as being suspended. While some recognise

S. K. MAITRA

u

a mere negative operation in the nature of a temporary
suspension of the counteracting considerations as being
sufficient, others think that there is a positive judgment
that such considerations are unavailing. It will be
seen that in the actual conditions of life the negative
as well as the positive forms operate. Thus in the
case of ordinary suicides it is the negative form that
generally suffices, there being in these cases nothing
but a temporary suppression of the deterring motives.
But in the case of martyrs and suicides who act from
deliberation or morbid self-consciousness it is the positive
form that holds good.

(3) While there is thus consciousness of good
(including the absence of the deterring motives) in all
volition it is also necessary that the anticipated good
(ishtasddhanata) must be tadanim-ishta-sadhanata, i.e.,
must be relative to the time and circumstances. Thus
what is good in one condition of life may not be a good
in another condition and thus may cease to be desired
in the altered conditions. This is why the meal which is
greedily desired by the hungry man only disgusts him
after appeasement : tripto bhojanc na pravartatc. The
reason is that the condition of the desire, viz., hunger
having ceased in the changed circumstances, the meal
(bhojana) is no longer felt as a good.

N.B . — It follows from the above that good and evil
as depending on subjective conditions like attraction
(rdga) and aversion (dvesha) in the individual, must
always be relative and conditional. But this contradicts
the Nydya doctrine of an absolute and unconditioned
good as being the highest end. The Naiydyika solves
the difficulty by conceiving the highest good not as
positive happiness but as the absolute cessation of
suffering. According to him the highest good conceived
negatively “ as absolute freedom from suffering does

THE ETHICS OF THE HINDUS

47

not imply either rdga, attraction, or dvesha, aversion,
in the agent, for this negative state being not positively
favourable (anukula) but merely not unfavourable
(apratikula) cannot inspire any pathological feeling
such as raga, attraction in the agent in order to be
desired.

(4) If there is thus consciousness of good in all cases,
the question rises, how is moral evil possible ? The
essence of moral evil lies in the conscious choice of the
evil course in preference to the good. How then is
such deliberate choice of the evil possible which
constitutes sin ? As a matter of fact we find that crimes
are perpetrated by believers (dstikas) who believe in
hell as well as by persons who know the penalty they
have to pay. Thus men often yield to temptation such
as forbidden sexual indulgence (agamyagamana), the
destruction of the enemy (shatrubadha) even though
they are fully alive to the penalty attached. How is
all this possible if consciousness of good is a necessary
condition of volition in all cases ?

The answer is : under the influence of strong passion
there is a temporary suspension of the consciousness of
the penalty. Thus the seductions of the pleasure some-
times succeed in driving out the consciousness of punish-
ment in hell and volition takes place as a consequence
in spite of the presence of the counteracting motives as
a rule. (Utkatardgddind narakasddhanatddhitirodhandt.)

(d) The Vieio of the Nabyde.

Amongst the Nabyds or New Naiydyikas there are
followers of Prabhdkara as well as of orthodox Nydya.
The New Naiytlyikas who hold the Prdbhdkara view
demur to the old Naiydyikas as regards their views as
to the conditions of prabrtti or volition. According to the

48

S. K. MAITRA

orthodox Nydya view the conditions which are required
for volition are valvadanishtdnanubandhishtasddhanatve
satikrtisddhyatdjnana, i.e., krtisddhyatdjndna or confidence
in one’s power or capacity and ishtasddhanatdjnana or the
consciousness of the agent’s good together with valavada*
nishtdnanuhandliitvajndna or the absence of the deterring
motives of evil. The Nabyds however point out that
the confidence in one’s power is not always a condition
of volition. As there cannot be an original consciousness
of competency in regard to future acts which have
never been willed before, the individual would never
will them if the sense of competency were a necessary
condition of all volition. The truth is that these acts
are in the first instance an imitation of what has been
observed to bo done by other persons. Hence it is only
in the later and more developed stage of self-conscious
willing that the consciousness of power can enter as a
determining factor of the volitional process. The old
Naiyayikas however argue : there can be no question of
imitation in such acts. As a matter of fact there is
imitation neither in new constructions (prompted by con-
structive imagination) nor in the spontaneous unfolding
of the life of instinct such as sex-gratification.

N.B . — It is to be seen however that the real point
at issue is whether the sense of competency is to be
included among the conditions of volition. The instances
of instinctive, spontaneous or impulsive actions which
the old school cites against the new views may disprove
the theory of imitation but do not establish the
traditional view as regards consciousness of competency
being required as a necessary condition. As a matter
of fact there is some confusion here which obscures
the real issue as neither imitative, nor spontaneous and
instinctive acts come strictly within the class of volitional
actions which they are supposed to illustrate.

THE ETHICS OF THE HINDUS

49

(e) Comments of the “ DinahaH^'

The “ Dinakari ” makes some very interesting
comments on the Nydya view as expounded in the
Siddhdntarauktdvali. Thus :

(1) With regard to the condition of desire (ichchhd)
it points out that this may exist svarupatah, i.e., on
its own account, without being known or consciously
referred to the self. This means that volition need not
be self-conscious though of course a conscious desire for
some good must be present. It is the presence of such
a desire that distinguishes volition proper (prabrtti,
prayatna) from automatic, reflex or instinctive acts
(jivanayoniprayatna) in which there is no conscious
desire. But this merely means that the desire involves
the consciousness of the future good towards which it
strives and not that there is also a consciousness of
the desire itself or of the self as so desiring. Ishta-
sddhanatdjndn^ ichchh^-svarupatath visheshanam, tena
ichchhdjndnashunyakdleapi chikirshd nirvdhah.

N.B . — It follows from the above that according to
the Nydya view conation includes

(a) Automatic, reflex and instinctive activities which
are characterised by the absence of conscious desire, and
(&) Volition proper involving conscious desire for a
future good.

The latter again is —

(1) Either simple volition as implying nothing more
than the effort to realise a future good aimed at,

(*i) Or self-conscious willing implying not merely
the conscious desire for a future good but also a con-
sciousness of this desire or of the self as so desiring.

The distinction between volition and self-conscious
volition is possible only in the Nydya view according to
which self-reference is not a necessary condition of the

7

50

S. K. MAITRA

volitional process. For the Prdbhdkaras however as
all desire must specify the self in order to move the will,
volition is necessarily self-conscious in all cases.

(2) Again as regards Aversion (Dvesha) the “Dinakari”
points out that this may be either direct or transferred.
It is direct in regard to pain (duhkha) while in regard
to all that is a cause of pain (duhkhasddhana) the
aversion is indirect, derived or transferred. Even the
natural fear of a snake (sarpa) is in this sense transferred
or derived.

(3) As the presence of a strong aversion (valavad-
dvesha) stands in the way of volition, the question rises :
how is the absence of the deterrent to be conceived in
order to be regarded as a condition of volition ? The
view of Vishvandtha is ; the consciousness of a preponde-
rating evil (valavaddvishtasddhanatdjndna) being the
deterrent, the absence of such consciousness is a condition
(hetu) of volition. But this raises the question as to
what constitutes the counteracting or deterring force
of the deterrent and several other questions. («) Thus
we have first to ascertain what comtitutes the deterring
strength {valvattm) of the aversion. According to Nydya
this is not a question of the sheer intensity of the pain
involved. As a matter of fact the agent is not deterred
or moved to act by mere consideration of the greatness
or smallness of the pain involved. Considerations of
vahutara or alpataraduhkha, i.e., of quantitative diffe-
rences in the pain, do not decide the question here,
even an intense pain sometimes proving unavailing
while even a comparatively feeble one being observed to
be effectual. This shows that the deterrent force of
the pain is a peculiar quality which is nut easy to
describe. Kvaohit vahutarasya duhkhasya avalavattvdt,
kvaohit alpasya duhkhasya valavattvdt, anugatasya
vallavattvasya avalavattvasya durvachattvdt. According

Tills ETHICS OF THE HINDUS

51

to Nyaya this deterrent force of the aversion (dvesha)
is a specific quality independent of quantity, aversion
(dvesha) in certain forms and certain occasions being
deterrent, i.e., falling within the class (jd>ti) qf feelings
characterised by the mark of being deterrents — dvesh4-
valavattvam jdtivisheshah.

The ordinary Nyaya view of a valavadanishta or
deterrent evil is as follows : — A deterrent evil (anishta)
is that anishta or evil which is other than whatever is
entailed as a necessary accompaniment or consequence
of the act in the interval before fruition : valavadanishtd-
nanubandhitvam cluiishtotpattinantariyakaduhkhddhika*
duhkha-aianakatvam . Ish topattinAntaviyakaduhkhadhika
duhkha-ajanakatvasya, valavadanishtanauuvandhitvasya
vidhyarashasydkshateli (Vijnanabhikshu’s “ Sankhyapra*
vachanabhAshya)”. If therefore there be any pain arising
from the act even after the realisation of the end, such
pain will act as a'deterrent. It may be noted that the
pain which is entailed by the act before fruition, either
as an accompaniment or as a consequence of it, may or
may not deter. The pain however which comes after
fruition is * always a deterrent, the idea being that the
presence of pain at this stage is the negation of the
fruition which is the real incentive to the act. Some
point out however that the absence of pain which is
other than what is involved as a necessary accompani*
ment or consequence of the process leading to fruition
cannot be a condition of volition as this will imply that
there is always nintariyakaduhkha or intervening pain
accompanying the process of realisation of the end.
As a matter of fact there are also sukhamdtrajanaka*
karmas or acts which produce pleasure only without
causing pain and such acts do not imply the absence of
pain other than that involved in the intervening process
as a condition, there being no intervening pain at all

S. K. MaITRA

M

in such acts. The Nyaya meets this objection however
by showing that pain cannot be altogether got rid of in
any case as it will always be present at least in the form
of the effort or exertion (shrama) which must be put
forth by the agent in realising his end.

The above is the ordinary Nydya view of the deterrent
as being the pain which is apprehended as likely to
come after fruition. Vdchaspatimishra however inter-
prets the deterrent to mean narakaduhkha, the fear of
punishment in hell or theological penalty. He thus
imports psycho-ethical considerations to explain the
psychological process of arrested will in the presence
of the object of desire. In this respect the ordinary
Nydya view as being a purely psychological explanation
is not only deeper in its analysis but also profoundly
original there being nothing corresponding to it even
in modern Western psychology. The Chdrvdkas no doubt
offer also an explanation on a purely psychological basis,
but they emphasize only the quantitative differences
of pleasures and pains as the determining factors in
selection and rejection. Thus according to them there
is selection when there is a balance of pleasure over
pain as contrarywise there is rejection when the amount
of pain exceeds that of pleasure. The Naiydyika however
points out that quantitative differences are not always
effectual in determining the result, but there is one
factor which is always potent as a deterrent to volition,
viz.i the existence of pain after fruition. Hence the
pleasure which is to be potent as a motive must always
come at the end of the process, just as the pain which
comes after the pleasure of fruition must always act
as a deterrent. There is, in other words, a certain order
in time in which the pains and pleasures must follow
one another in order to move the agent to act, an order
which may^be said to be a specific quality in pleasures

53

THE ETHICS OP THE HINDUS

and pains like Mill’s quality which decides the question
of their strength as motives and deterrents. It will
be seen that this is an entirely new element or factor
which is not included in the Benthamite calculus
according to which distance and proximity in time affect
only through variations of the intensity or quantity of
pleasures and pains and not through their order in time
in the process leading to fruition.

(ii) Secondly the question rises : what is it that acts
as a deterrent ? Is it the subjective aversion of the
agent, or the object which inspires the subjective
feeling ? The Dinakari observes : it is not the object of
aversion (dvishta or anishtavishaya) but the feeling of
aversion in the subject that acts as the deterrent in
volition. Here is therefore a question of subjective
value, the dete^’ring strength of the feeling being
relative to the person, the time and other circumstances.
Tattatkdlinatatpurushiyechchham prati prabrttim prati
cha tatkdlinatatpurushiyavalvaddvishta-jnakatva-jndnasya
pratibandhakatvara kalpyate. Thus naraka, suffering in
hell, is a deterrent evil f'valavaddvishta) to Ghaitra and
he abstains from sinful self-indulgence as a consequence,
but as such suffering has no influence as a deterrent on
Maitra he does not abstain from such self-indulgence.

{in) The force of the deterrent may also be overcome
in another way. Thus one and the same act may be
capable of producing intense pleasure (utkatasukhaja-
uaka) and intense pain (utkataduhkhajanaka) at the same
time. Here neither desire (ichchhd) nor aversion
(dvesha) will be produced. But there may also be
competition between the two states of desire (ichchhd)
and aversion (dvesha) resulting in an oscillation between
the two antagonistic conative attitudes which may
culminate at last in volition when the aversion (dvesha)
has been overcome or has subsided.

54

S. K. MAITRA

Volition may therefore be suspended in two ways :
(1) when the desire has arisen but does not culminate
in actual willing, being counteracted by a deterrent
aversion, .(2) when the desire as well as the aversion are
unproduced as a consequence of the act being cognised
to result in intense pleasure and intense pain at the
same time. In the latter case the pleasure being exactly
balanced by the pain, the corresponding impulses do
not arise being neutralised at the very beginning. But
under certain circumstances there may be a state of
oscillation instead of complete suspension or abeyance
which may be said to constitute the uon'intellectual
basis of the intellectual process of deliberation. This
state will cease when the indecision at last terminates
into actual willing by the aversion being overcome or
subdued or when it has otherwise subsided of itself.

As there are two forms of arrested volition, there
are also two ways in which the force of the deterrent
may be counteracted. Thus the deterrent may be simply
unproduced beinff completely neutralised by an equally
strong impulse to act generated by the consciousness
of intense pleasure, as in states of complete suspension
of conation. But the deterrent may also be overcome
by the consciousness of pleasure after a state of
oscillation between desire and aversion as in the case of
final resolution of indecision and wavering into actual
willing.

(iv) It should also be noted that consciousness of
impending evil is a deterrent only in the sense that
the agent is practically certain about the conse*quences
of the action he contemplates. In cases however where
the consequences are uncertain and problematic and
the apprehension of evil is merely speculative, desire
and volition are not necessarily counteracted. Thus men
are not prevented from risking the dangers of costly and

THE ETHICS OF THE HINDUS

55

wasteful wars merely by the speculative apprehension of
* possible evil consequences to themselves. Yuddhddau
valavadanishtasadhanatva-sandeheapi ichchhdprabrttyoh
udaydt.

Note . — Hence with regard to tlie deterrent it is to be
observed that it is always a feeling of aversion arising
from the conscious apprehension of evil and not the
simple cognition of an object of aversion. Secondly, the
evil apprehended is some painful experience which is
cognised as marring the fruition aimed at by the act of
volition either through theological penalty believed to be
associated with the action or by entailing suffering on the
agent after fruition and thus negating the fruition.
Thirdly the force of the deterrent is relative to the person,
the time and the circumstances, so that what is sufficient
to deter one person, or under one kind of circumstances
may not deter another, or in a different set of conditions.
Fourthly, the deterrent implies some degree of certainty
about the evil consequences on the agent. For example,
where the possibility of evil is a matter of mere speculation
the deterrent is not necessarily effectual. Fifthly, the
deterrent may also fail either by being simply unproduced
as when the feeling of aversion is neutralised by an
equally strong feeling of attraction the result being the
complete suppression of conation, or by the attraction of
pleasure at last overcoming the aversion and resolving
itself into action after a temporary state of oscillation.

(4) It is to be seen from the above that volition
includes positive as well as negative conditions which
again imply intellectual as well as conative and affective
factors. The question thus arises : how are these intellec-
tual and non-intellectual factors to be conceived in
relation to the positive and negative conditions of
volition ? The Dinakari discusses five different alterna-
tives in this connection.

56

S. K. MAITIIA

(/) Thus it may be supposed that the conditions
wliich suffice to induce volition are cognition of the
absence of any deterring evil consequences (valavadanish-
tdnanuvandhitvajndna) phts cognition of the action being
conducive to the agent’s good (ishtasddhanatdjnana) plus
resulting desire, etc. It will be seen the emphasis here
is on a positive cognition of the absence of the deterrent,
i.e., the negative condition of the absence of deterrent
motives is conceived as a positive consciousness of
security.

{it) It may be supposed that the deterrent is itself a
cognition, being the consciousness of the act as entailing
serious evil consequences on the agent. Therefore the
absence of such cognition, being the absence of the
deterrent or pratibandhaka, is the real ground (hetu)
of the volition. The negative condition is therefore
conceived here negatively as valavadanishtiinuvandhi*
tvajndndbhdva, i.e., absence of the cognition of serious
evil consequences, in response to the logical demand for
parsimony of hypothesis and the inadmissibility of
unnecessary and superfluous assumptions. It is assumed
that volition being psychologically possible even without
a positive cognition of the absence of the consciousness
of a deterrent in many cases, a positive cognition is not a
real determining factor even where it may be felt to be
present.

{iii) In the above the deterrent is conceived as a
simple cognition of possible evil consequences on the
agent. It may be supposed however that the deterrent,
pratibandhaka, is not mere valavadanishtajanakatvajndna,
i.e., not the simple cognition of the act as entailing serious
evil consequences, but dveshavishishtasya valavadanishta*
janakatvajndna, i.e., the cognition of the act as a source
of «vil by an ag(mt who entertains a feeling of aversion
for it. In other words, the deterrent, pratibandhaka, is

Tit 15 ETHICS OF THE HINDUS

57

not a simple cognition but a compound made up of the
•two components of the feeling of aversion (dvesha) and
the cognition of evil (anisktajndua). Hence mere
aversion is ineffectual just as mere cognition of’ the evil.
(a) Thus suppose there is aversion (dvesha) without any
jndna, cognition of the evil. Such aversion is powerless
as a pratibandhaka or deterrent, i.e., there may be volition
inspite of such groundless aversion. (b) Similarly
suppose there is cognition of evil but no avei'sion, i.e.,
suppose the cognition (jnana) exists without the feeling
of aversion (dvesha) which it should ordinarily produce.
Such cognition is also ineffectual as a deterrent, i.e., there
may be volition inspite of such cognition of the evils
associated with it. (c) Again, suppose there is not only
the cognition but also the feeling of aversion. Here we
have everything that is necessary to constitute the
deterrent or pratibandhaka, and the presence of the
deterrent renders volition impossible, (d) Lastly, suppose
both the cognition and the feeling are absent. Here the
factors of the deterrent being all absent, the negative
conditions are ful tilled. Hence where the positive con-
ditions are also absent, volition follows without fail.
Thus while in the case of (a) and (b) volition may or may
not take place, in the case of (c) it is impossible as in that
of (d) it is inevitable.

— It will be seen that (a) and (6) illustrate the
conflict between the intellectual and uon*intellectual
factors of the mind from two opposite points of view.
This conflict is writ large on modern life where intellect
and instinct are struggling simultaneously for victory,
(a) illustrates the impotence of mere feeling which inspite
of heredity and transmission has often to give way to the
light of knowledge. This is how race-prejudice and
race-habit yield gradually to enlightenment and higher
moral outlook, (b) illustrates the tragedy of the

8

58 S. K. MAITRA

overdeveloped intellect “sicklied o’er with the pale
cast of thought,” of the intellect which grows at the
expense of the other factors and thus cannot translate
itself into the life of feeling and willing.

(iv) In (iii) above we have discussed the alternative
which conceives the deterrent as a compound in which
the feeling of aversion as well as the cognition of evil
enter as essential components. There is a fourth alter-
native which remains to be considered, viz., that which
conceives the deterrent as consisting essentially in a
feeling of aversion, a feeling however which is itself
induced hy the cognition of the evil consequences on the
agent that may he entailed by tbe action contemplated.
In this view' it will be seen a causal relation is assumed
between the cognition and the feeling, the latter being
regarded as an effect of the former. It is not clearly
shown how'ever ■whether the cognitive element continues
in the effect, or ceases wdth the appearance of the
feeling. If the first of these is meant we have only, it
will be seen, another variety of {Hi), the deterrent being
conceived as a compound of components which are
causally related to each other. It will also be noted
that in this view in cither of its two forms w'e have an
analysis of volition from the intellectualist standpoint
which ascribes primacy to the cognitive factors and does
not admit irrational feeling to have any influence over
conscious choice and will. It however follows from
this view that cognition is also ineffectual without
feeling, though it may have primacy as the causally
determining factor and therefore priority over the other
factors of the mind. 'Thus according to it there may
he cognition of evil (dvishta-sddhanatdjnana) but it
will not of itself prevent willing till there is feeling of
aversion produced by such cognition. This is illustrated
in the case of suicides. Thus when a suicide resolves on

THE ETHICS OE THE HINDOS 59

self-destruction by means of poisoning (vishabbaksbana)
,it cannot be supposed that he has no idea of the evil
consequences on himself of the act of taking poison
which he resolves upon. What therefore happens is
that the cognition of the evil consequences fails to
produce the feeling of aversion which it will in ordinary
circumstances. A.8 a result of this his cognition has no
influence on his decision and fails to act as a deterrent
to the action.

Note — we have thus three difl'erent explanations of
suicide, etc.,

(1) We may explain such acts as being due to the
cognition of their evil consequences being overpowered
for the time being.

(2) We may suppose also that the agent under
the influence of strong feeling and abnormal mental
conditions has a i^ositive consciousness or conviction that
the acts will not entail serious evil consequences on
himself as ordinarily believed.

(3) Lastly we may suppose that the agent has cognition
of the evil consequences but the cognition fails to
produce the feeling of aversion (dvesha) which alone
can act as a deterrent.

(4-) Dinakara however does not accept any of the
four alternatives discussed above. According to him the
deterrent is neither the mere cognition of evil nor the
simple feeling of aversion, but is either of these according
to special circumstances. Hence in some cases the
cognition is sufficient and in some again the feeling
of aversion is required. But as primacy belongs to
cognition as the causally determining factor, the absence
of the deterrent as the negative condition of volition
does not mean the mere absence of the affective factor
of aversion but also the absence of the cause of the
aversion, viz., the cognition of evil. Hence the negative

60

S. K. MAITRA

condition of volition is always the cognition of the
absence of evil consequences (ananuvandhitvajndna).
and not the mere absence of the Dvesha or aversion.
It follows therefore that the absence of aversion
(dveshdbhAva) without cognition of the absence of evil
consequences will not suffice to cause volition even
when the other conditions remain.

The five alternatives explained above represent the
various ways in which volition can be regarded from
the positive and negative standpoints. The implied
hypotheses in the five alternatives are all tested by
application to certain specific cases and the appeal is to
the solemn testimony of a person who is asked to report
what passes in his mind, i.e., other people’s introspection
is used as objective material. It will be seen that the
entire analysis is based primarily on the Nydya conception
of volition. The Nydya recognises in all volition con-
sciousness of some good to be attained which in its
negative aspect means the absence of serious evil
consequences marring the worth or value of the good
aimed at. The Prdbhdkaras however -do not recognise
any consciousness of good as being necessarily implicated
in volition. Therefore the analysis of volition from the
Prdbhdkara standpoint must differ essentially from that
of the Nydya which conceives willing as a pursuit of
some good desired or aimed at. The Dinakari therefore
next analyses the Prdbhdkara conception of volition
discussing its bearings and implications particularly with
reference to the question of freedom of will.

(6) In all volition according to Prdbhdkaras the
psychological process is as follows :

(») In the first place, there is Svavisheshanavattdprati-
sandhdna, i.e., the representation of a certain vishesliana
or specific determination of the acting agent or pravarta-
mdna puri:^a.

THE ETHICS OP THE HINDUS 61

{ii) Secondly, there is kdryatdjnd^na or cognition of
something to he done.

{Hi) Thirdly, there is chikirshd, or desire which is a
desire for things capable of being realised by the
will — a desire which is itself chaiactejised by the
fionsoiousness of power or competency with reference
to the object to be realised or acliieved by the will
(krtisddhyatvaprakdrikakrtisddhyakriydvishayinich cH h d).
Hence the desire is not merely about objects that are
capable of realisation by the will but also implies
subjective consciousness of such capacity or competency
on the part of the acting agent.

(iv) Lastly, there is volHion, prabrtti following on the
desire — volition which completes the process.

It will be seen the above analysis agrees with the
Nyaya only in the last two steps. The first two
however show an essential departure from the Nydya
view according to which the steps are : —

(1) Cognition of kdryatd or duty with reference to
something which is recognised as conducive to good
without entailing serious evil consequences — valavada-
nishtdnanu vandbish tasddhanatdvishayakakdryatjij ndna.

(2) Chikirsha, desire.

(3) Prabrtti, will.

Hence according to Nydya, the consciousness of good
with its negative implicate is necessarily involved in
all volition, but according to the Prdbhdkaras, this is
not a' necessary condition of volition which requires
only the representation of something as a specific
determinant of the self but not necessarily the conscious-
ness of good. Thus the consciousness of good is present
only in some actions, i.e., in kdmyakarma or empirical
actions from material motives of personal profit or
gain. It is not present however in the performance of
the unconditional duties (the nityanaimittikakarraas).

63

S. K. MAITRA

This shows that volition is possible without the conscious-
ness of good, that the latter, where present, is only
an inessential accompaniment rather than a necessary
determining condition of the process of willing. In
fact the so-called consciousness of good in empirical
prudential actions is not itself the real determinant of
the process of willing — it determines will only as being a
mode or modalisation of the representation of the act as
svavisheshana, i.e., as specifying the self. It is thus
the representation of the act as appropriated by the
.self which is the real cause of volition, and in empirical
action it further presents itself as conducive to the
well-being of the agent.

But this is not the only point in respect of which
the Frdbhdkaras differ from the Naiydyikas. They also
differ materially from the latter in their conception of
the relation between the first and the second step in
the process. Thus according to the Prdbhdkaras the
relation between the first and the second step is that
of establisher and established, i.e,, the representation of
the act as a visheshana or specific determinant of the
self is the catiae wdiich produces or generates the
kdryatdjndna, i.e.^ the consciousness that it is to be done.
The Naiydyika however does not recognise any causal
relation between the consciousness of good and the
cognition that it is to be done, the relation according
to the Naiydyika being a bare relation of the sameness
of object, the vishaya, i.e,, the object of the consciousness
of good, being also the vishaya, the object of the consci-
ousness of duty with reference to it. In other words,
according to the Naiydyika there are not here two
psychoses one conditioning the other but only one
psychic compound with the two aspects of consciousness
of good and the cognition of duty with reference
to it.

THE ETHICS OF THE HINDUS

63

N.J3 . — It is to bo noted however that with the
Naiydyika also nothing is ishta, desirable or good except
in relation to a subject. It is the subject of volition
that determines his own values and therefore there is
no question of mere mechanical determination as may
appear at first view. In fact, the Naiydyika differs
far less in this respect from the Prdbhdkaras than do
the Ghdrvdkas who believe only in mechanical attraction
and repulsion of pleasure-pain. The Chdrvdka view
in this respect may be described as mechanical hedonism
as distinguished from the self-deterministic hedonism
of Nydya which ascribes valuation to subjective freedom.
The only important difference between the Prdbhdkaras
and the Naiydyikas in this respect relates to the fact that
while the latter conceive this subjective determination
as a consciousness of good in all volition, the Prdbhdkaras
do not admit that this is always the case, volition
being possible according to them without the act of
self-determination taking the form of a specific conscious-
ness of good. What is essential, according to the
Prdbhdkaras, is subjective self-determination with
reference to the act which appeals as good only in
kdmyakarnias or empirical actions from material motives
but which apears as Duty pure and simple in regard to
the Nityanaimittika karmas i.e., the non-empirical and
unconditional obligations of the individual.

Hence the essential difference between the Nydya
and the Prdbhdkara views consists first in the importance
which Nydya attaches to the consciousness of good and
secondly with reference to the relation between the
self-reference of the act and the consciousness of duty
with reference to it. For the Prdbhdkaras the latter
relation, as we have seen, is a niydmaka relation, i.e.,
of establisher and established, the svavisheshanajndna,
the cognition of the act as a specific determinant of the

64

S. K. MAITRA

self being the ground or cause of the Mryatdjnana,
the cognition that it is to be done. In fact, according to
the Frdbhdkaras, the cognition of duty follows from
the representation of self -reference as consequence from
ground or helu, as conclusion from premise (Tasya
svavisbeshanapratisandhdnasya kdryatdjndnahetutd linga-
jndnavidhayd). Hence for the Prdbhdkaras we have
here two distinct psychoses, one leading on to the other.
Eor the Naiydyikas however, the two cognitions, viz.,
the cognition of good (ishtasddhanatdjndna) and the
cognition of duty (kdryatdjndna) are held together in
a complex, the object (vishaya) of the two cognitions
being the same. In other words, according to Nydya,
that which is cognised as ishtasddhana or good is also
cognised as kdrya, the thing to be done, so that the
link between the two steps, viz., the purely cognitive
(the consciousness of ishta or good) and the cognitive-
conative (the cognition of duty with reference to it)
is the simple one of community of vishaya or object,
that which is the object of the value or ishtasddhanatd-
cognition being also the object of the duty or kdryatd-
cognition. Hence for the Nydya, though analysis reveals
a distinction of aspects, yet there is only one psychosis
with a dual nature — a cognitive and a conative one.
For the Prdbhdkaras however there are here not two
aspects of a single psychosis, but two psychoses, the
link between them being that of establisher and
established. As we have already noted, the Prdbhdkaras
regard this relation as that of ground (hetu) and
grounded, or premise and conclusion and they actually
elaborate this into the form of an inference (anumdna)
both in regard to kdmyakarmas or ordinary prudential
and empirical actions as well as nityanaimittikakarmas
or unconditional and non-empirioal duties.

THE ETHICS OF THE HINDUS

65

1. Let US first consider the ease of ordinary empirical
actions from material motives. Let us consider, for
example, the act of cooking one’s meal (PAkah) which
is an empirical action (kAmyakarma) implying desire
(kAmanA) for some good to be attained. For the
PrAbhAkaras such an act involves inference amongst the
psychological antecedents or conditions which determine
it. The inference involved is this :

The act of cooking is to bo accomplished by my will
or ki’ti — pakah matkytisAdhyah (Conclusion).

Tnasmuchas

While the act is conducive to my good (madishta-
sAdhaua), it is at the same time incapable of being
accomplished except through my volition : matkrtimvinA
asattvd sati madishtasAdhanatvAt (Ground).

The ground of the inference, it will be seen, is a
specific determination of the self, i.e.^ the determination
of it by the act of cooking, Avhicb, in this case, takes
the form of conduoiveness to the agent’s well-being,
cooking being an ordinary kAmya or empirical action.
It is this subjective appropriation of the act which
presents itself as conducive to the agent’s good that acts
as the ground or reason of the subjective cognition that
it is to be done or accomplished by my Mill. It is this
latter cognition which is thus determined or produced
by the subjective appropriation of the act that leads to
chikirshA or desire and finally to krti or will. It is to be
seen that the act is self-appropriated not merely as
being conducive to the agent’s good but also as one
which is incapable of being realised except through
the agent’s will. This latter qualification is added to
exclude performances beyond the agent’s power such
as vrshti or production of a rainfall and also similar
results compassed by the volition of other persons such
.9

S. K. MAITRA

as parak;tap<ika or cooking done by others. In neither
of these cases is there subjective self-appropriation
though there is the consciousness of good, in the case
of rain-fall ^ because of the consciousness of impotency
or helplessness and in the case of cooking by other
persons because of the absence of the necessity of
exerting oneself for the result which is being realised
without the agent requiring to will it. It is also to
be noted that the qualihcatioa of madishtasddhanatva or
conduciveness to one’s own good is negatively significant
as excluding shrama, i.e., the fatigue of the muscles,
etc., involved in the act of cooking. These are not
subjectively appropriated as objects of volition or
things to be accomplished by one’s krti or will even
though they are incapable of being accomplished except
through one’s own volition. The reason is that they
lack the quality of being conducive to the agent’s
good — a quality which distinguishes the act of cooking
and thereby makes it to be subjectively appropriated.

Some point out that there is here neither inference
as the Prabhdkaras suppose nor any compounded
consciousness of duty and good as the Naiydyikas hold.
Thus there is no compounding of the consciousness of
duty (kiiryatd) and conduciveness to good (ishtasddhanatd)
into a unitary complex experience through the unity
of the vishaya or object as the Naiyayikas suppose nor
are there two psychoses, one establishing the other, as
the Prdbhdkaras think. The Pravartaka or motive here is
a simple psychosis which involves neither any inference
nor any duality of nature, there being nothing more
in it than the simple cognition that something is to be
accomplished by my will. It is this Ki tisddhyatdjndna
or cognition of something to be accomplished as svech-
chhddhina, i.e., as dependent on my pleasure or freedom
which is the essential condition of volition. The motive

THE ETHICS OF THE HINDUS

67

is thus the consciousness of soraethinq to be accomplished
by the agent’s free will and is neither an efEect of
subjective self-appropriation as the Prdbhdkaras contend
nor a component in a psychological compound as the
Naiydyikas urge. It is dependent on the iigent’s
svechchhd or undetermined will and is thus neither an
effect of self-determination through self -appropriation
of the act as a vishesbana or qualification of the self
nor an implicate or moment in the consciousness of ishta
or good. In other words, the motive is the cognition
that something is to be done by me by my free will
and this is independent alike of hedonistic considerations
of good or advantage to self and of any representation
of the act as purushavisheshana or qualification of the
self. It is purely svechchhddhina, *.<?., does not depend
on any other condition than the agent’s free and
undetermined will so that it is a mistake to try to deduce
or infer it or further analyse it into simpler components.
Motivation, in other words, means the indetermination
of the agent expressing itself in the determination to
accomplish a particular action — his absolute indetermi-
natioD, liberum arbitrmm, or liberty of indifference, as
expressing itself in the cognition that something is to
be accomplished by his will as freely willed. Hence
there is here not merely the cognition that something
is to be willed or accomplished but also that this
willing is itself freely willed, is dependent only on
the agent’s pleasure. There is thus a will to will, «.<?.,
pure will in which the agent expresses his freedom of
indetermination by willing, signifying his assent
to, the accomplishment of the act by his will. The bare
consciousness that something is to be accomplished by
my will does not therefore suffice to constitute the motive,
there being also involved the fact that the accom-
plishment of the act as thus intellectually determined

6s

S. K. MAI^RA

is itself freely willed, i.e., is non>dependient on or
undetermined by anything else than the freedom of the
agent or .subject. We may compare this with the
pure will as conceived by Augustine — the will to will
which he assumes even in cognition as the will to know,
i.e., as the spontaneity of attention which is not resolvable
into interest, intensity of stimulus or any other natural
condition. It is however not to be conceived as blind
spontaneity in so far as it involves the definite cognition
that something to be accomplished by the will is freely
willed.

The PrAbh^karas however urge that this indeterminism
is itself a moment in their doctrine of self -determinism.
They admit that the will to accomplish is itself freely
willed, i.e., depends on the agent’s undetermined freedom,
but they hold that this undetermined freedom is itself
determined or established by a process of mediation
through self-reference. Thus according to them also the
cognition of duty implies svechchhddhinakrtisAdhyatd-
jndna, i.e., the cognition of the will to will, but they
contend that this freely willed will is itself established
by a process of mediation through self-appropriation
or self-reference. In other words, there is inference
involved in the process of motivation even though the
motive is svechchhddhinakrtisAdhyatAjnAna, i.e., cognition
of duty as freely willed. This cognition of freely willed
duty is itself the sAdhya, the object established so that
the anumAna, the inference is a process of self-mediation
through which freedom, instead of being arbitrarily
posited, posits, establishes itself through itself, in this
inferential form. Thus the inference is as follows : —

Conclusion.

The act of cooking is to be accomplished by my free
wiUr‘^r,^pAkaik^veehchhAdhina-matk|*tisAdhyah),

tHE ETHICS O]^ TkE HINDUS 69

. Ground

Inasmuchas

It is incapable of being accomplished excepf through
my will — (svechchhAdhinamatkrtimvind asattv6 sati)

And is at the same time characterised by conducive*
ness to my good (madishtasddhanatvdt)

Hence the process is one in which freedom mediates
itself through itself, freedom being involved in the
ground (hetu) and involved in the established consequence
or conclusion (sddhya). Freedom thus establishes itself
through itself there being indetermination alike in the
will which is cognised to be indispensable for the
accomplishment of the act and in the will to accomplish
it which follows as a consequence from this cognition.
But this self-mediation of freedom is not pure indeter-
mination but self-determination in so far as it implies an
act of self-reference or self-appropriation in the form
of representation of the act as a specific determination
(visheshana) of the self. Thus the process according to
the Prdbhdkaras is as follows : —

(1) There is svavisheshanavattapratisandhdna or repre-
sentation of something as svavisheshana or qualification
of the self.

(2) This something which is represented as a quali-
fication of the self is also cognised as incapable of being
accomplished except through my free will.

(3) This couscious self -appropriation of what is thus
cognised as depending on my free will leads to the
cognition that it is to be accomplished by my free will.

II. We have so far considered the nature of the
any mdna or inference involved in the case of an
empirical action (kdmyakarma) such as cooking the meal.
We shall now consider it in the case of the nitya or
unconditional duties such as sandhyd or the cMly prayer.

70 S. K. MAiTEA

We have seen that in empirical actions the conscious-
ness of duty (krtisddhyatdjndna) implies the consciousness ‘
of good (ishtasAdhanata) as a condition. But the
latter prdduces the former only as a purushavisheshana
or specific qualification of the self. Hence it is

this self-qualification or representation of the act as
specifying the self which is the essential condition of the
consciousness of duty, though in empirical actions such
self-qualification takes place in connection with the
consciousness of an anticipated good. In the case of
the unconditional or nitya duty however the self-quali-
fication is not mediated through any such hedonistic
calculations of advantage or profit to self so that the
consciousness of duty or karyatdjnana follows immediately
on the consciousness of it, the bare cognition of the
injunction necessarily inducing the representation of it
as a self-qualification or purushavisheshana. Hence the
inferential process which establishes the kdryatdjnana
or cognition of duty with reference to it is independent
of any reference to any extraneous end such as is
involved in an ordinary empirical action. Thus the
inference involved in the case of a nitya or uncon-
ditional duty such as the daily prayer (sandhyd) is as
follows : —

Conolmion.

I am now to (or under obligation to) offer my daily
prayer — aham idanintanakrtisddhyasandhydvandanah.

Oroutid.

Because belonging to the twice-born caste, I am
qualified by the enjoined ablutions, etc., of morning
and evening — dvjidtitv4 sati vihita sandhyd kalina shau-
chdcUmattvill; ..

THE ETHICS OP THE HINDUS

71

Hence the steps in the inference are
, (1) Vidhi, prerand or command embodied in the

scriptural imperative as revealing (jndpaka) the enjoined
ablutions and the like (vihitashauchddi). *

(2) The representation of these enjoined ablutions,
etc., of scripture as a qualification (visheshana) of
the self — the representation which arises from the
consciousness of the injunctions revealed.

(3) Krtisddhyatdjndna or the cognition that the
duties enjoined are to be accomplished by me, a cognition
which results from the consciousness of the duties as
qualifying or specifying the self.

In otlier words, the scriptural Imperative or Vidhi
reveals the particular acts (ablutions, etc.,) as obligatory
on the agent in consequence of which they are subjec-
tively appropriated by the individual as determinations
(visheshanas) of the self and this self-determination
or self-qualification leads to the cognition that they are
to be accomplished by the agent’s will.

It is to be noted that the command in this particular
instance is relative to a particular time, i.e., to the
sensible present (iddnintana) as experienced by the
individual. Hence th(i resulting cognition of duty or
krtisddhyatdjndna is also relative to this particular
time, i.e., the cognition that it is to be accomplished
is not a purely general consciousness that it is to be
done at any time according to convenience but a specific
cognition* that it is to bo accomplished now, i.e., within
the felt present as exptjrienced by the agent through
his mental continuum which is in time.

Against this view of the Prdbhdkaras the Naiydyikas
urge : how can time be a qualification of the purusha
or individual (kdlasya katham purushavisheshanatvam) ?
One may concede ablutions (shaucha), etc., as qualifying
the individual (purushavisheshana) though their effects

n

S. K. MAITBA

of cleanliness and the like, but it is difficult to conceive
how the appointed time, viz.^ the sensible present
(iddnintana) can also similarly qualify the individual.

The Prdbbdkaras answer : purusha’s jivana, i.e.^ the
mental continuum of the individual is in time and
the individual is related to time through his mental
continuum.. (1) svavrittijivanavattvasambandhena tasya
(kalasya) purushavisheshanatvdt, (2) vihitkdlajivitv&dervd.
In other words, in the case of unconditional duties such
as the morning or evening prayers, what qualify the
individual are not merely the enjoined ablutions, etc.
(shauchddi), but also the appointed time (vihitakdla), or
rather the ablutions, etc., and purusha’s experience as
enduring in the lime appointed (vihitakdiajivitva).
Thus though time considered objectively may not be
a qualification of the individual, it certainly determines
the individual in so far as the latter endures in time.
The individual as enduring in time is thus related to
order in time and his experience as enduring in the
appointed time (vihitakdla) is also an experience of
the time in which it endures. In this way he becomes
conscious of the appointed time through being qualified
by it through his life*continuum which endures in
time. His life-continuum as enduring in time thus
constitutes the sensory basis of localisation in a time-scale
and order.

Another objection which is raised in regard to the
Prdbhdkara inference is : how can the act (ablutions,
etc.) which is objective can be purushavisheshanavat,
i.e., become determined as a visheshana or qualification
of the individual (purusha) ? How is it possible, in
other words, for an objective act to appropriate to itself
the character or form of being a subjective determination
or qualification of the individual ? The Naiydyika
here objects: the acts (empirical such as cooking or

THE ETHICS OP THE HINDUS U

tton-empirioal such as prayer) may possess ishtas&dha-
• natva or conduciyeness to the agent’s well-being as a
mark from which one may infer that they are
krtisddhya or to be accomplished by oneself, but they can
in nowise be qualifications of the self (svayisheshanavat).
Some acts may be specially fitted to produce certain
results there being yogyata or suitability in certain
acts for certain results. In this sense we may speak
of an inherent ishtasddhanatd in certain acts, i.e., an
inherent capacity to produce certain desired results.
Thus we may speak of an inherent conduciveness to
desired results or good in the acts of cooking, rituals
and sacrifice, and the like — ^an ishtasddhanatva or
conduciyeness to good being ydgapdkanishtba, qualifying
or being inherent in, y^ga (religious sacrifice) and
pdka (cooking). It is however absurd to conceive of
these objective acts as thereby becoming purusha-
vishesanavat, i.e., becoming determined as qualifications of
the individual or appropriating to themselves the charac-
ter of being subjective determinations of the agent.

It may be argued, what qualifies the individual is
not the act as such which is objective but the ichchhd
or desire which is induced by the act. This desire is
certainly a qualification of the self even if the mere
act is not, and it is this desire as qualifying the self
that serves as the mark (linga) from which results or
follows the cognition that it is to be done. The Nydya
objection to this is : there is no vydpti or invariable
connection between ichchhd, desire and ydgddikriyd
or particular acts such as rituals and sacrifice. Hence
we cannot suppose that these acts will necessarily
induce desire or ichchhd in the agent. Moreover even
though there were invariable connection between such
acts and the desire to accomplish them so that the
desire might be treated as a mark or sign of the acts,

10

74

S. K. MAITRA

yet such desire may be mere blind impulse and thus
would not account for the element of cognition (jndna)
in the cognition of duty (kdryatdjndna) which is supposed
to result " from it. In other words, there is neither
any necessary connection between the acts objectively
considered and any conative impulse in the individual
nor any proof that such impulse, even if there be any
such necessary connection, is an intelligent impulse or
desire implying the cognition that it is to be accomplished
by the agent’s will.

In reply to all this the Prdbhdkaras point out : when
we say that the act to be accomplished is svavisheshanavat,
i.e.f determined as a visheshana or qualification of the
self, all that we mean is that there is either a cognition o,;
the qualification (tajjndna, visheshanajndna) or a cognition
of relationship with the qualification (tatsambandhajiiana,
visheshanasambandhajnana). In other words, self-quali-
fication means either the cognition of the act as a quali-
fication of the self or the cognition of it as being connected
with such a qualification. There is nothing objectionable
or paradoxical in this as the Naiydyikas themselves
conceive of the Vishaya or object as qualifying the subject
in one or other of these senses. Thus they speak of
kdmyasddhanata or conduciveness to the agent’s desire,
in the vishaya or external object. Here therefore they
admit something in the object which has a subjective
signification or meaning. How is this subjective significa-
tion in the object to be conceived ? How are we to
conceive of the object as being characterised by con-
duciveness to the subject’s desire or want ? It must be
by conceiving the kdmandvishaya or object of desire as
being determined or conditioned either by a cognition of
the want or desire (kdmandjndna) or by a cognition of
intimate connection with the want or desire (kdmandsam-
bandhajndna^. Aa the Naiydyikas thus admit a subjective

76

THE ETHICS OF THE HINDUS

determination in the desired object in the form either of
•a cognition of the desire as constituting it or a cognition
of essential relationship with the desire, so likewise do
we, the Prd>bhd.karas, conceive of the objectiVe acts as
becoming determined as qualilications of the self through
the cognition either of these qualifications or of relation-
ship with these qualifications as conditioning the acts.
In fact, it is hardly consistent for a Naiydyvka to quarrel
with a Prdbhdkara on a point like this. Both accept
self-determinism and therefore for both alike the Purusha
or individual is himself the conditioning or determining
factor in volition. The only difference arises from the
way in which the Naiydyika would conceive the form of
this self-determination which according to him is always
a form of hedonistic valuation —i.e., a form in which the
act is cognised as conducive to the agent’s good. But
even for the Naiydyika the acts themselves (cooking, etc.)
considered objectively are external goods being suited for
certain, results and without any effect on the agent’s
consciousness till they are subjectively self-determined as
worth striving for or deserving conscious realisation by
will. They are not antarbhuta, internalised, internally or
subjectively appropriated, till there is this subjective
valuation and selection, i.e., subjective self-determination
with reference to them. The self thus must determine
its own values for itself even according to the Naiydyika
and it is through the sambandhajndna, cognition of rela-
tionship with itself, that it thus determines the merely
external good or object as a good for itself. Vastutah
tadvattdjndnam tatsambandhajndnam tajjndnameva va na
tu pakshoapi tatrdntarbhuta iti kdmyasddhanatd-jndnasyapi

kdmandsambandhajndndtmakataydkdmandjndndtraakatayd

vd anupapatyabhdvdt.

Hence the essential difference between the Prdbhdkaras
and the Naiydyikas is not in regard to the question of

78

S. K. MAITRA

self -reference and self-determination so much as in regard
to the form of this self -reference vrhich with the Naiydyika
is always a form of hedonistic valuation. Eurther accord-
ing to the Naiydyika as ichchhd desire may exist
svarnpatahy i.e., as mere conscious desire without being
seif -conscious or involving consciousness of the self as
desiring, the sambandhajndna or cognition of relationship
through which the external good is subjectively appro-
priated is the self’s cognition of the odjeot as good and not
necessarily a distinct consciousness of the self whose good
it is. In other words according to Nydya the object may
be self-appropriated as good to itself without any distinct
consciousness of the self to which it is cognised as a good,
such self-consciousness being distinct only in special
cases and being ordinarily at the background. For the
Frdbhdkaras however there is no self-appropriation without
definite self-reference and thus all desire is self-conscious
involving a clear consciousness not merely of the act
to be accomplished but also of the self as qualified by
the act.

6. In the previous section we have considered the
various conceptions of the relation of kAryatujndna or
cognition of dut)? to the other conditions of volition.
Thus far we have considered three different forms of this
relation — ^the Nydya and the Frdbhdkara forms as well
as a form of indeterminism which differs from both.

(1) According to the Nydya form, the cognition of
duty (kdryatdjndna) is a component in a psychological
compound involving the cognition of good (ishtasddha-
natdjndna) as its other constituent.

(2) According to the Frdbhdkaras — the cognition of
duty is a distinct psychosis which is eatahliahed or
produced by the representation of the act as specifying
the self. Hence there is inference involved in the
process of ^ivipg at the cognition of duty, this cognition

THE ETHICS OP THE HINDUS 7t

following as a consequence from the representation of
> the act as self>appropriated.

(3) According to others however, there is neither a
psychological compound nor any inference* involved.
The cognition of duty is simply the cognition that it
is to be accomplished by my will as depending on my
svechchhd or freedom. Svechchhd-dhina<krtisddhyatd-
jndnameva kdrj'atdjndnam. This is indeterminism, the
will through which the act is cognised to be accom-
plished being also cognised as undetermined, or as
depending purely on the agent’s freedom.

Some however consider this indetermination to be
itself mediated. Thus they put this indeterminism in
the form of an inference or anumdna as follows : —

(4) 'l ake the act of cooking (pdka) for instance. The
inference may be stated thus : —

Conclusion. — The act of cooking is to be accomplished
by my free will — pdkah svechchhddhina-matkrtisddhyah.

Ground. — Because being distinct from mere exertion
or effort such as the exercise of the muscles it is at
the same time incapable of being accomplished except
through my free will — shramddibhinnatvd sati svechchhd-
dhinamatkrtim vind asattvdt.

Or again thus : —

- Conclusian. — The act of cooking is to be accomplished
by my free will — pdkah svechchhddhina-matkrtisddhyah.

Because being distinct from exertion as
such it is at the same time that which is non-existent
in the absence of my willing it — shramadibhinnatvd sati
matkrtivyatirekaprayuktavyatirekapratiyogitvdt.

Here there is no svavisheshanavattva or self-reference
as a condition. Hence it is indeterminism rather than
self-determinism, though it is not unmediated indeter-
minism as in the third form explained above, but a
species of self-mediated indeterminism in which freedom

78

S. K. MAITRA

realises itself through itself m mctio as it were indepen-
dently of any specific determination by the self. Thus
the act of cooking is asat, unreal or non-existent but
possible and the step here is. from possibility to
actualisation, the transformation being accomplished by
the will as dependent on the agent’s freedom (svechchhd-
dhinamatkrti). There is no self-appi’opriation of the act
either through any hedonistic calculations of advantage
or profit or through any pure representation of it as
a self-qualification. Hence sheer exertion (shrama) has
to be excluded to limit the sphere of the choice; the
value-cognition (ishtasadhanat4jnana) being omitted from
the conditions of the willing, the sphere of volition has
to be definitely limited so as to exclude all mere shrama
or exertion — willing for the sake of the effort of willing.
The willing must have an object other than itself, ie.,
must be defined by being limited to something objective
and external to itself.

The Frdbhdkaras and the Naiydyikas both reject this
form. According to them there must be either cognition
of self-reference (svavisheshanajn^na) or cognition of good
(ishtasddhanatajnana) in the motive. An action which
is neither cognised as good or advantageous nor repre-
sented as a self-qualification, can have no impelling
force. In fact, the above process is a pseudoprocess
simulating a ground or reason where there is none. Thus
my ungrounded freedom (svechchha) becomes the hetu,
ground or reason, of the act being willed. But how can
the groundless be itself a ground ? As a matter of fact
there is here a specific ground surreptitiously introduced
behind an appearance of indetermination or ground-
lessness. For the ground (hetu) which is svechchhd-
dhina matkrti, i.e., my will as purely dependent on my
wish or pleasure, contains ichchha, wish, as an element.
There is thi^^ antecedent ichchhd, wish, or will, in

THE ETHICS OP THE HIND US

79

the hetu or ground. How is this wish or will to be
• understood ? It may be a desire for pleasure (sukha)
or for absence of pain (duhkhdbhdva) or may be
pure desire implying nothing but self-reference or
svavislieshana. Thus in any case we cannot avoid either
self-reference (svavisheshanatdjnana) or the cognition
of good (ishtasddhanatdjndna).

(5) There is yet another form in which the relation
of krtisadhyatdjnana or cognition of duty is conceived
with reference to the otlier conditions of volition — a form
which Gdgd Bhatta notices in the “ Bhdttachintdmani.”
In this form krtisddhyatajndna or cognition of duty
is conceived to produce prabrtti, volition, by being
subject to ishtasddhanatdjndna or cognition of good.
In other words, tlie relation of the duty-cognition
(krtisddhyatd) to the value-cognition (ishtasddhanatd)
is not merely that of community of vishaya, object,
the act which is the object or vishaya of the one being
also the object of the other as conceived in the
ordinary Nydya analysis. There is besides a relation of
dependence or subordination —a relation which makes the
cognition of duty dependent on or subject to the cognition
of the value. This is thus a compromise between the
Prdbhdkara and Nydya views recognising as it does a
relation of dependence without admitting any inferential
process or any absolute independence or distinctness of
psychoses. (Keebittu iddnintanamatkrtisddhyatdjndnam
hetuh, tat eba iddnintanamadishtasddhanatdjndnddhinam
iti tadabhdvdt na prabrttih itydhuh).

The objection to such a view is : even in the absence
of the volition that should follow as an effect, there
may be such cognition of subjective capacity or
competency in the form : if it be willed by me the
desired result will surely be realised. In other words,
such cognition of subjective competency being present

80

S. K. MAITRA

and yet volition being non-existent, the former cannot
be the ground of volition. Tadanukulakrtyabhdv^ api
yadi mayd kriyate tadd idam bhavishyati iti etddrisha-
krtisddhya’tdjndnasya taddnimapi sattvAt. “ (BhA^chin-
tamani).” (It is to be noted however that in this
objection krtisAdhyatAjoAna is not interpreted as the
cognition that the act is to be accomplished but merely
as the cognition that it is capable of being accomplished
if I will it. The force of the objection being derived
entirely from this interpretation, it is hardly a valid
one as it can be easily perceived that the propounders
of the view understood krtisAdhyatAjnAna only in the
first sense).

Note on hhta in lahtaaddhanatd.

What is it that constitutes the desired object (ishta)
an object of desire ? What is it that constitutes its
worth or value as an object of desire ? What is the
good the cognition of which is a condition or cause
of desire ? We have already discussed the question
partially in course of the previous exposition. We shall
now conclude by comparing the GhArvAka and the
NyAya views on this question of the nature of the
good. We omit the PrAbhAkaras for the obvious reason
that the good is not, according to them, one of the
essentials of the volitional process.

Por the ChArvAkas the good is either sukha or
duhkhAbhAva. By sukha the ChArvAkas mean empirical
pleasure, particularly the pleasure of the senses and
the body. They believe neither in spiritual, non-sensuous
pleasure nor in any Transcendental Bliss or Ananda
such as the YedAntists conceive. Similarly duhkhAbhAva
signifies for the ChArvAkas freedom from bodily suffering.
Of course the ChArvAkas do not believe in the possilnlity
of in life. Pleasures are mixed up

THE ETHICS OF THE HINDUS

81

with pain, but this does not make them worthless. On
the contrary pleasures are to be sought as being the
only possible good in life and the highest good consists
in the enjoyment of the maximum of pleasure with
the suffering of a minimum of unavoidable pain. The
highest good consists thus in a maximum of pleasure
with a minimum of pain and all relative good consists
in a balance of pleasure over pain just as all relative
evil consists in opposite. Hence for the Ghdrvdkas
all actions are empirical being the resultant of the
two forces of attraction of pleasure and repulsion
of pain and the highest good does not differ in kind
or quality but only in degree from relative and empirical
good.

According to the Naiydyikas however there is a
difference in kind or quality between empirical actions
prompted by attraction (rdga) and aversion (dvesha)
and the non-empirical impulse towards the highest good
which is moksha or the Freedom of the I;ife Absolute
and Transcendental. Thus in empirical actions the
object of volition is either sukhaprdpti, attainment of
happiness, or duhkhaparihara, the avoidance of suffering.
Hence such actions depend on or presuppose the
attraction of pleasure (rdga) and the repulsion of pain
(dvesha). Thus they are not jree action in the true
sense of the term being under the sway of the two
forces of attraction and aversion and thus cannot ensure
the condition of Absolute Freedom of the Moksha
State which is the highest good. As a matter of fact
happiness cannot be the highest good because it is
always mixed up with pain. Nor can the avoidance
of pain under the influence of dvesha, aversion or
repulsion be such a good, because aversion itself being
of the nature of pain, or unhappiness, there can never
be absolute and complete cessation of pain under its

11

S. K. MAITRA

SS

uiflaeiiype. ^Furiher i£ a man were to be aotuated by
jpaloulations of eternal happiness (nityasukha), he would
nerer attain the Freedom of the Moksha state-^his
7ery motive to realise it for the sake of the possible
bappiness will be a source of bondage, for attraction
(rdga) is the prius in consciousness of the state of
bondage. It is true that dvesha, aversion, as motive
to mukti or liberation, will equally bind (dveshasya
bandhana samdjndndt), but duhkhadvesha, aversion to
suffering, is not a necessary condition for duhkhaparihdra
or realisation of freedom from suffering. Such dvesha
or aversion is the determining condition of empirical
actions which seek relative and not absolute freedom from
pain, but it has nothing to do with the Transcendental
Impulse towards absolute and complete freedom from
suffering. Such impulse does not imply aversion (dvesha)
which is itself a form of suffering, nor does it imply
rdga, attraction, inasmuch as the absolute freedom from
suffering which it aims at is not anything positive so
as to be anukula or positively favourable to the self.
In fact this absolute freedom can be conceived only
as apratikula or not unfavourable and therefore cannot
either attract or repel as do ordinary empirical objects
of desire. It follows therefore that there are two kinds
of objects of desire or ishta : (1) those that are relative
and empirical implying attraction (rdga) and aversion
(dvesha) in the agent, (2) that which is absolute and
non*empirical and the desire for which is pure and not
pathological. It is to be seen also that the relative
goods fall into the two classes of (1) positive empirical
pleasure which is relative and (2) relative and partial
cesacUion of pain.

4b regards these empirical pleasures it may be noted
that they a^ recognised to differ not merely in degree
but tlsQ^-^ind. Thus Qangesh as well as Mathui^ndtha

88

tHE ETHICS OF THE HINDUS

(author of "Mdthuri”) both refer to vaijdtya,
specific differences of quality, in the different kinds of
svargasukha, happiness in heaven, promised as the
reward of different religious sacrifices or yajnas, the
alternative supposition being that these sukhas, amounts
of happiness, differ from one another not qualitatively,
but quantitatively, either in respect of duration or of
number (samkhyd).

CHAPTER II.

tHB ANALYSIS OP CONSCIENCE OR CONSCIOUSNESS

OP DUTY.

In the previous chapter we have considered the
psychological basis of Hindu Ethics, viz., the analysis
of prabrtti or volition. We shall consider now the
Hindu analysis of conscienoe or consciou.sness of duty.
The Doctrine of Conscience constitutes an important
part of psychological Hindu Ethics. It is elaborated
in connection with the interpretation of the scriptural
code of duties laid down by the Vedas. Since the
moral code according to the Hindu primarily signifies the
code of scriptural commands, the analysis of conscience
necessarily involves the analysis of the shdstrika imperative
as embodied in the code of Scriptural duties. We shall
therefore have to consider the Doctrine of Conscience
in the light of the analysis of the Scriptural Imperative.

The consciousness of duty implies not only karma
or an act to be accomplished and the consciousness of
it as duty or morally imperative but also righteousness,
dharma or merit as accruing from the proper accom-
plishment of the duty. Since nothing is duty which
does not conduce to dharma or righteousness, the
question has to be first considered as to what is signified
by dharma, righteousness or merit. We shall therefore
first explain the conception of dharma or righteousness
in Hindu Ethics and in particular its relation to karma
or acts prescribed as duties. This is a necessary
preliminary to the analysis of conscience or consciousness
of duty which presupposes not only karmas but also
dharma or merit as resulting from the proper accomplish-
ment of kar^a.

The ethics oe the Hindus 86

From the brief summary of the various conceptions
of dharma in iKdmkrshna’s “ Siddhdntachandrikd ” (com-
mentary on Fdrthasdrathimishra’s “ Shdstradipikd ”) it
appears that the term has not one identical connotation
in the different systems of Hindu Philosophy. According
to Kdmchandra, dharma, righteousness, signifies —

(1) For the S^nkhya, a specific function of the
mind;

(2) For the Shdkyas (Buddhists), an auspicious dis-
position of the mental continuum ;

(3) For the Arhats (Jainas), certain subtile forces
in atoms as the causes of specific consequences or
effects ;

(4) For the Vaisheshikas, certain specific qualities
in the Atman ;

(6) For one school of the Mimdmsakas (the Prdbhd-
karas), something transcendental ( Apurva) ;

(6) For the Bhdttas, the sacrificial acts and other
ceremonies.

Sdmkhydstu manaso vrttivishesham dharmam dhuh
Shdkydstu chittasya'shubhdm vdsandm,

Arhatdstu kdrydrambhakdn sukshmdn murtimatanh
pudgaldn dharmam ahub,
y aisheshikdstu dt mano visheshagundn ,

Mimdmsakdh ekadeshinastu apurvameva
dharmam dhuh,

Ydgddireva dharmashabdavdchyam iti Bhdttdh.

Hence according to Sdnkhya righteousness and un-
righteousness do not touch the individual (Purusha) in
his transcendental nature, but appertain only to the
mind which is a modalisation of Prakrti in the empirical
state of parindma or transformation. It is Prakpti
which 'evolves under Purusha’s transcendental influence
into the empirical world consisting of empirical subjects
with minds and organs of experience on the one hand and

86 S. K. MAlTRA

objects of experience on the other, and it is only in
relation to the empirical order in which empirical subjects
stand mutually related in a common world of objects that
the question of right and wrong and of morality and
immorality has any significance. Morality and immora*
lity, righteousness and unrighteousness have thus only an
empirical significance and therefore are functions of the
mind (manas) which is the organ of empirical life rather
than attributes of the Transcendental Self, Atman, or
Furusha. The individual in his transcendental nature
is no more touched by righteousness and unrighteousness
than the crystal is tainted by the colour of Yapd.
(hebescus) that stands near it. There is nothing but a
‘transcendental shine* round about Furusha as a
consequence of the empirical modes and forms which
Prakrti undergoes under Furusha’s influence. This is
however no real enrichment of Furusha, no bhoga or
experience of Furusha in a transcendental sense, but is
only of the order of pratibimba, reflection or phenomenal
appearance.

Thus for Sdnkhya the Self in its transcendental nature
remains eternally pure, untouched by righteousness and
unrighteousness and the forms of experience. For the
Yaisheshikas however (and also for the Naiydyikas), the
Self (Atman) is not untouched by righteousness and
unrighteousness, but is determined by both in its
phenomenal, empirical life of samsdra. There are indeed a
phenomenal and a transcendental life of the Atman or Self,
but the phenomenal life belongs as much to the Self or
Atman as the transcendental life, and does not appertain
merely^ as according to Sdnkhya, to the mind or any
special organ of experience, 't hus according to the
NydyarYaisheshikas though the transcendental life is a
supermoral plane of being of the Atman in which it is
free :froiu^r||^toQ.usness as well as unrighteousness, there

THE ETHICS OE THE HINDUS

87

is also an empirical life of the Self — a life of Samsara, in
which the Atman becomes implicated in the moral order
and determined by righteousness and unrighteousness.
But such determinations are not permanent mo’didcations
of the Atman and can be removed by a process of spiritual
discipline by means of which the Self may recover its
transcendental purity of being free from the taint of
experience or sarnsAra — a purity of being in which the
Atman becomes a pure spiritual substance without
knowing, feeling or willing, i.e., devoid of all
experience.

Thus for the Nytlya-Vaisbeshikas righteousness is a
quality of the Atman or Self, i.^., is a subjective category
to be distinguished from the objective act (karma)
as well as from any impersonal transcendental category
(Apurva) which may be generated by it. Nor is it
any objective quality of an act which has any such
supersensuous category in its aid or support (Apurvo-
pakritakarmnguna). In other words, according to them,
moral merit has only a subjective significance there
being no merit in the act itself or any other objective
category, no objective right or wrong. This is why
abhisaudhi, intention is necessary to constitute merit or
demerit, the intention being {>ure, vishuddha in the case
of merit or righteousness. 'Phus righteousness (dharma),
according to Prasastapdda, is vishuddhabhisandhijab, ' is
born of the purity of the intention, i.e., of the
intention free from pride and the like (dambhddira*
hitasamkalpavishesha) so that there is no righteousness
even in good acts prompted by impure or evil
intentions, e.g,, by pride or vanity, etc. Similarly in
unintentional acts, i.e., acts which are accidental and
unpremeditated, there is neither merit nor demerit though
the consequences may be good or evil. There is thus no
unintentional wrong in a strictly moral significtmce, the

88

S. K. MAITRA

intention being absolutely essential to constitute moral
right and wrong. According to Sridhara however there '
is sin (adharma) even in unintentional acts (akAmakrta)
in so far* as they indicate pramAda or a lack of moral
earnestness, moral relaxation or carelessness in the
agent. There are however cases of unintentional acts in
which there can hardly be any question of habitual
carelessness and in so far as these are not exempted from
moral judgment there is evidently a deviation from the
subjective standpoint. It is however probable that
Sridhara’s view was largely influenced by the medieval
system of prdyashchitta or expiation enjoined even for
akamakrta or unintentional acts.

Just as righteousness is an effect of pure intention
so also unrighteousness results from evil intentions
(dushtdbhisandhi). Hence where the intention is evil
there is unrighteousness even if the actual result of the
action be good or beneficial, llighteousness and
unrighteousness are thus subjective categoi’ies, determina*
tions or qualities of the Atman or Self that result from
the purity or impurity of its intentions in volition.
Secondly they appertain to the Self in its phenomenal
life, i.e,, as participating in experience and therefore
implying pur ushautahkarauasam yoga, *.<?., the contact of
the Self, Atman or Purusha and the Antahkarana, the
internal organ or instrument of experience, i.e,, the
mind. It is in so far as there is this contact of the Self
and the mind that there is experience and it is in so far
as there is experience that there is righteousness or
unrighteousness. Thirdly, righteousness and unrighteous-
ness are atindriya, *.<?., supersensuous. They are qualities
or determinations of the Self, but not in the sense in
which pleasure and pain are qualities of the Self. These
latter are objects of internal perception — they can be
perceived,, by nieana of the mind without the aid of the

89

THE ETHICS OP THE HINDUS

external senses. Not . so however righteousness or
unrighteousness. These are objects of yogic intuition
only, i.e., the intuition of the Sages and not of ordinary
mortals who can perceive only their effects, namely,
happiness and unhappiness. Fourthly, righteousness
and unrighteousness are the effects of experience — they
are born of the Self’s participation in Samsdra or
empirical life. Hence they are effects and have a
beginning! n time. They are thus contingent phenomena
and thus cannot be eternal. Being non-eternal they
must also perish in course of time. How then do they
cease to be ? Righteousness is the cause of fruition or
happiness and thus it may exhaust itself by the last
fruition, i.e., by the experience of the last happiness.
Hence it is antyasukhasamvijnanavirodhi, contra-
dictory to or cancelled by the experience of the last
happine.ss, the last fruition. Contrarywise unrighteous-
ness is cancelled by the experience of the suffering due.
But these are not the only ways in which righteousness
and unrighteousness may wear away. They may also
be destroyed by the knowledge of the true nature of
things. Such knowledge by clarifying intellectual vision
and removing all delusion destroys attraction (rdga)
and aversion (dvesha) which are the causes of volition
(prabrtti) and thereby of participation in experience and
samsdra. In this way by inducing the individual to
withdraw from empirical life it ensures his freedom from
the moral order of karma and of right and wrong and
thus prepares the way to his mukti or liberation. The
fire of knowledge consumes his sanchita or accumulated
karmas, meritorious and demeritorious, which are tims
destroyed before maturing into their proper effects.
There are also no uttara karmas or subsequent actions,
i.e., actions, right or wrong, subsequent to the awakening
of such knowledge. In other words, knowledge of the
12 .

90

S. K. MAITRA

true nature of reality is contradictory to any active
participation in experience and thus there is no more
any righteous or unrighteous action. It is only the
prdrabdha *karma or acts which are already in the state
of fruition, that take their course and consume them-
selves by the natural process of maturing into their
proper effects.

Hence according to Sdnkhya as well as the Nydya-
Yaisheshikas, righteousness and unrighteousness are
subjective categories that appertain only to the empirical
life. But while according to the Nydya-Vaisheshikas
they are subjective in the sense of being qualities of the
Atman itself in the empirical state, for Sdnkhya they are
subjective in the sense of being functions of the mind
which is the organ of experience in the empirical life.
Hence for Sdnkhya the empirical Self is an independent
category, a modalisation or form of Prakrti which is
independent of the Transcendental Individual or Purusha.
It is Prakrti which evolves into the empirical self under
the reflection of Purusha and it is this empirical self
which functions in the acts of merit and demerit.
For the Nyaya-Vaisheshikas however there is no such
absolute dualism of the empirical self and the Tran-
scendental Self, the Atman which participates in
experience and thereby is qualified by righteousness and
unrighteousness being also the Atman which through
spiritual discipline becomes free from the dross of
experience and tiiereby r<!Covers the Transcendental purity
of its being.

According to Buddhists also righteousness is an
empirical and subjective category. Thus it is vasand,
disposition of the chitta or mental continuum — a
continuum which is annulled in the transcendental state.
Hence dharma, righteousness has only empirical signifi-
cance and is . subjective or mental in essence. But it is

91

THE ETHICS OF THE HINDUS

not a passing function, state or vrtti of the mind. A
function or vritti is a fleeting, momentary state ; but
righteousness (dharma) is essentially a vdsan^, trend or
disposition of the mind. The disposition is much more
than a momentary state or function of the mind — ^it is
an enduring trait or tendency of the mind. Every
righteous act conduces to such a tendency and every
new one strengthens this tendency. And it is the
cumulative effect of such acts transforming and modifying
the entire personality and producing a disposition or
inclination towards righteous acts that constitutes
the righteousness of the mind. Every single righteous
act, in other words, is more than a momentary
function of the mind fleeting over its surfq,ce — it implies
a more or less permanent modification of the mind
reaching down to the subpersonal and subconscious
strata and thereby generating a definite tendency or
disposition in a specific direction. It is not the momen>
tary function but the enduring disposition which is thus
produced that constitutes dharma or righteousness of
the mind.

Hence according to Sankhya, Nydya-Vaisheshikas
and Buddhists, righteousness and unrighteousness are
subjective categories. They have also only an empirical
significance being relative only to the empirical life.
But M'hile for the N ydya-Vaisheshikas they are qualities
of the Self or Atman, for Sdnkhya as well as for the
Buddhists they belong only to the mind or mental
continuum and not to the Self. For Sdnkhya however
they are mere • functions (vrttis) of the mind, and
therefore nothing but fleeting and momentary states.
According to the Buddhists however every such momen-
tary function implies an enduring modification, a specific
impetus or disposition of the mental life, and it is this more
or le.ss permanent trait, tendency or disposition of the

92

S. K. M AIT II A

mind which is so produced that constitutes righteousness
and the opposite.

Opposed to these', conceptions of righteousness (dharma)
as a subjective category is the view of the Mimdmsakas
according to which dliarma is objective or external.
According to the Mimamsakus, dharma or righteousness
is essentially of the nature of an artha or good, i.e.^ of
the nature of something objective and not a subjective
trait or state — a thing worthy of being aimed at or desired
rather than a subjective quality or disposition to be acquired
or cultivated. But it is not a mere artha but an artha which
is sanctioned by chodarui or vidhivakya, i.e., by scriptural
prescription (chodanalakshanah arthah dharmah). What,
then, is the nature of such artha ? Wliat is the nature
of an artha prescribed by scripture as distinct from an
artha of non -scriptural siguilicance ? This raises the
question as to what makes an artha to be artha, a
desirable object an object worthy of desire. What then
is it that constitutes an artha to be what it is ? What,
in other words, is the essence or constitutive principle of
the good ? The Mimamsakas answer this question in
terms of pleasure and pain. According to them whatever
does not produce pain (duhkha) in excess of pleasure
(sukha) is an artha or good and whatever produces pain
in excess of pleasure is anartha or evil, (Arthamsukhd-
dhikaduhkhdjanakatvam — “Subodhini ”). Hence accord-
ing to the Mimamsakas we have artha or good not merely
where there is an excess of pleasure over pain but also
where the pain does not exceed the pleasure that may
be derived. This is what constitutes the nature of artha
or good in general and dharma or moral good is a
specific form of this generic good, i.e., the good or artha
which is sanctioned by scriptural prescription or
vidhivdkya. The idea is that there aie not only arthas
of scriptural dgnidcance but also arthas which are

THE ETHICS OP THE HINDUS

laukika, empirical or non-scriptural in nature. I’he
» Mimdmsakas extend this division not merely to arthas
but also to anarthas or evils, i.e., according to them
there are not merely scriptural and nou-scriptu’ral arthas
but also scriptural and non-scriptural anarthas. Eor
example, certain forms of animal slaughter (hirasd)
are enjoined by scripture. Involving as they do

the infliction of sulfering on sentient beings they
are evil or anarthas, but they are anarthas prescribed
by scripture as distinguished from ordinary evils or
anarthas of nonscriptural import. Thus we have
scriptural arthas and anarthas as well as non-scriptural
arthas and anartlias. The latter arc the drshtdrthas
and drshtanarthas, i.e., of empirical import or
significance while the scriptural arthas and aiiarthas
are adrshta, i.e,, of non-sensuous or non-empirical
import. In other words, we have not merely empirical
good and empirical evil but also non-empirical good and
non-empirical evil. The latter are revealed by Shastric
prescriptions just as the former are determined by
secular experience. Dharma or moral good is essentially
non-empirical in nature and is revealed by scriptural
prescriptions. As such it is distinguished alike from
drshtdrthas and drshtanarthas, i.e., from empirical good
and evil. As essentially an artha or good it is also
distinguished from adrshtanarthas or non-empirical evil,
i.e., evil enjoined by Shastric prescriptions. There is
no dharma in such evil even though prescribed by Shdstra
because it is essentially evil or anartha while dharma is
essentially artha or of the nature of good. A dharma
must therefore satisfy two tests : — (1) it must be an
artha or good, i.e., must not produce pain in excess of
pleasure (sukhddhikaduhkbajanaka), and (2) it must be
sanctioned by chodana, or Shastric prescription. Dharma
is thus the artha or good which is of nou-empirical or

S. K. MAITRA

Hi

Shastt'ic import. This non-erapirical character belongs
also to the opposite of dharma, i.e., to moral evil or
adharma. Adharma is also non-empirical, i.e.^ adrstdn-
artha or hon*empirical evil and not an artha, good or
desirable object. Hence there is no adharma in drstd-
nartha or empirical evil just as there is no dharma in
drstdrtha or empirical good. It is only in regard to
the adrstdrthas and anarthas, i.e., in regard to the
non-empirical good or evil that there is any question of
dharma or adharma, all empirical good and empirical
evil being devoid of moral significance.

It is not clear from the above however as to what in
particular constitutes a non-empirical good or a non-
empirical evil. Is it the act enjoined by scripture that
constitutes an adrshtdrtha or adrshtdnartha in the sense
of dharma, merit, or adharma, demerit ? Or, is it some
effect or consequence of the act, something which results
from or is revealed by it ? The Mimdmsakas divide into
two schools as regards their answer to this question — the
school of Prabhdkara and the school of Kumdrila Bhatta.

(i) According to the Prdbhdkaras dharma is not a
subjective category and therefore not a quality of the
Self or Atman as is conveyed by its rendering into such
equivalents as righteousness, virtue, merit, etc. But it is
also not for that reason to be identified with the kriyd or
act enjoined by scripture. In fact, it is a new category
distinct alike from any subjective condition or state and
the mere external act enjoined by scripture. It is reveal-
ed by niyoga, i.e., the imperative or command involved in
a Shdstric prescription, or more precisely, it is revealed by
prerand, i.e., by the authoritative suggestion to the will
implied in such a command or imperative. This prerand
is a kind of dtmakuta, i.e., wave, excitement or impulsion
in the Atman or Self — an excitement which becomes
bhautikayyi^4rahetu, i.e., the cause of certain physical

THE ETHICS OP THE HINDUS

96

processes or effects. Dharma is thus an objective category,
but is non-empirical or supersensuous in nature being
revealed by the authoritative suggestion involved in the
moral imperative or niyoga. In the Sutra chodandlak-
shanah arthah dbarmah, the meaning is : even in certain
scriptural prescriptions or chodandydkyas there is an
element of evil or anartha and such anartha is a moral
eyil or adharma. Consider for example a scriptural
injunction such as shyenena abhicharan yajata — one who
wishes to kill his enemy should perform the ceremony of
shyena. Here the form is that of a recommendation or
injunction (chodand) — yajeta being in vidliilin, i.e., in the
optative or potential mood and thus implying a specific
recommendation to him who wants to dispose of his enemy.
But as the enjoined ceremony involves the infliction of
pain on the enemy and therefore injury or himsd, it is
essentially anartha or evil and is thus a moral wrong
(adharma). To exclude such anarthas or evils in the
Vedic prescriptions or chodandvdkyas, the Sutra defines
dharma as consisting essentially in artha or good. Thus
artha in the definition excludes all anarthas or evils, even
the anarthas involved in some of the Vedic prescriptions.
Hence such prescriptions do not constitute dharma or
moral right, though they may lead to specific results. It
is only Shdstric prescriptions which lead to artha (and not
to anartha or evil) that result in dharma through their
supers<'nsubu8 effects (Apurva). These Shdstric prescrip-
tions include nitttanaimittikakarmasor unconditional duties
as well as karnyakarmas or acts from empirical motives.
In either case there is dharma or moral good in so far as
there is no anartha or evil involved in such prescriptions.
But in the case of the nittanaimittikakarmas or uncondi-
tional duties there is no positive good or artha in a positive
sense, i.e., they do not produce pleasure, but they also
do not produce pain (dulikha) in excess of pleasure

96

S. K. MAITRA

(sukha) and in this sense are arthas and therefore dharma.
Through the proper accomplishment of these duties the
mind is purified and thus the knowledge of reality (jndna)
is attained which leads to Transcendental Freedom or
Moksha which is freedom from pain (dhhkhdbhdva).
In the case of kamya or empirical duties however there
is artha in a positive sense, positive sukha or pleasure
and therefore also dharma in so far as there is no anartha
or evil involved. In either case however the dharma
or moral good is not the act itself but the Apurva or
supersensuous verity which it generates or involves
and which is revealed by the prerand or impulsion in
the Atman produced by the niyoga or the coinmand
involved in a Shastric injunction.

(ii) According to the Bhdttas however yAyAdi^ i.e., the
ceremonial and sacrificial acts, in themselves constitute
dharma or moral good. Dharma is thus no non-empirical
category, no supersensuous potency (Apurva) with which
Vedic prescriptions are charged but the prescribed acts
themselves. In fact dharma is shreyaskara, conducive
tc good, works for the agent’s nihshreyasah or highest
good. These ceremonial acts (ydgadi) are conducive to
good (shreyaskara) in this sense and therefore are
dharma. In fact, there is no difference in this respect
between kdmyakarmas or conditional duties with refe-
rence to something desired for empirical pleasure and
the nityanaiinittika karrnas or unconditional duties. The
latter conduce to good quite as much as the duties
prompted by empirical motives and are dharma only
as thus conducive to good. Hence the Sutra chodana
lakshanah arthah dharmah is not intended to exclude
ohodanalakshanah anarthas. This cannot be the intend-
ed meaning as all Shastric prescriptions are dharma
and therefore are artha and not anartha or evil. The
anartha orr^^:^vil which comes within the scope of a

97

THE ETHICS OP THE HINDOS

SMstrik prescriptioa is only by way of prohibition
(nibrtti) and thus constitutes the subject-matter only
of nishedha-chodands or prohibitory and negative pres-
criptions. The prohibition or negation of an anartha or
evil thus {)rescribed is itself an artha or good and thus
is dharma. We have thus dharma as constituting the
content of Shastric prescriptions in two forms. In
Vidhi-chodands or positive Shastric prescriptions, the
dharma is a positive good (artha), the good involved
in the act enjoined; while in nishedha-chodands, i.e.y
prohibitory or negative prescriptions, the dharma is
abstention or cessation from some anartha or evil, i.e.,
from the sin and consequent punishment entailed by the
nishiddha or pi’ohibited action.

Hence while according to Sdnkhya, IBauddha and
Nydya-Vaisheshika systems dharma is essentially righte-
ousness or virtue and thus a subjective trait or disposition
of the mind or the self, according to the Mimdmsakas
it is an objective category consisting, according to the
Prdbhdkaras, in Apurva or a supersensuous verity involved
in the Vedic prescriptions, and, according to the Bhdttas,
in the prescribed acts themselves, i.e., the acts prescribed
by Vedic injunctions and prohibitions. But the question
remains still to be considered as to how dharma or
righteousness is related to Karma, i.e., the external act
of duty. If dharma is a subjective category, is it an
effect of the accomplishment of the karmas? How is
it related then to the scriptural and non -scriptural
karmas respectively ? If it is an objective category, is
it the duty itself, or an objective accomplishment of the
duty, or an objective effect of the accomplishment ? Is
it scriptural duty only ? Or is it non-scriptural duty
as well ? Or is it mere ethical duty as conducive to
the life of the spirit^ not necessarily implying scriptural
sanction P These are questions that necessarily arise in
13

98

S. K. MAITRA

connection with the question of dharma or righteousness.
As involved in the question of dharma, they are also
implicated in the consciousness of duty. We shall
therefore next consider those questions before we proceed
to the analysis of conscience proper.

(1) What, then, is the moral value of karma according
to the Bauddh v ? From what has been already explained
it is obvious that for the Bauddha there is no merit
in karma or duty in an objective sense and that it
assumes a moral signidcance only as subjectively willed
and accomplished and thus as modifying the subjective
disposition of the agent. Hence according to him there
is no inherent moral worth in karma, but only in its
condnciveiiess to the puridcation of the mind. Thus
the Shastric karmas have no inherent worth or excellence,
their moral value being conditional only on their
conduciveness to spiritual perfection. In so far therefore
as Siiastric and ceremonial acts fail to conduce to the
life of the spirit, they are devoid of moral value and
cannot lx; morally obligatory. There is no good making
a fetish of Vedic prescriptions, and the exercise of proper
discrimination is necessary in the ascertainment of true
moral duly. To bo sure there are special moral codes
even for the Bauddhas themselves. Thus there are
different shilas, virtues, and charyyds, duties, laid down
for the Updsakas, devotees, and for the shrdvakas,
learners, but they are so laid down not because they
have any mysterious moral potency but only because
they conduce to spiritual culture and thus are means
to ethical discipline. Hence according to the Bauddhas
even when karma is to be considered as haying any
moral significance, it is from the ethical standpoint as
conducing to spiritual perfection and culture rather
than from the standpoint of pure ceremonialism and
formalism, ./

THE ETHICS OE TIIB HINDUS 9S

(2) The Sdnkhya in some respects resembles the
* Buddhist in this ethical view of karma, hut there are
also important differences. Thus according to Sdnkhya
there is no special spiritual significance att*aching to
Vedic (finushravika) karmas. They involve himsfi, i.e.,
injury to sentient creatures, and thus cannot but lead
to evil. Hence they cannot conduce to real spiritual
good which is the agent’s freedom from the taint of
Sami^^ra or empirical life. It is this freedom, apavarga
or moksha, this freedom from the whirlpool of the
phenomenal life, that constitutes the highest purushdrtha
or spiritual good. Compared with this even svarga or
happiness in heaven is loo insignificant a purusluirtha to
be worthy of desire. This svarga indeed comes often in
the wake of the proper accomplishment of tlie Vedic
prescriptions but as an effect that comes into being in
time it is also bound to lapse and cease to be in course
of time. It is thus contingent and perishable and thus
can appear only as duhkha or suffering in comparison
with the imperishable or eternal good which constitutes
the essence of Transcendental Freedom or Moksha.
Vedic Karma thus cannot lead to anything which is
really good or worthy of desire. In so far as they are
tainted by the impurity of hims^ or injury to sentient
beings, they are bound to bring suffering to the agent
according to the law of karma or moral justice, and
even when they lead to svarga or happiness in heaven
they conduce only to a transient and perishable good
and therefore a good or purushdrtha which can appear
only as evil by the side of the imperishable Freedom
which constitutes the essence of Moksha or Apavarga.
And what applies to Vedic actions applies also to other
empirical actions prompted by motives of gain or
advantage. These also lead to suffering in so far as
they involve the infliction of suffering, and even when

100

S. K. MAITRA

they produce happiness, that happiness being perishable
and liable to increase and decrease can appear only as
evil (Drshtavadanushravikah sa hyavishuddhi-kshaydti-
8hayayuktah-“ karika.” Kdmyeakamyeapi sddhyatvdvi-
sheshdt-Vijndnahhikshu). In other Avords, according to
Sdnkhya, there is real spiritual value neither in drshta
and kdmya karmas, *.<?., ordinary ethical actions hut
done from empirical motives, nor in dnushravika karmas
i.e., ceremonials enjoined by the Shdstras. They may
lead to svarga, happiness in heaven, but this being
perishable is only duhkha, I.e., a form of suffering.
Besides, the impurity of injury (himsd), etc., involved in
Vedic karmas will lead to suffering in due course even
though the religious merit acquired thereby may bring
about happiness in heaven for the time being. Hence
for the Sdnkhya as for the Bauddhas the ceremonial is
to be judged by ethical tests, but while for the Bauddhas
there is no special significance attaching to ceremonials,
i.e., no potency or power in them to produce specific
effects, it is not denied by Sdnkhya that ceremony has
a certain efficacy in leading to svarga or happiness in
heaven. Such happiness however being perishable, the
desire for it is condemned as a form of avidyd or
nescience, i.e., as arising from aviveka or absence of
the proper discrimination of the true nature of reality
Such non-discrimination is the ground of all impure
actions and arise from a preponderance of the constituents
of Tamas or Inertia and Bajas or Energy in the chitta
or empirical self. When the Tamas and the Bajas
Gunas will give way to the constituent of Sattva or
Intelligence-stuff so that there will emerge in the
empirical self a preponderance of Sattva over the other
two constituents, non-discrimination will also give way
to right discrimination or vivekakhydti which will lead
to Moksha or |he true Freedom of the individual. It

THE ETrtiCS OP THE HINDUS

101

is the Sdttvika Karmas, not originating in passion or
’ intellectual indolence, that conduce to this sattva-vivr-
ddhi or preponderance of Sattva in us, and such actions
have thus real spiritual value, not the Vedic actions
nor ordinary ethical actions from material motives of
gain.

(3) The Nydya-Vaisheshikas however do not go as far
as the Sankhya in the condemnation of ceremonialism.
According to them, righteousness, dharma is indeed a
quality of the Self (Atmaguna) and therefore subjective,
in significance, but this subjective quality or trait is
itself to be acquired through the proper discharge of
an objective code of duties, 'fhese duties are the
sddhdranadharmas or duties of universal scope and appli-
cation and the Varndshramadharmas or the duties of
station in life. It is through the proper discharge of
these common or universal duties and the special duties
of one’s Varna or social class and of one’s Ashrama or
specific stage in spiritual growth that one realises that
special quality of the Self which constitutes dharma,
virtue or righteousness. While the sadhdrana or common
dharmas constitute his properly ethical duties, the
Varndshramadharmas comprise both ceremonial actions
as well as the duties of station in life. Hence ceremonial
actions are not to be condemned as they are not devoid of
moral significance as the Sdnkhya supposes. They con-
duce to dharma or righteousness when duly accomplished
and are thus obligatory conformably to the social class,
temperament and special powers of the moral agent.

According to Nydya-Vaisheshikas therefore cei’emo-
nials are not to be discarded as morally useless. On the
contrary, they are essential and indispensable for moral
culture according to the social position and spiritual
growth of the individual. But they are essential and
indispensable not in the sense of being charged with

102

S. K. MAITRA

any non-natural magical potency, but in the sen^e of
being conducive to the moral perfection of the agent.
Hence ceremonials have validity and justification only
from the ethical standpoint, i.e.^ as being conducive to
moral improvement and culture, and are not obligatory
per 86 nor as mysterious agencies of magical potency.
This therefore is an attempt to vindicate ceremonials on
rational grounds instead of simply accepting them on
trust or on the authority of the Vedas. It thus stands
midway between the unmitigated condemnation of
ceremonialism on the one hand (as in Sankhya) and its
blind acceptance on the other (as in Kumarila Bhatta’s
school). According to it, ceremonials have moral value,
but only because they conduce to moral well-being. It
is only in this sense that even Vaidha Himsa is justified,
i.e., himsa or injury which is sanctioned by Vidhi or
Vedic injunction. Such injunctions constitute a part
of the moral code which is obligatory on every individual
in accordance with his station in life. Such injunctions
are thus authoritative as being conducive to moral
well-being and moral training. This applies not merely
to the beneficial part of these injunctions but also to
himsd and the like which they may involve in special
cases. Even these latter when enjoined in the Shdstric
code cannot be really evil but must be conducive to
real good though we may not perceive how this can be.
Hence the injunctions of scripture, even those that enjoin
himsA or injury to others, have authority, but not as
arbitrary fiats whose authority we must not challenge^
but as conducive to the good of the individual.

(4) The view of the Purva Mimdmsakas is the
diametrical opposite of the view of the Nydya-Vaisheshikas
in this respect. While the latter defend ceremonialism
on ethical grounds and thus try to give a rational
ezptf|natiofi? Df jthe ceremonial actions, the hJim^msakas

THE ETHICS OF THE HINDUS 108

resolve even the ethical into the ceremonial and derive
their validity from Vedic authority or scriptural pres-
cription. Thus according to them the duties all come
under the class of ceremonial actions and alre authori-
tative only as being prescribed by Shdstric injunction.
This applies both to the nityanaimittika-karmas or
unconditional duties and kdmya-karmas or ordinary
ethical duties from empirical motives. They are obli-
gatory only as prescribed by an external Shastric code
of injunctions and prohibitions (vidhinishedha) and not
as conducive to moral well-being or perfection as Nydya
supposes.

The above is thus an attempt to vindicate even the
ethical from the standpoint of the ceremonial. Xt is
the view of the Purvamitnainsakas and particularly of the
Bhdtta School of the Purvamimdrasakas who represent
the extreme externalistic conception of morality and
accept ceremonialism in all its arbitrariness.

'(*) Thus according to the Blidttas, the ceremonial and
sacrificial acts in themselves constitute dharma. Since
they are prescribed by Shdstra they must conduce to the
agent’s good and as thus conducive to good (shreyaskara)
they are dharma whose nature is to conduce to the
agent’s highest good or nihshreyasah. This applies both
to the nityanaimittika-karmas or unconditional duties
and kdmyakarmas or ordinary ethical duties from
empirical motives, the former producing beneficial results
(phala) just like the latter and thus being duties, i.&.,
obligatory on the agent.

(ii) The Prdbhdkaras however do not carry externa-
lism as far as the Bhdttas. They do not impugn the
authority of the Vedic injunctions and ceremonial actions.
On the contrary they accept these as the content of duty
just as the Bhdttas do. But they give an altogether
different explanation of their authority. It is derived

104

S. K. MAITRA

according to the PrAbhAkaras not from their conducivenoss
to any ulterior end or consequence to bo inferred from
their being scripturally prescribed as the BhAttas
suppose blit from their intrinsic validity as self-positing
Duty or verity of the Moral order. This constitutes
their Apurva intrinsic validity or as impersonal ontolo-
gical verities of the moral order. It is revealed
through a self- evidencing experience in the Self which
constitutes preranA or moral prompting of the
imperative. The BhAttas also assume Apurva, hut this
is, according to them, only a certain conduciveness
to specific ends in the prescribed acts or duties and not
the intrinsic essence of these acts as self- validating,
self-establishing realities of the Moral order. Nor is it
known, according to them, by any unique feeling of
moral impulsion but only by implication (arthApatti)
from their being scripturally prescribed as duties. Since
they are prescribed by ShAstra, they must be dharma or
duty and since dharma is Shreyaokara, conducive to good,
these duties must be conducive to specific ends such as
happiness in heaven, etc. By implication it follows
that there is Apurva or objective potency in these acts
for specific ends or consequences. This Apurva however
is not itself dharma, the acts themselves as scripturally
prescribed being dharma and Apurva being only an
implication of their essence as dharma or moral duty.
The NaiyAyikas also accept Apurva but only as a
subjective disposition or modification of the self, an
Atma-samskAra or specific subjective tendency which
matures into consequences of happiness and suffering in
a non-natural way according to the principles of moral
justice. It is thus a subjective tendency and not an
objective karmic potency, and is known by inference from
its effects. The PrAbhAkaras however accept Apurva
only in the; ;^ense of the intrinsic moral authority or

THE ETHICS OF THE HINDUS

105

validity of the prescribed acts as impersonal moral
verities. It is known neither by implication nor by
inference but is immediately revealed to the self in the
unique feeling of moral impulsion or preran4 which is
self -evidencing like the Self. It is this Apurva which
appertains necessarily to the pi-escribed acts of scripture
as duties that constitutes their moral authority or validity.
Though the duties consist in the Shdstric prescriptions,
their moral authority is independent of Shdstra being
due to their ontological essence as duty which implies
Apurva. Apurva is thus the rafio essendi, the reason
or ground of their objective validity, while prerand,
moral impulsion is the raHo cognoacendi, the reason or
ground of the objective validity being subjectively known.
The act has intrinsic authority on the moral agent as self-
established moral verity which is its Apurva. This is
revealed to the Self through moral prompting or iinpulsion
which every such act necessarily induces, and this is
prerand. Through the conception of Prerana and Apurva
the Prdbhdkaras thus seek to get over the pure exter-
nalism of the Purvamimdmsa. By the conception of
intrinsic moral authority of duty as duty they are also able
to distinguish between a disinterested, non-utilitarian
morality of the nityanaimittika or unconditional duties and
the utilitarian prudential morality of the kdmya or condi-
tional duties. Por the Bhdttas however there is no such
disinterested morality in the strict scubb, dharma neces-
sarily implying conduciveness to good in the conditional
as well as the unconditional duties. The Bhdttas are also
unable to get beyond ceremonialism and externalism as
they regard Shdstric prescription not only as the only
ground of the moral authority of the duties but also
as the only evidence of their conduciveness to good.

(6) In the preceding section we have considered the
externalism of the Purvamimdmsa, particularly the
14

106 S. K. MAITRA

FrAbhdkara view which builds an ethical interpretation
of conscience and duty on the foundation of an external
code. In this section we shall discuss the views of the
UttarmimAmsd with regard to this question of the
ethical value of ceremonials. Shankara’s views are of
special interest in this respect. In a synthetic scheme
of the moral life as a gradation of ascending stages
Shankara tries to find a place for ceremonialism as well
as ethics proper by their demarcation relatively to the
spiritual end aimed at. EAmdnuja however recognises
only ethics proper, i.e., the ethical duties only, as
conducing to divine knowledge. Some RAmdnujists
however recognise the ceremonial duties also, these being
required, in their view, for the preservation of the body
and other auxiliaries of the spiritual life proper.

(i) Shankam*s view . — Thus according to Shankara
there are two mdrgas or paths of the spiritual life, (a)
One is the path (mdrga) of prabytti or desire. It is the
path intended for the person who participates in empirical
life and who is governed by the feeling of attraction
and aversion. Duty in this path, is what best subserves
desire or kdmand. Hence duty (karma) is here a means
to the satisfaction of desire ; i.e., to the realisation of
the desired ends or consequences. These ends may be
empirical (drshta) or non>empirical (adrshta). Hence
there are drshtdrthaka-karmas or duties of empirical
import and adyshtdrthaka-karmas or duties of non>em-
pirical import. The non*empirical duties are laid down
in Yaidika-karma-kdnda, i.e., in that part of the Vedas
which deals with the nature and significance of karma.
The empirical duties are known from vyavahdra, i.e.,
from the customs and practices of men, and also from
empirical sciences such as dyurveda, science of medicine,
nitishdstra, science of the rules of conduct, etc. These
empirical and non-empirical duties together constitute

THE ETHICS OF THE HINDUS

107

the moral code for the way of desire, i.e., they are the
duties of the person who desires to make the best of his
empirical life. 'I'hey however do not constitute the
highest morality. Ensnaring man in the toils of the
empirical life (samsdra) they ensure only a relative
satisfaction and not the highest satisfaction of freedom
from all limitations. They have indeed a moral signi-
ficance since merit (dharma) and consequent possibilities
of karma are generated thereby. But their real value
is in preparing the individual towards the higher morality
of cessation (nibrtti). This latter is the other path or
mdrga. It is the path of knowledge and realisation in
which the empirical life of duties becomes merged in
the end. (Sarvakarma pdrtha jndne parisamapyatd).
Some Shankarites hold that the life of duties is only
an inducement, consequences like happiness in heaven
being held out with a view to draw on the ignorant
multitudes. (Ajnaprarochanarthatvdt-** Advaita-Brahma-
Siddhi ”). These consequences attract them to the life
of duties which is a precondition of the higher life of
dispassion. (6) This latter is the higher life of the spirit.
It is the life of absolute cessation from desire and
therefore from duties prompted by desire. It thus is
the sphere of the ethical virtues proper, i.e., of the
disinterested virtues practised without reference to any
extraneous, empirical end. It is the sphere of the
fourfold training of the four disciplines (sddhanachatu
shtaya), the sphere of purely ethical or spiritual culture
which leads at last to Self-knowledge (Atmajndna)
and through Self-knowledge to that Ereedom-in-lifetime
(Jivanmukti) which is the highest consummation of the
spirit. The highest end is therefore the realisation of
Self-knowledge, i.e., of the knowledge of the Self as
identical with Brahma. By realising this knowledge the
Spirit shakes off its limitations and bonds of finitude

108 S. K. MAITRA

and recovers its true essence as the unlimited and
eternally accomplished being. The highest duty is that
which conduces to this knowledge and the duties of
the empirical life have moral significance only as a
preparatory training for the discharge of the higher
duty which leads to Self-knowledge. For Shankara
therefore the consummation of the othico-spiritual life
is a stage of the spirit towards which the perfection of
knowledge is essential. The highest duties are those
which conduce to this end of knowledge and all other
duties are duties only as preparatory to the duties which
culminate in true knowledge. Hence the highest duties
are noetic rather than ethical and even the ethical
duties are of moral significance as leading up to the
noetic duties of the four disciplines, i.e., to duties
which are strictly speaking jndndngas, constituent
members or moments in the realisation of knowledge.
According to Shankara therefore the duties of the empiri
cal life have no spiritual significance except as preparatory
to the higher duties of contemplation on the ultimate
esssence of the Transcendental Reality so that we must
distinguish between two planes or paths of the moral
life — (1) the plane of Lower Ethics, i.e., of the morality
of worldly men which has only a worldly or empirical
significance, or at best a mediate or indirect significance
for the true ideal of the spirit which is a transcendent,
non-empirical ideal, and (2) a plane of Higher Ethics,
i.e., of the higher morality of the dianoetic virtues
which conduce directly to the realisation of knowledge
and of freedom in knowledge. In this latter plane the
ethical or Avordly duties cease and only contemplation
and its auxiliaries remain.

N.B . — In Manu and the Gitd however a third plane
or path is recognised, vis., Nibrttakarmamdrga or path
of d^interji^d ,, duties. It is a synthesis of Shankara’s

THE ETHICS OP THE HINDUS 109

two paths of desire (prabrtti) and cessation (nibrtti).

* Shankara’s higher path of nibrtti or cessation from
activity presents only a negative ideal which leads
necessarily to spiritual bankruptcy. It implies in its
later stages the cessation of all duties including nityd>
naimittika or unconditional duties as well as the kdmya
or conditional duties. It is therefore a condition of
spiritual void without content, i.e., the negation or death
of Spirit. Such nibrtti or cessation according to the
Gitd cannot be an end-in-itself and can be recommended
only as preparatory to the attitude of disinterestedness
and detachment. The highest ideal is that which fills
this void of nibrtti or cessation with concrete content,
i.e., which brings disinterestedness to bear upon the
accomplishment of the duties of life — the ideal or plane
of nib^ttakarma or disinterested performance of duty for
duty’s sake. It is the plane of karma without material
motives, i.e., of the nityanaimittikakarmas or uncondi*
tional duties to be done simply from the sense of duty.

(ii) Rdmdnuja'a view . — Ihe view of Jidmdnuja fur-
nishes a close parallel in this respect to that of the Gitd
and of Manu. According to Ildmdnuja also the highest
stage of the spirit is not one of karmasanydsa or freedom
from duty as Shankara supposes, but one of moral obliga-
tions to be discharged disinterestedly without any desire
for the consequence. But these duties have spiritual
significance, according to him, not in themselves but in
so far as they are serviceable to divine knowledge. Thus
according to him works are to be abjured when they are
obstacles to divine knowledge and to faith. There are
punyakarmas or works of religious merit. These lead to
specific ends or consequences such as happiness in heaven
(svargddiphala). There are also pdpakarmas or works of
religious demerit. These lead to the opposite consequen-
ces, viz.y suffering and punishment. All pdpakarmas or

no

S. K. MAITRA

works of demerit are obstacles to divine knowledge.
Meritorious works (punyakarmas) are also obstacles when
accomplished from interested motives, for reward or
happiness! Only when the latter are accomplished dis-
interestedly from a sense of pure duty, are they conducive
to divine knowledge. Even then however they are unable
to accomplish this end through themselves, but such
meritorious works disinterestedly accomplished are a
means to that predominance of the power of enlightenment
(sattvavivrddhi) which qualifies us for the spiritual life.
In fact, mere works cannot produce anything but im-
permanent and insignificant results. They thus conduce
to ends which are only relative and insignificant and
cannot themselves lead to Divine knowledge which is of
absolute worth or value. (Kevalakarmdnam alp^thira-
phalatvajndnam cha karmamimdmsdvaseyam — ‘Shribha-
shya’). Such works are to be performed throughout life,
i.e.y in all stages or Ashramas of the spiritual life (Evam-

rupayd dhruvdnusmrteh sddhandni yajnddini karmdni

tadutpattaye sarvdnydshramakarmdni ydvajjivamanush-
they&ni). Hence there is no supermoral plane of being,
no plane of karmasanydsa or freedom from the obligations
of duty. Even the highest stage requires the due dis-
charge of the unconditional duties (anabhisamhitaphala-
karma) without desire for the consequence. Such duties
are sattvavivrdhijanaka, i.e.^ increase our pow^er for
enlightenment, and are obligatory throughout life, «.e.,
in all stages of the spirit including the stage of absolute
or divine knowledge (jndnavirodhi cha karma punyapdpa-

rupam Tasya cha jndnotpattivirodhitvam jndnotpatti-

hetubhutasuddhasattvavirodhirajastamavivrddhidvdrena....
Tannirasanam cha anabhisamhitaphalena anusthitena
dharmena).

(w) The vieio of Venkateaha {of the Rdmdnujiat
School }^ to Bdmdnuja works are to be juddge

THE ETHICS OP THE HINDUS 111

by their conduciveness to divine knowledge and therefore
^only works of religious merit accomplished without desire
for the consequence are to be recognised as of moral value.
According to Yenkatesha however works are to be judged
by their conduciveness to the realisation of the good %nd
the avoidance of evil. Works therefore which are means
to the attainment of the good are right. Similarly works
which ensure the avoidance of evil are also right. Now
good and evil may be empirical or non-empirical and
there are laukika or natural means as well as alaukika or
non-natural means for the attainment of good and the
avoidance of evil. But while the secular or natural
means assure only empirical results, the non-natural or
scriptural means accomplish both empirical and non-
empirical ends. The laukika means are known either 1by
induction based on observation or from the various
sciences such as Medicine, Morals, etc. (Jjaukika
hitdhitayoh anvayavyatireka dyurvedanitishdstrddikam
pramdnam. — ‘Nyayaparishuddhi’ by Yenkatesha). The
alaukika or non-natural means are known from the Yedas
(Alaukikahitdhitayostu vedah pramdnam). Even the
natural means are not to be neglected. They are required
for the preservation of the body which even the devotee
who aims at meditation cannot do without. But they are
to be resorted to only in such ways as not to hinder or
impede the non-natural means prescribed by scripture.
(Tadapi yogasddhanabhutasharirakshandrtbam mumuk-
shdndmapi shrutismrtyddigavirodhena anusaraniyam.)
The scriptural prescriptions have only good and evil in
view. Whatever is scripturally enjoined or forbidden is
good or evil according to the scope and sphere of such
injunctions and prohibitions : (yachcha shrutivihitam
tadakhilamapi yatbddhikdram hitam yachcha tannishid-
dham tadakhilamapi ahitam...adhikdrivishesham apekshya
hi sarvo vidbirnishedhashcha). But bow can there be

112

8. K. MAITRA

conduciveness to good in all scriptural works? Such
works include unconditional duties as M'ell as conditional <
duties for the accomplishment of relative ends. How
can these' conditional duties be regarded as conducive to
anything really and absolutely good ? Further the scrip-
tural duties also involve destruction of life. How is such
destruction compatible with their conduciveness to good ?
The answer is that scriptural prescriptions always have
reference to persons specifically coming Within their
application. There are persons who desire happiness and
the cessation of unhappiness. For them the laukika
means which may lead to suffering are undesirable in
comparison with the scriptural means which produce
the happiness without producing suffering. (Nanu
abhichArddikarmantlm anarthahetundm kshudrapuru-
shdrthasddhandndm cha kdmydndm karmandm katbam
hitatvam? Uchyate — adhikdrivishesham apekshya hi

sarvo vidl»irnishedhashcha...yo hi sukhara duhkhanibrttim
cha ichchhati tasya tatsddhana apekshamdnasya laukikeshu
sddhaneshu prabrttasya teshdm nirayiidihetubhutdnartha-
hetutvena tatparihdrdya anarthahetutvarahitah sukhddy-
updydh pratipddyantd.) In fact, there is a justification
for the conditional duties not only from this but also from
the higher standpoint of the spiritual ideal of liberation
or freedom. The devotee who aims at spiritual freedom
must practise the prescribed duties up to his death.
For this he must look to the preservation of his body.
It follows therefore that for the sake of mere self-
preservation not only hiinsd such as destruction of
the enemy by scriptural means but also conditional
.duties for such relative and minor ends as bringing about
a rainfall or ensuring a good harvest, are necessary. In
this sense there is a moral justification even for those
conditional scriptural duties which aim at relative and
natural er^s such as rainfall, economic comfort, etc.,

113

THE ETHICS OP THE HINDUS

just as there is a justification even for destruction of
life for the sake of preservation of the Self. As regards
conditional duties which are prescribed for non>natural
ends, they are raised, by being done without desire, to
the position of the unconditional duties and are thus
morally obligatory. Lastly, the unconditional duties are
the means of avoiding evil and are thus good for all.
In other words, the himsd which is prescribed by Shdstra
is only for self-preservation necessary for devotion.
Similarly the conditional duties are means to devotion
either as conducing to natural ends such as the neces-
saries of physical life, or as accomplishing non-natural
ends and thereby attaining the status of the unconditional
duties through the attitude of disinterestedness. The
unconditional duties are necessary for all for the
avoidance of evil to which they are the means. The
Shdstrika prescriptions are thus our benevolent guides
on the path of life full of dangers and obstacles. We
are the children of Shastra and Shdstra’s love to
us is like that of a thousand parents. Mumukshorapi
rakshakakshatriyddyabhavd rdkshasddyabhibhave cha dt-
marakshandrtham abhichdrah karttavya eva...anyathd
aharaharanushtheyasydpraydndd-anuvarttaniyasya karmd^
deruchchhedaprasangenopdyanishpatte mokshdsiddhiprasa-
ngdt. Yrshtynnddidfshtdrthdni cha Sarvdnyupdsandni-
shtotpattyoupdyikatayd tattadapekshdydmanushth ey dn i.
Pdraloukikam tu tatphalabhisamdhi-virahena karmayo-
gdnushthdnadashdydm nitydnaimittikeirekikrtya kartta-
vydni. Neimittikdni hi sarvdni prasaktdnarthaparibdrdr-
thatay d sarvahitdni e va. Evam nitydni . . . atah . . /* Shdstram
hi vatsalataram mdtdpitrsahasratah ” iti.

Hence according to Yenkatesha the natural means
known from experience are to be resorted to only in
such ways as not to conflict with the non-natural means
of scripture. These latter are superior to the natural
15 ■

114

S. K. MAITRA

means for the accomplishment of natural as well as
non>natural ends. The Shdstrika means do not bring
suffering while the natural means may entail con-
sequences at suffering and mischief, Further the natural
means are of no avail for the accomplishment ‘ of non-
natural ends, but the Shdstrika means accomplish
both natural and non-natural ends. Both natural and
Shdstrika means however are instruments for the attain-
ment of good and avoidance of evil. This is true
even of the ShAstrika prescriptions which recommend
destruction of life. Such destruction is prescribed only
for self-preservation which even the pious devotee cannot
do without. This also holds good in the case of the
conditional prescriptions having empirical and relative
ends in view. Such empirical ends are required for the
natural life which the devotee has to live through the
body to which he is attached. The conditional duties
which have non-natural ends in view are however
necessary in another way. By being done without desire
they become the same as the unconditional duties which
are indispensable for keeping out of harm’s way.

With Venkatesha, therefore, the ceremonial code loses
its magical character and becomes homogeneous with the
known laws of conduct, i.c., with ethics. The scriptural
prescriptions are only better and surer means of attaining
happiness and avoiding unhappiness and evil. Men, by
following these injunctions, are prevented from running
into devious ways of mischief and misery in the pursuit
of the ends prompted by desire. There is a legitimate
satisfaction, according to Venkatesha, even for prabrtti
or desire — a satisfaction which Edmdnuja will not allow.
According to lldmdnuja all desires must be subdued
as being obstacles to divine knowledge. According to
Venkatesha even desires have their place in the ethical
life, *.f,, aft\^eans to meditation and devotion which

115

THE ETHICS OF THE HINDUS

lead to spiritual freedom. Thus works from desire are
not to be condemned altogether, neither empirical works
nor the non-empirical Avorks prescribed by scripture.
Both are serviceable for the accomplishment of specific
ends required even by the devotee, but as the non-
empirical works are more effectively useful for these
purposes, the empirical secular works must always be
resorted to subserviently to the non-empirical works.

The above is a fairly complete survey of the relation
of Karma to the moral life as conceived in the different
systems of Hindu Philosophy. We have seen that Karma
includes, for the Hindu, both secular works based on
experience and ceremonial duties prescribed by scripture.
The secular works as conducing to relative empirical ends
are regarded as having a certain value. But the greatest
importance is attached to the scriptural duties which are
either rationally justified or accepted on their OAvn authori-
ty. The Sdnkhya alone is an exception in this respect
condemning as it does all ceremonial actions without
exception because of the evanescent character of their
effects and of the impurities of animal slaughter, etc.,
which they involve. Even the Sdnkhya however recog-
nises in the scriptural duties a certain efficacy to lead to
consequences of happiness and the like.

Hence with nearly all Hindu systems the code of duty
comprises not only the ethical code proper but also the
ceremonial code of Yedic injunctions and prohibitions.
The analysis of conscience or consciousness of duty thus
resolves itself into the analysis of the consciousness of
authority which attaches to a scriptural imperative or
prescription. What is the nature of this Imperative or
Command? How does it present itself as authoritative
to the consciousness of the Moral agent ? What precisely
is its relation to the motive of the latter ? These are some
of the questions which arise out of the imperative and

S. K. RtAITRA

ite

impelling character ascribed to YidhivAkyas or prescrip-
tions of scripture. The answer to these questions gives
us the analysis of conscience or consciousness of duty.

In the> previous chapter we have dealt with the
psychology of volition with special reference to the
question of the motive to will. We have there considered
two principal views of the character of the motive. It
can be seen that these different views of the psychological
motive will lead in their ethical application to different
views of conscience and of schools of ethics. The ques-
tion of conscience is the question of the relation of the
psychological motive to the moral imjterative. Hence the
conceptions of the motive and of the moral imperative
will lead to corresponding differences in the conception
of conscience. We may suppose, e.g., that all acts are
done with a view to some ishta, a desirable end or good,
that this ishta or end is pleasure or happiness, or that it
is some form of satisfaction other than pleasure, or again
that it is an end other than either pleasure or satisfaction.
Or, we may suppose that some acts are their own ends and
do not stand in need of an ishta or extraneous end. It is
obvious that these different views of the motive will also
lead to different conceptions of the moral imperative and
thus to different views of conscience. Similarly we may
also conceive Vidbi or Scriptural Imperative in as many
different ways. We may suppose, e.g.^ that it is only an
additional motive appealing by means of ishtasAdhantd or
qonduoiveness to good. This will give us the hedonistic or
Eudoemonistic view of conscience. We may suppose again
that it is an independent source of authority which provides
a new end, or again that Yidhi is its own end. It is
obvious our conception of conscience will differ in each
case according to our conception of the ShAstric Imperative.

We have therefore to consider the nature of Yidhi-
YAkya or So^tvyral Imperative and the character of its

THE ETHICS OP THE HINDUS lir

impelling force or obligatoriness, we have to consider
not only the general character of the Shdstrio Imperative
hut also its relation to the empirical motive of the indivi-
dual. We shall therefore first consider the general mean-
ing or import of a Vedic prescription and we shall next
consider the relation between the imperative or command
involved in such a prescription and the empirical will of
the individual.

The nieming of chodand, Vidhivdkya or Vedic Pres-
cription : —

What then is the nature of a Chodand or Shastric
prescription ? What is the special mark or function
of a Vedic injunction which distinguishes it from
an empirical imperative or command ? The question
is considered in the ‘ Shavarabhdshya* on the Jaimini
Sutras where the nature of chodand is described.
It is pointed out that a Shdstric prescription has
evidential value and validity in regard not only to
the present but also the past, the future, the super-
sensuous, the remote and the mediate. Hence it
transcends all the limitations of space and time and
produces knowledge only of what is artha, tattva or reality.
It is thus superior as a source of knowledge to sense-
experience (indriyas) as well as the other sources of know-
ledge. These latter cannot cross all limits of space and
time while chodand transcends all limitations. Chodand
bhutam bhavantam bhavishyantam sukshmam vyavahitam
viprak^shtam ityevam jdtiyam artham shaknoti adhiga-
mayitum, na anyat kimchana indriyam. Chodand thus
bridges the gulf between the empirical and the non-
empirical, the phenomenal and the transcendental. No
other pramdna or means of knowledge is capable of this.
Hence chodand has the highest authority as pramdna and
this constitutes its obligatoriness on the moral agent
as duty or dharma.

Its

S. K. maitra

The question therefore is : how is such a chodand or
Vedic prescription empirically known ? How is the ■
authority of a Scriptural Imperative empirically revealed
to the mural agent P This leads us to the next question,
Dig.

The Genesis of Vidhipmiyaya^ Conscience, or Cons-
dausness of the Imperatice.

The question here is : how does this Moral Imperative
as embodied in a Scriptural Prescription establish itself
as authoritative in the consciousness of the moral agent ?
What is the nature of the process by means of which a
Vidhivdkya or scriptural prescription reveals itself as
obligatory or morally binding ?

It may be supposed that we have here only a particular
form of physical or psychological necessity, that the
command establishes itself in consciousness just as will
accomplishes itself in the action willed, i.e,, by a process
in time. This is the view of the Bhdttas according to
which the Imperative is of the nature of bhdvand,
becoming. There is a moral order and there are facts
relating to that order whose nature is that of causation.
These are the moral causes which are analogous to
physical causes.

The Prabhdkaras here join issue with the Bhdttas.
Scriptural prescriptions are of the nature ef niyoga which
is indeed a fact of the moral order, but is a realised
or accomplished fact and as such is not becoming but
being. This distinguishes its relation to the moral agent
from kriyakartrsambandha, the relation of the doer to
bis deed. The latter is a relation of causation, of
psychological determination of the will. Hence it is
essentially process, becoming or bhdvand in which the
motive prompts or realises the act. Here however we
have the revelation of something accomplished to the
consciousness of the moral agent, a verity of the moral

THE ETHICS OP THE HINDUS 119

order revealing itself as self-established, self-authoritatiye
« Law to the individual. Hence we have here an original
or unique relation — the relation of a command to the
agent commanded (preishya-preisha-sambandha) which
differs radically from the relation of Kartd or agent;to
his kriyd or action willed. The latter is a relation of
causation while this is only a relation of revelation
which makes known the Law (prabartandm jndpayati).
Eevelation is not causation being merely illumination
of enlightenment. Niyoga only reveals the Law but does
not compel, moral prompting being entirely different
from physical or psychological prompting.

The Bhdttas however contend that the assumption of
two kinds of relation is uncalled for and unnecessary.
The concept of becoming (bhdvand) suffices to explain
the authority of a Scriptural Imperative. When one
hears a scriptural injunction one is conscious of two
bhdvands or operative processes. It is these two processes
that account for the obligatoriness or moral authority
of such injunctions. (Iha hi lin ddi yukteshuvdkyeshu,
dv4 bhavan^ pratiyatd shabdabbavana arthabhdvand oha.)
Thus one becomes conscious of a shabdabhdvand or
operative process of the imperative when one hears a
scriptural injunction and one is also conscious of an
arthabhdvand or process of becoming in the self through
which the imperative is realised in action. These two.
processes together constitute the mode of operation
of the Vidhi or Scriptural Imperative in consciousness*
One is a vydpdra or operative process of the shabda,
i.e., of the Imperative itself. It is shabdabhdvana, the
operative agency of the categorical Imperative which
calls forth purushaprabrtti or volition in the moral
agent. The other is a vydpdra or operative process in the
purusha, i.e., in the individual himself. It is arthabhd*
vand or operative agency of the individual’s will which

ISO

S. K. MAITRA

brings about the act. The one is a process outside
the individual, the other a process within him. The
shabda-yydpAra, the causal operation of the Imperative
induces purushavydpdra, the process of volition in the
individual, and this latter realises the act which is to be
done.

Tobhdvanakriydkarttrvishayaprayojakavydpdrah
purushasthah sa arthabhdvand yastu sHabdaga-
taprayojakavydpdrah yatra purushaprabrtti,
sddhyatayd pratipddyate sa shabdabhdvand

(“ Nyaymcmjari ”)
Tatra purushaprabrttyanukulobhdvayetuh vyd-
pdravisheshah shdbdibhdvand. Sd cha linam*
shena uchyate. Lin shravani^ ayam mdm
pravartayati, matprabrttyanukulah vydpdravdn
ayam iti niyamena pratitih. Sd cha bhdvand
amshatrayam apekshate sddhyam, sddhanam iti>
karttavyatdm cha. Kimbhdvayet, kena bhdvaye^,
katham bhdvayet. Tatra Sddhydkdnkshdyam
drthibhdvand sddhyatvena anveti.

(“ Arthamimdmsd ” of LatigdksM
Bhaakam a writer on JPurm-
wtimdmaa).

In Kantian language we may say there is an operative
agency (vydpdra) of the Pure Reason prescribing to the
will, laying down a certain form for the guidance of
the latter. This is shdbdibhdvand or shabdavydpdra. It
is to be distinguished from drthibhdvand or purushavyd-
pdra which is the will realising something, ».e., seeking
a particular satisfaction or accomplishing itself in a
specific way.

How then are the two bhdvands related ? According
to Kumdrila, the relation of the two operations being that
of ekapratyaydbhidheyatva, being expressed in one and
the same there cannot be any priority or posteriority

THE ETHICS OF THE HINDUS 121

between them, logical or chronological. As a matter of
* fact the shahdahhdvand necessarily involves the artha*
bhdvand. Thus the shahdabhdvand, the operation of the
Imperative supposes three things : (1) stidhya or Siomething
to he realised, (2) sddhana or means whereby to realise
this something, and (3) itikarttavyatd or manner of
realising this something by the proper means. Now the
sadhydmsha, i.e,, the object to be realised by operation of
the Imperative is the inducement of purushaprabrtti, the
volition of the agent. This inducement of the agent’s
will leads necessarily to the realisation of the empirical
action which is arthabhdvand. Hence arthabhdvand is a
necessary implicate of shabdabhdvand being involved
in its sadhydmsha or part constituting the object to be
realised.

Consider for example the case of any particular
Vidhi or Imperative such as ‘yajeta’ (sacrifice in such and
such ways). Here the injunctive or imperative consists
of two parts — (1) the pari which constitutes the dhdtu or
root expressing the nature of the act, vh., the sacrifice,
and (2) the affix or pratyaya which expresses the act in
the form of a command or imperative.

The latter, i.e., the pratyaya or affix again is
divisible into (1) akhydtatva, i.e., conjugational affix in
general common to all tenses (dashakdiddhikarana) and
(2) li^itva which expresses the element of imperative or
command.

Now what is expressed here by the affix or pratyaya,
i.e., by the injunctive or lip of the akhydta ? It expresses
both shabdabhdvand, i.e., the prompting force or operation
of the imperative and arthabhdvand or operation of the
will which brings about the act of sacrifice. Thus the
operation of the imperative (the shabdabhdvand) consists
in the inducement of the agent’s will (purushaprabj’tti),
this being its sddbydmsha or object to be realised, and the
16 -

122

S. K. MAITRA

will which is thus generated necessarily leads to
arthabhdvand, the realisation of the act of sacriftce.
Hence the operation of the imperative necessarily
involves the operation of the empiiical will which brings
about the act, so that the two bhavanj1.s, processes or
operations are co-ordinate, the one necessarily implying
the other.

Some Bhdttas however differ from Kumarila in this
respect, i.e., as regards the two processes being co-ordinate
or same in rank. Thus some hold that as the shabda-
bhdvand induces or leads to the arthabhdvand, the former
is primary (pradhdna) while the latter is auxiliary (guna).
Others again hold that as it is the avtha, the object which
is realised that determines the operation of the injunctive,
the arthabhdvand is the principal operation, the shabda-
bhdvana being only auxiliary or subservient.

The Prdbhdkaras however do not accept two bhdvands
or operations. We are not conscious of two bhdvands
or processes when we hear a scriptural in j unctive or
Vidhivakya. We arc conscious only of one bhdvana or
process, viz.^ the process of volition in the agent which
realises the act. This is arthabhdvana which is subordi-
nate to the Vidhi whose essence is injunction, i.e., revela-
tion of the Law as authoritative as distinguished from
causal determination or compulsion. The lin expresses
this injunctive or imperative character of the Vidhi or
scriptural prescription and not any causal operation
(bhdvand) nor the meaning of the root (dhdtvartha). A
scriptural command or Vidhi is obligatory by its very
nature and necessarily reveals itself as authoritative
or binding in the consciousness of the agent. It is
cognised through a unique mode of consciousness, atmd-
kutavishesha, *.<?., a specific wave, excitement or impulse
in the Self which is svaprakdsha or self-luminous like the
Self. Ghodi^ndvdkya, the scriptural prescription, is the

The ethics op the Hindus I23

occasion, nimitta or karana which induces this feeling of
•impulsion in the Self. On hearing such a maxim or
prescription one becomes conscious of this impulsion in
one-self. It is a self-validating experience, this Atmdkuta
or impulsion in the Atman which validates the Moral
Imperative in consciousness. This Atmdkuta is not
however peculiar to moral impulsion or preranA It
exists also in laukikaprerana or non-moral impulsion,
f’or example, it is present in request, invitation and other
non-moral experience. Psychologically this moral prerana
and the non-moral or laukika prerana are the same. In
both cases there is this Atmakuta or impulse in the Self.
This is a unique feeling which cannot be further analysed.
If one has experienced it one knows what it is ; if «ne
has not experienced it one cannot understand what it is.
It is a self-validating impulsion which is induced by
shahda or verbal command and has thus the latter as its
pramdna or instrumental cause. We first know it in
empirical, non-moral expereince as in request, invitation
and the like. In the ease of chodandvdkyas we hare
a certain nirupddhika vidhi or unconditional command
which necessarily induces this feeling of impulsion.
This is the knowledge-inducing or jndpaka function
of a scriptural maxim or vidhivdkya. By producing
this impulsion or Atmdkuta it becomes prabartaka, a
motive to the will. The Imperative thus impels only
in the sen.se of revealing the Law as duty, i.a., by
inducing the knowledge of its authority. It is this
sense of the authority of the Imperatiye in the form of
the cognition that it is binding or obligatory on me as
duty that constitutes the pi’avartakatva, the power
of motivation of the Vidhi. Preritoahamatra iti tu
jndnajanakatvnm vidheh prabartakatvam.

Linadibhyo vidhih pratiyate katham ? ...vyutpat-
tisbeha asya vyavahdrat avakalpate, gachchha, adhishva,

124

S, K. MAITRA

itti shrnvan briddbah cheshiamdno drs^hyate. ChestA
cha svatmani prabairttikA avagamapurvikA dpshtA.
Fratyakshadrshte cha amrAdau sukhasAdhanatayA
anvayavyAtirekAbhyAm avagatd tadanusmaranAt
prabartAmAnah kasmimshchidAtraAkutc samupAtA sati
bhautikam vyApAram ArabbalA. Sashcha Atmadharmah
AtiuA iva svasamvedyah. Ahampratyay agamy o bi AtmA
nasau parasmai darshayitum shakyatA, na cba na
charcbchayitum shakyatA. TathA ayam Atmani
bhautikavyApArahetuh Atmakutavisheshah na pramAnAn*
taravedyah bhavati. Nacha na vedyatc,.,8habdebhyah
sah avagamyate tathA na anyatah iti ataeva pramAnAn*
taragocharadbarma ityAhuh.

The AtmAkuta is thus no subtile force acting on the
agent. Its function is to move the agent by making the
Vidhi known. This motivation by revelation of the Law
is radically different from bhAvanA. The latter is causal
determination or compulsion ; this is mere illumination
or enlightenment.

The NaiyAyikas however reject the BhAtta as well as
the PrAbhAkara conception of the Moral Imperative.
According to them there is here neither any impersonal
operation of the Imperative (shabdabhAvanA) nor any
unique feeling of impulsion. The authority of the Vidhi
is only the desire for the consequence presenting itself in
the form of moral obligation or duty. There is nothing
unique in this consciousness of authority, it being only
a form of phalecbchhA or desire for the consequence.
As ichohhA or desire it is svasamvedya, i.e., known
through itself. It is not shabdaikagocharab, induced
only by shabda or verbal command. Being a compound
of smrti, past experience, and abhilAsha, desire, it may
arise with or without a verbal command (smaranAt
abhBAshena vyavahArah prabarttate — “ NyAy-manjari”).
The Iihi^^tive appeals through this experience of the

THE ETHICS OF THE HINDUS 126

consequence which it promises or holds out. Its valida-
tion in consciousness is therefore only purushavydpdra, i.e.,
a process in the moral agent consisting in the impulsion
of desire which arises from the expectation of the conse-
quence. Scriptural Imperatives are of course personal
commands being the prescriptions of the Lord to
imperfect finite beings. There is compulsion implied in
such commands but this is only because the Lord creates
good and evil througli his injunctions and prohibitions.
Whatever the Lord commands is good and is good became
the Lord commands it. Similarly whatever the Lord
forbids is evil and is evil because the Lord forbids it.
The authority of the scriptural prescriptions on the will
of the agent is thus a vydpdra or process in the ^gent
himself: it is the desire for the good and aversion
tow'ards the evil involved in the injunctions and prohi-
bitions of scripture as the Lord’s commands. It is these
desires and aversions in the agent tliat are the real
operative forces and moral authority is the operation of
good and evil through the agent’s subjective desires
and aversions.

Hence according to the Naiyayikas Vidhi is a personal
command w'hich compels acceptance through phalecbchhd
or desire for the consequence. It is thus compulsion,
but only the compulsion of the subjective desire for good
acting through the command of a Superior Person and
compelling obedience through the promise of the result.
It thus differs from shabdabhavand which is an impersonal
operation of the Imperative on the consciousness of the
agent and acts on the latter independently of phalechchbd
or desire for the consequence. It also differs from niyoga
which reveals the imperative as an end in itself through
the feeling of dtmdkuta or impulse in the Self. The
dtmdkuta only enlightens, revealing the Law as self-
authoritative or obligatory in l^itself ; it does not compel

U6

S. K. MAITRA

as according to the Naiydyika nor act through the
phalechchhA or desire for the consequence.

Vidhi therefore may be conceived either as Personal
command ac again as mere Impersonal Law without a
personal source or authority. Again it may be supposed
to act empirically through phalechchhd or desire for the
consequence or non-empirically either through the im-
personal operation of the Imperative or by mere revelation
of the Law. The consciousness of Vidhi thus involves
preranA or sense of obligation in the agent which may be
conceived either as obligation to a Superior Person or
again as the impulsion of Impersonal Law realising or
revealing itself in consciousness as authoritative. We
shall therefore have to consider the nature and implications
of this preranA or sense of duty or obligation which a
Vidhi necessarily implies.

Analysis of Vverand or Sense of Ohliyation.

We have seen that it is the very nature of Vidhi as
Imperative to inspire the consciousness of duty or
obligation in the agent. We shall therefore have to
consider what is involved or implied in this impelling
character of the Imperative. Hence we shall have to
consider not only the nature of this impulsion or prei^nA
but also the source from which it is derived. And we
shall also have to consider how this obligatoriness or
impelling character stands related to the act which is
commanded. Lastly we shall have to consider whether
such obligation implies the subjective freedom of the
moral agent and any objective personal source of the
Imperative. Hence the questions to be considered are : —

(a) Whence does Vidhi derive its prerakatva obliga-
tory force on the moral agent ? What is it that determines
the authority of the Imperative in the consciousness of
the individual,? Is it ishtasAdhanatA or conduciveness

THE ETHICS OF THE HINDUS

127

to ^00(1 ? In that case, what is this ishta or good ? Is
it sukha or empirical pleasure ? Or is it duhkhdbh^va,
mere freedom from suffering ? Or is the Imperative
its own end which validates itself independently of any
extraneous end ?

(b) What is the nature of this impelling character or
prerakatva ? AY'hat is moral impulsion or moRxl prompt-
ing ? Is it compulsion ? Or is it inducement by mere
enlightenment ? Is there any difference between moral
and psychological prompting ?

(/?) How is prerakatva, the impelling function of the
Imperative, related to anushteyatva and kd,ryatva, its
function of objective prescription of a duty ? How is
subjective obligation related to the objective act enjoined ?
What is the ohjecllce content of the subjective impulsion
or obligation ? Is it the imperative or command itself ?
Or is it something other than the command, i.e., some
ishta, end or good which is implied in the command ?

{d) What docs prerana or obligation imply subjectively
and objectively t Docs it imply freedom in the subject
who feels the obligation ? Does it again imply any
objective personal source of the Imperative to whom the
subject is to owe his obligation ?

We have already partially considered the first two
questions in connection with the Genesis of Vidhi-Pratyaya.
AVe shall here go over the same questions again from
another point of view. This w'ill be necessary as much
for a complete analysis of prerand or obligation as for a
fuller and more detailed consideration of these questions :
(a) The source of the obligatoriness of Vidhi.

The first question to be considered therefore is : what
is the source of the obligatoriness or impelling character
of the Imperative ? Is the Vidhi or Imperative cognised
as authoritative because of its conduciveness to good ?
Or, is it authoritative in itself? It will be seen that the

128

S. K. MAITRA

answer to these questions will depend on our conception
of the psychological motive? If the motive is always
the consciousness of some good, the Moral Imperative
must also appeal through the consciousness of good. If
the motive however implies no such consciousness, the
imperative will he oblig3,tory independently of all consi-
derations of utility. The question of the ultimate source
or ground of moral obligation is thus intimately connec-
ted with that of the nature of the psychological motive.

In the “ Analysis of Volition ” we have seen that —

(1) Por the Chdrvakas, the motive is always pleasure
and volition follows necessarih/ when there is a balance of
pleasure over pain.

(2) Forthe NaiyAyikas, the motive is some ishta or good,
but this is not necessarily pleasure. It is either pleasure
or the avoidance of pain in the case of kdmyakarmas, i.e.,
ordinary empirical actions from material motives. These
suppose attraction (rAga) and aversion (dvesha) in the
agent and thus have pleasure and the avoidance of pain
as motives. But for, the mumukshu, the person seeking
Transcendental Freedom, the ishta or good is dukhena
Atyantikah viyogah, total and absolute freedom from
suffering. It differs essentially from the avoidance of
pain which is prompted by aversion. Aversion is itself
of the nature of pain and the avoidance of pain which
it prompts is tainted by the pain of the aversion which
prompts it. Hence freedom from pain thus attained is
never absolute freedom. But the freedom which the
mumukshu seeks arises from dispassion or virakti.
Hence there is neither attraction nor aversion here, the
motive being the prompting of total and absolute freedom
from suflering sought from a dispassionate contemplation
of the vanity of all things temporal. We have thus
according to the NaiyAyika not merely the pathological
motives of'^t^e attraction of pleasure and aversion towards

THJS ETHICS OP THE HINDUS 120

pain, but also a non-patfaological motive in the case of
the person seeking his Transcendental Freedom, a motive
which consists in the pure or dispassionate ^^sire fo^
Moksha as the total and absolute freedom from suffering.
Further, according to the Naiydyika, motives are not
given matters of fact which act mechanically on the
agent. They are themselves the effects of subjective
valuation or subjective self-determination, what is pleasure
to one and therefore a motive, being not necessarily
pleasure to another or a motive.

(3) For the Prdbhdkaras, however, the motive is not
ishtasddhanatdjndna or consciousness of a good, but
simply the cognition of something to be done as produced
by the representation of it as specifying the self. It is
the act to be done as self-appropriated or self-referred
which is the real motive and this need not present itself
as a good in order to move the will.

The motive thus may be conceived either as the
mechanical attraction of pleasure, or as a subjectively
determined value of good, or again as the Self itself as
identified with the act to be done. These psychological
differences in the conception of the motive will lead to
conresponding differences in the conception of duty or
moral obligation. If the motive, e.g.^ is mechanical
attraction, moral obligation will be only mechanical
compulsion. If the motive on the contrary is the good
as subjectively determined, moral obligation will be only
the authority of the agent’s freely chosen end or good
presenting itself as duty to his will. Lastly, if the m.otive
is simply the act as self-referred, moral obligation will
be only tile Imperative presenting itself as Law to the
agent.

' (1) Thus, according to the Ghdrvdkas the motive being
nothing but the mechanical attraction of pleasure, duty
or obligation is only the mechanical impulsipn of an
17

130

S. K. MAIT&A

anticipated happiness. The consequence or end, vis.^
a balance of pleasure over pain, constitutes, according to '
them, the essence of the psychological motive. Moral
obligation is the operation of the psychological motive
in moral action and is thus only the attraction of the
possible pleasure or happiness to be derived therefrom.
The obligatoriness of the Moral Imperative is therefore
only the causal operation of a foreseen or anticipated
happiness on the agent’s will.

(2) According to the Naiydyikas however, the motive
being the consciousness of ishta or good, the Imperative
derives its force from a sanction, mz.^ ishtasddhanatva
or conduciveness to good. The obligatoriness of the
Imperative is thus the worth or excellence of its end
appealing to the consciousness of the agent. But as this
worth or excellence itself depends on the agent’s kamand
or desire for the good and therefore on subjective
valuation or subjective preference, obligatoriness also
depends on the subjective ksimana or force of the agent’s
craving for the end or good. This kamand, subjective
ciaviug or ooiiative impulse in the agent, may be
pathological or pure. In the case of kdiuyakarmas or
actions from material motives, it is pathological being
either attraction for the good or aversion towards evil.
In the case of the desire for Moksha or Transcendental.
Freedom on the contrary, it is pure being free from
all pathological attraction (rdga) and aversion (dvesha).
Kdmand or subjective craving is thus a necessary factor
in all action, being a determinant of the subjective worth
or value of the end that constitutes the motive. In this
sense it also determines obligatoriness of the Imperative
just as does the worth of the end or good. A distinction
however has to be made between the subjective and the
objective aspects of the good as worthy or excellent.
The fact t^t the good acquires subjective value or worth

THE ETHICS OF THE HINDUS

131

through subjective preference or self-determination does
• not imply that it is objectively neutral. On the contrary
it has objective intrinsic worth or excellence though
this is presented to the subject only through Subjective
preference. Without aii objective value there cannot
bo a subjective value, though the latter implies, besides
the objective Value, an act of subjective valuation or
preference. The moral value has thus authority in two
senses. In the first place, it has objective intrinsic
authority as worthy or excellent, independently of the
agent’s choice or preference. Secondly, it has subjective
authority and this depends on the agent’s kdmand or
desire for the particular value or end. Even in this case
however the value itself is not created by the act, of
subjective valuation but only takes a sub jective significance
through it besides being a value in itself. Hence the
authority in 'this case is not brought into being, but only
mhjectivised or presented to the consciousness of the agent
through his kdmana or desire. This constitutes obligatori-
ness or subjective authority of the moral value which is
thus a compound of the objective authority of the end
and the force of the subjective desire or craving. Hence
according to the Naiydyikas, obligatoriness is to be distin-
guished from the objective authority of the Imperative.
In either case the authority is due to the Imperative being
conducive to some desired end or good. But the objective
authority arises from the intrinsic worth or value of the
end or good, while obligatoriness is due to this objective
value being subjectively appropriated through a particular
kdmand or desire. In other words, there is an intrinsic
worth in certain ends which ought to determine choice
and this is their objective authority which is thus indepen-
dent of our actually choosing them. When they are
actually chosen, they acquire subjective in addition to
their objective authority and this is their obligatoriness.

132

S. K. MAITRA

The Naiytiyikas point out that the nature of moral
obligation would be inexplicable without the conception <
of an end, good or ishta to be attained, there being no
discrimination possible between virtue (dharma) and vice
(adharma) without such a conception. Itarathd (pfaa*
Idbhdvd) hi arthdnarthaviveko na siddhyati (“ Nyayaman-
jari”). It is through the phala or consequence, for
example, that the wrongness of an act, like taking a
Brahmin’s life, becomes intelligible. Take away the
consequence and the negative injunction forbidding
such an act loses its meaning. (Evam punah brahmahat-
yaderapi naivdstyadbarmata (‘Nydyamanjari’).

(3) According to Kumdrila, the end, consequence or
phala determines only the motive and the choice, but not
the obligatoriness of the Imperative. The moral authority
of the Imperative is thus independent of the end or
consequence. The latter as constituting the motive is a
psychological condition of the moral action, but does not
determine the moral worth or excellence of it which has
intrinsic authority on the agent as Law. The phala or
consequence is only prabarttaka, i.e., a psychological
motive but is not vidheya, i.e., the object ol the moral
imperative. It is a psychological implicate of the moral
action, an end as motive being necessary for moral as for
all action, but it is not a moral implicate of the Impera-.
tive which is obligatory independently of the end or
consequence. The phala may even be a metaphysical
implicate of the vidhi or command, a command implying
necessarily something to be accomplished, but it does
not constitute its moral authority or obligatoriness.

This view of Kumdrila differs from the Ny4ya view in
two e^entials. In the first place, a phala or consequence
has to be conceived according to Nydya, not merely
because otherwise the Imperative will not be psychol^i-
cally impeUing but also because otherwise the distinctions

THE ETHICS OF THE HINDUS 18S

of right and wrong will all be meaningless. According to
Kum&rila the phala or consequence has to be conceived
because it is a logi(!0- metaphysical rather than a moral
implicate of the command or Imperative. * Secondly,
according to Ny<iya, the consequence as good or excellent
determines the objective authority of the Imperative
though not its subjective obligatoriness Avhich implies
something more, viz., the agent’s subjective preference
or kdmana. According to Kumarila however the conse-
quence enters only into the psychological motivation of
the act, and does not determine its authority or obligatori-
ness on the agent.*

Kumarila’s view, it will be seen, provides a plausible
ground fur the distinction of kamyadhikdra or relative
application of the Imperative and nityanaimittikudhikdra
or its unconditional application. Thus the Imperative in
the first instance is hypothetical being conditional on
the agent’s kdmand or desire : if you desire the end or
consequence, e.g., Svarga or happiness in heaven, the
Imperative binds you, embraces you within the scope of
its authority. But even in this case, the authority is
independent of the end, though coming into operation only
after the choice. In the case of nityanaimittikddhikdra or
unconditional application of the Imperative, there is also
phalakdmand, desire for an end, viz., pratyavdydbhdva or
avoidance of the sin that would follow on non-performance.
Here throughout life the agent is adhikfta or niyukta,
i.p., under the authority of the Imperative. But it is not
because of the phala or consequence, but because he is
niyuktapurusha or morally appointed by the Imperative,
that the latter binds him. There is indeed an end even
in nityanaimittaka or unconditional duty, but it is only
the agent’s motive that has reference to this end and not
the authority of the duty. The Imperative would not
have existed except for the artha or end to be realised by

134

S. K. MAITRA

the act, but it does not derive its imperative character
from tlio end, but has intrinsic, independent authority of
its own. The end is thus a psychological implicate or
accompaniment of the Imperative, and does not constitute
its moral authority.

('!•) For the JPrdbhdkarais however there is no
extraneous end in the Vidhi as Imperative, morally,
psychologically, or metaphysically. The Imperative is
its own end and constitutes the sanction, the motive as
well as the moral authoidty of the Vidhi. It is the
independent, intrinsic authority of the^ command which
determines motive and choice. The very moaning of the
Vidhi fis a command implies tin's authority on the
agent which thus determines choice because it oitght to
determine choice. The Vidhi thus constitutes its own
end and does not imply any extraneous end as motive.
The Naiyayika who conceives an external sanction for
the Imperative cannot explain moral obligation by his
superfluous conception. Beyond the external end there
must be another and thus the chain will drag on length-
ening from end to end. Consequential or prudential
morality thus leads to an indeflnite series of ends that
has no end. The external end to have moral authority
must lead to another, and that to another and so on
indefinitely. We are thus in the anavastha or instability
of an endless regress which the Naiydyika can avoid only
by investing the external consequence with intrinsic
independent authority. But such superfluous assumption
of an extraneous end which is an end-in-itself is neither
legitimate nor self-consistent. If an extraneous end
were to establish the authority of the Imperative in
consciousness, it must also itself be established likewise
through another, and if an end-in-itself is to be conceived
it is superfluous to assume any extraneous end of moral
autho^ty. „ fallacy of the Naiydyika consists in

135

THE ETHICS OF THE HINDUS

conceiving moral or Shastric Imperative on the analogy
of secular injunction. Since the latter appeals through
an external sanction, there must also be a sanction for
the scriptural Imperative. The Naiyayika forgets that
in the case of the latter we have something which is
ultimate, irreducible and absolute, while in the former
only that which is derived and relative. This essential
difference between a Shastric and a secular injunction
implies a corresponding difference behveen their respec-
tive authority. A secular injunction has only derived
and relative authority ; it is heteronomous. A moral
injunction (Yidhi) has absolute and independent autho-
rity : it is autonomous (svatantra). Shdstra is not so
weak as to be incapable of realising itself. In fact even
in secular injunction the impulsion itself is a unique
feeling and not a form of the desire for the consequence.
A consequence may be ordinarily implied, but the
prompting of the injunction is not the prompting of the
consequence through a subjective desire. The Naiyayika
also makes the mistake of supposing that the psychological
motive is necessarily the consciousness of some ishta or
good. It is this erroneous psychology which vitiates his
conception of moral authority or obligation. The motive
to will is simply the consciousness of something to bo
done as produced by the representation of the act as a
self-qualification. It is thus the self itself as identified
with the act to be done which acts as motive, and not
the consciousness of any good. In moral prompting, the
real motive is thus not any consciousness of good but
the Imperative itself as qualifying or specifying the
Self. The real motive is thus not the prompting of any
extraneous end or ishta, but the prompting of the Impera-
tive in consciousness, the consciousness of it as duty
as arising from the representation of it as qualifying the
Self. This prerand, subjective prompting or consciousness

136 S. K. aiAlTRA

of obligation as produced by the revelation of the Law
in consciousness is all that is required to move to action
and not any consciousness of au extraneous end as the
Naiyayika thinks. As a matter of fact there is no such
end or phala in nityachodands or unconditional duties :
these are obligatory throughout life and have to be
accomplished without reference to any good to be attained.
Hiese therefore cannot be satisfactorily explained
according to the Nydya consequentialism. The Naiydyika
is wrong in conceiving an end or phala as a necessary
accompaniment of the Yidhi or Command. A Vidhi
does not imply more than two anubandhas or necessary
accompaniments of itself, viz., (1) adhikdranubandha or
niyojya, i.e., an agent or person commanded (kasya
niyogah) and (2) vishaydnubandha, the act commanded
or enjoined (kutra niyogah). The consequence or end is
not one of these auxiliaries or necessary accompanimente
of the Imperative. The plialakalpana or conception of
an end is purushavuddhiprabhava, a representation of the
understanding of the individual. It is thus relative to
the understanding of the individual and not shdstriya, i.e.,
the intended meaning of scripture (atahparam phala-
kalpanam purushaviiddhiprabhavam na shdstriyam —
“ Nydyamanjari ”). The scriptural meaning implies only
two conditions of the Imperative, viz., a }iiyojya or agent
commanded and a vishaya or act commanded. The
command impels simply by revealing the act as obliga-
tory. Where the agent is impelled by lipsd or desire
for the consequence as in kdmyakarmas or duties from
empirical motives, the Imperative becomes udasina,
indifferent or morally neutral. Thus the Imperative in
kdmya duties merely declares the act being a means to
the end desired, its operation consisting only in the
establishment of this sddhyasildhanabbdva or end-and-
mealis ,yel%timr apd not in the investment of the end with

THE ETHICS OP THE HINDUS

187

moral authority. The Vidhi thus does not derive its force
• from any extraneous end either in kdmya or in nitya
or unconditional duties. In an unconditional duty, the
Imperative is its own end and sanction and is thus self-
authoritative or self- validating, while in kdmya actions it
is without any imperative character, its function being
merely to establish a relation of means and end between
the act and the consequence desired to be attained thereby :
Ydhye tu prabrttllakshan^ bhautik6 vydpdr^ yatra lipsyddi
prabarttakdntaram asti tatra bhavanti api vidheh prayok-
trshaktih uddstd.

Fratishedhddhikard api pratyavdyo na kalpatd
Nishedhyavishayddeva labdhatvddadhikdrinah
Tatrdsau kalpyamdno api narakddiphalddayah
A.vaidhatvam prapadyeta, na hydkdnkshedrshi

vidheh.

Vidherapekshd dvd eva niyojyavishayau prati
Tatpurand trptastu na vdnchhatd tatoadhikam
Niyojyastdvadetdvdnkruddho arihananodyatah
Yishayastannibrttishcha niyogo yatra gamyatd

(“ Nydyamanjari”)

What is true of Yidhi or positive injunction is also
true of Nishedha or negative prescription. Here also
there is no extraneous end, the Imperative being authori-
tative in itself and constituting its own end. The concep-
tion of an extraneous end, e.g., avoidance of pratyavdya
or sin and consequent penalty is purushavuddhiprabhava,
a product of the understanding which has nothing to do
with the intrinsic moral authority of the prohibition. The
prohibitory Imperative has both the two necessary accom-
paniments (anubandhadvaya) without reference to any
ulterior end or consequence. Thus the adhikdra, the
scope of the Imperative is given in the nishedhyavishaya,
the prohibition of the act. Hence the Imperative does

18 •

138

S. K. MAITRA

not need to point beyond itself to any extraneous end.
What it prescribes is simply refraining from the act <
forbidden, i.e., non-doing of what is not to be done. The
doing here prescribed is thus not non-doing or refraining
from the non-doing or not-to-be-done action. It is only
ayoiding or refraining from the non -doing and not the
consequences of the non-doing or not-to-be-done action
which the Imperatire has in view. By doing one simply
ayoids the non-doing and what the non-doing is. There is
thus no ulterior end, no pathological motive, the Impera-
tive or doing which is not non-doing or refraining from
the not-to-be-done act being itself the end.

Hence the Imperative directly imports nothing but
Niyoga or the command enjoined. This is true of the
positive as well as the negative form of the Imperative,
there being no direct implication of phalasddhanatd or
conduciveness to an end in either case. But the phala or
consequence may be indirectly implied in some cases, e.ff.,
in the case of Imperatives which prescribe duties with
reference to the satisfaction of particular desires. These
are the kdmyakarmas or duties to be performed in view of
some desired end or good. Empirical motivation being
the essence of such actions or duties^ there is necessary
implication of an end or consequence. But such implica-
tion is indirect and not direct, the moral authority of the
Imperative being independent of such implication. Thus
(1) according to some, the Vidhi or Imperative being
universally authoritative (sarvatrapreraka) cannot lose its
imperative character (vidhdyakatva) even in kdmyakarmas.
Hence it has moral authority even in these duties for the
realisation of empirical ends — a gMosi-obligatoriness which
does not come into full operation on account of the agent’s
subjective desire for the consequence. Hence its actual
operation becomes restricted to the itikartyavatdmsha, to
the manner^of accomplishing the end and does not extend

THE ETHICS OP THE HINDUS 189

to the phal^lmsha, the end itself. In other words, the
•Imperative merely reveals the act as a means to the end
desired instead of establishing its authority or obligatori-
ness on the agent. Objectively the Vidhi indeeRl implies
this authority as an Imperative or Command but this fails
to come into operation on account of the agent’s subjective
desire for the end. Since the agent is moved by his desire
or lipsd, the Vidhi becomes uddsina, morally neutral or
inoperative. The Moral Imperative can only be absolutely,
independently authoritative. It thus necessarily loses its
character of motivation where a pathological desire domes
into operation, (ii) Others of the Prdbhdkaras hold
however that the Injunctive (Linddipratyaya) directly
imports only the Command, Niyoga or the act as duty, but
since the agent (niyojya) must also be actuated to the act
commanded, it follows by logical implication (sdmarthya)
that the act in question must be conducive to the end
which brings him under the scope of the Imperative. The
direct meaning of the Vidhi is thus the act commanded
and the phala or end enters through the adhikdrdnubandha
or condition of its application : the duty can impel only
as the agent comes under its scope, and as this adhikdra
or application of the duty implies the agent’s desire for.
the end, the end is logically implied in the duty or
Imperative. In other words, the Vidhi as Imperative
signifies mere objective duty, and since it can acquire
subjective authority only through the agent’s desire tor
the end tvhich brings him under its application, the end
must also be logically implied in the Imperative as being
involved in the condition of a proper adhikdri or agent
under the Imperative. (iU) According to others again the
phala or end is intolred by implication in the very
meiming of the sentence embodying the commaud. Thus
there is anvaya, connexion by meaning or import,
between the niyojya, the person commanded and the

140

1^. K. MAlTtlA

vishaya, the act commanded. Now the iiiyojya, the
agent commanded, in the case of a kdmya duty for the
satisfaction of a desire, is a person who is under the
influence df the particular desire {e.g.^ desire for srarga
or happiness in heaven). It follows therefore that there
must be a nexus of meaning between the enjoined acts
{e.g., the sacrifice and the like) and the agent under the
injunction {e.g.^ the person desiring the happiness of
heaven). But such connexion of meaning would be
impossible if the sacrificial acts (ydgddi) were not
related to the desired end, viz., happiness in heaven,
as guna to pradhdna, i.e., auxiliary to principal or means
to end, from which follows sddhyasddhanabhdva or the
relation of means to end between the enjoined acts and
the desired consequence. Hence according to {ii) and (in)
the end (phala) is implied in kdmyakarma though not
directly present in the consciousness of the Imperative
as authoritative or morally impelling, while according to
(i) the presence of the end to the agent’s consciousness
as a motive makes, the Imperative morally inoperative.
(qf. ” Vivaranaprameyasangraha.”)

NIB . — Some of the FrdbhAkaras conceive phalasddha-
natd or conduoiveness to an end even in nitya or
unconditional duties, though not admitting a direct
knowledge of it in the person commanded. The end is
only implied in the command, but not consciously present
to the agent as a motive.

Hence according to the Ghdrvdka, the obligatoriness
of duty is only the mechanical attraction of pleasure while
according to the Naiydyikas it is only its ishtasddhanatd
or conduoiveness to an end appealing through the agent’s
desire. For the Bhdttas and the Prdbh&karas on the
contrary it is independent of extraneous ends, an end
being only necessary to constitute the psychological motive
and not moral authority of the duty according to the

The ethics op the Hindus hi

Bhdttas, and being only implied and never consciously
present to the agent, if present at all, according to the
Frdbhdkaras. These different views of the nature of
moral authority or obligatoriness imply also Correspond*
ingly different views of the nature of the operation of
the Imperative on the agent’s consciousness. The next
question therefore to be considered is

(b) Wbat constitutes the prerakatm, th" impelling
force of the Lupemtive or Vidhi.

The question here is : how does the moral Imperative
act on the agent’s will ? How does it influence conscious*
ness so as to lead to the accomplishment of the duty ?
Does it act mechanically just as one physical object acts
on another ? Or does it act in some other manner which
differs altogether from mechanical action and constitutes
a category by itself ?

(1) We have already seen that for the Chdrvdkas the
obligatoriness of the Vidhi is only the attraction of
pleasure. Hence in this view the operation of the
Imperative on the agent’s will will be only the mechani*
cal attraction of the anticipated happiness. This is
extreme hedonistic determinism.

(2) As against this we have the Refined Consequential*
ism and Self*determinism of Nydya which recognises a
pure desire for the Good besides the pathological motives
of pleasure-seeking and pain*avoiding. According to
this view the Imperative being obligatory through
ishtasddhanatd or conduciveness to an end, the operation
of the Imperative in consciousness is the operation
of the desired end or good to which it conduces. But
since the end itself is constituted or determined by the
■subjective desire or kdmand, the action of the Imperative
implies also the action of the desire in the agent’s
consciousness. The operation of the Imperative thus

S. K. MAITRA

14e

consists in awakening the dormant desire by presenting
adequate means for satisfying it. The Imperative
presents the duty as conducive to the end. Tf the
agent’s desire is awakened thereby, tbe duty acts on the
agent’s will as being conducive to the desired end.
Provided there is the desire or kdmana, the Yidhi
becomes operative, but the particular kdmand or desire
depends on the agent’s subjective preference.

(3) According to Kumdrila the operation of the
Imperative is independent of any extraneous end just as
is its authority or obligatoriness. A scriptural Injunctive
( Yidhi vdkya) is charged with a peculiar prompting force
(shabdabhdvand) which is of the nature of causation.
This calls forth purushaprabrtti, the agent’s will which
leads to the accomplishment of the act (arthabhdvand).

(4) According to the Prdbhdkaras, we have here
something different from causation or bhdvand. Bhdvand
is that in the agent which causes what was not: it
is the causality of the will and actual willing or krti.
Niyoga is not bhdvand in this sense : it does not cause or
determine or bring into being. It is only a prerand or
authoritative suggestion to the will. This suggestion is
only the revelation of the Law as imperative and is
distinct from physical or psychological compulsion or
determination. Prerand, moral prompting, implies prai*
shyapraishasambandha, the relation of the command to
the agent commanded. It thus differs from bhdvand or
causation which is kriydkarttrsambandha or relation of
the act of willing to the agent who wills it. Through
this relation of command to the commanded, prerand or
moral obligation is realised or revealed to the agent.
Henoe it comes first, is primary (prathama) in the con-
sciousness of duty or moral impulsion. There is also
kriyakarttfsambandhah, the relation of the act to the
agent willing^ but that is only secondary or derivative

THE ETHICS OP THE HINDUS 148

(pdsehdtyah). Ayam adyah sambandhah, pdsohdtyahstu
kriyakarttrsambandhah.

Tatra hi praishyapraishasambandbayo aambandho ava*
gamyat6. Kimanyashohitra kriydkarttrsambandbo u&va>
gamyat6 ? Na bramah ndvagamyat^ iti, kim tu praisbya-
praishalakshanah api sambandhah pratharaam avagamyat^.
Preshito hi kriydm karttum udyaohohbati. Satyam
kriydsambaadhitayd sambhantsyat6 kriyaydcha (*Nya>
yamanjari ’).

Moral Impulsion thus inrolves the agent’s relation to
the command as well as his relation to the act commanded,
but the latter is derivative being mediated through the
former relation which is the revelation of the Law. The
latter thus implies the former as its reason or ground, the
agent’s relation to the act or actual willing of the duty
implying, besides the psychological process of the moral
choice, the consciousness of the Imperative as its ground
or prius. We have thus two moments or factors in the
complex constituting moral willing — ( 1 ) the bhautikavyd*
pdra or empirical process in the agent which is derivative
and secondary and is of the nature of bhdvand, causation
or becoming and (2) the ground or reason of it which is
prerand or moral impulsion and is mere revelation of the
Law as distinguished from compulsion, mechanical deter-
mination or causation.

It may be objected that prerand or moral impulsion
is itself a form of action or kriyd and thus the two
sambandhas or relations are same in essence. But this
misses the fundamental character of moral obligation
which is only knowledge-inducing (jndpaka) and not
action-making (kdraka). Enlightenment (jndna) is not
causation (kriyd). The rational motive is no subtile force,
jndpaka, what reveals, and kdraka, what compels, being
fundamentally distinct. The Vidhi, the Imperative is a
motive (prabarttaka) simply by its function of revelation

S. K. MAITRA

U4

of the Law, i.e.^ of the act as something commanded.
Its suggestive force is through an appeal to the reason,
hut does not amount to a compulsion of the will. Nanu
nodam ubhayam hhavati preshah api kriyd eva. Fra-
harttanam hi kurvvan prabarttayati ityuchyat^, soayam
kriydsambandhah eva bhavati na tatoanyah praishyaprai-
shasambandhah iti. Preritoaham atra iti tu jndnajana-
katvam vidheh prabarttakatvam sah eshah prabarttanam
jndpayati na karoti iti anyah eva ayam kriyakarttrsam-
bandhdt praishyapraishasarabandhah (‘ Nydyamanjari ’).

There are different forms of prerand, impulsion or
suggestion as in request (anurodha), invitation (niman-
trana), favour-seeking (adhyeshana), etc. These are
expresssed by the different moods, viz., lota, lip, etc.
They are only different modes or modalities of prerand or
suggestion, being due to the differences of upddhis or
modalising circumstances (Aupddhikdh abdntarabheddh).
The modalising factors are the circumstances of its
prayoga or application, i.e., the particular position of the
impelled relatively to the preraka or person impelling.
Thus the suggestion (prorand) may be of an equal to an
equal (samavishayaprayoga), or of a superior to an inferior
(hinavishayaprayoga), or again of an inferior to a superior
(jydyavishayaprayoga). In each case we have impulsion
or suggestion in a particular form or mode and the
particular form or mode is determined by the special
circumstances of the suggestion as arising from the
position of the person suggesting relatively to that of the
person to whom he addresses his suggestion. In every
case we have therefore the same thing, viz., impulsion
though particularised or modalised hy the peculiar cir-
cumstances of its application. In no case however is this
impulsion of the nature of causation or compulsion. It
is always suggestion by enlightenment and is to *be
distinguish^ from nijartha which is compulsion. Herein

THE ETHICS OP THE HINDUS 146

the relation of praisha or command differs from the
relation of doer and his deed (kriydkarttrsambandha).
The latter admits of different degrees of freedom : the
agent may be partially compelled (kdrita). 'Not so the
former, there being no compulsion in inducement by
knowledge which only reveals the Law and leaves the
agent free to choose. The function of enlightenment
ends with producing the consciousness of the Imperative,;
the actual willing of it being left to the agent’s freedom,
while the function of causation extends to actual willing,
i.e., to a determination of the agent’s choice. Tt is for
this reason that preraml, moral impulsion or persuasion
is possible only in the case of the prabartamdna, the
person capable of free will and choice : e.ff. a tree which
lacks this freedom of the will is also incapable of prerand
or moral persuasion by knowledge. (Anyd hi karotu,
kurydt iti pratitili, anyd cha kdrayati iti pratTtih.
Prayojakah vydpdrah hi nijarthah, indpakah vydpdrah
tu liQiarthah. Tatra hi kdryam pashyata,h prabarttanam,
iha tu prabarttitasya karyadarshnam iti mahdn bhedah.
Praishah prabarttamanam prerayati na aprabarttamdnam
sthdvaram iti, na banaspati uchyate yajasveti. Na sthd-
varddeh ayogyatvdt “ Nyaya-manjari).”

This impulsion or prerand is an Atmadharma or
subjective determination of the Self. Like the Atman
or Self it is svasamvedya, known only through itself. It
is not pramdndntaravedya, known through any ether
cognitive process or means of knowledge. It is an
ultimate irreducible fact of consciousness just as the Self
is or just as volition is. It is essentially a kind of
Atmdkuta, wave, excitement, or impulse in the Atma
which is not bhavand or becoming strictly speaking, but
which is itself the hetu, ground or reason, of the bhauti-
kavydpdra, the empirical, psychological process which
constitutes the willing of the act commanded, It can
19 •

146

S. K. MAITRA

only be felt where there is an imperative or command
(shabda, vidhivAkya) present to consciousness. It follows
therefore that dharma, the code of duties that are morally
obligatory,* cat! be known only through shabdapramdna
or scriptural commands : the duties imply prerand, moral
impulsion and are revealed through prerand and therefore
can be known only through authoritative commands
(shabda) and not through any other pramdna or means of
knowledge.

According to the Prdbhdkaras therefore impulsion
through suggestion or command is essentially of the
nature of enlightenment or inducement by knowledge
which does not interfere with the agent’s freedom or
compel obedience. It is thus no conative impulse in the
agent, though it may lead to it through the agent’s
subjective choice. It is however not the simple cognition
of a fact, but the cognition of an act or duty to be
accomplished, implying a unique feeling of excitement
or impulse in the Atman which is not however eonative
impulse or force. We have thus in prerand something
which is new and unanalysable, a new category of
determination which is not physical or psychological
determination. It is determination or impulsion
without compulsion or mechanical constraint on the
freedom of the will. According to the Bhdttas however
the two determinations are of the same order. The
shdbdibhdvand, the action of the Imperative is however
trans-subjective, being the operation of the Impersonal
Law on the agent’s will, while the drthLbhdvand,
the realisation of the Imperative • is «n^ro>8ubjeotive
being the agent’s accomplishment of the duty
through the psychological operation of the motive.
For the Naiydyikas on the contrary, there is no
et-subjective or trans-subjective operation, the action
of the Inoperative being only the operation of an end

147

THE ETHICS OP THE HINDUS

or good influencing will through the agent’s desire or
kdmand.

(e) The question however remains to be considered as
to what constitutes the object of the Infperative as
distinguished from its mode of operation on the agent’s
consciousness. Though distinct from the question of
operation or action, it is also closely connected with it.
The action, the mode of operation of the Imperative, may
be conceived only psychologically as the operation of an
end or object of the Imperative as distinct from the
Imperative itself, an end which operates through the
agent’s choice. It may also be conceived- unpsychologir
cally as independently operative, an end of the Imperative
to be accomplished being admitted at the same tjpie as
a psychological motive. Lastly, the imperative may be
conceived as being itself its own end and therefore as
the object to be accomplished, no extraneous end or
object of the Imperative being conceived. We have
therefore to consider this question of the end or object of
the Imperative and its I’elation to the impelling function
of the Imperative.

What, then, is the object of the Imperative ? What
is the anushtheya, the thing to be accomplished in the
Imperative ? Is the djnd, the command, itself the
anushtheya, the object to be accomplished P Or, does
the command point beyond itself to something to be
accomplished ? What is the kdrya, the objective content
of the ' duty in the Imperative ? Is the Imperative
or command itself the duty that impels ? Or, is the
prerakatva, the impelling function of the Imperative,
distinct from its anushtheyatva or function of an objective
prescription of something to be accomplished ? Is the
command distinct from what is commanded as duty P
Or is it itself the duty which is commanded to be
accomplished P

148

8. K. MAI'TrA

(1) The Bhdttas hold that the anushtheya, the object
of the Imperative, is an ishta, end or good. The
command necessarily refers to this end to be accomplished,
an end being logically implied in the command as well
as required tor psychological motivation in the execution
of it. The moral authority of the command is however
independent of this end which is only a psychological
and logical implicate of it. The moral impulsion
(shabdabhdvanA) is expsychological, the operation of
the end being confined to arthabhdvand or the psycho-
logical process of the accomplishment of the duty. It
is only through a specific content as end or object that
the operation of the Imperative embodies itself in
concrete empirical willing.

(2) According to the NaiyAyikas, however, there is
no preraka or impelling function of the Imperative
independent of its function of the prescription of an
end to be accomplished. The end as subjectively
determined by the agent’s desire or choice is not only
the object of the command or Imperative but also the
sanction of its authority or impelling function. We
no doubt speak of the Imperative or vidhi as being itself
impelling (preraka), but this is mere usage or conven-
tion (vyAvahAramAtra). The AjnA, the command, is not
itself the sampAdya, the object to be accomplished.
The {^ent (anushthAtA) certainly does not consider that
the command (AjnA) is itself to be accomplished
( sampAdyA ). In accomplishing his duty he is conscious
of accomplishing some ishta, end or good of his own.
It is this ishta or end therefore that constitutes the
object of the Imperative or Command, the AjnA, the
command itself serving only as an incitement to the
same or as a sanction ( in the juristic sense ). Hence what
impels is not the Command itself but the end or good
which it ho^s out. As a matter of fact, there may be

, ThE tlTHICS of THE HINDtJS 149

impulsion even witout a command, e.g., men may be
prompted to action from the mere knowledge of a possible
good even when such knowledge is not acquired or
conveyed through any Imperative or Gomroancf.

Ajnd hi ndma naivdnyasampadyatvena gamyat6
Ndnushthdturiyam buddhiriijna sampddyatdmiti „
Enam hi yasya kasy^pi prabarteta sa djnay^ „

Na cheha vdlomattddivachandt yatnavarjitat „

Satyapi prerandjnane prabartante sachetasah „

Bhayam ndshankatc yasmatphalam va api samihitam „
Tathdvidhasya rijnoapi n^ljndnusthiyah? janaih „
Vartamd,ndpadesheapi phalam yatra avogamyato „
Tatra pravartato loko lipddishvashruteshvapi „

Bhavatydrogyasampattirbhunjanasya haritakim „
Tatkamo bhakshayechcheti ko visheshah prabarttane „
Anvayavyatirekdbhydm tadevamanumanyate „

Prerakatvam phalasyaiva na niyogdtmanab punah „

The prerakatva, the impelling function, thus belongs
to the phala, consequence or end, and not to the command
itself. The command only incites by indicating the end
to be accomplished and is not itself the thing to be
accomplished. If the command were itself the object
to be accomplished, men would be prompted to act even
from the suggestions of little children and insane people.
Men do not execute even the commands of the sovereign
from the simple consciousness of a command without any
hope of gain or fear of loss. And even where there is no
impulsion through a command or imperative, men are
acti^ed to specific acts through the simple expectation
of a good. Consider the case, for example, of the person
actuated to take myrohalan from a knowledge of its
healing virtues. His knowledge rnay be only an
inference based on agreement and difference and such
inferential knowledge is sufficient to impel provided he

150

S, K. MAITRA

desires the healing in question. There is therefore no
imperative necessary in impulsion, the consequence or
end being the only necessary condition of impulsion.
It is this end which is accomplished in the accomplishment
of the duty and it consitutes not only the object of
accomplishment in the duty but also its impelling force
on the agent. It is wrong to make a distinction here
between the object of the Imperative and its impelling
force. The Bhdtta conception of a shabdabhavand or
operation of the Imperative which is underived and
independent of the object or end to be accomplished, is
arbitrary and inconsistent with actual facts. Experience
testides not only to impulsion without an imperative
but also to suggestions which are unavailing or fail to
impel because of the absence of an end.

For the Naiydyikas therefore the object to be accom-
plished is an end which is other than the Imperative or
Command, an extraneous end which validates the
Imperative and imparts to it its impelling character.
Hence impulsion is derived or mediated through the end
which alone has intrinsic value and validity.

(3) For the Pnlbhdkaras hoAvever the Imperative
itself is its own end having absolute value and validity.
There is therefore no extraneous end, not even as a
psychological or logical implicate. 'J he anushtheya, the
thing to be accomplished, is the Imperative itself, the
command (djnd) and the object of the command
(anushtheya) being one and the same thing. That this
sameness or indentity is not apparent to us is due only
to our intellectual indolence. When Law or Tidhi is the
motive, the sense of an unsatisfied demand accompanies
the action from beginning to end. It is this demand of
the Law or Command which acts as the spur to action,
and the fulfilment of the Command or Niyoga requires
nothing b^ the agent and his actual willing it. There

161

THE ETHICS OP THE HINDUS

18 thus no extraneous end involved, neither in the moral
authority of the Command nor as a logical implicate of it
nor also as a psychological condition of motivation, the
Imperative or Command being itself the motive, the end
and the sanction. Hence what is anushthita, acoom*
plished in the execution, is the djad or command, the
prerand, the subjective prompting or impulsion, being
itself the sampddya, the object of accomplishment.
According to some however there is a distinction between
the subjective prompting or prerand of the Vidhi and the
objective duty or kdrya, a distinction however which
does not imply absolute separateness or ind,ependence of
meaning. Thus (1) some hold that the prerakatva, the
impelling function is shdbda, i.e., the primary and d.tfect
meaning of the Inoperative or Injunctive, while kdryatva,
the function of objective prescription of a duty is drtha,
follows by implication. (2) Others however consider the
kdryatva or objective function to be the primary meaning
and prerakatva or impelling function to be merely
implied. In any case however there is only one meaning
of the Imperative and not two, viz.^ one with the other
as necessarily implied— either prerakatva, subjective
prompting with aparityaktakdryabhdva or necessary im-
plication of an objective right or duty, or kdryatva,
objective duty with aparityaktaprerakabbdva or necessary
implication of subjective impulsion.

N. B , — ^Vidydnandi in the Ashtasahasri enters into an
extremely acute analysis of the meaning of Niyoga or
Command with special reference to these two functions
of objective prescription and subjective impulsion. The
various possible interpretations of Niyoga which he
considers in this connection constitute an invaluable
contribution to 'the Doctrine of Conscience remarkable
alike for the. depth, the profundity and the subtlety
of the analysis. There are according to him altogether

152

S. K. MAITRA

eleven different interpretations of Niyoga or the Moral
Imperative. Thus : —

(1) According to some, Niyoga is k&ryarupa, i.e.,
of the nature of something to be done or ought to be
done. Hence it refers to objective right, right as right
considered objectively. Right or Duty thus conceived
as having objective value and validity, i.e., as an
objective fact belonging to the Moral Order, is the
essence of the Moral Imperative or Command which
constitutes Niyoga. Niyoga is thus objective duty
(kdryarupa) as distinguished from subjective prompting
(prerandrupa), but it is shuddhakdryarupa, pure, un-
conditional duty, duty as duty without the visheshanas
or modalities. It is not this or that duty, but duty as
such without the particular mode. “Give unto such
and such persons,” “sacrifice in such and such ways,”
etc., — these are duties, obligations to be discharged, but
not pure duty, but only modalities, visheshanas or
particular modes of duty. Niyoga is what is common
to these all without the modalities or visheshanas — it is
pure (shuddha) and absolute (anyanirapeksha). This
particular act or that particular act — these are only modes
that do not enter into the pure consciousness of duty —
neither the particular mode of the act, nor desires {e.g.^
Svargakdmand) and other psychological accompaniments.
As to prerakatva, the subjective prompting or motive —
that also does not enter into Niyoga as such. The
accompanying modalities and the psychological accom-
paniments have alike to be stripped off from Niyoga which
is pure, unconditioned objective Right. The purity of
Duty as Duty must not be spoiled by importing anything
extraneous into it.

(2) According to others, Niyoga is prerand, the
subjective prompting aud not anything objective such as
the act. |Phis prompting or moving force cannot be

THE ETHICS OP THE HINDUS 168

ignored in the Niyoga. The objective factor, that which
is to be done, is only an objective accompaniment, and is
inessential. It is the subjective prompting that is
essential — the prerana in the sense of psychological
motivation. The duty as such is only a means to the
subjective impulsion. Take away the flatter . and Niyoga
loses all significance. It is the subjective impulsion or
prompting that constitutes the value and the validity of
the Niyoga. Niyoga is thus essentially this subjective
prompting or preran4, the objective duty being only an
accompaniment or means to it. Hut it is shuddhapi’erand,
pure, unadulterated preranA, or moral prompting from
the pure sense of duty without pathological or material
motives. It is this pure impulsion from the sense of
duty for duty’s sake that constitutes the essence of the
Niyoga or Command, not the objective duty or act
commanded. The agent does not consider himself
appointed (nijukta) under the Law unless he also feels
that he is prerita, subjectively impelled or prompted by
the sense of duty. It is prerand or subjective prompting
therefore that is the essential factor in the command, the
objective duty being inessential or adventitious.

(3) According to others, Niyoga is neither pure
objective duty nor the mere subjective prompting, neither
mere kdryarupa nor mere prerandrupa, but preranasahi-
takdryarupa, *.e., kdrya or objective duty as supported by
the sense of prerand or impulsion. The emphasis is on
the objective aspect, but the subjective impulsion must
also be there. The pure act, the thing to be done,
considered in itself, is not sufficient to constitute duty
which must also present itself as my duty (mama idam
kdryam). Hence it must also be subjectively impelling,
must operate as a motive on the agent in order to be
presented as hia kdrya or duty. It completes itself in
the kdrya or duty and therefore the objective factor is

20

154

S. K. MAITRA

principal, but it must also present itself as mama k&rya
or my duty and therefore prerand or subjective prompting
is also necessary.

(4) Abcording to others, Niyoga is prerand, subjective
prompting, in the first instance, and kdrya or duty only for
the sake of the realisation of this prerand. Hence it is
kdryasahitaprerand, subjective impulsion modalised into
objective duty. It is the subjective factor that is
primary, but the objective duty as giving form to the
subjective prerand is also necessary.

(6) According to others, Niyoga is morally valid,
authoritative. It is this which constitutes its prerakatva
or prabartakatva. But whence does it derive this binding
force, this authority on the agent or subject ? The
external act, the objective duty or kdrya cannot have
binding force on the subject. There is no natural link
between the kdrya or duty and its prerand or validation
in consciousness. The Kdrya, the external act, cannot
exercise authority on the free subject. It derives
its authorilativeness by upachara or projection, not
from its own nature. The duty validates itself in
consciousness. There is pramanavydpdra, a process
of validation, through which it establishes itself. What
then is the process ? How does the duty establish its
authority on the agent ? The act as objective external,
fact cannot be obligatory on the subject. Its authority
is only by upachdra, projection, of the Self on the
external duty. It is the Self as Cbaitanya or
Illumination which is the real Pramdna or validating
authority. The Prameya, the object, is object because
of the subject which is chiddtmaka or Illumination.
The object shines, is established as object, through the
light of the validating subject which is the true validating
authority. Its authority is thus derived from the
subject or-^lf which is the Light of Intelligence or

tHE ETHICS OP THE HINDUS 165

Consciousness. It is this Light of Consciousness which
is transferred by upachdra to the external fact thereby
investing it with objective authority or validity. The
free person does not submit to the dead matter of fact :
it is the fact that derives its binding force from the Self
which is the Light of Intelligence.

(6) According to others, Niyoga is kdryapreranayoh
sambandhah — the sambandha or link between the kdrya
or duty and the prerand or subjective prompting. It is
neither kdrya or the act as duty, nor the agent’s
subjecting prompting, but the relation between the
subjective and the objective factors — a certain indisso*
luble nexus between the agent and his present duty.

(7) According to others, Niyoga is not bare sambandha
or relation, nor mere kdrya or duty, nor simply the
agent’s prompting, but is the samudaya, the entire
complex of the duty, the prompting and the nexus. It
is an organic whole of consciousness consisting of the
subjective factor, the objective factor and the nexus —
the concrete experience which is neither the one simply
nor the other simply. By themselves these are all
abstractions, Niyoga being the concrete whole of
experience consisting of all these together.

(8) According to others, Niyoga is Tadubhaya-vinir-
raukta, is free alike from the subjective and the objective
factors, being neither prerandsvabhdva, subjective impuL
sion, nor kdryasvabhdva, objective duty. These are only
modalities which are conditional, but Niyoga is absolute,
unconditional Imperative and therefore represents some'
thing Transcendental. Brahma is this Niyoga — the
noumenal reality, the Absolute. It is the accomplished
(siddha) Absolute that manifests itself to you under the
phenomenal form of kdrya or sddhya, the form of
something to be accomplished. Because Brahma is
accomplished (siddha), prerakatva, subjective prompting,

166

S. K. MAItRA

kdrya, objective duty, etc., must all be only phenomenal
forms. They are modalisations of the timeless under
the form of time.

a

(9) According to others, Niyoga is the yantrdrurha
agent, the agent as the master of a machine or as using
a certain instrument. The agent uses an instrument
to accomplish something, to work out some end, and
Niyoga is the agent as working out his end, the agent
representing himself as driven along the path of fruition
(vishayarurham dtmdnam gamyamdnam prabartatd). The
agent desires something which sets him to work along a
particular line and Niyoga is the agent considering himself
as vishayarurha, i.e., as the master of or realising the
object of his desire. Hence Niyoga is the agent conscious
of himself as rising to fruition through a particular line
of action. It is the agent’s .subjective impulsion along a
particular line as determined by the sense of progressive
fruition. Hence it is preranarupa or subjective impulsion
but not pure impulsion without pathological motives, but
impulsion as determined by empirical ends and sustained
and fed by the sense of progressive realisation.

(10^ According to others, Niyoga is bhogyarupa i.e.,
something which fulfils, something which conduces to
fruition. It is therefore essentially an object, an object
which conduces to the Self’s fruition or fulfilment. But
such an object cannot be considered as detached from the
subject ; the bhogya, the object of experience or fruition,
points necessarily to a bhoktd, experiencer or subject that
is fulfilled. Hence there is self-reference (mamatvena
vijndna) niyoga as bhogya or object conducing to fruition
becomes merged as it were in the subject that is fulfilled
(bhoktari vyavasthitam). But this is not all: bhogya
implies also feeling of ownership (svdmitvena abhimdna),
the feeling of self-appropriation. There is a bhogya or
object of 4i^iop only through the sense of ownership or

t:he ethics of the Hindus

167

self-appropriation, bhoga or fruition necessarily implying
the self as being fulfilled and therefore as being enriched
by or as appropriating the object to itself., Niyoga
therefore as bhogya or conducing to self-fulfilment implies
this self -appropriation or svdmitvena abhimdna. But
even this is not all. It must also determine the self as
agent or doer (svam nirupyatd), must be self-deter-
mining besides being self-determined or self-appropriated
as bhogya or object of fruition. It is only as it determines
the self as bhogya that the latter is a moral agent ; till
then he is not a moral agent and tlie Niyoga has no
application. Niyoga is thus the self-determining and
self-determined bhogya, the bhogya which constitutes its
cxperiencer and is itself constituted by its experiericer.
Further as bhogya or object of fruition, it is not siddha,
accomplished, but sddhya, to be accomplished. In other
words, it represents a satisfaction which is to he thus
implying an element of becoming — the realisation of
what is possible. Hence Niyoga is the self -appropriated
and self-determining bhogya in the form of a duty to be
accomplished. But it is not pure unconditioned duty
(shuddhakdryarupa) without subjective or psychological
accompaniments but duty constituted by as well as
constitutive of its subjective conditions.

(11) According to others, Niyoga is the agent himself
(Purushaeva niyogah), the agent determining himself by
the act (karyavishishtah purusha). The agent is both
the sddhaka, accomplisher, and sddhya, accomplished. In
accomplishing Niyoga, the agent accomplishes himself.
It is not the act which is really accomplished or sddhita,
but the agent who acts. The agent no doubt says to
himself “this is my kdrya or duty”, but this is only
because he conceives himself as fulfilled in this particular
mode. It is the agent therefore that realises himself and
the agent is therefore the Niyoga.

158

S K. MAItftA

Hence Niyoga may be conceived either (1) as
unconditioned objective duty, or (2) as pure subjective
impulsioUj,, or (3) as duty with prerana as auxiliary, or
(4) as prerand with duty as an accompaniment, or (5)
as the free person prescribing freely to itself, or (6) as
the bare link between the prerand and the duty, or (7)
as the entire complex of the duty, the prerand and the
link, or (8) as the Transcendental Absolute as the
negation of both prerand and duty as phenomenal forms,
or (9) as empirical prerand or impulsion implying patho-
logical motives and also the objective act as conditions, or
(10) as empirical duty implying subjective determinO'tion
and realisation in time, or (11) as the Self itself. It will
be seen that (9) is the hedonistic and empirical form of
pure, unconditioned preranarupa just as (10) represents
the empirical form of unconditioned kdryarupa.
Again both (5) and (11) consider Niyoga from the stand-
point of the Self but while (5) considers the Self
as Self 'Validating, Self-establishing experience, (11)
considers it as Self-fulfilment or Self-realisation.
Lastly, both (5) and (8) emphasise the factor of validation
through the Light of Consciousness or chaitanya, but
while in (5) this is considered from the standpoint of
the individual subject or Self, in (8) it is regarded as the
essence of the Transcendental Brahma or Absolute.

((i) We shall now consider the last question, viz.,
the implications, subjective and objective, of Niyoga as
the Moral Imperative. Two questions will have to be
discussed in this connection

(1) Does Niyoga imply subjective freedom or the
agent’s free will ? And

(2) Does Niyoga imply an objective, personal source —
a superior or Perfect Person as the Lawgiver to the
Moral agent ?

(1) Ae regards the question of subjective freedom,
it is coat^ded that it is a necessary implication of the

THE ETHICS OP THE HINDUS

159

Moral Imperative. The Imperative, it is argued, being
prabartandrupa, or actuating in character, 1 necessarily
implies a corresponding capacity or competency in the
agent to accomplish it. It would be a moral ae well as
a logical absurdity for the Imperative to actuate the
agent to anything which it is not in his power to accom-
plish. The “ Ought,” the Imperative of the Vidhi, thus
necessarily implies “ can,” #.<?., the agent’s capacity
to accomplish it. (Prabarttandrupo hi Ydbih arthdt
samihitasddhanashaktim vodhayati. Prabarttand cha
ashakyavishayd na sambhavati ; iti shyddeva aprdmdnyam-
Pdrthasdrathimishras “ Shdstradipika ” ). Hence there
cannot be any moral injunction in respect of the
impracticable or impossible — a command which enjoins
the unattainable or impracticable loses all moral signi-
ficance and authority by the very fact.

It follows therefore that the agent’s subjective
competency or freedom is a psychological as well as a
logico-ethical implicate of the Moral Imperative. The
Imperative can impel or actuate only through the agent’s
subjective consciousness of competency or freedom as a
psychological condition, and it would be a logical
absurdity which would deprive it of its validity or moral
authority if the imperative were to enjoin anything
which is by nature beyond the power of the agent to
realise. Niyoga thus implies the agent’s subjective
freedom psychologically, logically as well as morally.

(2) As regards the question of an objective implication
of a personal source, there are two schools of Hindu
thought, viz,y (i) the school of Paurusheya-vddinas which
conceives a personal (Paurusheya) source of the Niyoga
and (ii) the school of Apaurusbeya-vadinas which conceives
it as Impersonal Law without any personal source. Thus
according to the Chdrvdkas, the Bauddhas, the Jainas,
the Nydya-Yaisheshikas and the Bdmdnujists, Niyoga is

160

S. K. MAITRA

a Personal prescription of a superior to an inferior
being, while according to the Purvamimdmsakas (i.e., the
Bhdttas, the PrAbhdkaras, etc.) it is Impersonal Law
without a ^Lawgiver.

For the Chdrvdkas however Niyoga is only the
command of the earthly king (rdjdjnd) and not of any
perfect person as ordinarily assumed. As a matter of
fact there is no such perfect person nor any supersensuous
satisfaction which he can vouchsafe as the sanction of
the command. Wordly pleasures are the only possible
pleasures and the law of the king as the dispenser of
earthly happiness is therefore the true Moral Law.

For the Jainas and the Bauddhas however, the Law is
the declaration of the Aptas or Seers of the transcendental
plane — persons who by acquiring personal experience of
matters of spiritual significance are competent judges of
what is truly right or wrong. Hence Niyoga represents
the verdict of spiritual experts, persons who have acquired
spiritual insight and vision. The Vdtsydyanabhdshya
notes the following characteristics of these spiritual
experts or Aptas : kim punardptdndm prdmdnyam ? Sdk-
shdtkrtadharmatd, bhutadayd, yathdbhutdrthacbikhyapayi-
shd iti. Aptdh khalu sdkshdtkrtdharmanah idam hdta*
vyam ayamasya hdnihetuh idam asya adhigantavyam
ayamasya adhigamaheturiti bhutdni anukampantd. Tes-.
hdm khalu bai prdnabhrtdm svayam anavavudhyamdndndm
na anyat upadeshdt avavodhakaranamasti, na cha anava-
vodhe samihavarjanam vd, na vd akrtva svastibhdvah,
ndpi asya anyah upakdrakah api asti, hanta vayamebhyo
yathadarshanam yathabhutam upadishdmah.

An Xpta, therefore, is one who is possessed of —

Sdkahdhrtadharmatd, right judgment as to what
is dharma or duty by virtue of direct, personal experience.

iihutodayd^ compasssion towards all sentient creatures
sincerely, ivishipg that they should know the right from

THE ETHICS OP THE HINDUS 16J

the wrong, the beneficial from the injurious, in order to
• attain the one and avoid the other.

Yath&bhutdrthaohikhydpayishd, the desire to teach
sentient beings the nature of things as the/ really sere,
i.e.y to testoh them as to what is really injurious and should
be avoided and what is really beneficial and should be
sought— a desire which proceeds from the knowledge that
they cannot themselves know either the one or the other
suid the means of avoiding the one or attaining the other,
suod also that they have not anybody else to help them to
acknowledge of these things.

It follows from the above that the Apta is free from
the faults and shortcomings which vitiate the knowledge of
ordinary mortals — the faults, e.g., of carelessness (pramdda),
error (viparyaya), greed (vipralipsd), defects of sense-
organs (indriyadosha), etc.

It is the declarations of these iiptas, perfect or
perfected persons, that constitute Niyoga according to the
Bauddbas and Jainas. But this does not imply however
that there is an eternally perfect being whose commands
constitute the Moral Imperative or Niyoga. The Bauddhas
and Jainas, being atheists, do not admit any such eternally
perfect being. In place of such a being they assume an
endless series of perfected persons who acquire perfection
in; course of time — an endless series in which the preceding

i^ptas stand as preceptors to those who succeed.

The Nydya-Vaisheshikas and the Bdmdnujists on the
contrary conceive an Isvara or Lord as the prescriber of
the Moral Law, an Eternally Perfect being who lays
down the duty for man in a code of injunctions and
prohibitions. But while according to Bdmdnujists the
commands represent the Intelligence of the Lord, i.e., his
knowledge of what is truly right and what is wrong,
according to the Nydya-Vaisheshikas they represent only
the will of the Lor<^ i.e., his mere pleasure or fiat.

81

162

S. K. MAITRA

The Purvamimdmsakas however do away altogether
with the conception of a personal source. Kiyoga in their
view is an impersonal verity of the Moral Order — a Law
which has intrinsic validity without being a personal
command. For what is Niyoga ? It is Vidhivdkya, i.e.t
the declaration of scripture. Now a declaration (vdkya)
is its own evidence or pramdna. It is selLvalidating, self-
evident by nature and can be overthrown only by
vaktfdosha or fault of the speaker. But the Vedas have
no speaker or Vaktd, there is no personal source of the
Apaurush^ya Vedas. Hence there is also no vaktrdosha^ no
fault of the speaker to vitiate the purity of the Vedic
declarations. ' Such declarations have thus intrinsic
validity without implying a personal source. These self-
evident, self-authoritative Vedic Declarations constitute
the Moral Law which is Niyoga. The moral Law is thus
the Impersonal Law of the Vedas without a lawgiver.

The Naiydyikas however point out that the mere
absence of vitiation by the speaker’s faults does not
constitute the prdmdnya, the evidential value or validity,
of the Vedic Declarations. This is only a negative
condition of their validity which supposes also other
positive conditions such as direct experience, etc. With-
out these the Scriptural Declarations will lose all
authority. The Mimdmsaka conception of the self-
evident character of all declarations is an arbitrary
assumption which does not bear examination. The
Mimdmsakas ignore the element of personal experience
and other positive factors involved in the validation of
the Moral Imperative.

We have so far considered tbe nature and implications
of the Moral Imperative without reference to the nature
of the specific duties enjoined. We have seen however
that there are not only nityanaimittika or unconditional
duties for th^individual but also kdmyakarmas or duties

THE ETHICS OF THE HINDUS 168

which are conditional on the agent’s subjective desire
for an end. The question therefore remains to be
considered how the Imperative is to be conceived in
regard to these conditional duties. These duties imply
the agent’s desire for empirical ends and yet according
to the Bhdttas and the Fr^bh&karas the Imperative is
independent, in its authority as well as its operation, of
any subjective desire of the agent. We shall therefore
have to consider now :

The Nature of the Impei'ative or Vidhi in the con-
ditioiial duties (^kdmj/akarniasJ, particularly those that in-
volve evil in the form of himsd or injury to sentient beings.

Such himsd or destruction of life is part of many
kdmya duties such as shyena, agnishoma, etc. Thus shyena
is the specific ceremonial duty which is obligatory on
the individual who wants to destroy his enemy. In so
far as it enables him to attain this end it involves anartha
or evil in the form of destruction of life. The question
therefore has to be considered how from the Frdbhdkara
and the Bhdtta standpoints these can be conceived as
obligations or duties conducive to the agent’s merit,
particularly the acts involving anartha or evil.

(a) The Frdbhdkara vieio The Frdbhdkaras contend
that the Imperative as prabarttaka, morally obligatory
or impelling, requires only two things, a niyojya or
person commanded and a vishaya or act commanded.
These are the anuvandhadvayas, the two necessary
accompdniments, of Vidhi or Moral Imperative. Now
in kdmyakarmachodand or injunction as to a conditioned
duty we have these two anubandhas or necessary accom-
paniments respectively in the person desiring something
and the act which is laid down for the satisfaction of
the desire. For example, in the injunction svargakdma
yajeta, he that desires happiness in heaven must perform
this particular sacrifice, we have the adhikdranubandha,

S. K. MAI'TRA

the subject of the command, in the term ** svargakdma **
or ‘ the agent who desires happiness in heaven * and the
vishaydnubandha, i.e., object or act commanded, in the
term yajeta, ‘the injunction of the particular sacrifice.’
ft follows therefore by logical implication that the act,
viz., yajikriyd or particular sacrificial ceremony which
is the bhdvdrtha or object of the injunction, must be
svargasddhana, i.e., a means to the desired happiness in
heaven. If these were not so, the term svargakdma
would be meaningless. Why should there be reference
not merely to an agent but also to an agent desiring a
particular end, viz., a specific satisfaction or happiness,
if the enjoined duty had nothing to do with the particular
end in question ? It therefore necessarily follows that
the act of sacrifice is a means (sddhana) and the
happiness in heaven the end ( sddhya ) and there is
sddhyasddhanabhdva or relation of means and end be-
tween them. Hence this sddhyasddhanapratiti or sense
of a means-and -end relation is logically implied in the
prompting of the Imperative or Vidbi. But in this
case the prabarttakatva, the impelling character, of the
Yidhi as the Moral Imperative, does not exend to
svargddipihala or ends of happiness in heaven, etc. The
agent is prompted by his own subjective desire or lipsd
towards this end, and as this empirical, pathological motive
intervenes in a kdmya duty prompted by the agent’s
desire, the Yidhi as the non-empirical moral motive
becomes uddsina or indifferent. In other words, the
Imperative is deprived of its character of moral impulsion
or motivation through the presence of the empirical or
material motive. The only operation of the Imperative
in this case is to produce the sddhyasddhanapratiti or
consciousness of the act as a means to the desired end,
and to indicate the itikartyavyatd, the manner of accom-
plishing the ^t and thereby the end to which it is a

tttE ETHICS OE THE HINDUS MS

ineKns. These are the only functions of the Imperative
in the conditional duties which imply desire in the i^eat
and refer to specific empirical ends. In the nitya or
unconditional duties however there being no extraneous
end or consequence, there is also no subjective desire
or iipsd as a motive. Hence the Imperative here is a
motive to the act itself, its function extending to
motivation as well to the indication of the manner of
accomplishing the duty in question. The two anubandbas
or accompaniments here are ; — (1) the niyojya or adhikdri,
i.e., the agent commanded, in this case irrespectively
of his personal craving or wish, and (2) the vishaya ur
bhdvdrtha, i.e., the act enjoined. Since there is no
subjective motive, the vishaya, the objective act, is
itself the moving or prompting force.

Now let us consider the cases of agnishomiya himsd
and chyena. The one involves evil in the form df
pashughdta or slaughter of animals, this being part of
the sacrificial ceremony. The other also involves enril,
viz., ir. the form of the destruction of the enemy, this
being the object of the shyenaydga or ceremony of shyena.
Now we have seen that in the case of kdmya, empinoal
oi conditional duties (including jyotishtoma, shyena, etc.),
the prabartakatva, the prescriptive or prompting function
of the Injunctive as constituting shdstriyaprahrtti or
moral impulsion consists only in indicating the itikartta*
vyatd, the manner of accomplishing the act (including
the sddhyasddhanapratiti, the inducement of the means-
and’Ond consciousness), but does not cover the phal^sha,
the consequence or end desired to be accomplished. Now
in Agnishomiya himsd or injury to life involved in the
ceremony of Agnishoma, the himsd or element of injury
viz., animal slaughter (pashughdta) is included in the
itikartyavyatdmsha or manner of accomplishing the
ceremony and is therefore covered by the shdstriyaprabrtti,

166

S. K. MAITRA

the moral function of the Imperative. Hence such himsd
or injury to life is morally legitimate (vaidha), and the
sdmdnyavidhi, the general prescription which prohibits
himsd or injury to life {e.g.y ma himsydt, thou shalt not
take life), has therefore to be limited, restricted in its
scope, by the visheshavidhi, the special injunction which
prescribes the agnishomiya himsd in the sacrificial cere-
mony of jyotishtoma. But in the case of the shyena
ceremony however, the himsd, viz., shatrumdrana or
destruction of the enemy is phaldmsha, part of the end
or object which is aimed at. It does not fall within the
itikarttavyatdmsha, i.e., the part of the injunction which
relates to the manner of accomplishing the shyena cere-
mony. For this reason it cannot be covered by the moral
function of the Imperative or Vidhi, i.e., the function of
the injunction which prescribes the shyena ceremony for
the person who wants to destroy his enemy. Hence the
sdmdnyavidhi or general injunction which condemns
injury to life (himsd) is not restricted in its application
here, i.e., it condemns shyena as adharma or morally evil.

It follows from the above that for the Prdbhdkaras
shdstriya himsd, destruction of life having scriptural
sanction, is right or wrong according to the nature of the
particular injunction which leads to or involves it. Thus
scriptural injunctions include nitya or unconditional duties
and kdmya or conditional duties (including jyotishstoma,
shyena, etc.). Now of these only arthas, i.e., those that
are sukhddhikaduhkhdjanaka in the sense of not being
fraught with unhappiness in excess of the happiness, are
dharma, i.e., morally right or morally good. Shyena, e.g.,
is adharma, morally evil because it is anartha or evil, i.e.,
evil as leading to unhappiness in excess of happiness. But
it is not simply because it is an anartha or evil that it
constitutes moral wrong or adharma, but because it is an
anartha or evil which is soripturally condemned or

THE ETHICS OP THE HINDUS

167

prohibited. In other words, only such anarthas as are
prohibited by Shdstric command are moral evils, and
shyena as involving himsa or injury to life in its phaldmsha
or end aimed at falls within the scope of th*e general
prohibition of himsd or injury to life — a general prohibi-
tion which is restricted only in respect of such injury as
is involved in the manner of accomplishing an act and
not as an end or consequence desired to be accomplished.
Contrarywise only arthas, i.^., acts or objects which do
not produce unhappiness in excess of happiness are
dharma, morally good or morally right. But all arthas
are not morally good, only chodandlakshana arthas, i.e.,
arthas having the mark of scriptural sanction, constitute
moral duty. Thus there may be some arthas which are
desirable from the non-shdstriya or secular standpoint.
These are not dharma. Similarly there may be some
anarthas which are undesirable from the empirical stand-
point — anarthas as producing unhappiness in excess of
happiness. But these will not constitute moral wrong
unless prohibited by shdstric prescription. It follows
therefore that there may be some arthas and some anarthas
which are devoid of moral significance. Thus nonprohibited
anarthas are neither right nor wrong ; similarly non-
prescribed arthas are also neither the one nor the other,
and it is possible that there may be specific objects or acts
which are neither arthas nor anarthas, and these also are
morally neutral.

It follows from Frabhdkara’s view that the prdmdnya,
the authority or authoritative character of vedic injunc-
tions, is independent of any extraneous consequence or
end, any fruition or satisfaction to which it may conduce.
This is true of the nitya or unconditional as well as the
kdmya or conditional duties enjoined by the vedas. In
both oases the authority is independent of any ulterior
end, and since in the conditional duties the agent is

im

8. K. MAITBA

moved by his subjective desire, the authoritative or
imperative function of the injunction relates only to
the itikartyavatd, the manner of accomplishing the- act
and to the sildhyasddhanapratiti or inducement of the
knowledge of means*and*end relation, between the act
and the end aimed at. The authority in this case is
logical rather than strictly moral — the imperative ensuring
validation of the c )n3ciousness of means*and-end relation
and of the manner of accomplishing the act rather than
impelling the will or prabrtti through its authority. In
nitya or unconditional duties however there being no
intervening subjective desire, the authority extends to
the will and determines it through its moral validity or
phundnya. In either case therefore .the prdmdnya or
authority is established through the duty which is
enjoined and not through any utlerior fruition or
satisfaction which it may ensure. A nd this is true of
all Yedic prescriptions, there validity or authority being
constituted by the prescribed acts or duties independently
of extraneous ends (sarvasya vedasya kdrye eva
prdmdnyam.) Where such ends exist as in kdmya or
conditional duties, the Injunction loses its character of
moral impulsion or authority, its only function being to
indicate the act as a means to the end and the manner
of accomplishing it. It follows from this that all Vedic
prescriptions are validated through the duties enjoined
and that prescriptions which lay down ends-in-themselves
independently of specific acts or duties are apramdna
or unauthoritative. Hence the AtmasvarupaparavAkyas
o£ the Upanishads, i.e., the Texts which declare realisation
of the Self's true nature as the highest end, are un«
authoritative. Such declarations enjoin a static fruition
for the moral agent — the fruition of rest in the Self
true, nature as distinguished from an act of duty to
be done, an pnd therefore which is other than muy

THE ETHICS OP THE HINDUS

169

specific act to be accomplished. Hence they cannot be
valid or authoritative.

According to the Prdbhdkaras therefore jihe Vedic
Law as Vidhi or Moral Imperative is not the eternally
self-accomplished fruition of the Absolute as realised
consciousness or experience presenting itself as an end
to be realised. It is the act of duty itself in its pure
essence, the act as having self-evidencing, self-validating
authority, the act as an impersonal verity of the moral
order as distinguished fi’om a fact given in experience.
Vidhi, in other words, is the self-positing and self-posited
duty which is as different from the being of a given fact
as it is from becoming. It is accomplished, ’realised being
as distinguished from the static being of a given matter of
fact, the being or reality which constitutes the validity of
a self -authoritative duty or imperative as distinguished
from the being of a self-accomplished experience or
fruition. It is this accomplished being as the duty that
comes up to us in the from of a catogorical imperative.
The authority of the Imperative is only the self- validation
of the Duty in consciousness as an accomplished verity
of the moral order : it is the Law revealing itself to
consciousness in its essence as having dynamic reality or
the validity of a duty to be accomplished.

Such injunctions as are artha constitute dharma or
morality according to the Prdbhd.karas, i.e., injunctions
which do not produce unhappiness in excess of happiness
constitute moral right, while injunctions which are
anarthas as producing more unhappiness than happiness
are not morally right though having scriptural sanction.
It is these injunctions which are really accomplished in
the agent’s accomplishment of his duties and not any
ulterior end or consequence. Since in kdmya or condi-
tional duties the agent is moved not by the injunction but
by his subjective desire for an end, these are not strictly
22

170

S. K. MAITRA

duties in the moral sense : they are pseudo-duties whose
only function is to indicate the manner of accomplishing
an end without prompting or impelling the will which is
the true function of a duty as having moral authority.
Hence it is the unconditional duties without any extra-
neous end or consequence that are duties in the strict
sense. The prompting here is the pi’ompting of the
Imperative and not of any extraneous consequence or end,
and is therefore strictly moral prompting or impulsion as
distinguished from the empirical prompting of desire. It
is therefore the accomplishment of such duties with
prabrtti or will determined by moral as distinguished from
pathological < prompting that constitutes man’s proper
course. Such duties performed for duty’s sake constitute
morality (dharma), '.e., the accomplishment of the Im-
perative for the sake of the Imperative without reference
to any ulterior fruition or satisfaction. This is also man’s
highest good, his nishreyasa or paramapurushdrtha — this
niyogasiddhi or accomplishment of pure duty as distin-
guished from the realisation of an ulterior end or happiness.
It does not lead to happiness in heaven (svarga) or any
other ulterior satisfaction which is implicated only in the
kamya or conditional duties. These latter refer to a phala
or extraneous result, such phala being Akshiptd, drawn on
or implicated by, the fact of the subjective desire which
prompts, though not implied in the imperative or impelling
function of duty as duty. This impelling function
becomes inoperative by the very fact of the subjective
prompting in a conditional duty which thus lacks true
moral significance or value.

N.B . — Some points however remain obscure in the
prdbhdkara doctrine. (1) Does Niyoga imply vydpAra
or a process of becoming ? Is it something that realises,
posits itself ? In that case, it is bhdvand, becoming, and
nut beingi^vrMch contradicts the doctrine of a Moral Order

THE ETHICS OP THE HINDUS 17i

as a system of established or accomplished moral foots.
•Is it then not vydpdra at all, no process of becoming,
but mere svabhdva or essence ? In that case, what is

It

it the essence of ? Is it vishayasvabhdva, the essence
of the enjoined duty ? In that case, Niyoga is the act
itself, the act in its pure essence, not a fact in its pure
essence. But the question in this case is : is the yishaya,
the act which is the object of the Niyoga, siddha,
accomplished, or asiddha, un-accomplished, i.e.^ vidyamdna
existent, or avidyam4na, non-existent, at the time of the
niyoga ? If it is non-existent, then how does it become
vdkydrtha, the import of the categorical proposition?
An hypothetical proposition may refer even to the non-
existent, but a categorical proposition refers only to
what exists. To say that the non-existent may be clothed
with an imagined (kdlpanika) reality and thus be the
import of a categorical proposition is to deprive Niyoga
of its character of an objective, ontological verity, «.c.,
of its character of an accomplished fact in an established
Moral Order. It is to give it only kdlpanika, imagined
existence subject to all the forms and categories of the
understanding. Again, if the vishaya, the act in its
essence, is existent (vidyamdna), then it is siddha,
accomplished and cannot be accomplished again. Lastly,
if it be partly existent and partly non-existent (i.e.,
ideally existent and actually non-existent ), then by as
much as it is non-existent by so much it cannot be the
meaning of the categorical proposition, and by as much as
it is existent by so much it cannot be accomplished. Ts it
then phalasvabhdva, of the essence of an end, as
distinguished from vishayasvabhdva, the essence of a
duty ? This will be consequentialism'as distinguished from
the realistic ethical pragmatism of Niyoga as act-essence
or vishayasvabb&va. The difficulty here however is :
the Niyoga as looking forward to an end will imply also

172

S. K. MAITRA

an end of this end and also another end for the latter
and so on ad infinitimi. Again the end as end being
avidyamdna or unrealised cannot be the import of a
categoricHl proposition. (2) Again Niyoga is pramdna,
validates or establishes itself as authoritative. But what
is Pramdna? Pramana is chiddtmaka, self validating
experience or position in consciousness. Niyoga as
pramana is therefore bare pratibhdsha or position in
consciousness and thus we get neither its kdryarupa, the
form of duty nor its prerandrupa,the form of impulsion.
These must be therefore only illusory superimpositions on
Niyoga as mere self-evidencing experience. This is the
objection of, Brahma- vada or Absolutism against the
doctrine of Niyoga as mere Impersonal Law. Niyoga
in this view is samviddtniaka, the self-revealing Spirit
itself and is not Pure Act or Duty as an impersonal onto-
logical verity. (3) Thirdly, Ni.yoga is either of the form
of duty (kdryarupa) or of the form of moral impulsion
(prerandrupa.) This Niyoga again is Apurva which
constitutes dbarma or merit, Niyoga as accomplished
constitutes merit. But the Prdbhakaras reject alike the
Nydya-'Vaisheshika conception of Apurva as Atmasamskdra
or subjective disposition of the self and the Bhdtta
conception of it as kriydshakti, *.<?., an objective potency
of the act itself. Hence the question is : where does
Niyoga reside as Apurva and as constituting the agent’s
dbar ma or merit during the interval of its accomplish-
ment ? Further how can it be Apurva or Dharma as
pure kdryarupa or duty or as pure prerandrupa or moral
obligation and impulsion ? In either case we shall have
the acomplishment of that which in its true essence is
always to be. And further there is no difference in this case
between the Niyoga tvs accomplished and the Niyoga as
unaccomplished, at least it is not clear what this difference,
if any, positively is. Niyoga as Apurva is not karmika

173

TM j) ETHICS OF THE HINDUS

potency nor a samskdra or disposition of the Atman. What
then, is it positively as distinguished from unaccomplished
Law? (4) Lastly, what is the nishreyasa or highest
good in the sense of paramapurushdrtha or ultimate and
highest end of the individual P The Prdbhdkaras describe
it as niyogasiddhi, the realisation of the Imperative, i.e.,
its realisation in the case of the nitya or unconditional
duties (Tasmat nityeshu niyogasiddhireva purushdrtha,
niyogasiddheh paramapurushdrthatvdt — “ Chitsukhi ” re-
porting Prabhdkara’s view ). What, then, is the essence
of this realisation of the Imperative ? We have already
seen how the Prdbhdkaras avoid a positive definition of
it. They merely reject tlie Nydya-Vaisheshika and
Bhdtta conceptions. Hence it is not clear what constitutes
the positive content of Prabhdkara’s moksha. This
moksha as Transcendental Freedom is described as
niyogasiddhi or realisation of the Imperative, but niyoga
is always either prerand, impulsion, or karya, duty : it
is not clear how it can be accomplished or realised
without being deprived of its very nature. There is also
no possible locus of it in the interval of realisation or
accomplishment, and thus Prabhdkara’s moksha as consist-
ing in the realisation of Niyoga remains merely a negative
concept. Shdlikandtha (a disciple of Prabhdkara) however,
in the “ Prakaranapanchikd,” in the chapter on Tattvdloka
mentions duhkdbhdva or freedom from suffering as Prabhd-
kara’s moksha. According to him there are two courses —
the course which leads to svarga or happiness in heaven
and the Course which leads to moksha or freedom from
suffering. The former comes on the wake of kdmyakarmas
or conditional duties depending on the agent’s desire, while
the latter is brought on by self-knowledge (Atmajndna),
ihe discharge of the unconditional duties (nityanaimittika-
karmdnushthdna) and the varjjana, eschewing, of the
conditional duties (kdmya) and of the nishiddha or

IH ' S. K. MAltRA

forbidden actions, by an agent who is virakta, dispassionate
or indifferent to allurements of pleasure or happiness.
Hence Frdbhdkara’s moksha, according to Shdlikandtha,
is more thdn mere niyogasiddhi in the sense of the
disinterested discharge of the unconditional duties : it
is not merely the accomplishment of the duty but is also
self-knowledge besides conducing to an end, viz.^ duhkhd-
bhdva or freedom from suffering. But this is practically
giving up Prabhdkara’s speciality and conceding
everything to Kumarila. An extraneous end is assumed
as completing the accomplishment of the Niyoga and
even the Upanishad texts declaring self-knowledge as
the highest ei\d are rendered authoritative by being
brought under a chodana or injunction, mz., dtmajndna-
chodand or command enjoining self-knowledge. Says
Shdlikandtha : ato vishayavisheshasarabhogah eva dnandah
iti sundaram, i.e.^ the satisfaction which consists in the
enjoyment of specific objects is one way to svarga or
happiness in heaven. It is not moksha however which
is the end or good which results from the cessation
of all empirical suffering : mokshastu sdmsdrikaduhkho-
pashmdt purushdrtba iti pushkalam. What, then, is
this moksha or liberation ? He is said to be liberated
who by subduing his desire for empirical life full of
woes, religiously refrains from the pursuit of empirical
ends as well as from the acts which are forbidden as
sinful, whose merit as well as demerit have worn out, and
who by the cultivation of self-knowledge as a religious
duty with the aid of moral tranquillity, application, sexual
continence etc, has completely destroyed the entire mass
of responsibility for his doings. Kah punarmokshah ?
yah khaluh sdmsdrikebhyah duhkhebhyah gatasprhah sah
nishiddhebhyah abhyudayasdhdanebhyah cha nibartta-
mdnah dharmddharmau kshayam nayau shamadamabrah-
maoharyyddikdngopabrmhitena dtmajndnena na cha

THE ETHICS OF THE HINDUS

176

punardbarttateh ” itl choditena nihsheshakarmdshayam
lUishayan muchyate (S^lidlikanatha’s “ Frakaranapan-
chika.”)

(6) KtimariWs view : We have seen that Prabhdkara
interprets dharma as chodandlakshanah artliah in the
sense that it includes anarthas which have the mark of
scriptural sanction as well as avthas which are without
scriptural sanction. In other Avords, according to
Prabhdkara there may be arthas i.e., objects not producing
unhappiness in excess of happiness, which may not be
scripturally enjoined. These are not dharma, duty or
moral right. Similarly there may be anarthas or evils as
producing more unhappiness than happiness and these
may be scripturally enjoined. These also are not moral
duties or dharma. Only arthas are dharma and of these
only such as are scripturally enjoined. Por Kumdrila
however whatever is scripturally enjoined is an artha and
also a moral duty or dharma. Hence scripture cannot
enjoin anartha or evil : it only forbids or prohibits the
pursuit of such anartha. A scriptural law (chodand) may
be either a positive injunction (Vidhi) or a negative prohibi-
tion (Nishedha.) It relates to an artha or positive end in
the first case and prescribes its accomplisment as duty,
in the latter case it relates to some anartha or evil and
prescribes cessation or abstention (nib{ tti) from it. It
is these negative prescriptions as prohibiting anartha
or evil and wrong actions that are implied by chodand-
lakshaiiah anartha or anartha having a scriptural mark.
They are not anarthas having scriptural sanction as
Prdbbdkaras interpret them, but anarthas scripturally
indicated for abstention or cessation. Such anarthas are
adharma, morally evil or wrong, as prohibited by scripture
and not morally neutral or indifferent having scriptural
sanction as Prdbhdkaras contend. There are no anarthas
positively enjoined, anarthas being always the object

17 «

S K. MAITRA

of prohibition and never that of a positive injunction.
Contrarywise only anarthas are the objects of scriptural
prohihitioQ, and there are no objects of prohibition which
are arthas or positive ends as Prdbhdkaras hold. There
may indeed be anarthas which are not prohibited by
Shdstra and thus are morally neutral, but whatsoever is
thus prohibited is an anartha and therefore adharma or
morally evil, and never an artha which is morally neutral
as Prdbhd-karas contend as possible. Similarly there
may indeed be arthas which are not scripturally enjoined
and thus are moraUy neutral, but whatsoever is so enjoined
is an artha and therefore dharma., morally right, and
never an anartha which is morally neutral as Prdbhdkaras
conceive it to be possible. For Kumdrila an end is a
logical and psychological implicate of a scriptural
Imperative, though of course it does not constitute its
moral authority. Hence an end, either positive realisa*
tion of a good or negative cessation from an evil, being
necessarily implied, an Imperative as injunctive or
prohibitive must necessarily refer to an artha or anartha.
Hence there cannot be positive injunction of an anartha
nor negative prohibition of an artha. Kumdrila further
holds that there is no rule that the validity of the Vedas
consists exclusively in the obligatoriness or authority
of specific acts as duties. With regard to the Upanisbad
texts at least it must not be denied that the validity
accrues from something other than an act or duty, i.e.y
from the- intrinsic value or excellence of the Self in its
true nature as an accomplish<>d reality as distinguished
from an act to be accomplished It cannot be supposed
that the Self is a duty to be accomplished by the will.
It follows therefore that Shabda, verbal testimony, is
not necessarily and invariably in reference to some kdrya
or duty to be accomplished i.e., it is not invariably a
command bpi ^ ^ simple declaration of truth,

177

THE ETHICS OP THE HINDUS

(Sftrvasya Yedaeja k&rye eva prilindnyam iti na niyamab.
Upanishadavdkydndim Atmasvarupaparatyam na
nirdkarttavayam. Na avashyam prabrttyddhiad
yyutpattib. Tasmdt naikdntata kdryatbata sbabddndm.

Sbdstradipika.”

According to Kutndrila therefore an end is implicated
logically and psychologically in every scriptural Imperative
prescribing a duty, but does not constitute its moral
authority or validity as duty which depends purely on its
own nature as duty. But this holds in case of texts that
prescribe duties, i.e.^ are of the nature of imperatives or
commands. There are however other texts which are not
imperatives but simple declarations of truths or aocom>
plished realities. Such for example are the Upani^ad
texts which declare the intrinsic worth or excellence of
the Self in its true nature. In this case the nature of
an accomplished reality is declared as an end-in-itself, and
the validity or authority of the text is consequent on
this self-accomplished end or value which is thus not
merely a logical or psychological implicate of the
declaration but also constitutes its content and determines
its validity. We have thus two kinds of scriptural
declarations : — (1) those that are moral imperatives in
which ends are non-morally implicated or involved, but
which are not themselves validated or established as
morally authoritative through such ends, and (2) those
that are declarations of accomplished facts having
intrinsic value or excellence and are thus established
through these as being themselves their own ends.

What, then, are these ends which are nou-morally
implicated in Moral Imperatives ? According to Kumdrila,
we have two kinds of these ends, (1) duhkhdsambhinnam
sukham, i.e., un mixed happiness or happiness unadultera-
ted by unhappiness, and (2) nityasukham, i.e.^ eternal
happiness, unending satisfaction or bliss. The former

28

178

S. K. MAITRA

constitutes nihshreyasab or summum bonum in tbe lower
sense, an inferior sort of mnvmwnn, honum, wbicb is only
unmixed happiness but not eternal happiness as it may be
exhausted through fruition or bhoga and thus end in a
rebirth. The course which leads to it is the course of the
accomplishment of kdmya or conditional duties — the
course of vihitakdmyakarmdnusthdna. As it does not
lead to an enduring and imperishable fruition, it is only
a relative best. ' A better course is that of the discharge
of the nitya or unconditional duties and the realisation of
AtmajnAna or self-knowledge. These are dharmddharma-
virodhi, i.e., opposed to dharma, merit, as well as adharma,
demerit. Hence they may bring on the destruction of
both in the end, thereby conducing to an eternal happiness
or nityasukha (according to some followers of Kumdrila)
or the Self’s freedom by the destruction of all its specific
qualities (samastavaisheshikdtmagunochchhedah) according
to others. Hence while the lower course of the conditional
duties leads only to some kind of unadulterated happiness,
the higher course of the uuconditional duties and self-
knowledge leads to a lasting fruition either as samas-
tavaisheshikdtmagunochchheda, i.e., enduring freedom
through the destruction of all the specific qualities of the
Self, or as nityasukha, i.e., eternal happiness.

Let us now consider the nature and implications of a
specific duty involving evil in some form such as himsd or
destruction of life. Take the case of the ceremony of
shyena whose end is the destruction of the enemy. We
have seen that according to Kumdrila whatever is positively
enjoined by scripture is an artha as well as dharma or
duty. Now shyena is the object of a Yidhicbodand or
positive injunction. Hence it is svarupatah dharmah, i.e.,
moral duty considered in its own nature as scripturally
enjoined. But shyena also leads to an anarthaphala, Le.,
evil consequence or result, viz., the destruction of the

179

THE ETHICS OF THE HlNDtJS

enemy. How is such an evil consequence or anartha to
be reconciled with the nature of shyena as duty which is
always artha or good ? Kumdrila’s view is that the conse-
quence or end, being only a nonmoral implicate of the
duty, does not affect its nature as morally authoritative.
The duty as a moral imperative is an artha even though
there may be an anartha or evil in its implication of an end
or phala which is non-moral. The evil or anartha in this
case is himsd or destruction of life which' is the object of
the scriptural prohibition “ thou shalt not take the life of
a sentient being.” Hence it is not merely anartha or
evil but also adharma or moral evil. Now this adharma
or moral evil appertains to the consequ^nce or phala
which is implicated in the moral imperative but is not
essential to its nature as moral duty. Hence the nature
of the latter as moral duty and therefore as artha or
good is not affected by association with such moral evil
as its consequence. It may be called moral evil only
by upachdra or transference of the nature of the end
to itself, but in itself it is not adharma or moral evil.
This holds good inspite of the fact that the moral evil
of the consequence or phala will bring on its own retri-
bution in the form of naraka or suffering in hell, for
it is not shyena itself which brings on this retribution,
but it is the evil involved in the consequence. This evil
being destruction of life which is scripturally prohibited
must mature into its own punishment in due course but
not because of the ceremony of shyena as an enjoined
duty but because of the forbidden consequence of injury
to life which is not necessary to its moral authority as
scripturally enjoined. There are indeed certain excep-
tional or special cases in which destruction of life is
allowed by the Vedas. These are the six exemptions, i.e.,
the exceptions to the general rule prohibiting such destruc-
tion. Destruction of life is legitimate, e.y., in protecting

180

8. K. MAITRA

the life of a cow from the attack of an dtatdyi or enemy,
in saving the life of a Brahmin, etc. In such circums-
tances there is no evil in shyena if there is no natural
or laukikA means available. In all other cases shyena
involves evil, but only indirectly or mediately through
the consequence or end and not in its own nature as
duty. Such evil brings on naraka or suffering in hell,
but shyena itself does not bring about this suffering.
[This is also the view of most Neo-Niayayika writers
and also of Yishvandtha, but is opposed to that of Old
Nyaya writers {e.g., Jayanta) and of Sankhya, both the
latter condemning shyena as anartha or evil.]

Let us consider the above with reference to the three
parts or constitutive factors of a Yidhi or Scriptural
Injunction. We have seen that an injunction usually
consists of (1) a sadhydmsha or part prescribing an end,
(2) a sddhandmsha or part indicating tbe means and (3)
an itikarttavyatdmsha or part showing the manner of
accomplishing the act indicated as means. Now accord-
ing to the Frdbhdkaras, the end or consequence being
not implied or imported by the moral function of the
Imperative, shyena which involves prohibited himsd or
destruction of life in its phaldmsha or end cannot be
morally justified. According to Kum^rila however the
moral function of the Injuction covers all the three
parts of end, means and manner of accomplishment, but
unequally, viz., primarily the means or act {e.g., the
Ydga or sacrifice) and the manner or mode of aceomplish-
ment, and only by implication the end, sddhya or phala
such as happiness in heaven, etc. Further Yidhi or moral
Imperative has authority even in the kdmya or condi-
tional duties as revealing (jndpaka) the sadhyasadhanatd
or conduciveness of the act to the end desired. But the
phalakAmand or desire for an end depends on the purusha,
the agent, an4 therefore it is the purusha himself who

THE ETHICS OF THE HINDUS 181

causes the prabrtti or will to the accomplishment of the
end. (Svayameva hi jdnanti purushdh karttavyam iti
svayameva purushaprabrttih — Rdmchandra’s ** Siddhdn*
tachandrika” on the “ Sh^tradipika But since the
Imperative is also prabarttaka, obligatory or morally
impelling, the sadhyaphala, i.e.^ the end to be accomplished,
is also in a secondary sense vidheya, duty or object of
the Imperative. Hence in kdmya or conditional duties
like shyena, the scope of the Imperative extends also to
the end or consequence though only indirectly by implica*
tion or in a secondary sense, but since this consequence
is a prohibited anartha or evil in certain oases, e.g., himsd
or destruction of life, there is adharma or moral evil on
account of such consequence. But such adharma apper-
tains to the end and does not taint the nature of the
shyena itself in its own nature which is dharma or duty.
The shyena is thus svarupatah dharmah, i.e., is morally
legitimate in its own nature as a duty primarily imported
by a positive injunction, but since it brings on shyena-
janyahimsd, i.e., prohibited destruction of life, mediately
through its consequence or end, it is regarded as morally
wrong (adharma) by superimposition (upach4ra), i.e., the
superimposition of the consequence on the act itself which
leads to the consequence.

It follows therefore that according to the Frdbhdkaras
evil or wrong can be justified only as implicated in or as
a necessary part of the duty itself. It cannot be justified
as an end aimed at. According to Kumdrila however such
evil or wrong may be indirectly implicated in a relative
or conditional duty depending on the agent’s desire
though it cannot be primarily imported by the Imperative.
Thus there is a duty even with reference to the accom-
plishment of an end which is morally evil or wrong :
one may seek it in the proper manner or one may be
remiss even in this. The duty therefore is with reference

182

S. K. MAItRA

to the mode of accomplishing the end and one may
acquire merit or demerit by conforming to the rules or
not conforming thereto. The end is thus only indirectly
implicated in such a duty, and though the evil of the
end may result in the agent’s demerit, yet this is other
than the demerit which may accrue to him on account
of his not properly accomplishing his duty with reference
to the end. (In this sense even the sharper and the
robber have their specific duties : they must conform to
the rules, to their special codes failing wherein they will
be failing in their duty.)

In the foregoing analysis we have considered evil and
particularly moral evil with reference to positive scrip-
tural prescriptions or injunctions, i.e., we have considered
how far and in what sense such injunctions can be said
to imply anything which is wrong or evil in its nature.
It now remains to be donsidered in what sense such evil
is to be regarded as constituting the object of the negative
prescriptions or prohibitions. This leads us to :

The Doctrine of Niahedha or Scriptural Prohibition
according to Prabhdkara and Kumdrila respectively.

(1) Prabhdkara’ a vieio : We have already seen that,
according to the Prdbhdkaras, an anartha may be anartha
or evil merely from the laukika, secular standpoint, or
simply from the Shdstric, scriptural standpoint, or from
both. Now scriptural anarthas, whether simply scriptural,
or scriptural as well as secular, may be the object of
a scriptural prohibition as well as a scriptural injunction.
It is only anarthas which are scripturally prohibited that
constitute adharraa or moral wrong. An anartha is
ftcripturally enjoined in a kdmya duty, and as the injunc-
tion in such a case is without moral force because of the
agent’s kdmand or subjective desire, such anartha is
devoid of strict moral significance, i.e., is neither moral
nor immoral.^^ Provided therefore that an anartha is not

188

THE ETHICS OB* THE HINDUS

specifically prohibited in some other prescription, it may
be the object of a positive injuction without being either
right or wrong. But if it is prohibited elsewhere it is
wrong because of such scriptural prohibition. Further
all scriptural prohibitions have only anartha in view, i.&.y
anartha in the sense of producing more unhappiness than
happiness. Such anartha may not be anartha or evil
from the secular standpoint, but it is always anartha in
the Shdstric or non-empirical sense.

It is these anarthas which constitute the object only of
scriptural prohibitions that constitute moral evil or moral
wrong. But the prohibitions do not refer to any
ulterior end or consequence such as sin of the agent
(pratyavdya) and his consequent punishment in hell: it is
not reference to any such extraneous end that constitutes
the moral wrongness of an act which is prohibited. On
the contrary, the prohibition itself constitutes the wrong-
ness in question. As a matter of fact the prohibition
involves nothing beyond the two essentials of a niyoga
or command, (1) a niyojya, adhikrtapurusha or person
on whom the command is binding, in this case every man
who feels the desire for the forbidden indulgence, and (2)
a sddhana, means or instrument for the accomplish-
ment of the command which in this case is nibrtti or
cessation from the forbidden act. These are the only
necessary accompaniments of the prohibition as impera-
tive or obligatory so that no phalakdmand, no desire for
any ultdrior end or consequence such as pratyavdydbhdva
or freedom from the taint of sin, is necessary. The mere
presentation of the enjoined duty is sufficient for the
agen’ts cessation : the imperative is self -appropriated as
a purushavisheshana or specification of the Self, and
thus acts as the deterrent. There is no pathological
desire which acts as the counteractive to the forbidden
impulse, no extraneous end or consequence, the carrying

184

S. K. MAITRA

out of the command, in other words, the required cessa-
tion or abstention, being itself its own end. Hence the
only purushdrtha or end which is accomplished by the
cessation is niyogasiddhi or accomplishment of the oom-
man'l, the siddhi or accomplishment in this case being
negative abstention or overcoming of a positive craving.

(2) Kum&rila'a view : According to Kumdrila however
the desire for an end is a psychological condition of voli-
tion in every case', i.e., in the negative as well as the posi-
tive form of it. Thus there is hitaprdpti or attainment
of the good as a motive in positive willing (prab|rtti)
while there is ahitaparihdra or avoidance of evil as a mo-
tive in negative willing or nibrtti. The law of selection
and rejection ns a psychological condition thus holds good
in all cases, even in moral willing from the consciousness
of duty. Hence in nibrtti or cessation in view of scrip-
tural prohibition or nishedha, there is desire for an end,
viz., the desire to avoid subjective sin (pratyavAya)
and its consequence of suffering in hell (naraka). This is
the ahita or evil which is sought to be avoided by such
cessation just as in vidhi or positive injunction there
is the realisation of a positive end or good (hita), viz.,
happiness in heaven and the like.

It follows therefore that according to Prabhdkara
the prohibition, though binding independently of the
agent’s desire for an ulterior end such as freedom from
sin, is yet conditional on his feeling the forbidden im-
pulse. It is thus conditional in one sense and uncondi-
tional in another : provided you feel the impulse, the
prohibition binds you, but you cannot avoid coming under
its authority if you are under the sway of the impulse.
Further such impulse is a prius only of the application
of the imperative to your case, it is not a condition of the
accomplishment of the imperative. The imperative is
aooomplishedl purely through the moral prompting without

THE ETH1G8 OP THE HINDUS 1<|5

requiring a nonmoral psychological motive for its accon^*
pUshment. It is otherwise with the positive iujunctiona«
These are unconditionally authoritative, independently
even of a psychological prius of subjective impulse. They
are accomplished likewise through themselves without
implying any extraneous desire. The so-called * conditional
injunctions are not true moral injunctions. They imply
a subjective prius of empirical impulse and for that very
reason are not duties but mere facts resulting from psy-
chological causes. According to Kumdrila however there
is desire for an end in all scriptural imperatives, negative
and positive. Such desire is a psychological condition of
the accomplishment of the duty though not necessary for
the moral impulsion or obligatoriness of the impenitive.
This is true not only of the unconditional but also of the
conditional injunctions as well as the prohibitions. The
prohibitions however imply something more : they imply
a forbidden impulse in the agent as the prius of their
application. Hence they are conditional on the agent in
two ways, conditional on a forbidden impulse in him
and conditional on his desire to avoid the consequence
thereof. The former is the prius of the application and
the latter of the accomplishment of the prohibition. The
conditional injunctions are also similarly conditional in
two ways, conditional on an empirical impulse which in
this case is a condition of application as well as of accom-
plishment of the enjoined duty. Thus the prohibitions
and conditional injunctions are doubly conditional accord-
ing to Eumdrila : in either case there is not only desire
for an end as a condition of psychological motivation
but also an impulse (to be checked or realised) as the
condition of the moral application of the command. The
unconditional injunctions however apply without re-
ference to any subjective impulse and thus are conditional
on desire only in respect of psychological prompting.

24

1'86

S. K. MAITRA

Hence according to the Prabh&karas the moral im-
perative, positive or negative, is independent of patholo-
gical motivation, though in the case of the latter there
is a psychological prius of forbidden impulse to be coun-
teracted. Moreover the conditional injunctions result-
ing from subjective prompting are without moral force.
According to Kumdrila however, even the unconditional
injunctions imply psychological motivation through the
desire for an end. In the prohibitions and the conditional
injunctions there is moreover an additional psychological
prius of impulse as the condition of application. Both
Kumdrilaand Prabhdkara however admit that the moral
motive or prompting of the Law is the essential factor
which may require a pathological psychological prompting
as a secondary accompaniment or may not require it.
In either case therefore the moral intention is primary
and an extraneous desire is either unnecessary or merely
subsidiary. Another question however arises here : the
moral intention may not only refer to an extra-
neous end through the implication of a subjective desire,
but may also lead to unintended or undesired con-
sequences fraught with good or evil. How far are these
consequences of moral significance ? Do they lead to the
agent’s merit or demerit ? Do they affect in any way the
moral nature of the acts whose collateral accompaniments
or consequences they are ? This leads us to the question of
the subjective and objective rightness or im'ongness of an
act considered as such.

The question is : whether rightness or the oppo-
site appertains to the act in its own nature apart from
the subjective intention of the agent or whether it
attaches to it only through the agent’s conscious choice.
In the former case, there will be responsibility even for
unintended and accidental acts, i.e.y merit or demerit
will aoqrue,jiEwef3fom. In the latter case there will be

187

^ilE EtPHicS Ot’ TH15 B INDUS

responsibility only for dots from conscious foresight and
choice. Is the act, then, in itself right or wrong ? Is it
a source of merit and demerit on its own account, or only
through the subjective intention ? Is moral res'ponsibility
determined purely by the nature of the act, or by the
subjective intention, or by both conjointly ?

Consider the following cases : —

(1) When the forbidden anartba or evil, destruc-
tion of life condemned by scripture, is intended as a
consequence, but is remote and mediated (vyavahita),
though certain, (a) Thus there may be death in conse-
quence of festering boils, ulcers, etc., which may again be
hastened by means of poisoning (vishaprayoga), sword-
stroke (khadgaghdta), etc. Here death is caused by the
latter through the intervening boils, ulcers, etc., and the
question is how far this tantamouuts to murder and the
consequent guilt thereof, (d) Similarly death may be
caused by means of the shyena ceremony, the shyena
generating marandpurva i.e., a non-natural potency which
causes the death in question. Here also death is caused
mediately, the intervening factor here being a non-natural
agency as distinguished from the natural factors in the
previous instance. Is this then also equivalent to murder ?
(o) Again, one may worship the Shiva Deity with a view
to lay down one’s life at the holy pilgrimage of Kdsi.
Here also a non-natural means is employed and the
question is whether the agent is chargeable with the
guilt of suicide.

(2) When the anartha or evil is unintended audr
accidental, being the unforeseen consequence of an act.
done originally with a good intention, e.^., when there is
death of a cow caused by its falling in a well that has
dried up and thus has failed of its original beneficial
purpose of supplying drinking water to the locality.

isi S. K. MAii^tlA

(3) When the anartha or mischief is an accidental
chnsequence of an act which is morally indifferent (neither
good nor evil), e.g.^ the throwing of a javelin which by
Ihissing iti^ aim kills a Brahmin.

The question is : how far is the agent morally responsible
in each of these cases ? Has he incurred demerit because
of the consequence of his action? Or has there been
no demerit in so far as there has been no subjective
intentipn and choice ?

Here there are different views : —

(1) Some hold that right and wrong relate always to
the agent’s motive. There is indeed an objective factor,
the nature of the act or its consequence. But not
until these are subjectively foreseen and intended, is there
any moral responsibility. Himsd, e.g.^ destruction of life,
may be considered merely objectively as maranaphalavyd*
pdra, i.&., as a series of events ending in a death. Thus
regarded it is not adharma or morally wrong : it is only
an objective happening in nature, a chain of objective
conditions and circumstances culminating in the death
of a particular being. Himsd may also be defined
as prdnaviyogavachchhinna-prayojakavydpdra, i.e., as a
voluntary act which ends in a consequence of death.
Even in this case it would not be necessarily wrong as
the consequence in question may be no part of the inten<
tion of the voluntary action. Lastly, himsd may be de<
fined as maranaphaloddeshena anushthiyamdna marana-
phalaprayojakavydpdra, i.e., as a voluntary act culmina*
ting in death in consequence of the act being willed de-
liberately with the object of bringing about the death in
question, In this case the himsd is ihorally wjong
(adharma), but not if it is'scripturally sanctioned (as e.g.
in destruction of an enemy by means of shyena), nor also
if it comes under the six exceptions allowed as in protect-
ing the life of a cow or a Brahmin.

THE ETHICS OE THE HINDUS 189

Hence in the absence of subjective intention (uddesha)
the kupakarttd, the owner of the well, is not respon-
sible, i.e., incurs no sin, for the death of the cow ; the
paribeshayitd, the person who serves the meal, is not
responsible for the death of the bhuktd, the person who
eats it; the galalagudunamrta, the person who dies of
choking while taking his food, is not dtmahantd, guilty
of suicide. Because there in no uddeslia or subjective
intention of himsd or injury to life, therefore there* is no
sin in these cases. The upholders of subjective right-
ness exempt even unintentional causing of a Brahmin’s
death from the category of acts to bo regarded as sinful :
when the ndrdchaprakshepa, the throwing. of the javelin
which causes Brdhmanamarana or death of a Brahpiin,
is anyoddeshakfta, is thrown with a purpose other than
that of causing the Brahmin’s death, it is not BraJima-
hantrtva, Le., not culpable destruction of a Brahmin’s
life. It is regarded as culpable destruction by gaunavya-
padesba and lakshand, i.e., in a secondary sense to indicate
the social loss. The penalty for such unintentional
destruction of a Brahmin is only half, and is merely
vdohanika or customary being imposed for social reasons
and not for any sin (pratyavdya) incurred. But where
there is uddesha or subjective intention, there is sin even
if the consequence is remote and mediated as in kha4gd-
ghdtena branaparamparayd maranam, death caused by
by a dliberate injury on a festering boil. In this sense
there is sin in destruction of life by shyena and other
non-natural means, provided of course that such destruc-
tion does not come under the six exemptions or is
otherwise positively enjoined by scripture.

(2) Others however hol<| that rightness and wrongness
are objective categories independent of subjective inten-
tion or uddesha : they belong to acts considered objectively
as conducing to good or evil without reference to the

190

s k. Maitra

agent’s foresight and choice. The upholders of this view
hold that every forbidden act is charged vvith a narakasdd
hana-apurva, i.e., a supersensuous potency for evil
which necessarily leads to suffering ui hell and this is
independent of uddesha or the agent’s subjective inten-
tion. In other words, there are objective supernatural
potencies associated with certain acts and these bring
on a specific suffering or a specific happiness as the case
may be, even when the agent has been led into these acts
purely by accident without conscious intention and fore-
sight. Hence every such act is a sin and thus prdyash-
chitta or proper expiation is also obligatory on the agent
in every instance. Hence the man who kills a Brahmin
is guilty of culpable destruction of a Brahmin and must
undergo the full twelve years’ religious penalty even if
he has killed him by pure accident. Ordinarily no doubt
akdmakrta i.e., accidental and unini;entional acts, are
visited only with half the penalty, hut this does not apply
to acts which are scripturally forbidden. These latter
produce pratyavdya apurva or religious demerit and must
be expiated by the full penalty imposed.

According to Vishvandtha however there is no sin only
where adrshta or supernatural means are used, in every
other case the sin depending on uddesha or subjective
intention of the agent. Hence there is no sin in shyena.
Shridhara however holds that there is sin in all akdmakrta
or unintentional acts, this being due not to any objective
potency in the acts to lead to a specific punishment such
as naraka or suffering in hell, but being due to the
pramdda, carelessness or inadvertence which such acts
imply. The agent is responsible for this carelessness and
is thereby responsible also for the acts.

N.B . — With these conceptions of objective rightness
we may compare the Buddhist conception of institutional
morality and institutional responsibility.. The Buddhists

THE ETHICS OF THE HINDUS

191

hold that there is responsibility not'merely for the objec-
tive consequence of any particular action, but also for all
the consequences of all the actions which the founding of
a particular institution may entail. Thus the founder of
an institution is morally responsible for all the good and
evil effects of the institution, present and future, even
effects which come about long after his death. For
example, if a religious ceremony involves prdnihimsd or
animal sacrifice, then the person who first initiates the
ceremony is responsible for every life that is sacrificed
for the sake of the ceremony in question. (Devakulddi
pratishthdpanam, tatra sattvdh hanyante. . Taddevakuld-
dyapabhdgdt tatkarttrodm santdnaparibhdgdnvayam apun-
yamapi jayate. — “Madhyamikdvrtti” by Ghandrakirti).

CHAPTER III.

Cla.ssii'ication or the Sprixos op Action.

The “Analysis of conscience” has shown that the
consciousness of duty presupposes specific impulses in
the agent to be regulated, subdued or moralised. Thus
there are pathological feelings determining the so*called
conditional duties which are obstacles to ethical dis-
interestedness and must be restrained with a view to the
proper discharge of the unconditional duties. There are
also the immoral impulses and passions which are pro-
hibited altogether and these have also to he subdued.
A cliissifioation of these impulses and passions from the
psychological as well as the ethical point of view is thus
a necessary sequel to the analysis of conscience in the
Psychological Ethics of Self-Purification. In this chapter
we shall consider the Hindu Analysis and classificatibn of
the Springs of Action, and we shall find that the Hindus
tackle the problem not merely from the theoretical
standpoint of psychological mechanism but also from
the ethical standpoint of moral worth or value.

The subject is treated in Yaisheshika, Nydya, Sdnkhya
as well as Vedanta systems. The Yaisheshika treatment
of the question is to be found in Prasastapdda’s Bhdshya
on the Yaisheshika sutras which I have supplemented by
occasional references to the Nydyakandalitikd. As regards
the Nydya view however I have considered it necessary
not only to refer to Ydtsyayana’s presentation of the
subject but also the classification in the “Hydyamanjari”
of Jayanta Bhatta which is slightly different and in some
respects fuller. My presentation of the Sdnkhya treatment
is based n^nly on the Yydsa-Bhdshya on the Pdtanjala
sutras whu$ the Veddnta view I have tried to expotmd

193

THE ETHICS OP THE HINDUS

from one of the latter writings which, as we shall see,
presents many special points of interest in several ways. ^

I. The Vaishbshika CijASSification op the
Springs of Action.

Prasastapdda considers the subject of the springs of
Action in the Gunagrantha of his Bhdshya on the Vaishe*
shika sutras. According to him there are two roots or
Springs of the process of willing, namely. Desire (Ichchhd)
which is always the desire for pleasure or happiness,
(Sukha) and Aversion (Dvesha) which is the aversion
towards pain (Duhkha).

{A) Analysis of pleasure or Sitkha.

The nature of pleasure is that it is characterised by a
peculiar consciousness of gratification, a sense of favour-
ableness or anugraha, and its specifie effects are (1) this
sense of favourableness, (2) a feeling of attraction towards
the pleasurable object (Abhishvanga) and (3) certain
bodily expressions such as the brightness of the eyes, the
face, etc. (Nayanddi-prasilda, Vairaalya).

It is to be observed that the effect of favourableness
gives us the subjective side of pleasure while attraction
represents its objective or conative aspect. Lastly the
physiological effects, namely, the brightness of the eyes,
etc., are also taken into consideration.

In the Nydyakandalitikd the effect of favourableness
is very fully explained. It is pointed out that pleasure
being by nature favourable is the experience of the object
which reacts favourably on the self producing the
consciousness of fruition. This constitutes the subjective
appropriation of the pleasure. Pleasure being once
produced produces also the consciousness of itself as
favourable to the self and this constitutes the self’s

■ ^ 26 •

194

S. K. MAITRA

approval of the pleasure. Hence according to this
iliterpretation there are no unfelt or unrecognised
pleasureSj a conclusion against which the VedAntist will
cite such familiar states as the unconscious happiness of a
dreamless sleep and analogous experiences.

PrasastapAda next enumerates the conditions which
induce pleasure, which are ; — (1) proximity to the

desired object, (2) consciousness of some good to he
attained, (3) stimulation of the sensibilities by the object,
(4) organic equilibrium (svastatA) and (5) merit (dharma).

It is pointed that ishtopalavdhi or prospect of some
good to be realised by the object is a necessary condition
of pleasure, for the person who is drawn towards some
other object fools no pleasure from the experience
(VishayAntara-vyashahtasya sukha-anutpAdAt). Hence
pleasure presupposes not only subjective predisposition
towards the object but also active interest and attention
for the time being, this being the pragmatic aspect of all
feeling.

It is also assumed that besides the natural causes,
pleasure also supposes certain other conditions of a
non-phenomonal character. These are the moral causes
or conditions of pleasure such as dharma, merit or
righteousness of the subject. The assumption is that the
life of a spiritual being cannot be explained merely by.
natural causes without reference to his freedom. It is
freedom that distinguishes the spiritual from the merely
natural agent. A spiritual being is the creator of his own
values, and his pleasures and pains should be regarded in
the last analysis as the fruition of his own self-determined
activity, his own karma.

In the NyAyakandalitikA three other kinds of pleasure
are also recognised, i.e., pleasures which are induced by
conditions different from those noticed above. Thus we
have plea8\ips of reminiscence (Smrtijam) and pleasures

THE ETHICS OF THE HINDUS 195

of choice and resolution (Sankalpajam). These are not
* sensory feelings and do not depend on the condition of the
stimulation of the sense-organs. Thirdly, there is in the
case of those who have attained a. true knowledge of the
self a kind of satisfaction even when we have neither
object (Vishaya), nor desire (Ichchha), nor reminiscence,
nor anticipation — a kind of felicity which results from
(1) self-knowledge (atmajnana), (2) self-collectedness
(shama), (3) contentment (santosh), ( l) the consummation
of righteousness (prakrsta dharma).

Hence two kinds of pleasure are to bo distinguished :

(1) Lively and fleeting pleasures — the pleasuresarising
from the titillation of the flesh. These, include the
sense-feelings as well as the pleasures of reminiscence and
choice. All these arise from attraction towards the object
and consist in a feeling of restlessness.

(2) A quieter and more permanent form of satisfaction,
pleasure in self-centered repose and calm and therefore
free from mental unrest.

It is to be seen that the latter is not the same as the
refined pleasure of the Epicurean. The Epicurean’s
refined pleasure presupposes a minimum of objective
conditions and is therefore heteronomous. Here how'^ever
no objective condition is recognised, the pleasure arising
wholly from within, being the manifestation of the felicity
that belongs by nature to the self.

(fi) Analysis of Pain (Bukkha),

Just as pleasure is characterised by the sense of
favourableness so pain has the opposite characteristic of
unfavourableness (upaghdta). The effects of pain are:
(1) unfavourableness, (2) aversion tow'ards the object
causing pain (dvesha) and (3) paleness (dainya, viehchhd-
ya^). Similarly the conditions which induce pain are ;

196

S. K. MAITJIA

(1) proximity towards an object of aversion (anavipreta*
vishaya-sdnnidhya), (2) apprehension of evil (anishatopa-
lavdbi), (3) stimulation of the sense-organs by the object,
(4) absence of organic equilibrium and (6) demerit. There
are also pains of reminiscence and of anticipation in which
there is no sensory stimulation. But there is no tran-
scendental suffering corresponding to the transcendental

bliss which belongs by nature to the self.

.

(O) Analysis of Desire {Ichohhd).

Erom the feelings of pleasure and pain arise two kinds
of reaction of. the will, viz,, desire (ichchhd) and aversion
(dvesha).

Desire is defined as apraptaprdrthand, the yearning for
the unattaiued. It is either egoistic (Svdrtha) or altruistic
(Pardrtha). An egoistic desire is the desire to attain
something for the self of which it is not yet in possession
as when we say ‘ may this happen to me ’ (aprdptasya
vastunah svartham prati yd prdrthand idam m6 bbuydt).
An altruistic desire is the desire to attain something for
another of which the latter is not yet in possession as
when we say ‘ May this happen to him ’ (Asya idam
bhavatu). The Nyayakandalitikd does not recognise the
ego-altruistic form of desire as an independent class.

The conditions of desire are : — (1) Connection of
soul with the mind (atmamana-samyoga, (2) Experience
of pleasure, (3) Becollection of pleasure leading to the
expectation of similar pleasure in future.

In the case of the absent object the desire is supposed
to arise from the recollection of it as a means to pleasure,
in this case the absent pleasure moves the will through
the representation of it by the mind. This brings out the
pragmatic aspect of cognition. Even a representation is
a motive bpcauso of the consequence to the subject

197

tHE ETHICS OP THE HINDUS

(Phalasya prayojakatvjtt). An idea of the good is
therefore not a mere idea, bat also an incipient activity to
realise the good.

The Nydyakandalitikd here points out that desire is a
stretching forward as well as a stretching backward, a
double-faced psychosis which points alike towards the
future and the past, Thus we may desire to attain the
unattained, to realise the unrealised. This is one form of
desire. But there is also another form of it, which is the
desire to live over again through the past. Thus the
desire for the object of pleasure generates the effort
to realise it which has therefore a forward reference.
Similarly the desire to recollect the past restores the
past in the form of memory. (Updddnaichc^hdtah
tadanugunah prayatnah bhavati, smaranaichchbdtah
smaranam).

In the Nydyakandalitikd these two aspects of desire
are considered to be independent phenomena. In the
Vydsa-bhdshya on the Pdtanjala sutras however they are
shown to be closely related and to constitute the two
different marks of all transformation (parindma). It is
there pointed out that change of form involves the twofold
process of the transformation of the potential into the
kinetic and of the kinetic into the sublatent. Hence even
the present state (the kinetic, vartamdna) contains within
itself the marks of the past (the sub-latent, atita) and the
future (potential, andgata). The present that stretches
beyond itself into the future is thus the present which has
drawn the past into itself. Desire therefore as a present
smte of unrest is both a reinstatement of the past and an
anticipation of the future.

(D) The Springe qf Action under Desire.

After analysing desire Prasastapdda next considers the
Springs of Action coming under desire.

198

S. K. MAITHA

These are : —

(1) Kdma. According to Prasastapdda it signifies the
sexual craving in ordinary usage, but when particularised
may also 'designate longing for happiness in heaven
(svargakdmani), for wealth (artha-hdmana), etc.

(2) Avilasha, Appetite for food and drink (bhojanam
tatra ichchhd abhilashah).

(3) Edga, Passion which is the desire for a recurring
enjoyment of ‘objects (punah-punah-vishaya-ranjana-
ichchhd).

(4) Sankalpa, Hesolve which is the desire to realise
what is not yet (andgatasya arthasya karanechchhd).

(6) Kdrunya, Compassion which is the desire to remove
the sufferings of others without any prompting of self-
interest (svarthamanapeksha paraduhkha-prahdnechchd).

(6) Vairdgya, Dispassion M^hich is the desire to
renounce the world from the perception of its faults
(dosha-darshandt vishaya-tydgechchhd).

(7) Upadhd, Insincerity which is the inclination to
deceive others (parapratdranechchhd).

(8) Bhdva, which is a carefully concealed desire — a
desire without physical expression but manifested by signs
(anatarnigurechchhd lingair-dvirbhdvita yd ichchhd sd
bhdva).

(9) Chikirsha, Desircj for Action, Jihirsha, Desire for
appropriation, and the various other forms of desire
arising from the differences in their corresponding actions
(kriydveddt ichchdbheddh).

It will be seen that Prasastapdda’s list notices the
individualistic appetites {e.g., the appetite for food s^nd
drink) as well as the cravings of the sex which are «on-
individualistic and serve the preservation of the race.

Secondly, it also recognises the difference between a
desire as such and the more enduring and persistent form
of it which we call passion (itdga).

THE ETHICS OP ^HE HINDUS

199

Thirdly, a distinction is made between desires for
enjoyment and desires for action. This is the basis of the
difference between passion and resolve. Passion is a
Bhogechchhd, a desire for enjoyment or fruition while
Resolve is a Karanechchha, a desire for action, a desire to
realise the unrealised. . In passion the subjective aspect
of desire is prominent, in Resolve its objective aspect.

Pourthly, Dispassion is regarded as a form of desire
and not as a form of aversion. The reason is that aversion
or hate in any form is believed to be inconsistent with
the mental equanimity and calm of the state of Tran-
scendental Freedom or Moksha to which Dispession is
recognised to be a necessary means.

This is also the underlying purpose in the inclusibn of
compassion among the forms of desire rather than of
aversion. It is to be seen however that while the negative
feeling of compassion is recognised by Prasastapdda, the
corresponding positive virtue of the Buddhists, viz.,
rejoicing at the good of creatures, muditd, maitri, is not
noticed. This omission is significant from the biologist’s
as well as the sociologist’s point of view. For the main-
tenance of life as well as social stability removal of
suffering is perhaps more imperatively necessary than the
furtherance of happiness. This is why it is easier for us
to sympathise with suffering and misery than rejoice at
the good fortune of our fellow-beings. It also explains
the elaborate provisions of society for the detection and
punishment of crime and its comparative deficiency in
regard to positive reward of merit and service. In fact,
it is this consciousness of the interminable suffering of
life that accounts for the Hindu preference of Dispassion
to Compassion as the means to transcendental satisfaction.
Compassion is a virtue of the^ lower order : it may alleviate
suffering to a certain extent but cannot remove it al-
together. It thus gives us a relative best rather than the

200 S, K. MAITRA

absolute best, and the uncompromising idealist who seeks
an absolutely perfect order should turn away from the
world, i.e.^ should refuse to participate in a life which is
a mere compromise. Hence he must cultivate Dispassion
which is the desire to renounce all desires and this will
lead to his freedom in the end. It must be noticed here
however that the great teachers of Buddhism and Jainism
insist on vicarious suffering for others among the perfec-
tions, though it ‘does not appertain according to them
to the Transcendental State. The Vaishnava scriptures,
e.g., the Bhdgavat, and the Vaishnava teachers, e.g.,
Ramdnuja, go further recognising Compassion for suffer-
ing as among the perfections of the Muktas and indeed
of Bhagavdna himself.

(E) Amlgsia ofDvesha, Aversion^ and of the Springs of
Action which are Forms of Aversion.

Aversion is described by Prasastapdda as being of the
nature of a consuming flame that produces a burning
sensation, as it were, in the subject (Dveshah prajvalat-
makh).

Its conditions are : — (1) The contact of the soul with
the mind (dtma-raana-samyoga), (2) experience of suffer-
ing, and (3) recollection of buffering leading to the
apprehension of it in future.

The Springs of Action which are compounds of
Aversion are : —

(1) Krodha, Anger. It is the form of aversion which
exhausts itself after a momentary ebullition and is the
cause of certain physical expressions such as violent
tremor and agitation of the body as a whole as also
specific changes in the organs of sense and motor activity
(sharirendriyddivikdrahetu kshanamdtrabhdvidveshah
krodhah). . :

THE ETHICS OP THE HINDUS 201

(2) Droha, Revengefulness. It has no perceptible
physical expression (alakshita-yikara), is long-mediated
(chirdnuvaddha), and terminates only with the infliction
of some actual injury (apakiha-avashdna). *

(3) Manyu, Concealed ill-W’ill. It is the aversion
which an injured person feels towards his malefactor, but
on whom he is conscious of being powerless to retaliate;
(apakrtasya pratyapakarasamarthasya antarnigurhah dve-
shah). Hence it is a special form of a-evengefulness —
revengefulness conscious of being impotent to retaliate,
and it is therefore also without physical expression like
revengefulness in general, being seated (antarnigurha)
deeply within the inner life of the soul.

(d) Akshamd, Jealousy. It is the aversion which one
feels towards the good qualities in another (paragune-
shu dveshah).

(6) Amarsha, Envy. It is the aversion which arises
from the sense of relative inferiority. (Svagunapari-
bhavasamutthah dveshah.) Hence it is Jealousy become
self-conscious.

It is to be seen that the forms enumerated
under Dvesha are emotions and sentiments rather than
active impulses. They however lead to conation
and are therefore included among the Springs of
Action.

We should note also that Prasastapdda’s analysis is on
a scientific basis only as regards the two main classes, vh.,
Desire and Aversion. The rest arc mere enumerations
based on observation. At the same time Prasastapdda
shows an acuteness of psychological analysis which will
do credit to any of the modern psychologists.

Thirdly, we should observe that Prasastapdda gives us
a mainly psychological classification, but the division of
desires into egoistic and altruistic is also on a socio-ethical
basis.

26

202

S. K. MAITRA

•

Fourthly, we should note that Frasastapdda does not

trace all impulses to one root, viz., the desire for the good.
This is the view of Socrates who thus resolves evil into
something negative, i.e., as the privation of good. This
is wrong according to Frasastapdda. Pain could not be
the mere privation of pleasure because it is never ex>
perienced as such and also because a mere negation can
never be an object of willing.

Lastly, it is<to be remarked that the connection of the
soul with the mind is recognised among the conditions of
Desire as well as Aversion. But as in the Transcendental
state this connection ceases, Desire as well as Aversion and
their special forms must be regarded as apperttiining to the
empirical life as distinguished from the Transcendental.
They are thus pathological. At the same time we have
a special form of Desire, viz., Dispassion which is not
pathological but pure and which therefore characterises
the intermediate stage of the spirit between the purely
empirical and phenomenal and the absolutely Transcen-
dental and non-empirical.

II. Ntata Olassificaiion op the
Speings op Action.

According to the Yaisheshikas, there are two roots of
the will, namely. Desire and Aversion. The Naiydyikas,
however, resolve these into something more ultimate,
viz,, Error, Delusion, Moha. The subject is treated by
Vdtsydyana as well as by later writers on Ancient Njaya,
e.ff., Jayanta Bhatta. The later presentation, however,
is in some respects fuller and more advanced than the
earlier.

{A) Vdtaydyana'a Classification of the Springs of Action,

According to Ydtsydyana the passions and emotions a re
to be traced ultimately to one root, viz.. Delusion, Moha.

tilB ETHICS OP THE HINDUS 208

^ From Delusion arise Attraction towards the favourable
object (Anukulavishayeshu r^ah) and Eepulsion towards
the unfavourable object (Pratikulavishayeshu dveshah).
From attraction and aversion arise the various forms of
the passions and emotions such as Mendacity (Asatya),
Beceitfulness (Mdyd, Kapatatd), Greed (Lobha), etc.
These lead to conation (Pravrtti) which may be either
righteous (Shubhd) of unrighteous (Ashubha).

VdtsyAyana’s classification thus differs from Prasasta-
pdda’s in two respects. In the first place Vdtsydyana
traces attraction and aversion to something more ultimate,
viz.i Error. Secondly, in addition to the purely psycho-
logical classification of the springs of action' on the basis
of the original difference between attraction and aversion,
he'also 'suggests an ethical classification on the basis of
the rightness and the wrongness of the conduct to which
they lead.

It is also to be seen that Vdtsydyana considers the
disorder of the reason to be the ultimate source of the
passions. This intellectualistic contempt of the passions
is al8o>;oharaoteristic of the Stoics. There is, however,
one important difference between Vdtsydyana and the
Stoics in this respect. For the Stoics the impulses in
themselves are not passions — they are transformed into
the passions only when under the influence of error they
are carried beyond their natural limits. Vdtsydyan^,
however, , makes no distinction between the natural
impulses and the passions. According to him all impulses
are to be traced to the disordered reason and therefore
are to be regarded as subversive of the tran(][uillity of
the soul. This applies to the righteous as well as the
unrighteous impulses which are alike bonds that bind the
soul to the life of Samsdra. Hence the non-phenomenal,
transcendental life is a life of absolute freedom, of
freedom not only l"from]' the natural bonds but jalso from

204 '

S. K.. MAITRA

the obligations of the moral life. The released individual
is one" who has refused to participate in the phenomenal
life, has annulled his will-to-live (Trshnd) by withdrawing
his assent to Samsara and all that comes with it.

{B) JayantiCs Classification of the
Springs of Action.

Jayanta’s classification in the “ Nydya-Manjari ” re-
presents the later treatment of the subject from the
standpoint of Ancient Nyaya, and is more profound and
complete than the earlier presentation of Vdtsydyana.

According to Jayanta, conation (Pravrtti) is to be
traced to three roots, viz., Moha (Delusion), Edga
(Attraction), Dvesha (Aversion).

Delusion (Moha) is defined as the erroneous judgment
implying an assent of the will (Avasdya) which arises from
the failure to discriminate the ultimate transcendental
nature of things (Vastu-pararadrtha-aparichchheda-laksh-
ana-mithyd-avasdya)..

It is regarded as the crowning folly (Pdpatama)
because attraction and aversion cannot arise except
through Moha, Error or Delusion.

The emotions and springs of action which are com-
pounds of Delusion are the folloAving : — -

(1) Mithyd-jndna, Erroneous Cognition. It is the
erroneous judgment which ascribes to a thing the nature
of something else (Atasmin tat iti jndna).

(2) Vichikitsd, Perplexity, Scepticism. It is the
judgment or attitude of the will which arises from the
absence of certain or definite knowledge (Kimsvititi
vimarsha).

(3) Mdna, Vanity. It is the consciousness of a false
superiority produced by the ascription to oneself of
excellences jvhich one does not possess. .

THE ETHICS OF THE HINDUS

206

(4) PramMa, Inadvertence. It is neglect of duty
arising from the absence of earnestness.

Prom Delusion ai'ise the impulses of Attraction and
Aversion and the compounds coming under them, Hdga,
Attraction, is characterised by desire for the object
that is regarded as favourable (Anukuleshu artheshu
abhildshalakshanah rdgah).

The compounds coming under Attraction are the
various forms of Desire. These arc : —

(1) Kdma, sexual craving. Prasastapdda extends the
meaning also to longing for happiness in heaven, for
wealth, etc.

(2) Matsyara. It is defined as the unwillingness to
part even with that which is not diminished by sharing
with others : Yat anyasmai nivedyaraanamapi dhanavat
na kshiyate tat aparitydgechchha.

(3) Sprhd, Worldliness. It is the desire for worldly
possessions and things that are non-spiritual : andtmi-
yavastudditsa.

( 4 ) Trshna, Will-to-live. It is the desire to live
again as produced by the representation of a possible
recurrence of this phenomenal life : punarbhava-prati-
sandhdna-hetubhuta-ichchhd.

(5) Lobha, Greed. It is the desire to obtain a
forbidden thing : nishiddha-dravya-grahanechchba.

Next as to Devesha, xYversion.

It is the opposite of Avci’sion and is characterised by
repulsion towards the object regarded as unfavourable :
pratikuleshu asahalakshanah dveshah.

The compounds under aversion arise from the various
forms of repulsion : asahana-bheda-prakdra-bheddt.

These are : —

(1) Krodha, Anger. It is an explosive emotion of the
painful type, sudden in appearance and painful to the
subject like a burning flame (prajvaldtmaka). Its

206 S. K. MAITRA

physical effects are certain expressions of the eyes, the
eye-brows, etc.

(2) IrahyA, Envy. It is the Aversion which arises
from the perception of even the most ordinary advantages
by others : Sddhdrane api vastuni parasva darshandt
asahanam.

(3) Asuyd, Jealousy. It is the grudging sense of the
superior qualities in another : Faraguneshu akshamd.

(4) Droha, Hi^alevolence. It is the disposition to do
injury to others.

(5) Amarsha, Malice. It is revengefulness without
physical expression, that is, is the long-cherished but
carefully concealed desire for revenge in one conscious
of being powerless of doing an injury in return : adarshi-
tamukhddivikdrah param prati raanyu.

It is to be observed from the above that Jayanta
considers the enumerations under Delusion {e.g., erroneous
judgment, perplexity, etc.) to be independent motives to
will, and he holds that the forms under attraction and
aversion act as motives only under the influence of
Delusion. Hence according to him, we have two kinds
of the springs of action both arising from Moba or the
disorder of the reason : (1) those that are derived imme-
diately from Moha and as such are motives to the
will, (2) those that act through attraction and aversion.
The difference between these two classes lies in the fact
that the springs of action which arise immediately from
Moha are characterised by a minimum of feeling while
those that act through attraction and aversion are charac-
terised by a marked preponderance of feeling. It is also
to be noted that by including erroneous judgment,
perplexity, etc., under the springs of action Jayanta
brings out an important psychological truth, viz.y the
pragmatic aspect of cognition. It is a mistake in this
view to oonsl^r cognition apart from conation. An act of

THE ETHICS OP THE HINDUS 207

knowledge is at the same time a conative attitude imply<i
ing a reaction of the will and a preparedness to respond
in a specific way. This conative aspect of, cognition
comes out clearly in the last two enumerations under
this head, viz., vanity and inadvertence, the first of which
consists in the overestimation of the subjective factor in
all action and the second in the underestimation of the
objective factor. The folly of the vain person is
ultimately an illusion in regard to the slibjective condi-
tions of action, while that of the careless person is an
illusion in regard to the objective conditions.

Secondly, we should note that Jayanta’s classification
is scientific only as regards the three main classes, viz.,
Attraction, Aversion, and Delusion. The rest are mere
enumerations without any scientific basis. At the same
time certain forms of passion are noticed that have escap-
ed even so competent an observer as Martineau. For
example, while noticing revengefulness in general
Martineau has not analysed that particular form of it which
is characteristic of the person who is conscious of being
too weak to retaliate. This holds good also in respect of
Matsyara under Attraction and its corresponding feeling,
namely, Irshyd, under Aversion, and also of Worldliness,
Will-to-live and the enumerations under Moha.

Comparing now Jayanta’s enumeration with Frasasta-
pdda’s we notice that the enumerations under aversion
(dvesha) are much the same in both, but the enumer-
ations under attraction diverge widely in the two lists.
For example, in Jayanta there is no mention either of
Dispassion or of Compassion. Similarly in Prasastapdda
we miss Jayanta’s Trshnd and Sprbd. Jayanta excludes
Dispassion from his list of the passions and emotions
possibly because while the passions according to him are
the effects of the disordered reason which erroneously
conceives as a good what is in reality its opposite,

303

S. K. MAITRA

dlspission is the means through which the soul is liberated
from the bondage of these passions. But according to
Prasastapdda the ultimate roots are the feelings of attrac-
tion and aversion and these need not be regarded as co-
effects of some cause still more ultimate such as Moha.
Hence there ia room in Prasastapada’s scheme for the
inclusion -even of the Transcendental Impulse of Dis-
passion .

r

III. Patan.jali’s Classification of tiik Springs

OF Action.

He considers the subject in Sutra HI of the Sadhana-
pada in the Yoga Sutras.

Accoi’ding to him, the passions of cruelty, mendacity,
sexual indulgence, etc., are to be traced to three roots : —
Greed (Lobha), Anger (Krodha) and Delusion (Moha).
Por example, cruelty in the form of animal slaughter may
originate in greed or the desh*e for the pleasures of eating.
It may also originate in anger produced by any injury
received from the animal. Lastly, it may arise from' the
sophisticated idea that animal slaughter in connection
with particular religious coremonies is a source of merit
to the agent (Vitarkah himsddayah lobha-krodha-moha-
purvakah : Yoga Sutras : Lobhena mamsacharmar-
thena, krodhena apakrtamanena, mohena dharmo me
bhavishyatiti : Vyasa-bhAshya. Mohena yajnarthaliimsayd
nirdosho dharmo bhavishyatityevam rupena ityarthah :
Yoga-vdrtika).

These passions again may determine the moral agent
in various ways. Thus some tnay indulge their passions
by overt acts, some again may persuade others to acts
that will gratify themselves, while some may merely
assent to such acts in others (Vitarkdh himsddayah
krtakdritsinuraodita lobhakrodhamohapurvakdh). All
these again may be of various degrees of intensity. Some

THE ETHICS OP THE HINDUS 209

may be mild and comparatively harmless, some again
of mean (Madhya) intensity and therefore not to be
neglected, and some violent (Adhimdtra) and , urgently
requiring control.

Yydsa in his commentary goes a step further in this
quantitative division. According to him each of these
degrees is capable of a further sub-division on the same
quantitative basis. Thus within the class of the feeble
impulses we may notice the three grades of the extremely
feeble, the moderately feeble and the feeble approaching
the mean in intensity.

It is to be noted that Patau jali does not teach the
extirpation of the passions as the Stoics do. He only
insists on a gradual conquest of such passions as over-
throw the balance of the spirit and distrub its peace. In
fact he makes a distinction between passions that are to
be uprooted altogether and those that may be permitted
under certain special conditions. Thus the impulses of
cruelty, mendacity, etc., must be put down by all means
and in all Uhumis or levels of spiritual life. Thus it will
not do to excuse oneself for cruelty because one belongs
to a specific class of men, e.g.^ the class of fishermen, nor

because it is perpetrated in a particular place, e.g., in a

*

place of pilgrimage, nor also because there is a special
occasion, e.g., an auspicious hour or auspicious day.
These passions have no place in the moral life and there-
fore are to be uprooted altogether.

It is to be seen therefore that according to Patanjali
some impulses must be put down altogether and in all
conditions but other impulses may be permitted in certain
conditions and within certain limits, and the gradation of
the passions in respect of intensity or strength indicates the
practical method of restraining the impulses or uprooting
them altogether where necessary. In this respect Patan-
jali’s view may be compared with that of Aristotle and his
27

S. K. MAITRA

»ie

rule of the goldeh mean. The mean according to A.ristotle
is not necessarily the quantitative mean ; it is the mean
of the particular ethical context in every particular case
and therefore the mean that errs neither by excess nor
by deficiency. Aristotle does not show how this mean
is to be realised by the individual by a proper ordering
of his passions and emotions. What Aristotle does not
furnish in his ethical scheme Pntanjali gives us in his
theory of the qifantitative gradation of passions. As the
passions cannot be extirpated all at once, the practical
moralist should begin with the strongest and the most
violent forms of it. After subduing these he should turn
next to the weaker and less obvious forms. It will
be seen therefore that in a really comprehensive scheme
of ethical discipline Fatanjali’s method will have a place
in no wise less prominent than Aristotle’s. Aristotle’s
scheme provides the theoretical rule for deciding as to the
necessity of repression. Fatanjali’s scheme indicates the
course of practical training which must be undergone for
the actual attainment of self-mastery.

IV.

Thb Vbpanta Classification of the Sfbinos
OF Action.

The subject is very fully treated in the “ Jivanmukti*
viveka ” of Vidydranyasvami. In this work the author
classifies the springs of action on the basis of certain
spontaneous and instinctive tendencies.

The causes of anger and other motives are certain
latent and residual tendencies (samskdras) in the mind
produced by habitual past indulgence. These tendencies
are the Vdsands, and constitute the sources of the
emotions and passions which are unreflective and

THE ETHICS OF THE HINDUS *11

These subjective predispositions or Vasan&s are eitheir
good (shuvd., auspicious) or evil (ashuvd, inauspicious).

The evil tendencies are the cause of of birth and
participation in Samsdra. These are :--(») tlesire for
popularity (Lokavdsand), (ii) Desire for learning and
reputation for piety (shdstra-vdsand), (iii) Desire for
carnal pleasures (deha-vdsand) to which some add also
(iv) certain mental traits (mdnasa vdsand) such as boast-
fulness (dambha), pride (darpa), etc. *

Aocorvinu to a second interpretation,

Mdnasa-Ydsand signifies those unrealised desires which
flit over the surface of the mind wiihobt being sub-
jectively appropriated, the passing wishes (Kdmyaifidna)
that seem to have no effect on personal life, as distinguish-
ed from.

Yishaya-Vdsand or desires realised and appropriated
by the self (bhujyamdna).

The purer inclinations (Suddha-Ydsand) are supposed
to lead to cessation of life (Janmavindshini). They are
distinguished from the baser passions by the fact that they
are not unreflective or spontaneous but involve judgment
of the truth. These are : —

Sympathy with the happiness of others (Maitri).

Compassion towards the suffering (Kdrunya).

Bejoicing at the good of sentient creatures (Muditd).

Indifference or neutrality towards the unrighteous
(Upekshd).

Self-colleotedness and tranquillity of the mind (Shama).

Bepression of the external senses (Dama).

Endurance of pain (Titikshd).

]^nunoiation (Sanydsa).

It is to be noted that the distinction between unap-
ppropriated desires Skjid desires consciously appj^v^ 9i)i^

S. K.^MAITRA

21

chosen is of profound significance from the ethical stand*
point. Our modern ethical treatises notice only the more
obrious and potent forms of the passions and impulses,
that is, t’hose which either pass into obvert action or are
consciously approved by the moral agent. The passing
wishes and unappropriated desires are ignored on the
assumption that since they have no effect on the personal
life they are without ethical significance. Research into
the life of the subconscious is however bringing out the
significant fact that these fleeting desires are neither
arbitrary nor unimportant but are the occasional expres-
sions of an undercurrent of a deeper subliminal personality
which may under certain circumstances be strong enough
to upset the conscious life of the moral agent.

Secondly, we should note that in addition to the usual
Vedanta virtues of equanimity, repression of the senses, etc.,
this author notices also the altruistic impulses of compas-
sion, sympathy, etc. It may not be hazardous to conclude
from this that these are only later additions under
Buddhist influence.

We should note also that Maitri corresponds to the
Christian virtue of goodwill and Muditd to that of peace
with all sentient creatures. Hence Muditd as the harmony
of the individual with the rest of creation represents on
the objective side the state which is represented on
the subjective side by the virtue of equanimity (Shama).
Shama is a state of internal eqilibrium and self-harmony
while Muditd is harmony with creation in general.

Concluding Remarks

We have so far considered, in detail, the subject of
the Springs of Action as presented in the various systems
of Hindu Philosophy. If now we consider all these
presentations together, we find that one of the special
characteristjkis of the various psychological analyses of

THE ETHICS OP THE HINDUS 218

the passions is the description of their physiological
expressions and effects which are always fairly accurate
and exact. Another characteristic of the psyphological
analyses is the idea of psychological composition in the
genesis of the complex emotions and passions, the doc*
trine of the compounding of elementary mental states
into complex compounds. A third feature of these analy-
ses is the recognition of the residual, the instinctive, and
the subliminal even in our ethical life and*its psychological
basis. Another characteristic of the various Hindu
classifications of the Springs is the attempt at a non-
empirical explanation of the passions with a criticism of
their values based thereon. Thus the passions are judged
and appreciated not so much by reference to the standard
of the empirical order and its maintenance and progess
as by reference to their conduciveness to the life trans-
cendental and absolute. It is in fact this transcendental
standpoint that underlies the doctrine of Error as the
ultimate cause of the passions which bind the individual
to the phenomenal life of Samsdra. But this transcen-
dentalism and intellectualism, however, is counterbalanced
by a corresponding pragmatism in their empirical investi-
gations where cognition is always viewed in its pragmatic
aspect as intellection in the service of life and therefore
closely connected with the life of will or volition. It is
also to be seen that there is an attempt throughout to
overcome the dualism of the transcendental and the
empirical worlds by the assumption of some kind of trans-
cendental impulse even in the empirical life, a pure aspi-
ration as distinguished from the pathological yearnings of
the natural life. This is the significance of the Sdttvika
emotions, the Shubha-vdsands which have transcendental
Sukha or happiness for their object as distinguished
from empirical pleasure. 'I'hese are the pure impulses
which drive out the impure ones and thus bridge

%U s. K. MAlTRA

the gulf between the transcendental and empirical
worlds.

^ The psychological ethics of the Hindus is therefore
not only weoretical but also disciplinary and practical
always keeping in view the practical end of leading spirit
beyond the empirical life to that which is non-empirical
and transcendental. But the transcendental life which
it aims at is not a life of co-operation and freedom in co-
operation, but one of absolute freedom and perfect auto-
nomy of the self. It is here that it furnishes the
strongest contrast to Buddhist, Vaishnavika and Christian
ethics all which recognise self-realisation through the life
corporate as the highest ideal of the spirit.

CHAPTER IV.

Glassification of the Virtues

In chapter III we have considered the Hindu
classification and analysis of the Springs of Action, the
prabrtti-mulas or roots of the will regarded both in their
psychological and ethical aspects, and in Part I we have
considered the Hindu enumeration and classification of
the duties, i.e., dharma or morality considered objectively
as embodied in a code of injunctions and prohibitions.
In this chapter we shall consider the Hindu classification
of the virtues and their opposite, i.e., the duties considered
as subjectively appropriated by the moral agent and thus
realised as ethical attributes or determinations of the
personal life.

The virtues are considered in datail by Ancient
Nydya writers as well as by Patanjali and his commen*
tutors. There is also an interesting Buddhist treatment
of the subject which 1 have appended as a supplement.
Incidentally I have also referred to the Jaina treatment.

The Nydya- treatment of the subject appears both
in Vdtsydyana’s Bhdshya on the Nydya-Sutras as well as
in later writings such as the “ Nydya-manjari ** of Jayan-
ta Bhatta. Por the Pdtanjala treatment of the question
we have not only the sutras of Patanjali but also the Vyasa*
bhashya thereon. The Bauddha and Jaina treatment are
obtained from Buddhist and Jaina writings.

A. VMsyiyaiiwsk Olaasifioaiion cfthe Virtues.

Vdtsy&yana classifies will (pravrtti) into Pdpdtmikfi,
wicked, impious, and Shubhd, pious, auspicious. The
latter leads to Bhairma, righteousness, whila tha fdrmeir
product Adhaimia, Unrighte'oitshess,

216

S. K. MAITBA

1. Adharma, unrighteousness takes three forms with
reference to the originating condition or source, viz,

(1) Unrighteousness which depends on the Sharira,

the body, as its instrumental condition ,*

(2) Unrighteousness which arises from the improper

use of speech, Vdk or verbal utterance ; and

(3^ Unrighteousness which originates in the mind

(Manas) as the instrumental condition.

The forms of unrighteousness that are connected with
the activities of the body or Sharira are : —

(1) Cruelty (Himsd)

(2) Theft (Steya, Ohaurya)

(3) Sexual Indulgence (Pratishiddha Maithuna).

The vices originating in speech as the instrumental

condition are : —

(1) Mendacity (Mithyd)

(2) Causticity, Asperity, Tartness of expression

(Parusha, Katukti)

(3) Scandal, Insinuation (Suchand)

(4) Gossip (Asambaddha)

The vices originating in the mind as the instrumental
condition are : —

(l> Hostility, Ill-will towards others, malevolence

(Paradroha)

(2) Covetousness in respect of what belongs to

another (Paradravydbhipsa)

(3) Irreverence, Impiety, Scepticism, Want of faith

in the scriptures (Ndstikya).

It is to be seen that the enumerations under the last
head, i.e.y the class of vices depending on mind as the
instrumenral condition, differ from the lists under the
first two heads in being more properly subjective disposi-
tions or modifications of the personal life than active
tendencies manifesting themselves in overt acts. In this
reispect they.jqiay be regarded as internal determinations

THE ETHICS OP THE HINDUS

S17

of the moral personality which are either of the nature of
impeded or inactive emotions or general temperamental
characters which do not reveal themselves in any one

« 9

particular act or set or class of acts, but give a specific
direction or trend to the volitional life as a whole.

It is also to be observed that the enumerations under
the vices connected with speech are a special character-
istic of the Hindu treatment of the question, the compara-
tive neglect of which in Greek and Christian Ethics
unmistakeably establishes the refinement of the Hindus
in this respect who would not excuse even a harsh imrd
which does no visible wrong to anybody like cruelty,
ill-will and the other vices.

It is however to be noted that the inclusion of theft
with cruelty and sexuality under one class, viz., class of
vices depending on the body as the instrumental cause,
is artificial and forced to a degree. It may be possible
however to justify this by pointing out that just as
cruelty implies injury to the person and sexuality
involves injury to the race so does tlieft involve injury
to the individual not by any harm done to his body or
person but by the misappropriation of his property. It
is however doubtful whether the commentator Vatsyd.-
yana had all this in his mind while making his classifica-
tion.

II. Next as to Dharma, Virtue, llighteousness :

It is threefold like adharma or unrighteousness,
comprising

(a) The virtues of the body or Sharira,

(&) The virtues of speech, and

(<?) The virtues of the mind

The virtues of the body are : —

(1) Charity, Bounteousness, Munificence (Dana).

(2) Succouring the Distressed (Paritrdna).

(3) Social Service (Paricharana).

218

S. K. MAITRA

The virtues of Speech are : —

(1) Veracity (Satya).

(2) The uttering of beneficial speech, i.e., speaking

always with a view to the good of mankind

(Hitavachana).

(3) Gentleness and Agreeableness of Speech (Friya-

vachana).

(4) The reciting of the scriptures (SvddhyAya, Veda-

pdthddj).

Lastly, the virtues of the mind are : —

(1) Kindness, Tenderness or Benevolence (Dayd).

(2) Unworldiness, Indifference to material advan-

tages (Asprhd).

(3) Reverence, Piety (Shraddhd).

It is to be seen that of the three bodily virtues, Ddna,
Munificence is the opposite of the vice of theft which con-
sists in appropriating what belongs to another. Similarly
Paritrdna, succour, is the virtue corresponding to the
vice of cruelty or himsd. This correspondence however
is not obvious in the case of paricharana or social service
and pratishiddha-maithuna or sexuality. It may be
said however that just as paricharana consists in doing
good to society so pratishiddha-maithuna rends the
social fabric by loosening the social bonds and weakening
the stock.

As regards the Vdchika virtues or virtues of
speech it is to be observed that veracity corresponds
to mendacity in the corresponding dab of vices,
Priyavachana to causticity or asperity, Hitavachana
to scandal and insinuation, and Svddhydya to gossip or
idle talk.

Lastly there is also similar correspondence as
regards the third class between benevolence and
malevolence, yjinworldliness and covetousness, piety and
impiety.

THE Ethics op the Hindus 219

Again, it is to be observed that just as in the
lists under the vices, the virtues of the mind are of
the nature of emotions, subjective moods op tempera-
mental traits which need not manifest themselves in
specific overt acts rather than active tendencies in-
volving specific activities and modes of conduct. Thus
kindness or tenderness is a virtue which may not lead
to a specific act, but this can hardly be said of
veracity or social service or succour wfiich are nothing
at all without the overt acts on which they depend.

It is also to he noted that the virtues relating
to speech constitute one of the specific Hindu con-
tributions to the ethical knowledge of* the world, the
only virtue under this class which has received any
special notice by ethical writers being veracity.
That veracity is only one of the virtues of speech which
may under special circumstances be required to be
subordinated to other and higher considerations, was
early recognised by the Hindus. (Thus in the Mahd-
bhdrata in the Aajadharmdnushdsanaparva in chapter
109 , it is frankly recognised that there are circum-
stances where truth is falsehood and falsehood is truth
and the righteous man in such circumstances prefers the
latter. Thus the ruffian who is out for pillage and
murder should not be told the truth, and if
silence will excite suspicion it is proper even to put
him on, the wrong scent by telling a lie). It was
assumed that the ultimate purpose of speech was the
good (hita) of mankind and therefore if a rigid adher-
ence to truth was likely to do more harm than good
the evil should be averted by a lie, if necessary.
Similarly one should seek to be agreeable as well as
truthful, and if the plain blunt truth is likely to
wound mortally it is a duty to avoid it or at least
take off its edge as far as possible.

220

S. it. MAtTRA

Another thing to be noticed here is the virtue of
unworldliness or Asprha in the third class. It may
be said tp be the characteristic Hindu virtue indicat-
ing as it does the Hindu conception of the highest
Spiritual Ideal which is a life of detachment, i.e., of
absolute freedom and autonomy of the Self. This
negative attitude to the world is however relieved to
a great extent by the virtues of charity (Ddna),
succour (Paritrd^a), and service (Paricharana), which
open the way to a more positive and useful view
of life and a more humanitarian morality than that of
the stern ascetic.

<

3. PatanjalVs Clasaificaiion of the Virtues :

Patanjali considers the virtues in the Sddhana-
pada in connection with the question of the conditions
to be fulfilled by those preparing for the life of Yoga.

The virtues, according to Patanjali, are the yamas,
the restraints that purify the mind of the evil passions
and thus clear the ground for Yoga. They thus form
a subordinate class within the wider Nyfiya classifica-
tion of virtues — a class of virtues suitable only for
Yoga.

These virtues are : —

Ahimsa — Tenderness, Benevolence, Good-will.

Though negatively described as abstention from himsd
or injury to living beings, it also implies positive good-
will and amity with all creatures. Purther it is a virtue
which is to be cultivated without any exception as to
particular creatures and also without any restrictions
as to specific occasions or particular methods : SarvathA
sarvadA SarvabhutAnAm anabhidroha. Hence it is not
allowable to make any exception in regard to himsA
or cruelty Involved in the sacrifices; enjoined by

THE ETHICS OF THE HINDUS 2*21

•

scriptures. These must be abjured just as the other forms
of himsa.

Thus Ahimsd, kindness and good-will, implies some
other virtues. It implies self-restraint and sjtcrifice in so far
as some of the acts of cruelty are prompted by greediness
or inordinate hankering. It also implies the subjugation
of the feelings of aversion or hate w'hich are also the
determining conditions of cruelty in a great many cases.
Again it implies the overcoming of intellebtual indolence
which is itself the cause of greediness and aversion and
is also an independent cause of specific forms of cruelty
such as scriptural sacrifices. Similarly Ahimsfi, kindness,
implies abstention from harsh words (parusliavachana) as
well as from acts of intimidation. In short, it iS the
highest virtue, the mother of all other virtues, and vera-
city (Satya) and the other virtues are to be practised only
to the extent that they do not clash with this highest
virtue of Univer.sal Good-Will and Tenderness.

Salya. — Veracity. It is the opposite of mendacity and
and consists in correspondence in thought and speech
with the objective fact or event as ascertained by valid
proof. Thus when a thing or event whose nature has
been ascertained by perception or inference or reliable
testimony is correctly apprehended by the speaker and
described faithfully in suitable terms so that there is no
misapprehension of his meaning in the hearers, we have
veracity or truthfulness. Veracity therefore implies two
things: (1) that the object as ascertained by valid proof
is to be correctly apprehended by the speaker’s mind, i.e.^
there should be no illusion or error (bhrdnti) ; and (2)
that the speaker should faithfully describe his own idea
in his speech, i.e., there should be neither intentional
deceit (vanchana) nor indulgence in meaningless words
(pratipatti-vandhya) from inability to express oneself.
(Hence half-truths, evasions, subterfuges are to be treated

S. k. MAITBA

Hi

as lies, for though they may agree with some real objective
state, condition or circumstance, they do not convey what
the speaker has in his mind or means to convey). But
even such agreement is not the only condition : even the
most faithful, unambiguous and precise utterance would
fall short of veracity in the true sense if it were not directed
towards the good of creatures. Thus even the most truth-
ful speech which hurts or injui'es creatures is to be
reckoned amongst the forms of unrighteousness, not as the
virtue of truthfulness. In this sense ft is a sin to recount
even another’s real faults when such recounting will serve
no good purpose. (Yathdrthe vdnmanase yathddrshtam,
yathdnumitam yathdshrutam tatha vanmanashcha
iti, paratrasvavodha-samkrantaye vagukta sa yadi na
vanchita bhrdntd va pratipatti-bandhyA va bhavediti, esha
sarvabhutopakarArtharn prabrtta na bhutopaghAtajA, yadi
cha evam api abhidhiyamAnA bhutopaghataparaiva syAt
na satyam bhavet, pApameva bhavet.)

Asteya . — Abstention from theft. It is the opposite
of steya or unlawful appropriation of another’s property
and consists not merely in the abstention from the outward
act of theft but also in inward uprightness or freedom
from unlawful greed (asprharupam). Steyam ashastra-
purvakam dravyAnara paratah svikaranam, tatpratishedhah
punarasprharupam asteyam iti (Vyasa-bliAshya). Thus
there are pratigrahas, specific acceptances authorised by
ShAstra. W ith the exception of these, every other form
of appropriation is unlawful and therefore classed under
steya. According to VijnAnabhikshu however this is
only one interpretation of misappropriation or wrongful
possession. According to another interpretation however
every idea ol' ownership is rooted in error. Hence all
appropriation is misappropriation and asteya is freedom
from steya, from the sense of ownership or appropria-
tion altogetl^r. In this sense it is aspjrhArupa,, i.e., of

THE ETHICS OF THE HINDUS 228

the nature of asprh4, unworklliness, or absolute indifference
to the material advantages of life. (Pratigraha-vyavarta-
ndya ashastra-purvakem iti. Athavd svikaranam mameti
vuddhimdtram bhramasddhdranamiti tatpratishedhah
tannibrttih tayapi asprliamupalakshayitvdha asprharupa
iti : “Yogavdrtika.”)

Brahmacharyya . — Continence which consists in the
restraint Avhich one imposes on one’s desire for sexual
enjoyment. It implies not inerely the control of the
genitals but also abstention from lewdness in thought,
speech and the other organs of sensation and expression,
i.e., restraint here means restraint of every organ includ-
ing the genital in regard to the matter of ^sexual enjoy-
ment. (Brahmacharyyam guptendriyasya upasthasya
samyamali : “Vydsya-bhdshya”). (Samyama iti atro-
pasargena anyendriyasslhityamupasthasya grdhyam
tenopasthasya vishayo sarvendriyavydparoparama iti
lakshanam : “Yogavartika.”)

Aparigraha. — Unworldliness, Renunciation, i.e., the
attitude of indifference to material prosperity through
the perception of its being, tainted by cruelty (himsd) and
the other faults. Thus the earning, hoarding and
spending of riches all involve deceit (asatya), cruelty
(himsd) and the other faults. (Vishaydiidmarjanarak-
shanakshayasangahimsddoshadarshanat asvikaranam pari-
graha : “Vydsa-bhdsya”). According to Vijndnabhikshu
this] kind of unworldliness is to be distinguished from
the indifference (asprhd) arising from the freedom from
the illusory consciousness of ownership. This latter is
asteya, uprightnes, according to one interpretation. It
differs from the indifference signified by aparigraha in
being grounded in the sense of ownership as represented
in the impulses of dambha (pride), dshakti (attachment),
etc., while aparigraha arises from the consciousness of
all material prosperity being tainted by the faults of

S. K. MAITRA

2i4>

deceit, cruelty, etc. (Parigrahe himsddyd api doshah
teshdm darshandditl visheshanatn dambhdshaktyd-
dinimittakdsvikarancativyaptinirdsdyaiti : “ Yogavartika.”)

These virtues are to be practised without any re-
strictions as to class, profession, place or occasion. Thus
abstention from cruelty is to be practised even by the
soldier and the fisherman without reference to his
profession or class. Similarly cruelty (such as animal
sacrifice) is not allowable even in a pilgrimage or in an
auspicious day. Nor is an exception to be made in
practising abstention from cruelty in respect of a parti-
cular class of living beings as, for example, in respect of fish
by the fisherman : Ebhirjdtideshakdlasamayanavachchhinna
ahimsddayah sarvathaiva paripdlaniydh sarvablmmishu
sarvavishayesliu, sarvatha eva aviditavydbhichdrah
sdrvabhauma mahabratamityuchyate : “Vydsabhasya”).
The virtues are to be practised in all bhumis or planes
of the mind in regard to all vishayas or objects and
in every respect without exception.

It is to be seen that a distinction is here made be-
tween the common man’s morality and Yogika morality.
It is assumed that the former consists of a multitude
of moral codes which are unorganised and often mutually
contradictory. Thus the common man has one code of
morality for dealing with human beings and another
code for dealing with lower animals, one code for civil-
ised man and another for the uncivilised, one for bis own
countrymen and another for others ; and even the legal
code varies in relation to the particular zone or plane of
life which it is to regulate. Thus while human life is held
sacred by law there is no similar punishment;for the des-
truction of animal life. Similarly while flogging of
adults and other similar acts are denounced as inhuman
and brutal by customary morality, there is scarcely any
indignation nt similar treatment of the horse or the beast

THE ETHICS OF THE HINDUS 2B6

of burden which is only too familiar an oodurrence to
attract any special notice. The truth is that in these
as in many other instances we judge hy different moral
codes, i.e.i we recognise different moral planes lo which
we apply separate moral standards or norms disregarding
the mutual contradiction or incompatibility of these
standards. It is this multiplicity and conflict of moral
codes that the Yogin seeks to overcome and reconcile
hy insisting on the highest standard of«morality in all
planes of life including the lowest.

Another characteristic of Patanj all’s olassiflcation is
the conception of Ahimsd as tenderness or good>will
to sentient creatures as the highest of the virtues.
This relieves his ethical system of the severity of egoistic
rigorism which is a common charge against the Hindu
conception of the moral life. Patanjali however recog-
nises also the virtues of Aparigraha, unworldliness, and
Asprhdrupa-Asteya, i.^., uprightness and freedom from
greed as also essential to morality. Patanjali’s concep-
tion may thus he regarded as an attempt to reconcile the
ideal of a rigoristio autonomy of the self and freedom from
desire with that of the altruistic seeking of the good of
creatures through good-will and love. In this respect it is
free alike from the defects of ascetic egoism and impas-
sioned altruism. It is only too true that an immature
and exaggerated altruism without any preliminary train-
ing in dispassion and self-restraint often degenerates into
cynicism-, contempt and world-hatred with the failure of
the altruistic instincts, or rather it is only in so far as
there is a dispassionate pursuit of the good of creatures
that there is altruism in the true sense which without
this self-control becomes only a disguised and subtle form
of egoism that degenerates into unhealthy passions when
circumstances prove unfavourable. In so far therefore
as Patanjali insists on Ahimsd or good-will hein^

«26

S. K. MAITRA

supplemented by Asprhd., unworldliness or dispassion he
touches on an inherent weakness in altruism which is
itself to be practised under reservations if it is to produce
truly beneficial results.

As regards Satya or veracity, it is to be seen that
Patanjali emphasises two kinds of responsibility on the
moral agent. Thus it is necessary to ascertain that the
object has been properly cognised, i.e., that there is no
misapprehension in consequence of defective perception,
misinterpretation or error. Seeondiy the object as thus
apprehended must be faithfully described in speech, i.e.,
confused utterance as well as intentional deceit must be
avoided. It is therefore no excuse for the person prac-
tising veracity to pl(?ad ignorance, it being the duty of the
truthful man to refrain from utterance till he has acquired
all the knowledge under the circumstances. And it is also
no excuse for him to plead accidental slips or unintentional
misrepresentation, it being his duty to be careful, econo-
mical and precise in the use of words. Hence the truth-
ful man must cultivate the habit of gravity and serious-
ness and a capacity for silence. But this is not all : truth
which is not beneficial and wholesome is a pseudo-truth
or falsehood, and when circumstances are such that a
rigid adherence to truth will vitally injure a sentient
creature, the bare truth should be avoided even by a lie,
if necessary. The idea is that such lies are of the nature
of truth, because the True is the Good and the Good is
Truth, and the apparent falsehood that contributes to the
world’s real good is truth, while tjie truth that mars or
frustrates the world’s good is a pseudo-truth and an
evil to bo avoided like falsehood.

0. Jaina ClnttaiJicaHon.

Though Jainism does not come strictly under^rthod^iC
Hinduism, yet we may consider here some of the i>'aina

THE ETHICS OP THE HINDUS

S27

classifications not only for the philosophical interest they
possess but also fur purposes of comparison and contrast
with the strictly Hindu standpoint. •

I. Vidydnanda’s Glassification of the Virtues in the
Ashtasahasri : —

The most interesting Jaina classification is that of
Vidydnanda in the Ashtasahasri^ which is a commentary
on Samantabhadra’s Kdrik.

Righteousness (Punya) and unrighteousness (Pdpa)
are characterised by Vidydnanda as depending on subjec*
tive intention or abhisandhi and not merely on conse-
quences of happiness or suffering (sukba-duhkbaphala).
Thus even non-sentient objects which are* incapable of
morality can products consequences of happiness or suffer-
ing. Similarly the dispassionate saint who has attained
to the supermoral plane of being is also the cause of
happy or unhappy consequences to others. Hence mora-
lity and immorality do not arise merely from results of
happiness or unhappiness but depend on subjective
intention or abhisandhi which is absent both in the non-
sentient objects and the saint.

What is the nature of this abhisandhi, subjective
intention or attitude which determines right and wrong
as distinguished from consequences of happiness or
suffering? It is pure (Vishuddhyanga) in the case of
righteousness (Punya) and impure (Samkleshdnga) in the
case of unrighteousness (Pdpa).

1. Samklesha, impurity (of intention), is either

(a) ^ta, of a distressing or afflicting nature, which
may manifest itself in

(») the effort to escape from contact with the
unpleasant (Amanojna),

(n) the effort to attain {the pleasant when
separated from it,

iiS S. K. MAltRA

^ (Ui) absorption in the experience of pain and
suffering (Vedand),

(*p) desire for the acquisition of power not yet
acquirt'd (Niddna, Aprdpta-aishvaryyaprdpti-
samkalpaj^ or

(ft) lEiaudra^ aggressivt^* violent, which also may take
four forms, thie uH^^Jns of

(i) Himsd — Cruelty, ' t

(ii) Anfta—Unruth, Mendacity, '

(m) Steya — Theft, Wrongful Possession',

(io) yishaya>samrakshana — Aggressiveness

preservation of once’s property.

2. Yishuddhi, Purity, is likewise either
(a) Dharmadhydnasvabhdva, «.e., of the nature of
Contemplation of the ideal of Dharma or Duty ; or
(ft) Shukladhydnasvabhdva, «.«?., of the nature of
contemplation of the ideal of purity or perfec-
tion (Shukha).

This, it will be seen, is a new classification of the
virtues, based not on the consequences of happiness or un-
happiness but on the purity or impurity of the subjective
intention or attitude of the moral agent. Hence the
principle of classification is not any external consequence
or result, but a state of internal determination of the Self
or Atman, that which the Atman becomes. This
subjective determination takes the form of contemplation
of Duty or Perfection in the case of Righteousness
(Punya), and that of aggressiveness and absorption in
pain in tlie case of unrighteousness or Pdpa. Thus this
subjective self-determination is not the pure willing of
the Moral Law, but is the concrete determination of the
self in reference to positive content which consists in the
ideal of duty or perfection in the case of righteousness or
virtue and the states of affliction and aggressiveness
in the case ot unrighteousness. Hence we have here

TllE BtHICS OF THE HINDUS «»»

a synthesis of externalistic, consequential morality
with the internalism of the theory of self-determination.
While the consequence by itself does not determine virtue
or the opposite, it furnishes the content as it were in
relation to which the subject has to determine itself in
the direction of righteousness or unrighteousness. Thus
Himsd, cruelty, regarded merely as a consequence of
unhappiness to creatures, is neither righteous nor un-
righteous, but when it results from the a'^gressive nature
of the moral agent it is no longer morally neutral but
becomes a form of unrighteousness reflecting as it does
a specific act of self-determination on the part of the
self as a consequence of the specific impurity of aggres-
siveness in the will. This aggressiveness' or affliction
again as a specific psychic state cannot be pure, abstract
willing but necessarily signifies concrete self-determina-
tion in reference to positive content. Thus the state of
affliction implies concrete self-determination in relation
to the experiences of want, misery and suffering, thus
implying consciousness or determination of the self in
reference to its condition of passivity, helplessness and
weakness, just as the state of aggressiveness implies the
determination of the self in respect of its consciousness of
strength, power and vigour.

II.

Akothek Jain a Glassification.

/ ■

Asrava is that by which karma enters the soul.

Samvara is the Nirodha, i.e., the arrest of A.8rava, the
arrest of the flux of Karmic matter into the soul.

Pharma (Righteousness) is one of the means (Updyas)
of Samvara or arrest of Karma.

Pharma is Uttamdh, IJttamagunaprakdshayuktah, is
connected with, or manifests, excellences of the highest
quality.

280

S. K. MAITRA

The Dharmas, Virtues or Excellences, are : —

(1) Kshamd, forgiveness,

(2) l^drdava, Mridutd, Humility,

(8) Arjava, Eijutd, Sincerity, Straightforwardness,

(4) Shaucha, Cleanliness,

(6) Satya, Veracity,

(6) Tapas, Practice of physical hardship and privation

in view of the acquisition of strength of will
for devotion

(7) Tyiga, Renunciation

(8) Akinchanya, Strenuousness,

(9) Brahmacharyya, Continence.

This, it will be seen, is a mere enumeration of the
virtues without any soientilic basis of classification. But
the Jaina list does not include the otlier-resardinsr virtues
of Benevolence, Succour and Social Service. This shows
that the Jaina virtues aim more at self-culture than
at social service. This is particularly evident in respect
of the virtue of Forgiveness or Kshama in the Jaina list,
a virtue which we miss in the Hindu enumerations
proper and which consists primarily in effecting the
moral uplift of the forgiving person at the expense of the
forgiven.

D. Buddhist OiiASSipiCAXioN.

We shall now conclude by a study of the Buddhist
treatment of the virtues. Buddhism, like Jainism, does
not come properly under Hinduism, and as we shall see
Buddhism furnishes in certain respects a very essential
contrast to the Hindu ideal of life. But it is also this
contrast with Hindu Ethics that necessitates some consi-
deration of Buddhist ethics here without which the Hindu
standpoint cannot be fully understood in its true
significance.

THE ETHICS OP THE HINDUS 881

The subject of the virtues is considered in the Mddhya-
mikdvrtti by Chandrakirti where the virtues are classified
into

I. Vijnapti-samutthdpika, i.e., morality which is overt
and expressed

II. Avijnaptayah, or non>manifested moral traits,
subjective dispositions without physical expression.

III. Paribhdganvyam Karma — righteousness and
unrighteousness arising from institutional or communal
responsibility through the righteous and unrighteous acts
of the community or the institution.

IV. Chittdbhisamskdramanaskarma, i.e., righteousness
and unrighteousness arising from subjectfve determina-
tions as revealed in the conscious effort of the mind
(manaskarma).

I. As to the Vijnaptisamuttfidpikd, i.e., "Moral traits tha,t
express themselves in overt action. These are Kushala,
Viratilakshana, i.e., beneficial, in the case of righteousness,
and Akushala, A viratilakshana, i.e., noxious or injurious,
in the case of unrighteousness. They comprise

(1) Vdk, i.e., the virtues of speech and the correspond-
ing vices.

(2) Vispandah, Shariracheshta, i.e,, the virtues connect-
ed with physical activities and the corresponding vices.

II. As to Avijnaptayah, i.e., traits or dispositions that
are non-manifest or without physical expression (paranna
vijndpayanti iti avijnaptayah — i.e., do not manifest them-
selves to others). Tiiese are internal subjective traits or
dispositions without external manifestation, and comprise

(1) Avijnaptayas, subjective dispositions, which are
Aviratilakshanah or Akushalasvabh&vah, i.e., of a hurtful
or injurious nature, and

(2) Avijnaptayas, dispositions, which are Kushala-
svabhivah or Viratilakshanab, i.e., of a beneficial nature.

S. K. MAITBA

Stii

r

As examples of avijnaptsyas under class (i) we have
(a) the evil or unrighteousness that goes on accumulat-
ing, determining and modifying the character from the
moment it is subjectively resolved that “ from this day
forward I shall earn my living by plundering and by
killing sentient beings ” even though this resolution may
not be immediately put into execution, and again, (b)
the Akushalalakshanasamskdras or unrighteous tenden-
cies and dispositions that go on accumulating to the fisher-
man from after the moment the fisherman completes the
weaving of the net which will be an instrument or means
of killing fish.

(Adya prabhrti mayd prdnindm hatva chauryyam kytvd
jivikd parikalpayitavyd iti upagamalakshandt pravrtti
tadakdrinoapi akushalakarma iti upagamalakshandt sata-
tam avijnaptayah upajiyante kaivartddindm cha jdladi-
parikarmakdldt prabhrti tadakdrindmapi yd avijnaptayah
upajdyante td etd aviratilakshanah avijnaptayah.)

The difference between the two examples above lies
in the fact that in the first instance there is nothing but
the outstanding resolution or subjective choice, there
being no overt action, while i t the second there is
Avijnapti, i.e., a subliminal tendency with cumulative
effect after an overt act, vis., the weaving of the net.
Hence Avijnaptayah represent the subconscious deter-
minations of the self in continuation of a specific modi-
fication of the moral personality, a modification which
has been initiated by the first step in a specific line of
conduct, a step which may consist either in an outstanding
subjective resolution or choice or in the first of a series
of overt acts.

himilarly we have also subconscious determinations of
a beneficial nature (Kushalasvabhdvah, Yiratilakshanah),
determinations which may res alt either from a subjective
act of a pioiu resolution or from the outward objectiva

j THE ETHICS OF THE HINDUS 28 »

performance of the first of a series of meritorious acts.
Thus I may decide to abstain from the path of evil and
cruelty (adya prabhrti prdndtipdtddibhyah prativiraradm
iti) and from the moment 1 resolve to do so there is
subconscious modification of my personality in the direo*
tion of righteousness which goes on accumulating even
when there is no conscious endeavour to better and
improve myself in the intervening time. Similarly I may
perform an overt act of merit and from tlie moment I do
it there is subconscious determination of my self in the
direction of virtue which goes on accumulating even in
states of unconsciousness or sleep (pran)attddi>avasth&).
(Kaya-vdk-vijnaptiparisamaptikdlakshandtprabhrti tadut-
tarakalam pramattMi-avashthasydpi ydh kushalopdya-
svabhava avijnaptayah upajdyant^.)

III. As to Faribkdgdnvayam karma or morality
arising from communal responsibility. This again takes
the two forms of —

(1) Apunya, demerit or unrighteousness, and

(2) Punya, merit or righteousness.

1) Thus we have Paribhdgdnvayam Apunyam, un-
righteousness accruing to us from the unrighteous acts of
the institutions we have established. Take for example
the establishment of a religious institution such as the
worship of a particular god or goddess. Now such
worship may lead to animal sacrifice and this is an evil.
The responsibility for Ibis evil lies with the author of the
institution, i.e., Apunya or demerit must accrue to
him for every such unrighteous act of the institution.
(Faribhdgdnvayam apunyam, yatha devakulddi-pratisthd-
panam. Tatrasattvdh hanyantc. 'J'addevakulddi upabhdgdt
tatkarti nd.m sant&na-paribhdganvayam apunyam api jdyatd.)

(2) Similarly we have also Paribhdgdnvayam Punyam
or righteousness accumulating to the author of an insti-
tution for the good effects of the institution.

80

034

S. K. MAITRA

f

IV. Lastly as to Chittdbhisainsk^ra<Manaskarma.
This is the merit (or demerit) arising from Manaskarma,
eonsoious, effort or self-determination of the mind in the
direction of righteousness (or unrighteousness). Hence
it is to l>e distinguished from subconscious modification
of personality (avijnaptayah) as well as from overt acts
of merit or demerit (vijnaptayah). Thus it implies con-
scious determination of the self as distinguished from the
subconscious modifications after a conscious act, but this
conscious determination is a mental act (manaskarma)
without objective or physieal manifestation. There are
three forms of this self-conscious determination of the Self.

(1) Atmasamyamakam chetah or viparyyayah — the
conscious effort after self-restraint or the opposite,

(2) Pardnugr^ihakam chetah, or viparyyayah, i.e., the
conscious effort after benevolence or the opposite,

(3) Maitram chetah or viparyyayah — the conscious
effort after amity and peace with all creatures or the
opposite.

It is to be seen that the Buddhist analysis of the
virtues is suggestive of unique and original norms in
ethics. Thus the Buddhists recognise subconscious and
unconscious morality and not merely the self-conscious
morality of orthodox ethics. Thus ordinarily it is said,
if we have pravytti, a voluntary act, we have merit or
demerit. But the Buddhists with their fine ethical
sensibility suggest an entirely new norm in ethics. Even
outstanding resolutions, outstanding arrangements, have
moral effect because they influence the subconscious or
subpersonal strata.

Similarly the Buddhists also speak of institutional
morality, and this is a new category which has to be
added to modern ethics. By institutional morality the
Buddhists mean that given any institution, the founder
of the institution is responsible for the good and evil

j THE ETHICS OP THE HlNDlTS 2S6

effects of the institution. This is the conception of
communal and posthumous ethical responsibility — a
conception which furnishes the strongest contrast to the
Hindu ideal of ethical self-autonomy and self-determina-
tion as implied in their doctrine of karma.

If now we compare the cardinal Greek virtues with
the Hindu lists we find that the virtues of the mind, viz.,
Detachment (Asprhd), Compassion (Dayd), and Beverence
(Shraddhd) are specially Hindu. We may. contrast them
with the characteristic Greek virtues which are J ustioe
and Friendship, i.e., Justice based on a proper regard for
the rights of others and friendship which is a social feel-
ing. It is otherwise with the Hindus. Instead of friend-
liness which is based on strongly defined individuality
and worldliness, they recommend compassion (anukatupd)
and faith (paralokashraddhd). These two are also the
characteristic Christian virtues, but according to the
Hindu tht3se are to be cultivated with a view to Asprhi,
un worldliness, or detachment, which is the highest virtue,
i.e., from a standpoint which is diametrically opposed to
the Christian ideal of life.

It is also to be seen that the Hindu virtues are not
merely negative consisting in merely abstaining from
vice. Thus the lists include not merely Asteya, absten-
tion from theft, Asprhd, unworldliness, etc., but also the
positive virtues of charity (Ddna), succour (Paritrdna)
and service (Paricharana), and in Patanjali we have also
AhimsA in a positive sense as universal good-will and
tenderness as the highest of the virtues, the root of all
other virtues. These virtues also provide for social
service besides self-culture but for the Hindu it is self-
culture that is highest in rank aud social service is only
a means to self-culture and self-autonomy to be attained
by cultivating Asprhd or unworldliness.

CHAPTER V.

Special Features of Psychological
Hindu Ethics

We shall now consider the Psychological Ethics of
the Hindus as a whole with a view to find out what is
really significant) as well as what is distinctive or charac-
teristio in the Hindu treatment. As regards the
Analysis of Volition we may observe that the Hindu
treatment has almost a modern note about it. The
distinction between volition proper and the organic activi-
ties and the analysis of the motive with special reference
to the consciousness of good or the absence thereof are
in line with the modern treatment of these questions.
The distinction however between the cognition of an act
as distinguished from the passive cognition of a fact,
between prudential (kdmya) actions and moral actions
proper in their psychological aspects, and between the
positive and the negative forms of volition, are all specifi-
cally Hindu. The analysis of the process of choice with
special reference to the consciousness of freedom and with
reference to the order as distinguished from mere number
of the conditions of choice, is also a contribution to
the Psychology of volition. The forms of determinism
and indeterminism which are discussed in this connection
in a purely psychological reference are without parallel
in modern ethics and modern psychology both in respect
of subtlety and profundity. The analysis of the deterrent
and of the suspension of the deterent with reference to
the psychology of temptation and suicide, and particularly
of the operation of the deterrent in the negative as
well as the positive forms of willing, is also another
special feature of the Hindu treatment. The Nydya

j THE ETHICS OF THE HINDUS 287

conception of a specific order in pains and pleasures as
an operative factor in choice is an addition to the
Benthamite calculus which will do credit even to
a modern psychologist. Of modern significance is also
the relativistic conception of willing as dependent
on the agent’s condition and capacity relatively to the
time and the circumstances of the willing.

As regards the Analysis of Conscience, it may be
observed in the first place that the category of Dharma
or morality is considered from the subjective as well as
the objective points of view. And from the subjective
standpoint it is considered not merely as a function of
the mind (Sdmkhya) but also as a determination of the
substantive Self (Nyaya) resulting from the purity of the
intention. Similarly from the objective standpoint it is
considered not merely as external Shastrika prescription
(Bhdtta) but also as Apurva which is the essence of duty
as an accomplished verity of the Morai Order (Prdbhakara).
It may be observed also that morality is regarded as
having only relative and empirical vjilidity in all Hindu
systems except the Mimdmsaka, the idea being that the
righteousness which accrues to the agent through the
accomplishment of the duties being an event in time
cannot be a natural or essential accompaniment of the
Self in its true nature. This holds good even of the
Rdmdnujists who recognise an essential difference between
the natural unmediated morality of the empirical life and
the morality of the transcendental life which is transfigur*
ed by medintion through the act of self*surreuder to the
Absolute. In this latter stage morality is divested of
its subjective character as seeking of the subjective end
and becomes the realisation of the Absolute in Self so
that self-love becomes transformed into the love of' God.
The PurvamimAmsakas however, and particularly the
PrAbhAkara school of the PurvamimAmsakas, ascribe a

S. K. MAITRA

m

transcendental significance to morality, conceiving the
highest end of the spirit as consisting in Niyogasiddhi or
realisation of the Moral Imperative. The 8d.nkhya, the
Vedanta as well as the Nydya-Vaisheshika systems on the
contrary ascribe only a relative significance to morality
on the ground that it conduces to no lasting fruition and
also entails suffering. But while the Sankhya condemns
such morality altogether, particularly the morality of
scripture as entailing suferring through the impurities
of destruction of life, etc., recognising only a higher
noetic morality of Sdttvika duties as leading to the
discriminative knowledge of Spirit, the Shankara-Veddn-
tists and some of the Rdradnujists justify even the {lower
morality as subservient to the higher ethics of the
transcendental life. I he frank recognition of the evil-
element in the himsd of animal slaughter even from the
standpoint of ceremonial ethics is another merit of the
Hindus, and the attempts to reconcile the authority of
the natural reason with that of Shastrika revelation in
this connection are only an indication of their synthetic
mind, however scholastic the solutions may appear to be. Of
particular significance in this connection is the Prdhhdkara
justification of Shdstrika himsd as mere means and the
condemnation of it when desired as an end-in-itself. It
represents the most remarkable attempt at a purely ethical
explanation of duty from the standpoint of moral disin-
terestedness on the basis of a purely external code. The
conception of Apurva as an ontological verity of the Moral
Order which is self-established and therefore an end-in-
itself constitutes the foundation of the Frdhhdkara
rigorism which is elaborated out of tbe scriptural code.
It is a contribution to the analysis of duty which implies
not merely an external code but also a moral verity as a
new category which comes into operation through the
mod{|litidSj^ -|rhe Sdnkhya rejection of the external

THE ETHICS OP THE HINDUS

239

Shdstrika code, the Nydya and the Eidmdnujist attempts
at a rational ethical interpretation thereof, and the
Shankara-Veddnta differentiation of the two 'paths in
which exiernalism is merged at last into the higher ethics
of the noetic duties, are the various Hindu devices to
transcend the purely ceremonial standpoint. They are
indicative not only of a frank recognition of the inadequacy
of ethical externalism but also of the need of a rational
justification tlicreof from the internalistib standpoint of
self-purification. The recognition of a prudential morality
of the conditional scriptural duties besides the disinterest-
ed morality of the unconditional duties is also an indication
of the synthetic mind of the Hindus. Even* the Naiydyika
recognises disinterested morality from his utilitarian,
consequential standpoint by admitting a non-pathological
motive which is neither attraction nor aversion. It works
for the highest end through the unconditional duties
— the end, viz., of absolute freedom from suffering.
This end being negative does not imply pathological
feelings such as attraction or aversion. There is thus
a non-pathological feeling, viz., the desire for the
highest end — a non-utilitarian motive for the end of
freedom from suffering which operates through the un-
conditional duties. Hence there is disinterested morality
even for the Naiydyika who accepts ethical as well
as psychological utilitarianism or consequentialism.
Contrary wise even the Prdbhdkaras recognise an inter-
ested morality which they reconcile with their ethical
purism by divesting it of its strictly moral character.
I hus the conditional duties, according to the Prdbhdkara,
are not devoid of authority, but as this authority is of
the logical order as distinguished from the moral authority
of duty it does not impair the disinterestedness of morality
proper. The conditional duties are therefore to be
accepted along with the unconditional duties, but while

240

S. K. MAITBA

the latter are to be accompliehed as moral duties, the
former have to be recognised as expressing the nature of
things as the basis of action. This is how the Prdbh&kara
provides interested morality in his scheme of ethical
rigorism. The Prdbhdkara synthesis in this respect is
the counterpart of the Nydya synthesis of moral disinter-
estedness with psychological and ethical consequentialism.
The same synthetic spirit is also to he remarked in the
analysis of coifscience which is considered not only in its
ethical aspects and implications but also always with
reference to the positive psychological bases, viz.^ the
conditions of the psychological motive. Noteworthy also
in this connection are the comprehensiveness, the subtlety
and depth of the analysis which considers moral obliga-
tion not only with reference to the moments of subjective
impulsion and objective duty, but also with reference to
the nature of the operative process which it involves as
well as the implication, of subjective freedom and an
objective personal source. The Nyaya conception of a
purely psychological operation of the Moral Imperative
through the desire for consequence is significant in this
connection, particularly in view of the Nydya conception
of this Imperative as a Personal command which is law-
making. The Bhdtta and the Prdbhdkara conception of
a moral motivation distinct from psychological motiva-
tion through the desire for the consequence is also a
contribution to the Doctrine of Conscience. Particularly
important in this connection is the issue which is raised
by the Fr&bh&karas against the Bhdttas as to whether
moral causation is to be conceived on the analogy of
physical or psychological causation. The Prdbhdkara
contention that this being mere revelation as distinct
from compulsion we have here a category distinct
from causation as ordinarily understood, is full of sugges-
tion alike forjthe ethics of moral determination and the

THE ETHICS OP THE HINDUS Ml

metaphysics of causation. The PrAhh^karas rightly point
out that causality as an ethical category is to be.disitiii*
guished from causality as a psychological or .physical
category. The Bhattas however do not recognise any
essential difference between the two, the moral operation
of the imperative according to them being of the same
order as psychological or physical causation, the only
difference being that it is an impersonal action of the
law as distinguished from the action of tho desire in the
agent. The Bhattas thus secure the autonomy of moral
authority as independent of an end or consequence which
however operates cau.sally on the will analogously to
natural causation. In so far however they assume
also a logical end of this moral authority which operates
as a psychological motive in the agent, they also provide
the natural heterouomy of the will in their ethics of-
moral autonomy and impersonal operation of the
Imperative. Tlie Bbatta view thus represents an ex-»
tremely original reconciliation of the naturalism of
psychological willing with the independent authority of
moral duty. Tlie Nyaya conception of a subjective and
objective moral authority is also a unique synthesis of
ethical necessity with ethical freedom based on a purely
psychological interpretation of moral motivation.. The
Naiydyika contends that the moral end operates psycho^
logically through the agent’s desire without impugning
either moral freedom or the autonomy and independence
of moral authority. The Prdbhdkaras however analyse
moral obligation into a unique feeling of impulsion in
the self which is induced by the knowledge-inducing
function of the Imperative — a function which is distinct
alike from impersonal causal operation or compulsion and
psychological motivation through the desire for the
consequence. It is through this feeling which is self^
evidencing that duty as an ontological moral verity
81

S. K. MAITRA

establishes itself in consciousness and this is moral obli-
gation. The Pr^bhikaras thus secure the autonomy of
the Imfiprative not merely by recognising in it a new
category distinct from the psychological end, but also by
distinguishing its function of revelation of the Law from
eausal or mechanical operation on the will. The analysis
of Niyoga in this connection with reference to the two
moments of subjective prompting and objective duty,
pwrtioularly tho eleven different interpretations of Niyoga,
oonstitute one of the most valuable contributions to the
Doctrine of Conscience. The moral proof of freedom as
impHeated in the consciousness of duty is not specifically
Hindu, but eopsidered as a supplement to the psychological
proof of it as implicated in the consciousness of willing
it is characterised by a comprehensiveness of point of view
which is lacking in the western treatment. The Hindu
treatment of an objective implication of a Personal
Source of the Moral Law is also very full and comprehen-
sive, the question being threshed out from nearly every
point of view. Lastly, the Hindu conception of subjective
right as implying not only the agent’s intention but also
the purity of this intention such as freedom from pride,
vanity, etc., is quite in agreement with modern ethics.
Similarly the Hindu conception of objective wrong even
in the absmioe of the agent’s intention, i.e., of wrong and
consequent responsibility on account of the agent’s
iaadvertence which it implies, is perfectly rational and
legitimate. The conception of a penalty in the latter
case as required for merely social reasons (i.e., for im-
pressing on men’s minds the need of carefulne.^s in view
of the harm which may otherwise be done) is also a very
Same view of moral responsibility.

Gharaotwistic then in the Hindu analysis of conscience
are not only ihe conceptions of morality as a subjective
sfid an objeoMve category, of objective as well as subjective

li tHE EtHICS OP tHE HINOlTS Ml

(t

i

rightness, of duty as an ontological verity of thef moral
order, and of conditional and unconditional duties^ hot
also the distinction between the moral prompting and
the Imperative or duty which prompts, the coneeption of
a moral operation of the Imperative as distinguished from
the operation of desire in the agent, of a moral causation
as mere revelation as distinguished from natural causation
or compulsion of the will, and lastly of the importance of
purification of the motive from all empirical incltnatioa
with a view to the disinterested accomplishment of tho
unconditional duties which is the highest .morality. The
importance which is thus ascribed to the unconditional duties
is a necessary corollary of their conception of the highest
end as the non-empirical Transcendental Freedom of the
Spirit. The way of experience is not the way to this non-
empirical end or goal and this necessitates purification in
the sense of freedom from all empirical desire as a negative
condition of the realisation of the highest end. At the same
time the empirical duties are not discarded altogetiieur but
are recognised as having a certain value especially as a
preliminary moral discipline to the higher morality of
the unconditional and noetic duties. It is the uncondi-
tional and noetic duties therefore that are highest in
rank as leading direct to the Freedom and Autonomy of
the Self which is the highest end, and the ethical and
empirical duties have value only as preparatory te^ the
higher duties. The highest ethics, according to the
Hindu, is therefore the ethics of knowledge and purifica-
tion of desire, i.e., the ethics of the negation of empirical
life, but the lower ethics of the practical life is i^so
recognised as a preliminary training to the higher discip-
line of the spirit. We have already seen that this is also
a characteristic feature of the Hindu treatment of the
Springs of Action and the olaesification of the Yututs.
The passions and impulses are considered in view of this

S. K. MAITRA

Aon>emt)irical end of the spirit and even the social virtues
are recognised only as conducive to self-autonomy and
Spiritual freedom. The highest virtue is thus unworldliness
just as t£ie purest impulse is dispassion, and these are the
steps or stepping-stones as it were on which the individual
ascends to his non-emjnrieal ideal from the plane of the
pathological impulses of his phenomenal life.

The Psychological Ethics of the Hindus is therefore
essentially a scheme of practical ethics which has in view
the realisation of the Transcendental Ideal of the Spirit.
In so far as this ideal is conceived in the main as the
negation of the empirical, phenomenal life it is also a
scheme of practical ethics which has the annulment of
the practical life for its object. It is, however, a scheme
which is not metaphysically deduced or merely assumed
as a first principle, but is also expounded on a positive
basis of psychological observation and analysis of the
conditions of volition and the springs of action. This is
a special feature of Hindu Psychological Ethics in which
the scheme of the unconditional and noetic duties is
conceived not merely in view of the non-empirioal trans-
cendental ideal of freedom but also with reference to the
positive conditions of their accomplishment through the
non-pathological or Sdttvika impulses and emotions. It
is these which constitute the links as it were between the
empirical life of the individual and the non-empirical goal
which he is to. reach. Through these pure impulses free
from empirical taint the individual is prompted to the
accoinplishment of the unconditional and noetic duties
which hy inducing disinterestedness and knowledge effects
his freedom from the bonds of experience. The
highest ethics of the Hindus is therefore this ethics of
disinterestedness and contemplation and their psycholo.gi-
oal ethics is only the explication of this higher ethics
with reference to their positive and practical conditions.

THE ETHICS OP THE HINDUS 1^41

♦

The Psychological Ethics of the Hindus is therefore a
synthetic scheme of the practical and positive conditions
of the realisation of disinterestedness and the contempla-
tive virtues as preparatory to the non*erapirical and
intellectual ideal of freedom-in-knowledge — ^a scheme of
ascending stages of realisation through the secular, the
scriptural-conditional, and the scriptural-unconditional
duties merging at last into the noetic duties proper which
are essential to absolute knowledge, It is thus regulative
as well as empirical, noetic as well as practical, a synthetic
plan of progressive approximation to the non-empirical
spiritual end through a graded scheme of duties defined
with reference to their positive psychological bases and
conditions.

PART III.

The Ethico-Spiritual Ideal of the Hindus (Moksha)

AND

/

Its Realisation (Mokshasadhana),

We have seen how the Psychological Ethics of the
Hindus aims at the inwardisation of merely objective
morality by laying down the principles and conditions of
self -purification. Self-purification, however, is not the
highest spiritual end, but is only a means to the highest
end which is Moksha or Freedom of the life absolute and
transcendental. We shall therefore consider now the Hindu
Doctrine of Moksha or the Freedom of the Spirit and of
MokshasMhana or the means of its realisation. In so far
as this freedom has to be regarded in relation to a prior
state of bondage, the Doctrine of Bandha or bondage of the
phenomenal life has also to be considered in connection with
the Doctrine of Transcendental Freedom. We propose to
consider these from the standpoint of the different systems
of Hindu Philosophy, and for the sake of convenience we
propose to treat the ideal and the means of its realisation
separately in two sections.

1. The Spikitual Ideal of the Hindus :

The Doctrine of Moksha or Spiritual Freedom.

Wb have already seen that the highest ideal is con-
ceived in Hindu Philosophy as a state of freedom from
the bonds of the empirical life and therefore as a negation
of experience which, however, may or may not be conceiv-
ed as also a reaffirmation or restoration of it from a higher

THE ETHICS OF THE HINDUS M7

• •

standpoini Thus the Nydya, the Sdnkhya and the
Shankara-Yeddnta all conceive the highest ideal as the
negation of the phenomenal life, while the Bdmdnujists
contend that this negation is only a step in the reafdrma-
tion and restoration of experience from the absolute
standpoint. Hut while in the Nydya and Yaisheshika
systems this negation is conceived as itself constituting the
essence of the transcendental life, according to Sdnkhya
and Yeddnta the highest state is conceived also as the
realisation of a positive transcendental content such as
Blessedness or Knowledge besides being the negation of
all that is empirical.

Moksha According to the Yaisheshikas.

Thus the highest freedom is described in the Yaisheshi-
ka system as the negation of all empirical content in the
self. Sridhara in the Nydyakandalitikd describes
Yaisheshika Moksha as the absolute destruction of the
nine specific qualities of the Self. (Navdndm dtmavi-
sheshagundndm atyantoohchhedah mokshah.) The nine
specific qualities of the Self are : — Intelligence (Buddhi),
Pleasure (Sukha), Pain (Duhkha), Desire (Ichchhd),
Aversion (Dvesha), Conation (Prayatna), Righteousness
(Dharma), Unrighteousness (Adharma) and predisposition
due to past experience (Samskdra). All these become ex-
tinct, according to the Yaisheshika, in the state of
Transcendental Freedom. Hence it is a state of freedom
not only from pleasures and pains but also from intelligence
or consciousness, a state therefore of unconsciousness or
absolute cessation of all experience in the self. It is there-
fore not even a state of self-knowledge, though according
to the Yaisheshiikas it is produced by self-knowledge *and‘
the accomplishment of the unconditional duties. The
Yaisheshikas contend that though it is a state of negation

248

S. K. MAITBA

of all experience yet it is a state of felicity, i.e,, of the felicity
or satisfaction that belongs by nature to the self. This
is how the Vaisheshikas meet the objection of the critics
who say that Vaisheshika Moksha is indistinguishable
from the unconsciousness of matei'ial bodies such as that of
a pebble or a piece of wood. But the dilhcnlty siill remains
as to how a state of felicity is to be conceived which is
not an experienced felicity, i.e., of which there can be no
consciousness whatsoever. The Vaisheshikas argue that
there is felicity in the self-centered repose and calm of
the self, a felicity which may be realised by means of
self-knowledge, self-collectedness, contentment and the
highest righteousness. But since they maintain that
this state of pure being of the self is also free from
intelligence or consciousness, this felicity can only he a
felicity of quiescence and sleep, the rest and calm of
materiality as their critics point out. Further since
happiness is always a felt happiness according to the
Vaisheshikas it is a contradiction to suppose that there
is natural felicity in the 'keif even in the absence of
consciousness.

Moksha Accordikg to Nyaya.

The Naiydyikas agree with the Vaisheshikas in all
essentials in this negative conception of Moksha as the
freedom of the spirit from the bonds of experience. But
they point out that freedom from suffering which is the
essence of true spiritual freedom entails also the abjura-
tion of happiness which is inseparable from suffering.
The highest state, according to the Naiyayika, therefore
is not freedom from experience for its own sake, hut
total and absolute freedom from suffering (Duhkkhena
dtyantikah viyogah), and this implies not only renuncia-
tion of happiness which is always connected with pain.

THE ETHICS OE THE HINDUS .«4>

•

but also the negation of the empirical life. For the
Naiyiyika therefore the cessation of the empirical life is
only a moment in the realisation of that freedcftn from
pain which is the highest end. The Naiyayika is also
more consistent than the Yaisheshika in the rejection
of a transcendental felicity in the self as distinguished
from empirical pleasure. The Nydya contention is that
happiness has to he renounced as being inseparable from
suffering, and as there is no experience of suffering
in the highest state of freedom from pain there is also
no experience of any transcendental felicity or satisfac-
tion in the positive sense. It may he called a felicitous
state only in the negative sense, i.e., as a state of
freedom from the unrest of life and experience. The
Naiydyika points out that though the psychological
reality of pleasure as a positive experience cannot he
denied, yet pleasure being inseparably connected with
pain through the cause (nimitta), the substrata (ddhdra)
as well as the experience (upalabdhi) of pleasure,
there is no freedom from pain without the renunciation
of pleasure along with it. ' In this connection the Naiyd-
yika refutes the views of the opponents and critics of
Nydya, particularly the views of those who conceive
Moksha as a state of pleasurable experience. Against
these the Naiydyika points out that if a man were to be
actuated by calculations of imperishable happiness and
the like, he would not be free (mukta) in the true sense.
He will be the slave of his desire for the happiness of
Moksha, and this desire as a motive-force will be a source
of bondage. It is true that aversion to pain as a motive to
Moksha will equally bind (Dveshasya bandhana samd*
jndndt), but this is why the freedom of Moksha which is
total and absolute freedom from pain is to be sought only
in dispassion and not in the pathological feelings of desire
or aversion. Thus there is no patholo^ici^ Of

1250

S. K. MAITRA

attractian for Moksha as absolute freedom from paiir.
Attraction (rdga) supposes a positive content which is anu-
kula hr favourable to the self, but freedom from pain is a
negative ideal which is only not unfavourable (apratikula)
and not positively favourable. Similarly aversion also can-
not be a motive for absolute freedom from pain. Aversion
is itself a form of pain and thus cannot act as a motive for
that which consists in the absolute cessation of pain. In
short, the highest ideal conceived as the total and abso-
lute cessation of pain is independent of all pathological
motives, while the highest ideal conceived as a positive
happiness necessarily implies impure motives and thus
cannot lead to true freedom. The seeker of true freedom
therefore seeks only cessation of pain from a pure feeling
of dispassion without any pathological aversion as the
motive (Advishan pravartamanah apratikulam duhkhahd-
nam adhigachchati — “ Nydyavdrtika ” of Udyotkara).
Believers in the doctrine of imperishable happiness as the
highest ideal^ contend that there is imperishable happiness
in the self (Atmani nityam sukhamasti) and that man’s
highest end is the realisation of this happiness. Accord-
ing to their view a variety of conditions would not all
produce happiness in the absence of eternal, imperishable
happiness in the self. In the phenomenal life there is no
lasting manifestation of this happiness and the essence of
the transcendental life consists in the full manifestation of
this happiness. The Naiydyika however points out that
this psycholngico-epistemological argument for the exist-
ence of imperisimble happiness in the self will also equally
prove the existence of imperishable suffering as well as
imperishable desire and other states of consciousness
(duhkhamapi nityam kalpayitavyam, ichchddayashcha —
“NydyavArtika”), Hence the argument consistently']
carried out will make every conscious state a resurgence oij
what is b^w the threshold. It will thus lead to Idealis/

261

THE ETHICS OP THE HINDUS

»

and will make the assumption of external objects super*
fluous. But the Mimdmsakas who preach this will hardlj
accept this Idealistic metaphysic. Nor will the logical
corollary of eternal suffering in the self be consistent with
their doctrine of Moksha as the realisation of eternal
happiness. In short, the doctrine of eternal, imperishable
happiness being below the threshold in the phenomenal life
will also imply that every state of consciousness lives an
immortal life below the threshold and thus we shall have a
most wonderful netherland of mental life in which states,
contradictory and mutually incompatible, continue simul-
taneously in being so that desire continues alongside of
aversion and pain endures by the experience of pleasure.
Such will also be the state of Moksha in which' the mani-
festation of the latent happiness will also involve the
manifestation of the latent unhappiness. Further what
does this abhivyakti, this manifestation of happiness in the
self, mean? (1) If manifestation means cognition or
knowledge of the happiness by the self, then the question
is whether such manifestation is eternal or non-eternal.
If it were eternal then there would be no distinction
between the liberated (mukta) and the non-liberated
(samsdrastha). Further there would be no diversity in
the emotional life, but only one unbroken continuum of
happiness. Lastly there would be no possibility of suffer-
ing and therefore also no desire for freedom from suffering
(duhkhajihdsd) nor any toiling for liberation (Moksha-
praydsa) as a consequence. It is hardly to the point to
argue that the body is an obstacle to happiness, and there-
fore there is need of toiling for the realisation of this happi-
ness. The body is only a means of fruition (upabhoga)
and therefore cannot be an obstacle. Further with eternal
happiness of the liberated we may also imagine an
imperishable body as the instrument (nimitta, sddhana)’
•hereof. But if an imperishable body is felt to be an

S. K. MAlTilA

ui

absurdity so also must be eternal happiness, (2) Secondly,
if the manifestation of eternal happiness is non>etemal
(anitya), then there must be a reason why there is such
occasional manifestation. You must postulate a connec-
tion of the soul-substance with its organ of experience,
viz., the mind. This connection of soul and mind will
have to be assumed as a condition of the manifestation
besides the existence of eternal happiness in the self. In
liberation these will be the only conditions of the realisa-
tion of happiness and no external objects will be required.
In the same way then there may be sense-experiences
(rupddivisbayajndna) without external objects being
required. We shall thus have a strange sort of liberation
which will not be detatchment of the self (Kaivalya) in
any case as there will be apprehension of all objects
(sarvdrthopalabdhi). Believers in the Doctrine of Eternal
Happiness also prove their theory by an ethical argument.
They point out that there is ishtddhigamdrthapravi’ttih,
i.e., pursuit of the satisfaction derived from the good.
Since this cannot reach its proper goal except in eternal
happiness, therefore such happiness must exist. (Seyam
pravrttih nityasukbd arthavati ndnyathd). This is a
practical, ethical ground in proof of eternal happiness
based on a positive basis of conative experience. It is
assumed that conation as the pursuit of satisfaction would
be senseless if there were no eternal happiness in which it
could be fulfilled. The Naiydyika however points out
that it is not necessary to assume this. Conation is both
rejection of the evil (anishtahdna) and selection of the
good (hitaprdpti). Thus conation may have a negative
as well as a positive end, and therefore freedom from pain
(duhkhdbhdva) may be an object of pursuit quite as well
as a positive satisfaction (pravrtti-dveitadarshandt).
There is no happiness without suffering, but there is free-
dom from both happiness and suffering. A conation is

ttlE fitHICS Oi' THE HINDUS asd

thus fulfilled only in the negative ideal of absolute free-
dom and not in any positive satisifaction which invariably
entails suffering. It is sometimes argued on the basis of
scriptural Authority that liberation must consist in some
kind of imperishable happiness. Eor example, in the
Anandashruti the liberated is described as living the life
of blessedness and felicity (Miiktah sukhi bhavati iti
B hruyat4-Anandashruti). Such scriptural texts, it is helds
contradict the view that there is no happiness in the state
of freedom. The Naiyayika however points out that what
is really meant by happiness in such scriptural texts is
mere relief from suffering. As a matter of fact the
use of the term happiness to indicate mere negative relief
is very common among men (DuhkhdbhAveapi
sukhashabdah prayogah vahudhd loke). E.g., we describe
the state of freedom from illness as a state of being well.

In this connection the Naiydyika considers also some
of the other views of Moksha, for example, the views
of Patanjali and some of the Buddhists. Thus according
to some Buddhists (and also Patanjali) Moksha is the
destruction of the mind or mental continuum (Ghiitam
vimuohyate ityany^). It is argued that the mind is
subject to attraction and other impulses. Since these can
have no power over the self, the mind as subject to these
must originate in a material medium or vehicle other than
the self. The Naiydyika however points out that if this
were true, Moksha becomes possible after death (ayand
moksha siddhah). The Naiydyika holds that it is the self
which becomes subject to the impulses through the mind
which is its organ of experience. What is necessary is
therefore the freedom of the self by the purification of
its pathological dispositions and cravings. So long as
these continue in the self there is no true freedom (which
is the extinction of the possibilities of future experiences)
even though there may be a temporary separation from

S. K. MAITEA

464

the mind through death. It is therefore a mistake' to
think that one becomes free from experience merely by
being separated from one’s mind which is the organ of
experience. iThe mistake of these Buddhists arises from
the erroneous conception that the Chitta or mind is not
only the organ but also the subject of the experience.
The subject is the Atman or self and the mind is the
instrument through which the self becomes the subject
of experiences.

Another Buddhist view is that Moksha consists in
the arrest of the stream of consciousness (santati
anutpdda). But this is also inadmissible according to the
Kaiydyika for the simple reason that the stream as
a concatenation of causes and effects (kdrya-kdranapravdha)
can never cease. The Nydya contention is that an ideal
which by its very nature can never be accomplished or
realised actually is not admissible even as an ideal.

Lastly there is the view that Moksha consists
in the cessation of the possibilities of future experience
(andgatdnutpdda). The Naiydika points out that the
unborn future is of itself nonexistent and therefore
nothing remains to be done according to such a view. The
Naiydyika means that the past as an accumulated mass
of present dispositions with potency to mature in future
experiences leaves scope for work to be done, but the
future as future is simply non-existent and the arrest of
the future in this sense signifies nothing.

According to Nydya therefore bondage is a condition
of the Atman or self, the condition of its being subject
to experiences including feelings of attraction, aversion,
etc., which lead to unhappiness. It is a condition of the
self which comes about through its connection with the
mind which is the organ or instrument of experience.
The effect of such connection is not merely specific
experiences in the self, but also certain tendencies or

. THE ETHICS OF THE HINDUS. - 266

dispositions (samskdras) in the self as a consequence of
its experiences. The self’s true freedom therefore
consists not merely in the cessation of its experiences but
also in the destruction of these latest tendencies which
mature into future experiences through the self’s con*
nection with the mind when the suitable occasions arise.
The destruction of these tendencies means the destruction
of the future possibilities of experience, the negation
of the will-to-live and not merely of the actual experien-
ces into which it materialises. What is required therefore
is something more than the mere severance of the self’s
connection with the mind. Such severance may be
effected in death, in sleep, etc , nut it does not produce
real freedom, for the tendencies, the latent dispositions,
remain in the self inspite of the severanee and because
of such dispositions there is fresh connection with the mind
after an interval of rest, resulting in fresh experiences.
What is required therefore is tlie destruction of these
samskdras or dispositions in the self hy self-knowledge
and by self-purification through the performance Of the
unconditional duties. When the self thus masters its
Trshnd or thirst for life by the destruction of even the
subtle tendencies and dispositions, there is not only a
cessation of all actual but also of all possible experience.
Thereby the self becomes free from the miseries by being
free from all experience and lives the life of calm and
peaceful rest in itself. This may be a negative, pessimistic
ideal, but it is the only one worth seeking since happiness
is impossible without suffering. It is however not Bud-
dhist Nirvdna which is annihilation of self instead of being
the realisation of its freedom. Nor is it Shankara’s
Moksha which is self-annihilation in the Absolute instead
of being true self-realisation. It is indeed the negation
of all empirical content in the self, but this is because
such content does not belong to the self’s true nature,

S. K. MAITBA

£6S

Thb Sankhta Doctrine op Moksha.

There are many points of similarity between Sdnkhya
and Nydya in respool of this negative conception of
Moksha as freedom from experience. In the first
place, Sdnkhya agrees with Nydya in respect of its
pessimistic conception of the highest end as total and
absolute freedom from all kinds of suffering. It also
agrees with the Nydya view that the realisation of this
end is possible only by freedom from all experience.
Lastly it maintains that the self’s freedom is not self-
annihilation in Brahma, but the realisation of its distinc-
tive reality as independent and autonomous. But while
according to Nydya this self-autonomy means the reali-
sation of the self’s essence as spiritual substance in which
not even consciousness remains, according to Sdnkhya
the self is consciousness itself, not a substance, far less
an unconscious spiritual substance. It is this Furusha
as light of consciousness that shines forth in experience,
and true feedom is the realisation of Purusha’s essence
as pure light or illumination. It is through Purusha’s
illumination that the non-manifest, formless Prakyti
becomes manifest as a world of forms, and it is in
Purusha’s experience that the world is fulfilled as a world
of experience. Purusha is thus the bhoktd, the experi-
encer for which the world of experience comes into
being. But Purusha is not experiencer in the Nydya
sense of being the material cause of experience, the soul
substance to which experience appertains as a qualitative
determination. Purusha is experiencer only in the
sense of being the final cause, the end w))ich is being
realised by the world of experience. It is for Purusha’s
experience that a world comes into being, and it is also
in Purusha’s fruition that the world is fulfilled. Purusha
{accomplishes 'nothing for its own sake. It is inactive,

THE ETHICS OP THE HINDUS 257

J

indifferent, self-acoomplished Light from eternify. All
aotirity belongs to Prakrti which is the material and
efficient cause of experience. Prakrti functions^ towards
Purusha’s fruition, and the activities of Prakrti result in
Purusha’s experience. How can the fruition go to
Purusha if Purusha is not an active agent ? This is
not impossible the Sdnkhya replies. The fulfilled subject
is not necessarily also the fulfilling agent. Experience
abounds in instances to the contrary (A^^arturapi phalo-
pabhogah annddyavat). Take the case of the preparation
of the meal. The meal is prepared by the cook, but it
is the king who enjoys it (annddi upabhogah rdjno
bhavati). Take another case. The battle is fought by
the soldiers, but the glory or the defeat goes to the king.
So is it with Purusha. It is the Understanding (Buddhi)
that actively functions in experience, but it is Purusha
that enjoys the results thereof. The Understanding is a
form of Prakrti, and Purusha enjoys in the functions of
its Understanding through a beginningless relation of
ownership with it. It is a unique relation, this relationship
of ownership (svatvasvAmitvasambandha) which is to be
distinguished from the relation of agent and instrument
or of substance and attribute. It is the relation through
which each Purusha is related to its Understanding or
Buddhi which is an evolute of Prakrti. It accounts for
the individual character of experience, the one-to-one
ordering which gives uniqueness to my world as distin-
guished from yours. Through this relation Purusha
attains fruition in the transformations of its Understanding.
Pleasures and pains are functions of the Understanding,
the transformations of the Buddhi which is their material
vehicle or basis. Purusha is fulfilled through the transfor-
mations of its Buddhi which are reflected into it
through the relation of ownership. The Naiydyika
believes in a real determination of the Self in experience.

33

258

S. K. MAITRA

But hoW can there be real determination when the Self in
its true essence is said to be free from experience ? There
can therefore be experience only in the form of reflection
or appearance in the Self. There cannot be real modi-
fication of the Self as a consequence. All modifications,
all transformations belong to the Understanding, and
Purusha’s fruition is only ** transcendental shine,” mere
pratibimba, reflection or appearance. It is in the reflec-
tion of the pleasui'es and pains of Buddhi in Purusha, the
reflection of the determinations of the Understanding in
the Original Light of all experience, that Purusha is
fulfilled. This is Purusha’s bondage, this accomplishment
of the accomplished Light of consciousness through the
reflection into 'it of the empirical objects, which it itself
causes to appear. It is therefore oupadhika, phenomenal
bondage, not real enrichment of Purusha. It is the cause
of Purusha’s suffering however, this experience of Purusha
which is mere appearance. Realisation of true freedom
means the cancellation of this appearance by the realisation
of Purusha’s detached essence through discriminative
knowledge. It is because bondage is mere appearance
that freedom is attainable. If bondage were natural
(svdvdvika), freedom would not be possible except by
self-destruction. If Bondage were caused (naimittika),
then the only possible causes being space (desha), time
(kAla) and organisation (avasthd) the first two which are
ubiquitous (bibhu) will not explain bandha-vishesha, the
specific, individual character of the bondage Or experience
in every case, while the last being a characteristic of the
physical body (dehadharma) will not account for Purusha’s
bondage. Bondage is therefore of the nature of Bhrama
or illusion whose origin is to be sought in some adventi-
tious factor or Upddhi, In this case the Upadhi is the
attachment of Purusha to Prakrti, i.e., Purusha’s unique
relation to Prakrti through its specific Understanding in

TtlE ETHICS OF TfiE faiNDUS 2^9

«

each case, an Understanding which is an evolute of Prakrti.
It is this unique relation of every single Purusha to a
specific understanding in Prakrti, this svasvabuddhibhdvfi-
pannaprakfti-samyoga which is without beginning in time,
that constitutes empirical life or janma. It entails
bondage through the experience it reflects in Purusha. It
thus leads to Aviveka, non-discrimination or attachment of
Purusha to Prakrti. This Aviveka, non-discrimination, can
be removed only by removing its cause which is Purusha’s
relation to Prakrti through the understanding. This rela-
tion is beginningless, but not endless and can be terminated
by vivekakhydti or discriminative knowledge of Purusha
and Prakfti. With the realisation of Purupha’s essential
difference from Prakrti the latter falls off from PurUsha.
The Understanding dissolves into the formless Prakrti
in this state and there is no experience as a consequence.

Freedom therefore is attained, according to Sdnkhya,
by the realisation of difference, i.c., the essential distinction
between Purusha and Prakrti. It is therefore an intuition
of difference as distinguished from the intuition of
identity. It is intuition of identity that leads to Moksha
according to Shankara, an intuition which involves the
cancellation of difference as a moment. According to
Sfinkhya however what is required for Moksha is the
accentuation of difference nnd not its cancellation, the
accentuation, in other words, of the essential distinction
between Purusha and Prakrti. Through this differentia-
tion Purusha recovers its singleness, kaivalya or detached
essence. Hence Moksha is not the merging of the
individual Self in Brahma but the realisation of true
individuality in its detached essence. It is true freedom
of the Self as brought about by the intuition of Self as
distinct from not-Self, . and not the freedom of self-
annulment in Brahma through the intuition of the
Absolute as the negation of all difference.

260

S. K. MAtTRA

/ /

The Puramimamsa Doctrine of Moksha.

The Buryamimamsa Doctrine of Moksha furnishes a
contrast to this negative conception of Moksha of S&nkhya
and Nydya. According to the Furvamimdmsd view the
Self which is different in each body and ubiquitous,
is both spiritual (chidaohit-rupah api pratishariram bhinnah
bibhushcha-*' Advaitabrahmasiddhi ”). In respect of its
spiritual part it is the seer, the witnessing subject of
experience and is the object of the recognition “ I am he.”
In respect of its non-spiritual part, it is subject to trans-
formation in the forms of cognitions, pleasures, pains, etc..
This Self is revealed only in self-consciousness. [Tatrdpi
chidamshena drashtrtvam soaham iti pratyabhijna-visha-
yatvam oha. Achildamshena jndnasukhddirupena pari-
namitvam. Sah (atmd) ahampratyayeneiva vedyah.J

In the Purvamimdmsa view therefore, pleasures, pains,
etc,, are not transformations of the mind (manas) or
internal organ (antahkarana) as in the Sdnkhya and
Veddnta view, but are transformations of the non-spiritual
part of the Self. The PurvamimimsA also differs from
the Nydya. According to the latter the Self is a spiritual
substance without any non-spiritual part, and pleasures
and pains are specific qualities (visheshagunas) of the
Self as a spiritual substance. According to Purvamimd-
rasa however the Self has both a spiritual and a non-
spiritual part, and pleasures and other states are transfor-
mations (not qualities) of the non-spiritual part of the
Self. The Self as experiencer (bhoktd) is thus subject to
transformation, and this transformation of the Self through
its non-spiritual part is beginningless (anddi) and eternal
(nitya) in this sense. But the place of the fruition
(bhogasthdna) such as heaven, etc., as well as the duration
of the fruition (bhogakdla), are non-eternal (anitya).
Neither creation nor reabsorption are aooepted in the

tflB ETHICS OP THE HINDUS 2«1

» •

Purvamimdmsa system, experience being explained as the
beginningless transformation of the nonspiritual part of
the self leading to fruition. (Creation and r^absorption
are accepted in the Nydya-vaisheshika, the Sdnkhya and
the Yeddnta systems, but not accepted in the Furvami-
mdmsd, the Jaina and the Bauddha systems according to
which there is no Isvara or Lord of the world as creator
and destroyer.)

Hence as the world (jagat) is etern^, the bonds of
experience are also without beginning in time (anddi).
The Self’s freedom (Moksha) is thus not a nibrtti or
cessation from activity, but the realisation of eternal
happiness (nityasukhdbhivyakti) with praCbftti or active
participation in the duties. Since in the freedom of
absolute cessation from activity there is no activity of the
indriyas or sensibilities, there is also no possibility of
knowledge which presupposes sense-activity. Hence the
self-realisation (Atmaprdpti) which is ascribed to this state
is only lapse into the unconsciousness of pure materiality.
Tt thus cannot bo an end worthy of being aimed at — this
negation of the Self’s spirituality into blind, unconscious
materiality, and therefore the better course is the course
of active participation which leads to eternal happiness
and not mere cessation which leads to self-negation.
(Atyantika karmochcbhedarupamuktau indriyddirahi-
tasya jnandsambhavdt jarhatvena tddrshdtmapraptih
apurusharthatvdt prabirttireva shreyasi na nibrttih.)

The above is a statement of the Furvamimdmsd position
in general with regard to the question of Moksha. It
may be noted however that this general view is more in
agreement with that of the Bhdtta school of the Purva-
mimdmsakas than with the Prdbhdkara rigorism and
ethical purism. The view of E.umdrila Bhatta is explained
in the Sbdstradipikd by Pdrthasdrathimishra. Fdrthasdra-
thimishra explains Eumdrila’s moksha as i’lapanohasam-

263

S. K. MAITRA

bandhavilaya, i.e., as dissolution of the indiyidual’s
connection with an empirical world. It thus differs from
Shankara’iy Moksha which in its negative aspect involves
not the mere cancellation of our connection with the
world but the cancellation of the world itself, not Prapan-
chasambandhavilaya merely, but Prapanchavilaya
Prdpancha, the world of experience, is illusory stuff accord-
ing to Shankara, such stuff as our dreams are made of.
With the intuitidn of the Absolute the principle of illusion
being cancelled the world which is its construction becomes
cancelled of itself ( Avidya nirmito hi prapanohah ; svapna-
prapanchavat ; prabodhena brahmavidyayd avidydydm
vilinAydm svayameva viliyate.) There is thus a pseudo-
reality attaching to the world according to Shankara
which thus necessarily dissolves in the light of the intui-
tion of Absolute Reality. According to Kumdrila
however this world does not dissolve, but only the bonds
that attach the individual to a world thereby causing
experiences of pleasure, pain, etc There are Idealists
like Sankara who ascribe only a pseudo-reality to the
world. There are other Idealists who go further main-
taining consciousness to be the only reality. Both these
are wrong according to Kumdrila. The world is not
unreal, nor a mere dream-reality which can be cancelled
by knowledge. It is a real world that binds us and the
Moksha which man can aspire to attain is only the
freedom of detachment from the world. Some of the
Veddntists and Buddhists describe Moksha as the being
of pure consciousness which is realised through
the negation of difference — a negation effected by means
of the destruction of the residual tendencies of the
continuum of conscious states (jndnasantdnasya vdsanoch-
chheddt vaichitryam hityd kevalam samvitmdtrena
avasthdnam iti kechit). Some of the Mddhyamikas and
Yogdcharas go farther and describe Moksha as the cessation

THE ETHICS OF THE HINDUS 268

• •
of the stream of consciousness like the extinguishing of
the light of the lamp (dipasantdnasya iva jndnasantdnasya
uparama). The Shan kara-Vedantists again describe it as
the realisation of the essence of Brahma as Consciousness
and Bliss by the cancellation of the dreamworld we call
empirical life. All these in Kumarila’s view are open to
tbo common objection that they suppose that the world is
unreal and can be sublated like an illusion. But this is
an untenable assumption. We cannot cancel the world ;
we can only cancel the phenomenal bonds that bind us to
a world. Our attachment to the world is threefold being
due to our connection with (1) a body as the abode of
experiences, (2) sensibilities as the instruments of experien-
ces and (3) objects (sounds and the like) as the objects that
are experienced. (Tredhd hi prapanchah purusham
vadhndti — (1) bhogdyatanam shariram, (2) bhogasddhanani
indriydni and (3) bhogyah shabdddayovishaydh). Through
this threefold connection the individual is a subject of
experiences of pleasure, pain, etc. The freedom of the
individual means the absolute destruction of this three-
fold connection with the world (Tadasya trividhasya
vandhasya dtyantikah vilayah mokshab). Bondage is the
individual’s connection with the world in the threefold
form — a connection which is the cause of empirical
pleasure, pain, etc. Freedom is the cessation of this
connection and thereby the cessation of pleasures, pains,
etc. Whether the cessation of the latter implies the
absolute negation of experience is a point in respect of which
interpreters are not agreed. In fact there are two inter-
pretations of Kuraarila’s position as regards this question.

(1) According to one view, in the state of Moksha
merit (dharma) is completely exhausted and there is no
fresh acquisition of merit and thus there is also no happi-
ness as the effect of religious merit. Since such happiness
has a beginning in time it must also perish in the course

2«4

S. K. MAITRA

of time. But there is another kind of happiness which is
not an effect in time. This is the natural happiness of
the Self (svAbhdvika AtmAnanda) which remains over-
powered (abhibhuta) in the empirical life but will come to
manifestation in the state of metempirical freedom.
This natural happiness of the Self is experienced through
the organ of the mind alone without the aid of
the external senses. In the state of transcendental free-
dom the mind persists through all the external senses
(vAhyendriyas) cease. Consequently consciousness or
intelligence also persists in this state.

(2) Others among the Bhattas hold that there is no
experience of happiness because there is no organ of the
mind in the Moksha state; neither is there any intelli-
gence CjnAna), but there is only Shakti, capacity for
intelligence, which is natural to the Self. This is PArtha-
sArathimishra’s interpretation of KumArila’s Moksha.

N.B. — (1) According to PArthasArthimishra therefore
the Moksha of KumArila and of the NyAya-Vaisheshikas
are the same. But they differ in one essential point.
According to KumArila either course is optional, the
pursuit of happiness in heaven through the path of the
conditional duties or the pursuit of Moksha through the
path of unconditional duties. According to the NyAya-
vaisheshikas however pursuit of happiness in heaven is to
be abjured as necessarily involving pain along with
happiness.

N.B. — (2) The view of the PrAbhAkaras, it may be
noted, does not correspond to the BhAtta conception of
Moksha either as realisation of happiness or as
freedom from experience. The PrAbhAkaras define
Moksha as Niyogasiddhi rr realisation of the Moral
Imperative as duty. For the PrAbhAkaras therefore
Moksha is the accomplishment of duty for duty’s sake,
i.e., the disebftrge of the unconditional duties as moral

THE ETHICS OP THE HINDUS 2«fi

verities having authority in themselves without reference
to extraneous ends. It is therefore a state of unceasing
moral activity which does not look forward to ai^ ulterior
end beyond itself. Some commentators however interpret
Frdbhdkara Moksha as the realisation of freedom from
suffering (of. Shdlikandtha).

N.B. — (3) The Jainas do not accept the negative
conception of Moksha as the cessation' of experience
Mallishena’s criticism of the Nydya view ^ the “ Syddvd-
damanjari ” deserves notice. Mallishena observes that

(а) if in the Moksha state the Atman were to be reduced
to a condition in which it is indistinguishable from
material objects such as pebbles, etc.,^ what is the
use of striving after such a state ? Better far is this
phenomenal life (samsdrdvasthd) in which happiness
comes to us at least at intervals tainted by suffering
though it be. A state of absolute indifference in which
there is neither pleasure nor pain, a dead level of
emotional uniformity, is the negation of spiritual life.

(б) The pure happiness which results from self-restraint
and from indifference to things that are temporal
is not only worthy of a spiritual being but also
capable of being realised even in this life as is
proved by the testimony of experienced men. It
is an exquisite happiness, this satisfaction (nibrttaja
sukba) which results from self-restraint, a pure pleasure
as distinguished from ordinary pleasures which are
mixed with suffering. It is known to those who practise
self-restraint and it has to be accepted on the testimony
of such spiritual experts or judges, (c) Even those who
refrain from drinking the honey knowing that it is mixed
with poison, do so only in the expectation of a better
pleasure or satisfaction, (d) If pleasure be a good and
pain be an evil in this life, they must be so in every other
life. Goutrarywise the absence of pleasure is ap evtt and

84

< 266

S. K. MAITRA

the absence of pain a good in all conditions. If the
Moksha state were to consist in the absence of pleasure
or happiness, it would be an evil and an undesirable
consummation instead of being a desirable condition of the
Self. (<») The contention that the prompting of pathological
pleasure would be inconsistent with the self’s autonomy and
freedom iti the Moksha state is based on a nii.sconoeption.
While the attraction of earthly objects is heteroiiomous,
there is a higher pleasure which is not inconsistent with
the Self’s autonomy. It is based on a pure desire (sp.ha-
niatra) which does not bind for tlie simple reason that it
does not point beyond itself to anything that is external.
It makes its appearance when one has ascended the
penultimate stag«; and at last disappears in the ultimate
perfectiou of the Moksha state. There is therefore at
least one desire which is pure and not pathological-^it
is the desire which seeks the perfection of the Moksha
state, and is not directed t o anything external. Because
it seeks nothing that is external, it cannot bind the indivi-
dual, and it ceases of itself when the object, viz., perfec-
tion of the individual in the Moksha state, has been
attained or realised.

Shakkaka’s View op Moksha.

The conception of Moksha as a positive satisfaction is
also a special feature of the Shankara-Yeddnta system.
The Sbankarites also distinguish between relative and
empirical pleasures and a higher pleasure or satisfaction
which is absolute. But the essential feature of the
Shankarite view is the conception of this higher satisfac-
tion as something which eternally is and does not come
into being through the instrumentality of Self-restraint
and the like. The Sbankarites contend that it is this
eternally aoeQmplished felicity that manifests itself in

tHE ETHICS OP THE HINDUS
* •
empirical pleasure, and the realisation of this felicity is

thus the accomplishment of the accomplished, the lifting
of the veil that conceals this realised essence f»om view.
The position of the Shankarites is very clearly explained
in the “ Veddnta-paribhasha ” in the last chapter. The
author first defines an end, proyojana or purushartha.
According to his definition, whatever being known is desired
as a function or qualification of the Self is an end (yat
avagatam sat svavrttitayd ishyate tat prayojanam). Ends
are of two kinds : (1) direct and proximate (Mukhya), and
(2) indirect or remote (Gouna). The direct ends are either
happiness or absence of suffering, while indirect ends are
those which are conducive to the direct eqds. (Tatra su-
khaduhkhdhhavou mukhy6 praTojan6, tadanyataras^d-
dhanam gounam prayojanain).

Happiness again is of two kinds : (I) empirical happi-

ness which is limited and relative and which arises from
connection with external objects, and (2) transcendent.il
happiness which is the Unexcelled Bliss that constilutes
the essence of the Absolute. Empirical happiness is a
partial manifestation of the latter through the mould of
a mental function or psychosis. Transcendental Happi-
ness is the essence of Brahma, the realisatioji of which (uids
the miseries of life by cancelling the illusion which is
their cause. Moksha is the realisation of this highe'»t
satisfaction and it implies in its negative aspect the
cessation of all suffering. (Sukham cha dvividham,
sdtishayam niratishayam cha. Tatra sdlishayam sukham
vishaydnushangajanitdntabkaranavitti t dr atamyakrtd-
nandaleshdbirbhdvavisheshah. Niratishayam sukham
cha Brahma eva. Ananddtmaka-Brahmdvdptishcha
mokshah, shokanibrttishcha).

With reference to the objection that since this Trans-
cendental Satisfaction as being the essence of the Abso-
lute is an eternally accomplished fact and therefore

<68

S. K. MAltRA

I '

cannot be accomplished over again by human effort, the
Veddntaparibhdshd points out that this is not impossible.
As a matter of fact fruition (siddhi) may be either of
two kinds : (1) fruition consisting in the realisation
of the unrealised (aprdptaprdpti) and the rejection of the
unrejected (aparihrtaparihdra), and (2) fruition consisting
in the realisation of the realised (prdptaprdpti) and the
rejection of the rejected (parihrtaparihdra). In the
latter case there is only either a re-realisation or a simple
cancellation of an illusion. Consider for example the
case of the person who in an excited state misses the
necklace which is on his own neck. What is his feeling
when he learns the truth ? There is only a sense of re-
realisation, of realisation of the realised, or possession of
that which was never lost possession of. Consider again
the case of the man who mistakes a garland of flowers for
a snake. What is his feeling when he recovers from the
illusion ? There is only a sense of re-rejection, of rejec-
tion of the already rejected, of cancellation of the
cancelled, of negation of what is not. So is it also in the
case of Moksha which consists in the realisation of the
Absolute. The Absolute is self-accomplished from all
eternity, and the desire to realise the absolute is prompt-
ed only by a temporary illusion that it is unrealised. So
too is it with regard to the cancellation of the empirical
world. The world as mere illusory stuff is cancelled of
itself, and the cancellation of it in Moksha is. the cancella-
tion of the cancelled, the rejection of what is rejected
already. (Tathd Brahmarupasya Mokshasya asiddhatva-
bhramena tatsddhan^ prabrtti, evam parihrtasya api
anarthasya nibrttih mokshah.)

According to Shankara therefore Moksha requires not
merely the Self’s detachment from the world but the
cancellation of the world itself. This distinguishes
Shankara’s B^ksha from the Sdukhya, Nydya as well as

TflE ETHICS OE THE HINDUS

269 *

the Mimdmsaka conception. Further according to
Shankara the freedom of the Moksha state is not the
realisation of the Self as a distinctive reality,, but the
realisation of it as nondistinct or identical with the
Absolute. Here also Shankara differs from the Sdnkhya
and the Nydja-vaisheshika philosophers. Lastly, the
realisation of our identity with the Absolute implies,
according to Shankara, not merely the realisation of our
essence as accomplished consciousness or intelligence as
the Sdnkhya supposes, but also the realisation of the
Ananda or Bliss which constitutes the essence of an
accomplished reality. The Moksha state is thus one in
which the individual becomes merged i^^ the Absolute
essence as accomplished Consciousness and Bliss — a state
therefore of essential felicity as distinguished from the
mere absence of suffering and misery as the Sdnkhya
supposes.

Ramanuja’s View op Moksha.

The Ramanujists agree with Shankara in this positive
conception of Moksha as. a state of felicity and blessedness
as distinguished from a state of indifference. But they
differ from him in two respects. In the first place, they
reject Shankara’s conception of Moksha as self-annihila-
tion in the Absolute in the sense of merging of the
individuality of the individual. Secondly they differ from
Shankara as regards his conception of the Self as Imper-
sonal Consciousness and Bliss holding as against him that
the Seif is not intelligence itself but only an intelligent
substance, a substance with intelligence as one of its
many auspicious qualities. Intelligence is however not
an adventitious quality of the Self which it may be with
or without as the Nydya thinks, but an essential quality
(though a quality only) and therefore inseparable
from the Self and necessary to it. The state of llCoksha

' »70 S. K. MAITRA

. '
is the realisation of the Absolute in the sense of a

restoration of our harmony with it as factors occupying

subordinate places in its life along with other factors of

coordinate rank and subordinate to the whole. It is

therefore not a state of self-annulment in the Absolute

but only of self -surrender and renunciation with a view

to the realisation of our true individuality as factors in the

Absolute life.

The Self, Rdin^nuja points out, is the thinking subject,
the 1 ” that thinks, and not pure consciousness or
thought as Shaukara holds. Shankara thinks the Self is
nothing but pure, impersonal essence of Consciousness,
the thinking subject (jnatd) and the object thought
(jneya) being illusory superimpositions on pure. Imperso-
nal Consciousness which is the Self’s true nature as
identical Avith llrahma, RaTnanuja contends that this is
an inversion of the true facts. The thinking subject is
not an attribute of the Self as pure consciousness, an
illusory su peri mposit ion on its essence. It is the “ I ” or
thinking subject that constitutes the Self and consciousness
is only an attribute of it. We cannot suppose the Self to
exist in its own nature eVen if the “I” or “thinking
subject.” It is therefore a mistake to suppose that the self
should case to be the thinking subject disappears in the
Mokvsha state. If that were so the realisation of the ideal
life would mean the extinction of the Self itself. (Yattu
mokshadashdyamahamartho nduuvartlatd itih tadapesh-
alam. Tathd satydrmandsha evdpavargah prakdrdntarena
partijndtah sydt. IS^a cbahamartho dharmamdtram, yena
tadvigameapyavidydnibrttdviva svarupamavatishtbatd ;
pratyuta svaruparaevdhamartha dtmanah, jnd.na8tu tasya
dharmah. — “ Shribhashya. ”)

Rdmdnuja thus distinguishes between the essence
(svarupa) of the individual Self and its intelligence
(jndna) which he regards as its attribute (dharma). Both

THE ETHICS OF THE HINDUS

tri

• •
are eternal (nitya), immaterial (ajarha) and of the nature

of felicity or bliss (dnandarupa). But while the essence
(svarupa) is subject (dbarmi), monadic (auu) and self-
manifesting Csvasmei svayamprakdshab) in the sense of
being manifest to itself by itself, intelligence (judnn) is an
attribute (dharma), which is ubiquitous (vibhu) though
under limiting conditions, capable of expansion and
contraction (samkochavikashayogya), is non- manifest to
itself (svasmei svaprakasha), and is the mapifestiiig agency
of things other than itS(.‘if (svavyatiriktaorakushaka).

The Self therefore is the “ I ” known as the subject
of knowledge and it is this Self which reveals itself in the
state of Moksha. Since it is manifest to itself by itself
it is essentially an “ 1 ” or a thinking subject, and it is as
this self-revealing “ I ” or subject that it manifests itself
in the Moksha state. It is an unwarranted dogmatism
to suppose that because the Self reveals itself as an “ I '*
therefore it must be implicated in error or ignorance.
The Self in its true essence is an “ I ” and therefore there
can be neither error nor ignorance in the apprehension of
it in its essential nature as an “ I.” (At'>abamarthasyeiva
jndtrtayd sidhyatah piatyagdtmatvam. Sa cha pratyagdtmd
muktdvapi aham ityeva prakashatd, sa sarvvah ** aham
ityeva prakashatd. Na cha “ aham ” iti prakdsh-
amdnatvena tasydjnatvasmsdritvddiprasangah...Ajndnam
ndma svarupdjndndmanyathajndnam viparitjndnam vd.
Aham ityevdtmanah svarupamiti svarupajndnarupoaham-
pratyayo ndjnatvam dpddayati kutah samsaritvam ? —
“ Shribhashya ”.)

Hence for Bamanuja there is no such thing as the
merging of individuality in Brahma in the Moksha state.
Such merging is not merely the negation of individuality
but also the negation of the Self itself. Moksha is merely
the restoration of our harmony with the Absolute, the
abnegation of individual self-will in order that His Will

272

S. K. MAITBA

may prevail and realise itself through our lives. We aro
not isolated beings but factors in the life of the Absolute
having distinctive reality of our own, and our highest
destiny is to realise ourselves by realising God’s purpose in
our lives. This is the essence of true freedom as distin*
guished from the false freedom of the assertion of individual
self'Will which leads only to discord and misery. The
highest end is the life in harmony with the Absolute, the
life of self-surre/ider to the purpose of the Lord in creation.
It is a life of essential felicity and blessedness, a life in
which the individual persists as a self- revealing thinking
subject within the life of the Absolute and realises the
Ananda or satie>faction which is natural to consciousness
as revealing the true nature of things. Consciousness is by
its very nature of the essence of felicity or Ananda. Its
function is to reveal objects to the thinking subject, and
in so far as such enlightenment of the Self through
consciousness or knowledge is favourable (auukula) to the
Self, there is dnanda or bliss. The dnukulya or favour-
ableness is natural (svdbhdvika) since all objects have their
being in the Lord. The prdtikulya or unfavourableness
is adventitious (oupadhika) being due to the illusory
identification of the Self and the body (dehatmabhrama).
Consider, for example, the instruments of destruction
such as weapons, poisons, etc. What does their unfavour-
ableness consist in ? They are unfavourable only to the
body, and yet since the self is illusorily identified with
the body, they are also supposed to be unfavourable to the
Self. In the Moksha state there is no such illusion and
there is only the felicity or bliss that is natural to
enlightenment by thought. If favourableness were not
natural to objects, the same things would not present
themselves as favourable after having presented themselves
as unfavourable in another place and time. (Ananda-
rupatvam ndma jndnasya prakdshdvasthdydmanukulatvam

THE ETHICS OF THE HINDUS *73

▼ishAshastrddiprakdshandvasare pratikuldtvasya * hetur-
dehdtmabhramddayah. Isvar^tmakatvdt sarvveshdm
paddrthdndm dnukulyameva svabh^vah, prdtikulyam
aupadhikam. Anyaddnukulyam svdbhdvikam* ohet,
kasyachit kutrachit kdladeshddayah anukuldni ohandan-
akusumddini, deshantarc kiiUntdrt^ tasyaiva taddesba era
tatkdla eva pratikulant nasyuh — Lokdch6ryya’s “ Tattva*
traya).”

According to the Raradnujists therefore the Self is
not pure essence of consciousness but a thinking subject
with consciousness as its essential attribute. Secondly, it
is not absolutely identical with the Absolute life having
a distinctive reality. Thirdly, Moksha is neither the
realisation of the Self as an isolated being no^ the merging
of the Self in Brahma but the realisation of its true
essence as a distinct but subordinate factor in the Absolute
life. It is thus a restoration of harmony by the renunoia*
tion of self-will in favour of the will of the Lord. Lastly,
this Moksha is essentially a state of felicity which follows
as a consequence of the enlightenment of Consciousness
without any taint of error or illusion. The nature of such
enlightenment is felicity since it reveals objects in their
true nature as having their being in God and therefore as
favourable to or conducive to the good of the Self.

N.B . — There are a few other schools of the Veddnta
such as the Suddhadvaita school of Ballabhdchdryya and
the dualistic school of the Madhvas whose views of
Moksha may also be considered here. According to
Ballabha there are two kinds of Moksha suited to two
kinds of temperament. Thus for the philosopher who
chooses the path of knowledge Moksha is self-dissolution
in Brahma, but for the pious devotee who prefers the path
of faith and devotion Moksha is a testing of the Lord’s
sportive activity in creation (yetu jnd,naikah sannishthafa
oha laya eva hi, bhaktdnam eva bhavati lildsvddah

86

274

S. K. MAITBA

atidurtabhah. — “ Suddhddvaitamdrtanda ** of G'iridhara-
mahdrdja). According to the Mddhyas however the
essence of Moksha is neither self-dissolution nor mere
enjoyment of the Lord’s sport, but becoming united with
the Lord through the acquisition (by virtuous life) of a
non-natural body whose essence is pure, unmixed bliss.
Similarly another Yeddnta commentator, Appayadikshita,
describes Moksha as becoming one with the Lord and
becoming possessed of the perfections of the Lord
(Aishvaryyagiinas). Thus the Lord is the Governor of
the world and has the perfections not only of omniscience
and omnipotence but also of effective desires (satya-
kdmatva) and of effective resolutions (satyasamkal-
patva). For'* the individual to be released means acqui-
ring these perfections of effective will, effective desire,
etc., and thereby becoming free from limitations. The
released individual does not become reduced to pure
consciousness (suddhachaitanya) as Shankara holds, but
only becomes infinite and perfect. This Ishvarabhd-
vdpatti, this becoming God or becoming one with Him
by inducing His infinitude and perfection in oneself,
is, according to Appayadikshita, the release taught
in the Shastras {of. “ Siddhdntalesha ”). Ydmund-
chdryya’s brief summary in the “ Siddhitraya ’’ of the
various conceptions of Moksha as the realisation of the
Absolute (Brahmaprdpti) may also be noticed in this
connection. Says Ydmunachdryya : Tathd paramapu-
rushdrthabhutd brahmaprdptilakhshanamokshd api svaru-
pochchhittilakshanah, avidyastamayalakshanah, nihshe-
shavaisheshikdtmagunochchhedalakshanah kaivalyarupah,
tadbhavasddharmyalakshanah, tadgunasamkrdntilaksha-
nah, tachchhdydpattilakshanah, sdmsiddhikdnandddis-
varupdvirbhdvalakshanah, tadgunasambhavaj ah ita -

nirat i s h a yas uk h a samunmeshopanitdty antikatatkinkarat-
yalakshanah iti tathdtathd vivadante, Hence Moksha

THE ETHICS OP THE HINDUS

276

as the absolute life may be conceived, according to
YdmundchAryya, as

(1) Svarupochchhitti, self-annihilation, Nirvdna or
extinction of the individual,

(2) Avidydstaraaya, dispelling of Avidya, cancellation
of nescience.

(3) Nihsheshavaisheshikdtmagunochchhedalakshanah
kaivalyarupah, the freedom of the soul by the destruc-
tion (uchchheda) of all its Vaisheshika or specific quali-
ties.

(4) Tadbhdvasadharmya — approximation to or imita-
tion of Brahma by the realisation of a state marked by
resemblance to his being or essence.

(5) Tadguna-sarakrdntilakshanah — assumption by in-
duction of the qualities of the Lord, the inducing of
His qualities in the soul.

(6) Tachchhdydpattilakshanah, attainment of His
glory, splendour and light, the reflection of His grandeur,
lordliness or majesty in oneself.

(7) Sdinsiddhika- etc., -lakshanah, the realisation of
the self’s true essence as consisting in pure, natural
bliss.

(8) Tadgunanubhava- etc., -lakshana, the state of
being his sole and devoted servant as brought on by the
emergence of unexcelled bliss duo to the experience of
His excellences or perfections.

Hence according to Ydmundchdryya, Moksha, even as
the realisation of the Absolute, may be conceived either
negatively as self-extinction or as a positive realisation of
absolute essence. The latter again may be conceived as
a merging of self in the absolute or as being the absolute
oneself. This latter again may be conceived either as
mere freedom of the self from empirical life, or as the
realisation of its essence as bliss, or as imitation of the
Absolute in the Self, or as inducing of certain s^bsolute

276

S. K. MAITRA

r* •

perfections in oneself, or as reflecting the majesty and
glory of the Absolute in the Self, or lastly as realising
the Absolute by surrendering oneself to it and becoming
its sole and devoted servant.

The above is a fairly complete presentation of the
Hindu doctrine of the Ideal Life as conceived in the
different systems of Hindu philosophy. It will be noted
that a common feature of these doctrines is the concep*
tion of the Ideal as a negation or, at least, as a transcen*
dence of the empirical life proper. It is thus a super-
moral spiritual ideal rather than a strictly moral ideal
which the Doctrine of Moksha sets forth. Some systems,
e.ff., the Edmdnujist and the Vaishnavika, ascribe a
religious signiflcance to this ideal by interpreting it as
a life of devotion and worship of the l.ord. But the
general tendency is to regard Moksha merely as the
realisation of the absolute life of freedom from the bonds
of experience and Samsara. The question as to how this
ideal is to be realised by the empirical individual is also
discussed in all orthodox Hindu systems in their theories
of Moksha-sddhana, i.e., theories of the practical spiritual
discipline or training which is held to be necessary in
order to realise the transcendental life of freedom from
all limitations.

The Doctrine of Mokshas&dhana.

As we have said above, the question of the Sddhana
or right means of realising Spiritual freedom is also
very fully treated in Hindu philosophy as being
of direct practical import as distinguished from the
purely theoretical question of the nature and essence of
this freedom. The controversy here centres round the
question of the relative importance and efficacy of
wprks,.^ knowledge and faith as means, to the realisation

THE ETHICS OP THE HINDUS

of the absolute life. The main issue in this controversy
is as to whether one of these courses can be held suffi-
cient for the Spiritual life or vrhether an organisation of
different courses is necessary. This is really the question
of the organisation of the personal lite, i.e., as to whether
one ideal is to be the supreme or absolute ideal in terms
of which all other ideals are to be valid, or whether there
is to be a balancing and equilibriation and harmonious
cultivation of the different ideals. The latter is known
in Hindu Philosophy as Samuchchayavada or doctrine
of co-ordination as distinguished from the doctrine of a
single and exclusive ideal.

It will be observed that the possible logical alter-

• »

natives are : —

(A) Only one course.

(B) One with the other two as preparatory and
ceasing after preparation.

(C) One with the other two as auxiliaries.

(D) Two and two (sarnuchchaya), both being co-
ordinate.

(E) All the three as co-ordinate.

Of these (A) comprises the three possible alterna-
tives of

(1) mere works (Karma), (2) mere knowledge (Jndna),
and (3) mere faith (Bhakti). Similarly under (B) and (0)
we have (1) works as primary with knowledge and faith
as (i) preparatory or (ii) auxiliary, (2) knowledge as
primary with the other two as subsidiary and (3) faith
as primary with the other two as subsidiary. Lastly,
under (D) and (E) we have the various forms of the
doctrine of co-ordination (sarnuchchaya), i.e., the co-
ordination (1) of works and knowledge, (2) of works
and faith, (3) of knowledge and faith, and (4) of works
and knowledge and faith, all the three.

It is however recognised that mere works without

m

S. K. MAITRA

r

knowledge or faith are of no use. Therefore the alter-
natives of (1) mere works and (2) of works with
knowledge and faith as preparatory are not considered.

The Sdnkhya insists on the course of mere
knowledge as the proper means to Moksha. It is Viveka-
khyati or the discriminative knowledge of Purusha and
Prakrti that leads to freedom of the Self by destroying
Purusha’s attachment to Prakrti. Works are of no avail,
neither secular works nor scriptural works. Both are
perishable and both involve the impurities of destruction
of life and the like (Drshta vat dnushravikah sah hi
kshaydvishuddhiyuktah.-Vijndnabhikshu). They there-
fore cannot lead to any lasting fruition, nor to any satis-
faction which is pure and unmixed. This holds good also
of the conditional (kdmya) as well as the unconditional
(akdmya) scriptural duties (kamyd akamyd api sddhyatvd-
visheshdt. — Vijndnahhikshu). The Pdtanjala Sdnkhya
however recognises some other forms, of works as
necessary for purification and for destruction of the
subtle tendencies and dispositions which disturb the
practice of meditation. These are the works of self-
restraint (yamas) and of self-regulation (niyamas).
Certain physical aids such as postures (dsanas) are also
useful for meditation. Besides these, meditation on the
Lord’s glory and perfection is also an aid to dispassion
(vairdgya) which is necessary for the proper discrimi-
nation of I’urusha’s essence. These are the pure works
which lead to the knowledge through which freedom is
realised. According to Patanjali therefore works are not
to he abjured altogether, but the Sdttvika works as
conducive to true knowledge must be performed duly till
knowledge is attained.

Shankara also recognises a certain efficacy in works
for Chittasuddhi or purification of mind, but works are
not absolutely necessary in every case. Thus men may

THE ETHICS OP THE HINDUS

270

be born pure of mind or may attain purification indepen*
dently of works. In such cases works are not necessary,
and knowledge of Brahma leads to Moksha without the
aid of works. In all cases works cease with the attain-
ment of the knowledge of Brahma, though in some cases
works may prepare for such knowledge through puri-
fication of the mind.

The Nydya-vaisheshikas and the ildmdnujists how-
ever emphasise the necessity of works ai| well as know-
ledge. The unconditional scriptural works are to be
duly accomplished even when knowledge has arisen.
They supplement knowledge by training the individual
to disinterestedness and dispassion. Such dispassion with
the knowledge of the vanity of things temporal quenches
the will-to-live according to the Nyaya-vaisheshikas and
thereby leads to freedom of Self. According to Bdnidnu-
jists dispassion is an aid to divine knowledge which by
attaining its consummation in Bhakti or Faith and Prema
or Love secures freedom by subduing individual self-will
and reconciling the individual to the will of the Lord.

The controversy thus centres round the question of
the place and relative significance of works, faith and
knowledge in the spiritual life. The issues are between
Intellectualism and Voluntarism, Activism and Quietism,
Rationalism and Pietism. The familiar controversies
amongst the medieval mystics, the scholastic disputes
between the Thomisfcs and the Scotists will furnish apt
analogies to the Hindu discussions of these questions.
But the Hindus, it will be noted, consider the question
more from the philosophical and transcendental than
from the purely religious standpoint.

The efficacy of works in conducing to freedom, is vari-
ously explained by the Hindus in this connection. In
the Bhdmati-tikd, on Shankara-bhasbya four different
views of works as being conducive to knowledge are

tso

S. K. MAITRA

considered. Thus (1) according to one view, works have
only a negative efficacy in conducing to Moksha. The
unconditiqnal scriptural works remove the taint of sin
which is an obstacle to Moksha. By removing this taint
it becomes conducive to Moksha through knowledge and.
meditation. (.Atra cha yajnddindm shreyasparipanthi*
kalmashanivarhanadvarena upayogah iti kechit.) (2) Ac*
cording to others, the efficacy of works is not merely
negative but also positive. Thus works become condu-
cive to Moksha through an intervening merit (samskdra,
punya) which it generates in the agent. Thus moralised
and righteously disposed through the accomplishment of
the works enjoined, the individual turns to unceasing and
earnest meditation on the nature of reality. Such medi-
tation at last destroys his nescience (avidya) and the
tendencies in the self generated by nescience. Thereby
the Self reveals its purity, its freedom and its blessedness.
(Purushasamskdradvarena, iti anyd. Yajnddisamskyto
hi purusha ddaranairantaryadirghakdlaindsevamdno
brahmabhdvandmanddyavidydvdsandm samulakdsham
kasbati, tatah asya pratyagdtmd suprasannah kevalo
vishadibhavati.) (3) According to a third view, the effi-
cacy of works consists in the cancellation of the debts or
obligations (rna) that stand in the way of Moksha.
(Apard tu rnatraydpdkaranena brahmajndnopayogam
karmandmdhuh.) Thus an individual is under a
threefold obligation in the empirical life. He has
obligations to the Gods, to the forefathers and to the
religious teachers or sages. All these obligations are
sources of bondage and the effect of works is to ensure
freedom through the fuldlment of these obligations.
(4) According to a fourth view, it is not merely the un-
ocmditional works or duties that are efficacious in conduc-
ing to Moksha in the ways explained above but also the
prudential works or duties enjoined for the satisfaction of

THE ETHICS OF THE HINDUS

281

empirical wants. It is true that such prudential works
are primarily laid down for the satisfaction desired and
for those who do not desire Moksha they lead tq no other
end. But in the case of those who aim at Moksha they
also are useful as being conducive to the meditation
which leads at last to Moksha. (Anytl tu “ tametam
veddnuvachanena brahmana vividishanti yajnena,” ityd-
dishrutibhyastattatphaldya choditdndmapi karmandm...
brahmabhdvandm pratyangabhdvamachakshate.)

While therefore according to some only unconditional
works are conducive to Moksha, according to others the
efficacy of unconditional as well as conditional works con-
sists in conducing to the meditation which leads to Moksha
either (1) by removing the accumulated 'sins, or (2) by
generating a merit which removes the taint of sin by lead-
ing to earnest meditation, or (3) by cancelling the bonds
of the obligations. It will be observed that according to this
view the lines of works and knowledge do not run concur-
rently as in the doctrine of Samuchchaya or co-ordination.
In the Samuchchaya doctrine works (karma) and know-
ledge (jndna) are equally contributpry to, i.e., co-ordinate
causes of, Moksha. Here works are made subordinate to
knowledge as conducive to the latter. Hence in this view
works are conducive to knowledge and knowledge is con-
ducive to Moksha while in the Samuchchaya doctrine
works and knowledge are jointly conducive to Moksha.
This view also differs from Shankara’s. For Shankara
works are not necessary in every case. In some cases
they may be conducive to knowledge by producing puri-
fication of the spirit, but the latter, howsoever attained, is
the cause of Moksha through the knowledge of reality.
Hence according to Shankara though works may be
serviceable in some cases, they are not always required,
while according to this view works are required in every
case as being conducive to knowledge. In Shankara’s view,
86

282 S. K. MAITRA

as well as in this, works must cease with the appear-
ance of knowledge, but while in this view works are
indispepsable for knowledge, for Shankara they are not
always necessary. The view of the YedantaparibhdshA
may be noticed in this connection. According to it works
are mediately required for purification or removal of the
taint of sin in the self. Without this self-purification
there can be no knowledge of reality which leads to
Moksha. Moksha has thus for its immediate cause the
knowledge of reality, but in so far as this knowledge is
mediated through works which cause the removal of sin,
i.e., of the sin which is an obstacle to knowledge, works
are also indirect or remote causes of the realisation of
Moksha. (Tatcha jndnam pdpakshayat bhavati, sa cha
karmdnusthandt, iti paramparayd karmandm api viniyo-
gah.) Hence according to the “ Yeddntaparibhdshd ”
works are necessary and not optional as in Shankara’s
view, thougli indirectly or remotely necessary as causing
the removal of the obstacle of sin. Hence this view is the
same as No. 1 of the four alternatives of the Bhamati-
tikd.

We have already seen that the Samuchchaya doctrine
is essentially dilferent from the doctrine enunciated in
these alternatives. According to the Samuchchaya view,
the unconditional duties are obligatory for the purpose of
self-purification and cultivation of dispassion or ethical
disinterestedness. Hence they are to be performed duly
in all stages till Moksha is attained, i.e., their perform-
ance should continue even when knowledge has resulted
from self -purification. This, for example, is the view of
the Nydya-Yaisheshikfvs, the Rdmdnujists, etc.

Ydmundcbdryya in the “ Siddhitraya ” considers the
various alternative courses recommended for Moksha in
the different systems. He considers five different alter-
na,tives in this conhection. (Tatsddhanato’pi karmayoga-

THE ETHICS OF THE HINDUS

283

labhyah, jndnayogaJabhyah, anyataranugrhitdnyatara-
labhyab, ubhayalabhyah, ubhayaparikarmmita-svdntasyei-
kantikdtyantika-bhaktiyogalabhyah iti.) Hence •accord-
ing to Ydmu idchdryya Moksha may be regarded as
attainable through (1) Karmayoga or discipline of the
duties, (2) Jndnayoga or the practice of meditation, (3)
Ariyatara, etc., i.e., either of the two alternatives of

(а) works as principal with knowledge as auxiliary (saha-
kdri) and (6) knowledge as principal jrith works as
auxiliary, (4) the co-ordination of works and knowledge,

(б) Bhakti or faith with works and knowledge as prepara-
tory disciplines. A special feature of yamundchdryya’s
enumeration of the various courses is the recognition of
the doctrine of the Anyatara or optional courses. Accord-
ing to this view, the choice is optional between the two
courses, i.e., the individual is free to choose one or the
other according to his own personal ay)titude and inclina-
tion. According to Pdrthasdrathimishra’s interpretation
of Kumdrila’s view the individual is free to choose not
merely the courses but also his summum bontim which is
either Svarga, happiness in heaven, or Moksha, freedom
from experience. The means is Jndnasahakrtakarma for
Svarga, i.e., works as principal with knowledge as auxi-
liary in respect of Svarga, and Karmasahakrtajndna for
Moksha, i.e., knowledge as principal with works as subsi-
diary, in the case of Moksha or the realisation of freedom.
Thus both knowledge and works are required in either case,
but for happiness in heaven Avorks are primarily neeessary
and self-knowledge is only an aid to the proper accomplish-
ment of the works. In the pursuit of Moksha, however,
self-knowledge is primarily necessary and the discharge
of the unconditional duties is only an auxiliary aid to
self-knowledge. Such self-knowledge with the aid of
ethical disinterestedness as produced by the discharge of
the unconditional duties leads to freedom in the sense of

284 S. k. MAITRA

« *
Prapanchasambandhavilaya or severance of connection
with the world.

The objection that Moksha is by its very nature an
unattainable ideal is also discussed by the Hindus in
connection with the question of the practical realisation of
the ideal. The Nydyamanjari ” considers this objection
in detail and concludes that such criticism is based on a
shallow and superficial view of the circumstances that
constitute our bondage in empirical life.

Critics indeed often express the view that Moksha is
nothing but a pragmatic fiction. In their view it is a
subjective construction which may be good merely for
consolation in moments of sorrow and bereavement (shoka)
and of anxiety and trouble (udvega),' but it is useless and
even harmful in the enterprise of life (udyamasamaya).
There cannot be liberation according to them in the sense
of freedom from the cycle of life or Sams^ra and therefore
there can also be no Purushdrtha, i.e., spiritual end or
good in the sense of freedom from experience. Those who
allow themselves to be deluded by thoughts of Moksha
forget that life has certain necessary accompaniments
which cannot be got rid of.

Thus life involves the accompaniments (anubandha) of
(1) certain specific obligations (rna) to be fulfilled, (2) the
series of unavoidable miseries (klesha), and (3) the cycle
of works and activities (pravrtti). (1) The obligations
include obligations to the sages (rshirna), obligations to
the parental stock (pitrrna) and obligations to the deities
(devarna). These obligations have all to be discharged.
Thus obligations to the sages or spiritual experts have to
be fulfilled by the practice of sexual abstinence and study
(brahmaoharyya). Similarly obligations to the parental
stock have to be fulfilled by the begetting of children and
thereby securing the preservation and continuation of the
stock. Lastly the obligations to the deities have to be

THE ETHICS OP THE filNDUS 286*

* •
fulfilled by the proper accomplishment of the sacrificial
ceremonies as laid down in the Shdstras. The discharge
of these obligations will thus absorb all the time* at one’s
disposal and hence there can be no leisure (avasara) for
Moksha. As is pointed out in Jardmaryashrutih, our
obligations (raa) continue all our life and cease only with
death (mrtyu) and illness and physical incapacity (jara).
(2) Secondly, there are the miseries (kleshdnubandha) as
necessary accompaniments of life. They are the natural
and necessary consequences of the Doshas or faults, i.e., the
faults of attraction (raga), arersion (dvesha) and delusion
(moha). These faults lie at the very root of empirical
life and the chain of miseries is only a necessary effect
of the chain of the faults that underlies experience and
birth into Samsdra. Since birth into Samsdra involves
these tendencies or dispositions in the Self and since there
are objects (vishayas) to stimulate them, there cannot be
destruction of these Doshas, faults or evil propensities. As
a matter of fact there is lapse even after they have been
conquered and subdued ; even sages and saints have
been known to succumb w'hen their dormant propensities
have been stimulated by their proper external objects.
There is therefore no real freedom from the inherent
propensities and therefore also none from the miseries
which are their natural consequences. (3) Thirdly there
is the cycle of Karma, merit-demerit (dharmddharma),
birth, etc. Thus birth (janma) leads to karma or works of
righteousness and unrighteousness, works generate merit
and demerit, and merit and demerit result in a fresh birth
with works, merit and demerit, etc. Thus the cycle goes
on repeating itself without cessation, so that the chain of
activity (pravrtti) is a necessary accompaniment of life
because of the effects of merit and demerit in all karma.
Our deeds must necessarily mature into their proper
effects. There can be no doing without reaping the

S. K. MAITRA .

286

consequences thereof. There is Karmopashama, cessation
or suspension of karma, only by its exhaustion through
fruition 'phalopabhoga). There is a natural causal rela-
tion (kdryakAranahhiiva) hetvreen works (karma) and their
proper effects (phala) and this holds good independently of
the knowledge (jnana) or the ignorance (ajndna) of the
agent or doer. Karmas thus cannot be exhausted by
knowledge and the cycle of deeds, rebirths and fresh
accumulation of deeds, etc., is thus an unending cycle that
goes on. revolving according to a fixed moral law in an
unchangeable moral order. There is therefore no freedom
from Karma just as there is no freedom from the miseries
and the obligations.

It is customary indeed to distinguish four kinds of
Purusharthas or ends, viz., Dharmaor righteousness, Artha
or material wealth, Kama or happiness and the absence of
unhappiness and Moksha or freedom from life and its
experiences. It is also customary to distinguish between
righteousness and material wealth as mediate or indirect
ends (i.e., as means to ends) and happiness and Moksha
as direct and immediate ends. Lastly, it is also usual
to distinguish Moksha as snmmum honuni, Faramapuru-
shartba, or end par excellence, from righteousness, wealth
and happiness as relative ends. But all these distinctions
are open to the objection that they make of Moksha a
possible end or good which is capable of being actually
realised. As a matter of fact there can be no such
ideal as Moksha simply because it can never be realised,
and the right course is to seek the other three ends, viz,,
righteousness, material prosperity and happiness {i.e.,
one or other or all throe) without bothering about any
fictitious freedom from life and experience. As there
is no - such freedom, the individual should give up
all thoughts of Moksha and should think only of the
proper ordering of life with a view to realise happiness

THE ETHICS OP THE HINDUS ZST

therefrom ; (Mokshacharchch^hparityaj^ grh^. su-
kham dsyatam ).

This view of the opponent to the Moksl^a doctrine
is thus based on the impracticability of the Moksha ideal,

the impossibility of its practical realisation. It is

assumed that the three accompaniments of life, the

obligations, the miseries and the deeds, cannot be got rid of.

As against this contention the Nydyamanjari points out

that there is no sufllcient basis for such an assumption.

(t) Obligation to the sages (rshirna), the forefathers

(pitrrna), etc., is only a metaphor. There is no contract

and therefore no obligation. («) Man is born free : the

boy (bdlaka) baa no Rna or obligation (cf. Rousseau).

(Hi) Old age, death, etc., give us release from these

obligations, debts or Rnas. This is the real purport of

“ jardroaryya ” texts. It follows therefore that the so-

called obligations are only aids to self-discipline. They

✓

have reference to the different stages (Ashraraa) of life
and are laid down in view of the special aptitudes and
capacities of the different stages. Ordinarily thei’e is a
certain order in the unfolding of these aptitudes and capa-
cities in the successive stages of the growth of the indi-
vidual. The order of the disciplinary codes of the duties is
devised in view of the ordinary, general run of men. But
there are also exceptions to this rule, men of exceptional,
supernormal spiritual capacity, and in such cases the
order of the moral codes is not binding. Thus the order
is binding on Aparipakkakaslidya, «.<?., on him whose
Kashdya or taint of Samsdra has not been purified, but
for Paripakkakashaya or the person who is pure from
birth, there is no Apekshi, necessity, of Ashramakrama,
i.e., of the order of the different codes as suited to the
different stages. The order is not binding in such cases
as because of an inherent freedom from taint there is
no special need of additional purification in successive

S. K. MAITRA

* 288

stages. Henc^ for these there may be a direct transition
from Brahmaoharyya or stage of learning to Paribrajyd
or stage (jf renunciation and universal life, i.e., an inter-
vening discipline of Grhasta or family life is not necessary.
But this holds good only in the exceptional cases and not
in cases of ordinary men of average capacity in all which
the order of the successive stages is compulsory. Hence
there are two kinds of Brahmachdri or learners, i.e,, those
who require n^o family life after the stage of learning
and are learners as well as renunciates or mendicants
all their life, and those who require family life after the
stage of learning and sexual abstinence. In the case of
the latter, according to some, a subsequent recluse life
(vdnaprasthya) is not necessary provided that there is
due discharge of the duties without desire for the conse-
quences (karmaphaldbhisandhirahitakarttavydnusthdna)
besides ppptice of self-knowledge (Atmajndna), i.e*.,
with the disinterested accomplishment of the duties
combihed^with self-knowledge there may be Moksha
even in the stage of family life without a succeeding
life of retirement and hermitage being necessary. Accord-
ing to others however, afcer family life (grhastdshrama)
lie may take either to hermitage (vdnaprasthra) or mendi-
cancy (bhikshdchdryya) according as he is qualified by
the family training (grhdt vanat vA pravrajet). Hence
in this view the necessity of the order of the different
codes is relative to the agent’s spiritual growth, the order
being binding on the immature and unnecessary for the
mature. Some however think that the order is compul-
sory in all oases without exception. Whatever view
may be entertained about the obligatoriness of the
different codes, it is clear that their main object is the
spiritual discipline of the individual with a view to his
ultimate freedom. It is therefore a mistake to suppose
that these Obligations are a perpetual source of bondage

THE ETHICS OF THE HINDUS

289

and leave no spare time (avasara) for Moksha. |[2) The
assumption that there is no release from the chain of
miseries (kleshdnuhandha) is equally untenable. Release
from this chain is possible by Pratipakshbahdvanfidi, i.e.,
by Pratipakshabhdvand or contrary meditation and
Abhydsa or repetition. Thus contrary meditation is
meditation on the vanity of the pursuits of life, i.e.,
realisation of their true nature as incapable of yielding
lasting and real satisfaction. It is contrary meditation
as being contradictorily opposed to the usual erroneous
idea of these as capable of yielding real fruition.
It leads to Vishayadoshadarshana or realisation of
the vanity of earthly things and constitutes the
negative aspect of the meditation on the Ultimate tran-
scendental nature of things. Supplemented by Abhydsa,
practice, of dispassion (vairdgya), it leads to Doshdnu-
bandhanivrtti, i.e., cessation or eradication of the
evil propensities that lead to misery. It is a mistake to
suppose that our propensities are indestructible. They
cannot be indestructible as they are (1) not accidental
or uncaused (dkasmika), (2) not eternal (nitya), (3) not
due to unknown and unknowable causes (nitydjndtahe-
tuka), (4) not irrepressible or ungovernable (ashakya-
pratikriya), (5) nor of such nature as to be unknown in
respect of the means of repression thereof (ajndtasha-
manopdya). As a matter of fact, the propensities, viz.,
attraction and aversion, have their ultimate root in Moha,
Delusion, arising from Mithydjndna or Erroneous Cogni-
tion. Error being the root of these propensities (doshas),
right knowledge (samyakjnana) is the counteracting
agency (pratipaksha). Thus right knowledge strikes at
the root of the propensities by dispelling Mithydjndna
or the illusory idea of the worth or value of temporal
things. With this illusion dispelled, there is evaluation
of things at their true w'orth, i.e., there is full realisation
87

990

S. K. MAITRA

of their utter worthlessness as means to fruition. This
is Yishayadoshadarshana or perception of the vanity of
external objects, and with this disillusionment as regards
the true nature of objects there is also a cessation of
attraction as well as aversion. The “ NyAyamanjari *’
notes that such perception of the vanity of things must
be supplemented by meditation (chintA) and realisation
by concentrated thought (bhdvand), i.e., there must be
realisation of the perception by means of earnest and
prolonged meditation in order that the propensities may
be destroyed with their roots. It is also pointed out that
realisation implies mental equipoise and not Yishaya-
dvesha, i.e.^ there must be no antagonism and aversion
to the objects in order that they may be realised as
worthless. He that shows irritation at the natural
imperfections of things is as foolish as he that is angry
with the fire that burns the fingers on contact. (Sprsh-
yamdno dahatyagniriti ko asmai prakupyat^.) The wise
man therefore does not lose his mental balance either before
the Anukula or favourable objects or before the Pratikula
or unfavourable objects, but ascribes his happiness as
well as unhappiness to the inevitable effects of his own
doings. Thinking of the nature of things and of his
own nature as determined by his own doings, he acquires
an insight into the chain of causes and effects, and this
insight (samyakjndna) produces mental equipoise.
(Svakarmaphalamashndmi kah suhrtkashcha m6 ripuh.)
The meditation on the worthlessness of empirical pursuits
is thus a sort of self-hypnotism which acts upon the
forces of the subconscious and unconscious and thereby
brings about the transformation of our nature or will.
This is no casual or occasional remedy but Atyantikoch-
chheda or extinction of the passions with their roots.
The epicurean remedy by Upabhoga or enjoyment is
absolutely useless : it only stimulates or fires the passions.

THE ETHICS OP HE HINDUS 291

(Trshndkhaairag<idheyam dushpara kena puryatd, ya
mahadbhirapi kshipraih puranaireva khanyat^.) The
course of meditation is thus the only proper course and
the course of surfeit and cessation hy fruition is hound to
fail (na j^tu kdmah kdtnandmupahhogena shdmyati).
Through meditation on the true nature of things there
is cancellation of the illusion of the value of worldly
pursuits, and this quenches the thirst for life and its
desires and aversions which are the causes of misery.
Thus comes release from the chain ol the miseries.
(3) Nor is release from the chain of activities impossible
as contended. With the extinction of the passions
(doshas) the will (pravrtti) ceases to accumulate Karma
and thus there is cessation of Uttarakarnia or futural
possible actions. This is clearly stated in the Gautama<
sutra : Na Pravrtti Pratisandhaya Hinakleshasya — which
means that for him whose Klesha, passions and
miseries, are Hina, quiescent, there is no reaction (prati-
sandhana) of the will (pravrtti). But this applies only
to Uttara or future possible actions. Besides these there
are also Prdktanakarina, «.<?., accumulated actions of the
past with their effects including the part of the accumu>
lated actions which is Prdrahdha or in the process of
fruition. The question therefore is : how is release
possible from the Sanchita or accumulated past actions
and from the Prdrabdha part of the accumulated actions,
i.e., from the part which is already in the process of
fruition in the life-time in question ? As regards
the Prdrabdha part it is in all cases understood
that it is to be exhausted only by actual experience
(bhoga) in the particular life-time. (The idea underlying
this view is that the actions which are in the course of
fruition are part and parcel of the natural order of
causes and effects. Any non-natural suspension of the
course of these actions would mean a miracle which

in

S. K. MAITRA

snapped' the natural link between causes and effects and
upset the natural order.) The remainder of the accumu-
lated actions, i.e., the part which is not in course of
fruition in a chain of natural causes and effects, is suspend-
ed by a different process. The Mimdmsakas of course
reject all ideas of the suspension or extinction of our
actions holding that the cycle of Karma and birth into
life as a consequence cannot be ended so that neither in
this life nor hereafter is there release (mukti) from ex-
perience and Karma. Others however accept release as a
fact holding either (1) that our accumulated actions are
consumed by the tire of knowledge (jnamigni) even before
fruition (bhoga), or (2) that since Karma produces its
effects with toe passions (dosha) as Sahakdri, therefore
when the passions (doshas) are destroyed, the Karmic
potencies cannot mature, or (3) that the effects of our
deeds are exhausted through a specific fruition in the Yogin
who has attained true insight, i.e., through the happiness
produced by mental equipoise and contentment fshama-
santoshddijanitasukha) and through the suffering of the
hardships of physical heat, physical cold, etc., (shitdtapa-
kleshddidvdrakaduhkha), or (4) that tl)e Yogin may
consume the effects of his deeds quickly by simultaneous
experiences through the assumption of different bodies,
or (6) that even for the Yogin Karma must exhaust itself
through its natural course of happiness in heaven (svarga)
and suffering in hell (naraka), after which there will be
Moksha. Hence neither the accumulated past actions
nor the future possible actions are indestructible, nor
also the chain of the passions and inherent tendencies
which cause the miseries, nor again the obligations of life.
Our miseries can be ended by knowledge and meditation
just as our obligations can be transcended by the accom-
plishment of the duties. Lastly the chain of deeds and
their effects can also be suspended by the extinction of

THE ETHICS OP THE HINDUS 298

• •
the passions which prompt the deeds and lead to the
miseries.

It will be observed that the cycle of life and its
miseries, according to Nydya, is : error (mithydjndna),
passions (dosha), activities (pravrtti) with merit and
demerit (dharmMharma), birtli into life (janma), misery
and suffering (duhkha), error (mithydjnana), etc. The
crowning folly is therefore Error, Mithydjnana, Moha,
which is the root, as we have already notpd, of the attrac-
tions and aversions. Just as the cause of bondage is
error of judgment, so also the means of release is intel-
lectual insight, the knowledge of the true nature of things
(tattvajnana). As realists the Naiyayikas define this
knowledge as the knowledge of objects in their true
nature, including even tlie Self within the category of
objects having objective essence or nature. In this
respect the Nydya intellectualism differs from that of the
Shankara- Vedanta according to which the highest know-
ledge is not the knowledge of Self as an object distinct
from other objects but the knowledge of it as the sole
ultimate reality as pure consciousness or thought. The
Naiydyika points out that since there cannot be contra-
diction (dvairupya) in the heart of reality, Mithydjnd,na
or error must necessarily cease with the appearance of
Tattvajndna or true knowledge of things. It is assumed
that knowledge itself is distinct from the object of know-
ledge and since true knowledge has the confirmation of
the Vishaya or object while erroneous cognition has
none, the former necessarily displaces or removes the
latter. The former has moreover additional confirmation
from inference and the other sources of knowledge. It
will thus be observed that the assumption throughout is
that the valid cognition displaces the erroneous cognition
through the aid of the object and other extraneous means.
This is in keeping with the realistic standpoint of NyAya

S. K. MAITRA

‘E94

( •
ana distinguishes the Nydya view from that of Shankara-

Veddnta, For the latter the cancellation of error is
rejection of the rejected, the negation of what is not, a
negative negation. But for Nydya the error is a positive
judgment and the negation of it is a real negation (apari-
hrtaparihdra) through a positive realisation (aprdptaprdpti)
of the true nature of things, i.e., a realisation of the
unrealised as distinguished from the Vedanta intuition
which is realisation of the already realised. The process
of the realisation of knowl<*dge is explained by NyAya as
follows : Pramajnana-vishayabh^vanAprakarshadhydna-

vipdkadhydnabhAvandydm tasminarth^ tattvapratibodhi-
jnanam pratyaksham utpadyate. In other words, there
must be Pramdjnana or knowledge of the true nature
of things in the first instance. But this is nut all. After
attaining such knowledge the individual must meditate
thereon. This is Bhdvand or meditation. When this
meditation reaches its culminating point through a
process of Dhydna or continued, uninterrupted and
arduous concentration thereon, there is not merely a
bare cognition of things in their true nature but a
realisation of this cognition in the form of a presenta-
tion or intuition. The bare thought or intellectual
apprehension thus becomes transformed into a perception
or intuition, and the process by means of which this
is accomplished is a heightening of thought power
by continued meditation and concentration of mind-
energy. This is how conceptual knowledge is raised to the
intuitive plane, and till this is accomplished there is no
cessation of error nor the extinction of the passions.
Hence according to Nydya it is a positive intuition of
the true nature of things which cancels illusion which is
also a positive judgment. The cancellation -of the illusion
means not the cancellation of things or objects but only
their transyaluation, i.e., the realisation of their real

295

THE ETHICS OP THE HINDUS

» •
value in place of their face-value. This is Vishayadosha-

darsana or realisation of the worthlessness of things and
not Frapanchavilaya or cancellation of things as mere
illusory stuff. There is only cancellation of the face- values
and not cancellation of the things, the cancellation of the
significance attached to them in the empirical state hy the
realisation of their true significance from the transcen-
dental standpoint. The moments therefore in the
intellectual intuition which conduces to, Moksha are : —
the realisation of things in their true nature implying
realisation of what is really substantial and valuable as
well as the realisation of everything else in its true nature

as unsubstantial and worthless. The latter constitutes

• •

Fratipakshabhdvand or counter-meditation and leads to
cancellation of the illusory values ascribed to things in
the empirical state li’rom the realisation of the true
nature of things and the consequent perception through
counter-meditation on the vanity of worldly pursuits arises
dispassion (vairdgya) which is a disinclination for experi-
ence and fruition (bhogdnabhishvangah). The essence of
the counter-meditation consists in the endeavour to realise
all things as productive only of pain and suffering. This
is the Nydya method of cultivating dispassion which is
the effort to realise things as essentially evil even though
actually they may lead to partial happiness in some
cases. It thus differs from the Buddhist view according
to which things objectively are nothing but painful stuff
and not merely to be subjectively realised as such for
ethical purposes. By this the passions are extinguished
and the thirst of life (trshnd) is quenched, and the indivi-
dual, dispassionate and calm, becomes qualified for
]£loksha.

Hence according to Ny4ya meditation on the nature
of things is the cause of Moksha. Through this medita-
tion there is extinction of the passions and release from

296

S. K. MAITRA

the miseries. Since the passions are auxiliary 'Conditions
of our past deeds maturing into effects and also of
future possible deeds, the extinction of the passions leads
also to cessation of Karma, i.e,, both accumulated past
Karma and future possible Karma. It is therefore
knowledge that effects our release from Karma, i.e.^
the knowledge of the true nature of things which destroys
the passions. It is true that there is Karma even after
knowledge, but according to the Nyaya-Vaisheshikas
(as well as the Rdmdnujists) there is no merit acquired by
these Jndnottarakarmas or works done after the attainment
of tnre insight. The Mddvas also accept Karma after
knowledge, but according to them such Karma generates
eternal merit (nityapunya). The Shankara-Vedantists hold
on the contrary that there is no Karma for the man of
true insight, i.e., no ceremonial duties, not even the
unconditional duties. This is the doctrine of Naishkarma
or cessation of duties after knowledge. Of course, the
fourfold discipline (sddhanachatushtaya) and the ethical
virtues implied therein which have been acquired,
continue, but they become natural and spontaneous,
and consequently no merit is acquired thereby. Hence
there is also no bondage as a consequence. Thus in the
Shankara-Vedanta there is no obligation, no code of
injunctions and prohibitions, no duties after knowledge.
According to the Nyaya-Vaisheshikss (and the Bdmd-
nujists) however, the unconditional injunctions are duties,
i.e., obligatory, even after knowledge, but there is no
merit acquired thereby and no effect or consequence
(phala), for they must be done without any desire for the
consequence. The prohibited actions as well as the
conditional duties cease after knowledge, and even the
unconditional duties are hypothetical imperatives in the
sense that they are to be done according to one’s capacity
(yathdshakti). Only the FrArabdhakarmas, the actions

ETHICS

that are ia oOurse of fruition in thn system -of na^uyal
causes and effects, remain. With the exhaustion of
these and consequent death of the individual, there
is cessation of all Karma, and the individual becomes
free in the true sense. Hence (1) according to Mddhvas,
there are duties ■ after knowledge with eternal merit,
(2) according to Nydya-Yaisheshikas, there are duties
after knowledge, but no merit, (3) according to Shankara
there is cessation of all duties with the attainment of
knowledge.

The Bdmdnujists agree in the main with the Nydya-
Yaisheshikas in their view of Karma as d ‘means to the
realisation of Moksha, holding in common with the latter
that the unconditional duties are to be performed without
desire for the consequence even after the attainment of
knowledge. They however go beyond the Nydya-
Yaisheshikas by insisting on the necessity of Bhakti,
Faith, and Updsand, Devotion, in addition to Karma and
Knowledge. Thus according to them. Karma and Know-
ledge must culminate in Faith (Bhakti) and Love
(Prema) before there can be release in the true sense.
'I'his is in keeping with the Bdmdnujist positive ideal of
restoration and reconciliation with the world through
resignation to the Absolute as distinguished from the
Nydya-Yaisheshika ideal of mere negation of experience
and absolute self-autonomy. For the negative ideal of
the latter, dispassion is the only proper course, a positive

8. K. KAim

resignatlion or surrender with a view to reconciliation
with life by a process of tran'^dguration through the
Absolute being unnecessary. For the Rdmdnujists how-
ever this is the very essence of true, concrete freedom
as distinguished from the formal freedom of a negation
without -content. Hence according to them, the disci-
pline of Karma and the discipline of knowledge are not
in themselves sufficient : it is only as they culminate in
the discipline of Bhakti or Faith that they athiin their true
end by being conducive to Moksha. (Earmayogabhakti-
yogaprabhrtindm bhaktidvdraiva sddhanatvam.) The
nature of Bhaktiyoga is defined as follows : —Bhaktiyogd*
ndm yainaniyamdsanaprdiidydinapratydlidradhdranddhy-
dnasamddhiru{jdshtangavdn aviehchhinnasmrti.santdnasya
rup'ih. ("Yatiiidrainatadipikd” by Shrinivdsa). Hence it
is of the nature of Smvti or representation, an uninter-
mittent stream of representation which is characterised
by the eight Angus or organs of Yogika discipline,

(1) Yamas or virtues of self-restraint, (2) Niyamas or
rules of conduct, (3) Asanas or certain postures with a
view to concentration of the attention, (4) Prdndydm of
control of the vital forces through the regulation of the
breath, (5) Pratydhdra or mental rejection of all distract-
ing agencies, (0) Bharand or apprehension of the object
of meditation, (7) Bhydna or meditation on the appre-
hended object without break or interruption, (S) Samddhi
or becoming merged into tbe object as the result of

JkTHIOS 07 TEK niXBVS 990 ^

oontinued meditation. These are the eight Yc^dngas or
^sentials of Yogika meditationi and Bhaktiyoga is the
practice of faith in the manner set forth in those essen-
tials. Bhaktiyoga again presupposes certain auxiliaries,
the auxiliaries of Faith or Devotion. These are puri-
fication of the body (Viveka, Kdyashuddhi), dispassion
(vimoka, kdmandbhishanga), repetition and habit
(Abhydsa), the accomplishment of the sacrificial duties
according to one’s capacity (Krijd, Panehamahdyajndnu-
shthdnam shaktitah), certain auspicious virtues such as
veracity, straight>forwardness, kindness, charity, harm-
lessness, indifference, etc. (satydrjavadaydddndhim-
sdnabhidhyd'kalydndni), freedom from elation in pros-
perity (anuddharsha) and depression in adversity
(anavasdda). These are the auxiliary aids to the culti-
vation of Faith, and aided by these and cultivated
in accordance with the essentials of yoga or medita-
tion, faith becomes transformed into a living experience.
Such faith again is two-fold, faith which is only
a means to an end, viz., the end of Moksha, and
faith which is an end in itself. (Sa cha vivekavimokd-
bhyasakriy d - kalydndnavasdddnuddharsharupasddhana-
saptajanyah. Evam sddhanasaptakdnugrhitabhaktih
darshana-sarndndkdrd. Sd dvividhd, sddhanabhaktiphala-
bhaktibheddt.) Faith is thus the means and faith the
end. Through faith in which knowledge and actions
cnl>aiE&tc the individual attains that living experience

8. K. MAURA

*

af unity with the absolute which constitutes true fre^dom^
and which is itself nothing but a living faith and love,'
an atonement in devotion and a restoration through
surrender.

According to the Bdmanujists therefore the steps in
the realisation of Moksha are : —

(1) The abjuration of jndnotpattivirodhikarma, i.e.^
of actions which are obstacles to divine knowledge.
These are the unrighteous actions (papa) as well as the
prudential actions (kdmyakarma) prompted by desire.
Through the preponderance of the factors of inertia
(tamas) and of energy (rajas) they are obstacles to that
mental equanimity which is a condition of true know-
ledge, and are therefore to be abjured.

(2) The proper accomplishment of the unconditional
duties without desire for the consequence. These duties
are the auxiliaries of divine knowledge (Anabhisamhita-
phaldni karmdni brahmavidyotpddandni). These auxi-
liaries of absolute knowledge (brahmavidyd) and faith
(bhakti) which is the transfiguration of such knowledge
are purification, dispassion, etc. Hence karmas are
binding in all stages of life (sarvdshramakarmdpeksha),
only for Moksha they must be done without desire for
the consequence.

(3) Knowledge (jndna) which is Brahmajndna

THE ETFHCS OF THE HINDUS

297

or knowledge of the absolute. N, B, LokacliAryya holds
that this is Tattvatrayajnana, i.a., knowledge of the three
Tattvas or categories, inz., Brahma, the indii^idual soul
(jiva), and material objects (ajiva).

(4) Faith (Bhakti) which is defined as the representa-
tion of the ultimate reality (dbruvanusmrti) which by
continued and intense meditation (bhdvana-prakarsha)
becomes transformed into a presentation or intuition
(darshanarupd). Such faith is also termed devotion or
worship (upasana). 'I’bis is the direct cause of Moksha,
though indirectly Karma and knowledge are also pre-
supposed. Faith is thus a species of knowledge (jn^na-
vishesba), rw., knowledge of the form of an intellectual
intuition or realised thought, Le., thought transformed
into a presentation by means of unceasing and arduous
meditation. Through sucli faith the Lord is gratified and
pleased and releases the devotee by Ilis grace (bhakti-
prapattibhydra prasannah ishvara eva moksham dadati).

It will bo observed then'fore that with the exception
of the Bhakti school of Theism {fi.g., the Ramanujist and
the Madva schools) and, the atheistic school of the Purva-
mimamsd, there is general agreement among the Hindu
systems as to the negative conception of the ideal life as
essentially a state of quiescence. In this respect the
Hindu ideal furnishes a contrast not only to the Jaina
ideal of eternal progress but also to occidental ideals
generally. According to Plato and Aristotle, the contem-
plative life is indeed the goal, but still it is life and not
quiescence. Medieval Christianity however has laid
more stress on the element of contemplation than on the
element of life in the Greek view. Thus it has tended
more and more to a negative view regarding the ultimate
beatific vision as a state ,of .contemplation bordering

298

S. K. MAITBA

view. Thus the ideal of quiescence has given way to that
of struggle for existence, and the element of life in the
Greek vie\^ has prevailed more and more while the
element of contemplation has receded. This is quite in
accordance with the Teutonic consciousness, Kant’s
doctrine of infinite asymptotic progress being virtually
the philosophic reflexion of this Teutonic will-to-be. In
orthodox Hindu systems, on the contrary, the negative
ideal has generally predominated, the goal of Moksha
being regarded as a transcendental state of deliverance
from all activity or stress of life. This quietistic ideal
bos permeated even some of the theistic Bhakti systems
whose conception of the final state differs very little
from that of the beatific vision of Christianity, The
heterodox Jaina system however preaches a doctrine of
endless upper motion (anantagati) from Loka, empirical
condition, to Aloka, transcendental condition, — motion
which becomes infinite (ananta) after Mukti.

APPENDIX

The Moral Standauds in Hindu Ethics

An appendix on the Moral Standards is a necessary
supplement to the presentation of the ethical system proper.
The subject is capable of a twofold treatment, (1)
with reference to the Svarupa or definition of the Standard
which is the question of the standard proper, and (2) with
reference to its Pramdnya, evidential value and validity,
which is a question of logic, epistemologyand psychology.
Both these questions are considered in the Hindu systems,
and the epistemological and psychological issues are
clearly distinguished from the ethical question proper.
In the “ Nydyaratnakara,” e.g., the author (Pdrthdsdra-
thimishra) notes that with reference to the question of
right or wrong (dharmddharma) two kinds of viprati*
patti or doubt have to he resolved, viz. (1) as to the
Svarupa, nature or definition of right and wrong, and (2)
as to the Pramdna or evidence in the matter of right and
wrong (kim pramdnako dharmah, kim svarupah iti).
We propose to deal here with the definition of the Moral
Standard as being the ethical question proper.

There are many definitions of the moral standard in
Hindu Philosophy, some from biological, some from social
and some from internal and other standpoints. For the
purposes of the following exposition we shall follow the
undermentioned classification as far as practicable : —

I. The Standard as Custom and Tradition.

II. The Standard as Social Category.

III. The Standard as an End.

lY. The Standard as Law.

800

S. K. MAITllA

I. The Standard as Tradition (Loka-Upadbsha)
AND AS Consensus (Lokaprasiddhi).

«

In the “ NyAyaraanjari ” in discussing the moral
standards Jayanta Bhatta refers to Loka-Upadesha,
Tradition, and Lokaprasiddhi, Consensus, as the criteria
of right and wrong. Loka-Upadesha, Tradition, is the
standard according to those who liold that morality
consists in the long-standing customs and usages that
obtain amongst peoples. It thus differs from Lokapra-
siddhi, Consens'is, which is the standard according to those
who insist on universal agreement of belief as the
criterion of right and wrong. A distinction is thus made
between Tradition and Consensus, the assumption being
that as there are conflicting traditions obtaining amongst
different peoples there cannot be anything certain or
fixed in them to ensure their universal validity as the
standard of right and wrong. Hence it is not enduring
or long-standing customs that constitute the criteria
of morality, but customs that are universally accepted
as authoritative, i.e., in respect of which there is con-
sensus or universal agreement of bcdief.

In respect of consensus however there has been consi-
derable divergence of views as to its ultimate character
as a moral standard. Thus some have held Consensus in
itself to be the test of right and wrong, while other.s have
tried to resolve it into something more ultimate such as
well-being and ill-being. Thu.s

(a) Some hold that Consensus as a standard is only
secondary and derivative. The real standard is Well-being
(upakdra) and Ill-being (apakdra), and Consensus or
universal acceptance is the standard only as being
conducive to this Well-being and 111- being.

(b) Some again think that the ultimate standard into
which Consensus is to he resolved is not mere Happiness

301

THE ETHICS OF THE HINDUS

or Unhappiness in the psychological sense but includes
also the biological criteria of Anugraha, Organic Well-
being or Increase of Life and Pirhd, Organic Ill-being or
Decrease of Life.

(e) Others think that there is a specific revelation
behind Consensus, the Revelation of the Moral Law as
produced by Shdstra or Scripture. Consensus is based on
this Revelation and derives its authority from the latter.

(d) Others again think that Consensus ianot secondary
or derivative as the standard of morality but is authorita-
tive in itself and independently of any extraneous
support.

t •

II. The Standard as a Social Category.

TAe Standard as Social Good inclndhuj Lokasthiti or
maintenance of the Social JEqidlihrium and Loka-
siddhi or Realisation of the Social End.

In the pi’cceding section we considered the moral
standard regarded as Tradition and Custom. It was
assumed that established usage of long standing has an
authority in itself which validates its acceptance as the
standard of right and wrong in tbe moral life. There is
however no appeal here to social good as the ultimate
criterion of the validity of custom though such reference
may he indirectly implied. There are others however
who insist on this test of social utility as the essential
factor in the determination of right and wrong so that
custom, tradition, etc., are authoritative only in a second-
ary sense as being resolvable into this ultimate test of
social good. Thus the “ Nydyamanjari ” notices also the
following conceptions of the moral standard, viz., (1) the
standard as Loka-sthiti or Maintenance of the Social
Equilibrium, and (2) the standard as Loka-siddhi or
Realisation of the Social Good.

302 S. K. MAITRA

r •

It is to be seen that the conception of Loka-sthiti or
Social Stability is more compatible with moral order than
moral progress while that of Loka<siddhi, i.e., Realisation
of the Social End or purpose provides both for order and
progress. It is also to be noted that the standard of
Lokasthiti or Social Stability implies a relativism in the
moral life which impairs its authority by depriving it of
its absoluteness and necessity.

This relativism in the conception of Lokasthiti is very
clearly brought out by Aryadeva in the Chatuhsatikd.
It is pointed out that there being nothing durable or
immutable in popular morality, it hardly inspires
confidence in men’s minds. (Anavasthitatvdt laukikasya
dharmasya, tatrdstha na jydyasi). Why ? Because as
righteousness (Dharma) is nothing but what maintains
social stability, the social life is evidently superior
to morality and determines the nature of the latter.
Thus whatever is laid down by society for the regula-
tion of family ties and relationships and of citizenship
within specific territorial zones, e.ff., what is laid down
in regard to marriage and the like, is regarded as
constituting morality. Morality and immorality are
thus social conventions varying from zone to zone and
age to age. There is nothing constant or eternal in
righteousness, nothing that is fixed immutably by Nature,
morality being merely a means of social conservation,
the content of which must vary according to the
changing circumstances, conditions and the particular
organisation of the society which is to be conserved.

Yd yd lokasthitistdmstdm dharmah samanuvartat^
Dharmddapi tato loko valavdniva dyshyatd. Loko hi ydm
ydm sthitim vyavasthdpayati deshakulagotrdchdravyava-
sthayd kanydddnodvdhanddikam tdm tdm dharmah
samanuvartatd. Tasydh tasydh sthiteh dharmah iti pra*
siddhigamandt. Na cha eshah svabhdvavyavasthitasya

THE ETHICS OF THE HINDUS SOS

nydyo yujyatd, yat deshakdlabhedayoh anyathdtvdt
anydthd sydt.

On account of this relativism in the conception of
Lokasthiti, the Mahdnirvdntantra recommends Loka-
Shreya, Social Good, as the moral standard, as distin-
guished from Loka-Sthiti or Social Stability. An attempt
is thus made not only to get beyond the limitations of
communal and regional morality but also to provide for
moral progress besides moral order.

N.B . — It is to be noted that the conception of Loka-
Sthiti appears also in the Mahdbhdrat but there it is
interpreted as Lokapdiana, Preservation of Living Beings,
and not as mere Social Stability, i.e.^ Sthiti, Stability, in
the Mahdbbdrat, is interpreted to mean Fdlana or Baksha-
na, Preservation.

III. The Standam) as End,

The Standard as Mid of Sukha or Pleasure.

The hedonistic standard of pleasure also occupies an
important place in the ethics of the Hindus. It is the
Charvdkas that are credited.with this sensualistic standard
of pleasure as the guiding principle in morality. The
Ghdrvdka motto of life is : live for pleasure as you can,
and even if life is a blend of pleasure and pain the wise
man should so regulate his life as to enjoy the maximum
of pleasure with the minimum of unavoidable pain. It
is sheer foUy to forego pleasure because it is mixed up
with pain just as it is folly to give up eating fish to escape
the trouble of removing the scales and fishbones, or to
give up cooking the meal to escape the annoyance of
beggars infesting and disturbing us. On the contrary, we
should be reconciled to life as it is and should endeavour
to curtail our suffering as much as possible. This is true
morality which consists iu so regulating life as to make it

3Q4

S. K. MAITRA

yield the maximum of pleasure. Similarly immorality
consists in unnecessarily increasing the amount of avoid-
able su^ering or pain. Hence rightness and wrongness
are to be determined by reference to Upakdra, Well-being
and Apakdra, Ill-being, i.e., by egoistic pleasure or happi-
ness and egoistic pain or suffering and as the body as
consisting of the elementary particles of matter is all that
we mean by the self, soul or spirit, it is the bodily or
sensual pleasures that count, and it is only the fools that
sacrifice physical pleasures in anticipation of supersensu-
ous pleasures to come in a future life. In fact there is
no future life, the soul perishing with the disintegration
of the body so that the wisely-regulated life is that which
has made the 'most of this life so as to make it yield the
maximum of pleasure. It is necessary therefore to live
prudentially so as to increase our happiness and reduce
our suffering in this life, and it is even proper to purchase
the pleasures of life by incurring debts, and other similar
means. (Rnam kritvd ghytam pivet.)

It is to be seen that the Chdrvaka hedonism is gross
and sensualistic as well as egoistic. It is the happiness
of the self that counts in the last resort and a prudential
and tactful regard for others with a view^ to self-gratifica-
tion is the only form of altruism that is recommended as
rational and proper Similarly any discrimination between
sensual and refined pleasures in view of qualitative su-
periority is condemned as foolish.

N. B . — It is doubtful however whether the Chdrvdkas
rerlly preached this gross hedonism which has been
ascribed to them. The slokas ascribed to Vrhaspati or
some other Chdrvaka teacher may be nothing but a
caricature of their doctrine by their opponents, or
they may be only exaggerated tirades of some Chdrvdka
controversialist again.st the conventional teaching then
current. As a matter of fact we hear of different

THE ETHICS OP THE HINDUS 806*

# %
classes of Chdrvdkas such as the Sushikshita or

refined Ohdrvakas and the Dhurta or astute Chdrvilkas
besides the usual run of the Lokdyatikas. TJhey must
have represented different grades of refinement in
hedonism in their ethical teaching just as they are
actually reported to have taught materialism, naturalism
and scepticism in their metaphysical and psychological
doctrines.

Some onticiHm of the Chdrvdka ITedonism.

The Charv6ka sensualism has been severely criticised
by all the orthodox schools of Hindu philosophy. The
Ny^ya, the Sdnkhya, the Piirvamimflms^ jv\d the Veddnta
systems are all at great pains to refute the dangerous
creed of these free-thinkers. Thus Kumitrila in the
Sloka-Vdrtika criticising the pleasure-theory, observes :

If rightness of conduct follows from well-being and
wrongness from the opposite, how can contemplation be
an act of merit or drinking bo an act of demerit ?
(Anugrahdt cha dharmatvam pirhdtashchdpyadharmatd, •
vadato japasiddhadipdnadau nobhayam bhavet — “Sloka-
Vdrtika,” Second Adhyaya.) Or take the case of the
dissolute rake. His sensualism may cause some little
pain in the nature of compunction of conscience, but this
is more than compensated by the intensity of the sensual
pleasures he enjoys. Hence with the pleasure-theory as
the standard of rectitude, the sensualist must he consider-
ed to he acquiring considerable merit by indulging in his
sensualism (kroshato hridayenapi guruddrdbhigdminam,
bhuydndharmah prasajyeta bhuyasi hyupakaritd).

The above is a refutation of the pleasure-theory on
the ground of the comparative feebleness of the pleasure
in virtuous or meritorious actons and its superior inten-
sity and strength in wicked and immoral actions.
Others again refute the Charvakas by dilating on the
39 •

306

S. K. MAITRA

transitoriiiess of pleasures and their impurity on account
of their being mixed up with pain.

Thu^ Vijndnabhikshu in his commentary on the
Sdnkhyasntras condemns indiscriminate seeking of empiri-
cal pleasure as incapable of bringing lasting satisfaction
to the individual. There is no lasting relief from the
possession of wealth and .other worldly advantages, for
these are liable to perish or to exhaust themselves in the
course of time and with the loss of these there is a

t

recurrence of the pain. (LaukikAdupdydddhanaderatyan-
taduhkhanivrttisiddhirndsti dhanadind duhkhd nivrttd
pashchddd h anadi kshay e p unarapi du b k hdnu v rttid arshandt.
— V i j ndnabhikshu . )

It cannot be denied that these material advantages
bring some kind of relief, but it is neither absolute nor
lasting relief, the pain recurring after an interval like
hunger which revives sometime after appeasement.
Moreover the relief which is thus earned by empirical
means is like that of the elephant wallowing in the mud:
just as the latter obtains relief against its bruised skin by
soiling itself so does the person seeking relief from
suffering through worldly gain and material advantages.
(Drshtasddhanajan j dndm dukhanivrttdvatyantapurushd-
rthatvameva ndsti, yathdkathanchit purushdrthatvam
tvastyeva, Kutah? Prdtyahikasya kshuddukhasya
nirdkaranavadeva tena dhanddind duhkhanirdkaranasya
chestandt. Atah dhanddyarjand pravrttirupapadyatd iti
bhdvah. Kunjarashauchddikamapydpdtadukhanivartaka-
tayd mandapurushdrtho bhavatyeva iti : — (Vijndna-
bhikshu.)

Moreover this kind of relief earned by empirical
means does not essentially differ from suffering. Why ?
Because there is no cessation of all kinds of suffering
thereby. Again, even where these worldly means are
effectual in giving satisfaction, they implicate their

THE ETHICS OP THE HINDUS

307

possessor in sin because of the deprivation of others’
claims. Lastly there is also pain in the effort which it is
necessary to put forth for the acquisition of the&c advan-
tages. (Sarvaduhkheshu drshtasddliauaih pratikdrasam-
bhavdt. Yatrapi sambhavjistatrdpi pratigrahapdpddyu-
tthadukhdvashyakatvamdha. Sambhave’pi drshtopdyandn-
tariyakadiduhkhasamparkdvashyanibhavat : — Vijnanabhi*
kshu.)

It is to be seen that this is also the refrain of the
Shankarites’ criticism of the Charvaka Hedonism.
In the Mahdhhdrat it is also pointed out that desire is
insatiable because it grows by indulgence and hence there
is no end to desiring and the consequent strife, pain and dis-
appointment in the pursuit of pleasure {of. Schopenhauer).

The question why pleasure is to be shunned like pain
is also elaborately discussed by the Naiydyikas.

Thus Udyotkara in the Nydya-Vdrtika in defining the
highest ideal of life as Dulikheua Atyantika Viyogah, i.e ^
complete and absolute freedom from suffering, points oClt
that there are altogether three views as to the relation
between pleasure or happiness and pain or suffering : —

(1) It might be supposed that whatever is, is of the
nature of pain : pleasure or happiness as a positive experi-
ence does not exist. (Sarvam svarupatah duhkham ;
sukham svarupatah ndsti). This is the Buddhist view —
a form of ontological pessimism which follows as a
corollary from their doctrine of Universal Impermanence.
Udyotkara rejects this view because experience contra-
dicts it (pratyakshavirodhdt).

(2) It might be supposed that our so-called pleasures
are only subtle forms of pain (Duhkhavikalpa), that
happiness as an original positive experience does not
exist (svarupatah sukham ndsti). Udyotkara rejects this
view (T) on the psychological ground that it is incompa-
tible with the twofold reaction of the will (pravrtti), viz.^

'308 S. K. iMAlTEA

as pursuit of the good and as avoidance of the evil, which
supposes the existence of both pleasure and pain as
original and positive experiences : and (2) on the moral
ground that the purpose of righteousness (dharma) would
be frustrated if happiness did not exist, as a positive
experience (happiness being the moral fruition or reward
of righteousness).

(3) It might be supposed that pleasure exists as an
original postitive experience just as pain (svarupatah
sukham asti) for it is so experienced by every individual
(pratiteh), but there is no pure pleasure or happiness, i.e.^
pleasure uumixed with pain, Udyotkara accepts this
view. According to him jileasure exists just as pain,
but they are Satnaiiopalabhya, mixed up or involved in one
and the same experience. Hence there is Abinabhdva,
inseparableness, of pleasure and pain, and this relativity
of pleasure-pain consists in their —

(a) Samana-nimittata, being produced by the same
cause so that the causes that produce pleasure also produce
pain (yaiiieva sukhasadhanani tauieva duhkhasadhandni).

(ft) Samdna-adhiiratd, having the same adhdra, sub-
strate or locus so that the conscious state which is regard-
ed as the locus or Ashraya of pleasure is also the
locus, Adhara or Ashraya of pain (yatra sukham tatra
duhkham).

(<?) Samanopalabhyatd, being experienced by one and
the [same instrument of experience so that the experiencer
(here the manas, mind specifically) of pleasure must
also be an experiencer of pain (yena sukham upalabhyat^
tena duhkhamapi).

Hence Udyotkara concludes, Vivekahdna or judicious
selection of pleasure (as the ChdrvAka recommends) by
sifting it from pain with which it is mixed up, is impossible.
Therefore if pain is to be shunned, the wise man must be
prepared to give up happiness along with it. Not that

THE ETHICS OP THE HINDUS

i

30 »

• %

there is no happiness as a psychological reality, only it

does not exist un mixed with pain and should be treated
as pain for purposes of ethical discipline. This as ethical
pessimism as distinguished from the ontological pessimism
of the Buddhists. Pain and evil are not constitutive
principles of experience as the Buddhists think. On
the contrary, the psychological reality of pleasure is
a matter of immediate experience; only it should be
treated as pain by the Avise man because of its inseparable*
ness from the latter.

The Standard as Atma-Santosh, Self-Satisfaction, and
as Atma-Lahha, Self- Attainment or Self-Realisation.

In this section we shall consider Transcendental
Satisfaction as th(5 moral standard as distinguished from
empirical pleasure which is the Chdrvaka view, i.e., we
shall consider the standard regarded as the Shreyah or
Good as distinguished from the Preyah, the merely Attrac*
tive, Tempting or Pleasant. It is to be seen that the
conception of Transcendental Bliss is a. necessary supple-
ment to the negative criticism of the Charvaka Hedonism
without which the latter would continue to hold its sway
over the mind in spite of .the pain and evil which it may
bring with it.

This conception of Transcendental Bliss occurs not
only in the Upanishads, but is also to be found in Manu
and Shankara. Thus in the Upanishads a distinction is
made between Shreyah or what is intrinsically excellent
and good for the individual, and Preyah or what is merely
pleasant. Sbreya, the Good, consists in Atma-Santosh, Self-
contentment and Satisfaction, while Preya, the Pleasant, is
connected with Vishaya-sukha or empirical pleasure.
Every other pleasure is a reflection of Atma-priti or Bliss
that characterises the self, g,nd hence Atma-priti is the
highest good dnd the standard of all good and evil. In
fact whatever is done is done with a view to Atma-priti

S. K. MAITRA

*310

or Self-satisfaction so that Atma-priti is the highest good
and the standard of all good and evil. It is this Atma-
kdma or Love of the Self, says the Vrihaddranyaka Upani-
sad, that reflects itself into all other forms of Kdmana,
Attraction or Desire. Thus the husband is dear to the
wife not because of the wife’s love for the husband but
for the love with which the wife loves her own true self.
Similarly riches are desired not because riches are them-
selves objects of ^ love but because of the love with which
the individual loves his own self. (Na vd ard patyuh
kdmdya patih priyo bhavati, dtmanastu kdmayd patih
priyo bhavati. Na va ard vittasya kdmdya vittam priyam
bhavati, dtmanastu kdmdya vittam priyam bhavati.)

Kvery particular desire is thus a reflection or mode
of the desire for the realisation of one’s true self which
is the highest good, and this Good, Shreyah, is to be
distinguished from Empirical Pleasure, Preyah, which
arises from external objects. Thus in the Kathopanishad
we have : The good, Shreyah, is one thing, and the
plea.sant, Preyah, is iinother. They attract the Purusha or
individual in different ways by drawing them to different
objects or ends. He who chooses Shreyah attains his
highest- good, and be who chooses. Preyah is deprived
thereby of his ultimate good or end. (Anyachchhreyo*
nyadutaiva preyasfd ubhd ndndrathd purusham sinitah.
Tayoh shveya adadanasya sadhu bhavati, hiyate ’rthdd ya
u preyo brnitc.)

Shankara commenting on the above points out : —

Good, Shreyah, means summum bonum, Nishreyasam,
Highest Good, and is to be distinguished from the merely
pleasant. These two, viz., the good and the pleasant,
being directed to different ends or objects, bind indivi-
duals in different ways with reference to their station in
life. Of these, the . good is constituted by truth, Vidyd
or knowledge of reality while the pleasant is a mode of

THE ETHICS OP THE HINDUS 311

I ^

illusion, error or Avidya, Every individual is actuated
to perform his duties under the influence of either of the
two forces of Vidyd or knowledge and Avidyd, or illusion.
The individual that desires immortality is .actuated hy
the idea of the good to eschew the path of pleasures,
because without eschewing the pleasant there is no attain-
ing the good. By seeking the good the individual realises
the perfection and nobility of his soul. But the short-
sighted fool that chooses the path of pleasures is deprived
thereby of his ultimate good.

(Any at pythak eva shreyah nishreyasam, tathd anyat
utaiva prey ah priyataram api. Te preyah shreyasi
ubhd ndudrthd bhinnaprayojane sati purusham adhikrtam
varndshramddivishishtam sinitah vadhnitah. Tdbhydm
vidydvidydbhyam atmakartavyatayd prayujyate sarvah
purushah. Shreyah preyasor hi abhyudaydmjtatvdrthi
purushah pravartate. . . . Any atardparity dgena ekena puru-
shena sahdnusthatum asakyatvdt. Shreyah kurvatah
sddhu shobhanam shivam bhavati. Yastu aduradarshi
vimurhah hiyate viyujyatd arthat purushdrthdt pdra-
mdrthikdt. Ko’sau ? Ya u preyah vrnite upddatte.)

It is to he seen that the original passage speaks merely
of a moral struggle as arising from two different possible
ends which man may propose to himself — Shreyah, the
Good, and Preyah, Empirical pleasure. Shankara however
reduces this struggle to the metaphysical conflict between
the Principle of Knowledge (Vidyd) and the Principle of
Illusion (Avidyd). The choice of right as against pleasure
brings in good while the opposite makes man lose his real
good.

In Sloka 2 the psychological process underlying the
choice of the good or the pleasurable is described. It is
pointed out that the good and the pleasurable come to
man in mixed forms, hut the clear-sighted individual
separates the good from the pleasurable, and then chooses

S. K. MAITRA

*312

the good in preference to the pleasurable. But the dull
in intelligence chooses the pleasurable for the sake of
material gain such as the attainment of the unattained
(yoga)' and. the preservation of the attained (kshema).
(Shreyashcha preyashcha manushyam etah tau samparitya
vivinokti dhirah. Shreyohi dhira abhipreyaso ypnitc ;
Preyo mando yogakshomat vrnitc.) Shreya, the Good, is
therefore mixed up in experience with Preyah, the
Pleasant ; in other words, in the same situation there are
possibilitie.s of Shreya as well as Preya. The wise man
therefore considers both sides carefully, weighs or esti-
mates the relative worth of the virtuous and the pleasur-
able course, and thus separates the one from the other.
"When the two different courses draw him different ways,
the wise man chooses the virtuous course in preference
to the pleasurable one. The foolish choose, on the
contrary, the latter for prudential reasons.

Commenting on fhe above Shankara points out : —

Though Shreya as well as Preya are under the control
of the moral individual, yet owing to cloudiness of the
intelligence they come to us mixed up. But the wise
man knows how to separate the one from the other
even as the swan knows how to drink away the milk by
separating it from the water. In short, the wise man
discriminates the good from the pleasant and after com-
paring their relative worth chooses the former. But the
dull in intelligence, being incapable of discrimination, is
led away by prudential considerations and chooses the
pleasurable course as consisting of physical comfort and
material prosperity such as possession of juattle, joy of
family life, etc.

Yadi ubh6 api kartuh svayatt6 purushena, kimartham
preya eva adattc vahulyena loka? Satyam svayatte,
tathdpi sAdhanatah phalatashcha mandabuddhinam durvi-
vekarupe sati vyamishribhute iva manushyam etah

THE ETHICS OF THE HINDUS

313

prdpnutah shreyascha preyaahcha. Ato harasa ivdmbhasah
payah, tau shreyahpreyahpadd,rthau samparitya samyak
parigamya samyak raanasa dlochya gurulaghavam
vivinakti prithak karoti dhirah dhiman. Vivichya shreyo
hi shreya eva abhivrnite preyaso ’bhyarhitatvat. Yastu
mando ’Ipavuddhih sa sadasad vivekasamarthdt yogakshe-
manimittara sbarirddyupachayarakshananimittamityelat,
preyah pashuputradilakshanam vrnite (Shankara-bhasbya
on sloka 2). .

Hence there are two kinds of satisfaction: (1)
Transcendental Satisfaction arising from Atma-labha or
Self -attainment which is Atma-santosh or Self-contentmcnt
and (2) Empirical Pleasure arising from tho possession of
external objects.

In the “ Sarva-vedanta-siddhanta-samgraha ” the rela-
tion between empirical pleasure and one’s true self whose
essence is self-contentment, is explained in detail. It is
pointed out that empirical pleasure is desired only as it is
believed to be a means to tlie realisation of one’s true
self. In fact, it is the self which is the dearest of all
objects to sentient beings. The self is one’s own
(paramantarah) as distinguished from other objects
which are external ; its e.ssence is Ananda, Transcen-
dental Hliss, and it is the most beloved of all objects of
love.

Atmdtah paramapremaspadah sarvasbaririnam

Yasya sheshatayd sarvamupddeyatvamrehehati.

(Sloka 627, “ Sarvaveddntasiddhdnta-sangraha.”)

Anyasmdt api sarvasmdddtmdyam paramdntarah.

(Sloka 628.)

Tasmdddtmd kevaldnandarupo

Yah sarvasraddvastunah preshtha uktah.

(Sloka 632.)
fO

314

S. K. MAITRA

In the “ Upadeshasahasri ” (ascribed to Shankara) it is
similarly pointed out that the Self is the end of all our
activities* that there is no higher or better attainment
tl)an Self-attainment or Self-realisation, that all scriptural
Yirescriptions and duties have this Self in view as the
ultimate end.

Atmalabhdt paro ndnyo labhah kashchana vidyate.

Yadarthd vedavaddshcha smdrtdshchdpi tu ydh

kriyah.

(“ Upadeshasahasri.”)

But this is true not merely of scriptural actions and
duties, it also holds good in the case of empirical actions
from material motives. Even these latter have self-
attainment (Atmaldbha) aa their ultimate end. But such
actions whether prompted by motives of empirical pleasure
or by the sense of duty or Dharma, do not lead to
unqualified happiness ; the resulting happiness is impure,
i.e., mixed with its opposite, viz., unl)appiness (viparyayah) ;
also such liappiness is Anitya, non-eternal, perishable.
But the satisfaction arising from Self-attainment
(Atmaldbha) is eternal. Again the satisfaction of self-
attainment is autonomous, Svayamlabdha, while all other
satisfactions are Anydpekshah, dependent, adventitious,
heteronomous.

Atmartho’pi hi yo Idbhah sukhdyeshto viparyayah

(“ Upadeshasahasri.”)

Svayamlabdhasvabhdvatvdtldbhastasya na chanyatah

Anydpekshastu yo Idbhah so ’nyadrshtisamudbhavah.

(” Upadeshasahasri.”)

Hence the satisfaction in Self-realisation is (1) Pure,
(2) Eternal, and (3) Svayam-labdha, i.e.. Autonomous,

THE ETHICS OF THE HINDUS

316-

Self -eyidencing and Self-dependent, while other satisfac-
tions, whether of pleasure-seeking or of performances for
the sake of merit, are (1) Impure, (2) Transitory and (3)
Anydpeksha, Dependent and Adventitious, and also (4)
result from Anyadrshti, Attention to Things that are
Non-spiritual.

This, it will be seen, is a new type of Edaemonism, a
kind of Transcendental Edaemonism which radically
differs from the Aristotelian Edaemonism of the co-ordi-
nation of empirical pleasures. Similarly’ the conception
of Self-attainment or Atma-labha is an original and
unique form of the conception of Self-realisation which is
to be distinguished alike from the Hegelian and Kantian
conceptions of it in European Ethics.

Thus Atma-santosh, Transcendental Satisfaction, is
neither empirical pleasure nor the organisation of
pleasures but represents the essential content and bliss
that accompanies the eternally accomplished reality of
the Self. Similarly Atma-ldbha is neither the positing
of the Self as empty Law of Keason (without presentation
in experience), nor the realisation of it by the co-ordination
of conflicting impulses, but the rediscovery of an inter-
nally fulfilled Self which was missed only under the
influence of an Original Illusion (Mdyd).

There is thus an essential dift'erence between Shan-
kara’s Transcendentalism and Kant’s. Kant conceives
the noumenal self as realising its rational freedom in
Moral Consciousness as the Categorical Imperative of the
Moral Law. Because the self cannot realise itself in the
blind matter of sense which will never express its unity
completely and fully, it presents itself as self-determining
reason in the Categorical Imperative of Moral Conscious-
ness, independently of and despite the opposition of our
sensuous nature. Hence the autonomous self realises
itself as a supersensuous reality as the Moral Law or

»816

S. K. MAITRA

Ought of Moral Consciousness and not as a fact sensuous-
ly presented in experience. At the same time this Law
or Imperative is not an arbitrary fiat or command hut is
the Law of Reason and thus implies rational necessity
and not the freedom of indetermination. If now we
compare Shaukara’s Transcendentalism with Kant’s we
find that in Shankara the negative attitude to empirical
life is scarcely fis pronounced as in Kant. In fact we
shall see that some of the commentators have even tried
to relievo tlie 'antagonism between the transcendental
and the empirical by the conception of Pratibimba,
reflection or copy, as we have in Plato. We thus see that
in Shankara the transcendental is not merely the negation
of the empirical but also in a sense its consummation and
completion so that empirical values arc the reflections,
the imperfect and limited expressions, of the fulness of
the transcendental self. Hence the transcendental self
is an accomplished reality from eternity and does not
require to realise itself as Law in a specific act of the
Self-legislating Reason. It is also autonomous in being
essentially and independently real, i.e,, in being non-
dependent on anything other than itself. It follows from
this that it is of the nature of an eternally fulfilled
expei'ience whose essence is this consciousness of complete
realisation or fullilment as expressed in the feeling of con-
tentment or self-satisfaction, and which is therefore to be
distinguished from the self-realising ought or law of
moral consciousness which is the reality of the Rational
Self according to Kant. And just because it is not eter-
nally fulfilled absolute experience embodying the quintes-
sence of all reality it is the ultimate ground of all
empirical reality, the source or fountain from which all
other objects derive their reality.

This positive relation of' the transcendental self to
empirical life is brought out, as we have already stated,

THE ETHICS OF THE HINDUS

Sir

• *

ill the doctrine of Pratibimba, reflection or copy by Shan-

kara’s commentators. Thus in the “ Veddntaparibhdsha
we have a very interesting exposition of the doctrine as
arising from the question of the true nature of Sukha
or happiness. Sukha, happiness, says the “Veddnta-
paribhdsha ”, is of two kinds ; (1) Satishayasukha,

relative or limited sukha, i.^., sukha or happiness which
is capable of being exceeded, and (2) Niratishayasukha,
Unexcelled Bliss or unlimited happiness. The latter is
the essence of Brahma or the Absolute, 'the former, i.e.,
empirical pleasure, is a limited or partial manifestation of
the latter, i.e., a limitation of Transcendental Bliss or
Happiness. This limitation is due to tlie defects and
inequalities of the psychic modes through vvhich the latter
has to reveal itself in empirical life — defects and differ-
ences which are themselves determined by the dissimilari-
ties in the objects with which the Antahkarana or mind is
connected on different occasions. (Sukham cha dvividham,
sdtishayara niratishayam cha. Tatra satishayara sukham
vishayanushangajanitantahkaranavrttitaratfimyakrtanand-
leshavirbhdvavisheshah. Niratishayam sukham cha
Brahmaiva.)

The “Sikhamani” commenting on the above
observes : —

Just as a particular psychosis, owing to the predomi-
nance of the essence of Sattva or medium of illumination
partially reflects the intelligence which constitutes
Chaitanya and tliereby itself appears as a form of knowing,
so also such a psychosis, by appropriating or reflecting in
its essence of Sattva a ray of the transcendental Bliss
that constitutes Brahma, itself appears as a partial or
limited manifestation of happiness. It may be proved
by agreement and difference that these psychic modes
characterised by happiness ‘are connected with specific
objects of enjoyment (Yatbd kvdehit antahkaranavrttih

*318

S. K. MAITRA

sattvagunajanyatayd chaitanyagatajndndmshapratibim-
bagrdhityena jnanam, tatha tddfshi vrttih tadgat-
dnaiidaleabapratibimbagrdbakatvdt sukham iti vyapa-
dishyatd ; Tashydra sukhalakshandyam vrttau anvaya-
vyatirekdbhydm srakchandanabanitddivishayasambandha-
hetuh. Ataeva tattdrataniydt sukhatdratamyam). Hence
differences either in the degree or in the nature of all
empirical happiness must be ascribed to differences in
their objective causes or conditions.

An objection however may be raised. If empirical
pleasure is thus the psychosis that reflects into itself the
transcendental I31iss that stands near it, why does it not
reveal the transcendental felicity in its fulness in every
case ? But this 'does not happen as a matter of fact, for all
pleasures would then be identical in nature and degree.
The “ Sikhamani ” disposes of this objection by pointing
out that though this undivided Bliss always stands near
the mind or Antahkarana, yet it cannot be reflected by the
latter in its fulness and purity on account of the influence
of Muld-Avidya, an Original Illusion [Nanu yadi
Anandapratibimbagrahatvat antahkaranavrttireva suk-
ham, tada sannihita-paripurndnandasya api grahana-
sambhavena sarvamapi sukham ekarupam (ekarasam
nyunddhikyarahitam iti ydvat — “ Maniphrabha”) syat, iti
chet na. Paripurnajnanavat akh inddnandasya muld-
vidydvrttatvena iddnim tadbhandyogat).

As we have already pointed out this affords an
icteresting parallel to the transcendentalism of the
Platonic metaphysics. Plato also recognised an essen'ial
conflict between the pleasurable and the good, but instead
of sharpening this conflict into positive opposition he
sought to overcome the dualism by his theory of copies
and his distinction of a sensuous and a supersensuous
world. Thus the sensuous world is an imperfect copy of
an ideal supersensuous world, and the transitory pleasures

1:he ethics op the Hindus

f5i9*

• ^

of this life are the reflections in matter of the Ideal and
Perfect Satisfaction that constitutes the good which is the
gorerning principle of the supersensuous world.' It is on
account of union with matter that there arise the conflict
and incompatibility of pleasures and the^ consequent strife
and wickedness of this world. But in the ideal world
there is perfect harmony, every Idea in the Ideal world
being completely in agreement with the Idea of the Good
and all pleasures being thus moment^ in the absolute
satisfaction that constitutes the Good.

Hence with Plato as with Shankara empirical
pleasure is a partial and imperfect manifestation of
transcendental satisfaction, hut while with Plato there is
a harmonious co-ordination of s{)eciflc pleasures in the
supersensuous Smnmum Bonvm or the Good which is thus
a satisfaction constituted hy a synthesis of individual
pleasures, a synthesis which is lacking in the sensuous
world of experience, with Shankara Transcendental
Happiness is not a republic of pleasures with the element
of conflict and discord resolved into harmony but is the in-
finite essence of the self representing its unqualified and
undivided reality in its completeness and perfection.
Hence the Infinite Satisfaction of Transcendental Bliss
is a homogeneous undifferentiated infinite essence and
not an organisation of partial pleasures — an infinite
essence which is itself only imperfectly and partially
manifested in empirical pleasures through the veil of
Avidyd, or Nescience. It is tn bo observed that Shankara
ascribes the limitation of this transcendental happiness to
Mula Avidyd, i.e., an Original Principle of Illusion, a Power
of Irrationality which limits the true essence of the Self
and thereby causes the appearance of the empirical world
of evil and imperfection, while Plato ascribes all limitation
to hyle or matter which is an inert and inactive principle
of division in which the ideas reflect themselves.

'320

K. MAITRA

The Theory of Measure as the Moral Standard.

f-

In the preceding section we have considered the
standard as Atmj^-labha or Self-Realisation and as Atma-
santosh or Self-satisfaction and we have also considered
the refutat ion of the Chdrvdka Hedonism from the stand-
point of these theories, We have seen that Transcen-
dental Satisfaction as being pure and autonomous is
conceived as incapable of being attained by empirical
pleasures, and hence the wise man’s life is one of rigid
self-restraint and freedom from desires. The defect of
this view consists in its failure to appreciate the element
of truth coutaiiled in the hedonistic standpoint. Because
undue self-indulgence will entail suffering and misery,
therefore all empirical pleasure-seeking is to be con-
demned. The objection to this ascetic morality is sought
to be removed indeed by tbe offer of a purer non-
empirical satisfaction in return, but the fact remains
that in this view even innocent pleasures can have no
place in the moral life, not to speak of the happiness
arising from the higher sentiments and emotions such
as patriotism, benevolence, humanism, etc. In the
“ Atmanushasana ” by Gunabhadra, an attempt is made
to remove this defect in the ascetic view without however
encouraging indiscriminate pleasure-seeking as the
Hedonists do. Thus it is argued that sin (p^pa) does not
result from the experience of pleasure itself, but from
that particular kind of pleasure which destroys the
righteousness of the individual (dharmaghdtaka). This
righteousness is the moral cause or condition of happiness.
Hence pleasures that destroy Dharma, which Dharma is
the cause of pure Sukha or happiness, are to be con-
demned as evil ; and such ' pleasures always go beyond
measure (matrddyatikrania) .

THE ETHICS OF THE HINDUS 8«I

Na sukhdnubhav&t pdpam, pdpam tadhetugMtakd-
rambh&t.

Na ajirnam mishtdnndt nanutatmdtrddyatikramit

(“ Atmdnush&sana ”).

Thus indigestion is not caused by the mere eating of

sweetmeats, but by their being taken in excessive

quantity. Similarly pleasures as such are not evil, but

pleasures indulged without moderation such as will upset

the equilibrium of the moral life and destroy its true

happiness are certainly evil. Hence immoderate

pleasures are evil because (1) they destroy the soul’s

righteousness and (2) by destroying righteousness destroy

the soul’s true happiness. Hence all pleasures that are

» >

inconsistent with the soul’s moral equanimity and true
happiness are evil, and such pleasures always go
beyond measure {of. Aristotle). It follows therefore that
neither the natural appetites nor the higher impulses and
emotions are to be suppressed, but that they are all to
be co-ordinated, systematised and regulated in the perfect
moral life.

Th£ Standard aa Purity of the Motive {Viahuddhyanga-

Ahhiahandhi) aa diatinguiahed from the worth or exceU

lence of the conaequence.

This is the theory of morality as enunciated by
Samantabhadra in the Jaina-Xdrikas and elaborated by
Yidydnanda in his commentary thereon called the
“ Ashtasahasri.” It is pointed out that righteousness
cannot consist merely in the happiness of others and un-
happiness of the self just as unrighteousness cannot
consist in the unhappiness of others and happiness of the
self.

Thus if righteousness were equivalent to happiness of
others and unrighteousness to their unhappiness, then

41

^2

S. K. MAITRA

should we suppose that Achetana, the non-seniient object,
and Akashdya, the taintlees saint, are also in bondage, i.e.^
have moral bonds or obligations, as arising from their
righteousness and unrighteousness, because in them there
is also the Niraitta, cause or ground, of happiness and
unhappiness to others.

Again if righteousness' consist in self-mortification,
and unrighteousness in self-indulgence, then the dis-.
passionate saint (vitardga) as practising self-restraint
will have the tond of righteousness (^punyabandha) and
the seer or sage (vidvdn) as enjoying self-contentment
(dtmasantosh) will have the bond of unrighteousness
(pdpabandha).

Hence happmess and unhappiness, whether of self
or of others, cannot of themselves constitute righteous-
ness and unrighteousness. It is only when such happiness
or unhappiness arise from the purity and impurity of the
motives prompting the actions which cause them, that
there is righteousness or unrighteousness. Otherwise the
Arhat or Sage himself would be frustrated of his purpose,
i.e., would not be free (mukta) as he would then be
involved in the moral order by coming under the law of
righteousness and unrighteousness.

The “ Ashtasahasri ” commenting on the above points
out .' —

At two ends of the scale of being, there are no merit
and demerit, even though there may be benefit or injury
to others. Thus some are below merit and demerit, e.g.,
non-sentient objects (achetanah), and some are above
merit and demerit, viz., the dispassionate saints (vitaraga).
Only sentient beings that are not free from desires are
subject, through their activities, to merit and demerit.

It is therefore not the mere fact of causing happiness
and unhappiness that constitutes merit and demerit.
They must also be intentional in order that there may

THE ETHICS OF THE HINDUS 3^S

. •
be merit or demerit. In the case of the dispassionate

saint though there may be causes of happiness or un-
happiness, yet the intention to cause them being absent
on account of Tattva-jndna or kno\^rledge of reality, there
are no merit and demerit.

Abhisandhi, intention, is thus a necessary condition of
righteousness and unrighteousness, and not merely the
consequences of happiness and unhappiness.

What, then, is the nature of this Abhisandhi, i.e.,
this intention or subjective attitude, as distin-
guished from objective consequences of happiness
and unhappiness ? It is pure (vishuddhyanga) in the

case of Punya, merit or righteousness, and impure

• •

(samkleshanga) in the case of Papa, demerit or un-
righteousness.

Samklesha, impurity (of the mind) again is either
>•

(1) Artta, i.e., of an afflicting, distressing character, or

(2) llaudra, aggressive, violent.

(1) As Artta, Samklesha or subjective impurity mani-
,fests itself in

(«) the effort to escape from contact with the un-
pleasant ;

(6) The effort to attain the pleasant (manojna) when
separated from it ;

(o) Absorption in the experience of pain and suffering
(vedana) ;

(d) Niddna, the desire for the acquisition of power which
is not yet acquired (aprdptaishvaryyaprdptisamkalpa ) ;

(2) As Kaudra or aggressive, Samklesha takes the
forms of

(а) Himsd, cruelty.

(б) Anrta, mendacity.

(c) Steya, unlawful appropriation.

(d) Yishayasamrakshana, aggressiveness in the main ,
tenence of one’s property.

S. K. MAITfeA

Vishuddhi, purity (of the mind), is also twofold being —

(1) Either of the nature of contemplation based on the
consciousness of duty (dharmadhydnasvabhAvah).

(2) Or of the nature of contemplation of the ideal of
purity or perfection (shukladhyd,nasvabhdvah).

Hence right and wrong are to be determined not by
the objective consequences but by the nature of the
subjective intention of the agent. This therefore is an
attempt to go beyond merely consequential morality to
the intuitional principles of right and wrong with a view
not merely to their enumeration but also their classifica-^
tion, and the basis of the two-fold classification is not
anything external but is a state of internal determination
of the self or' A tman or that which the Atman becomos.
The ultimate goal however is the realisation of the true
nature of the self (dtmani svarup^avasthdnam), a
consummation which is to be attained by purification
through the successive phases of the contemplation of duty
and perfection. Hence this is to be distinguished from the
European goal of life which is one of ceaseless movement
or progress as distinguished from rest in the self.

IV. The Standabd as Mobal Law (Vidhi,
Impbbativb OB Command).

The moral Standard is also conceived by the Hindus
as a Law or Command which again is regarded either
as a Personal Prescription of a superior to an inferior
being (Paurusheya) or again as Impersonal Law (Apauru-
sheya) without a law-giver.

A . — The Standard as Personal Moral Lom^

i,e.^ as the prescription " of a superior to an inferior
spirit. This is how the Standard is conceived by the

THE ETHICS OF THE HINDUS SOt

Ohdrvdkas, the Jainas, the Buddhas, the Kdmdnujists
aijd the Naiydyikas. Thus —

(а) According to the Ch^rvdkas, the standard is the
law imposed by the king, who is the highest earthly
authority. The king’s injunctions constitute duties just
as the king’s prohibitions constitute the opposite.

Thus according to the Chdrvdkas the will of the
Sovereign determines right and wrong, but this is
analysed farther into the pleasures and pains of the
individual. As pleasure is the only real good and pain
is the only real evil, the will of the sovereign is the
Moral Law, for the sovereign is the highest earthly
authority and the dispenser of all happiness and
suffering. (Sukhameva purushdrthaj * duhkhameva
narakam. Lokasiddha rdjd parameshvarah.)

(б) According to the Jainas and Buddhas however,
it is not the prescriptions of the king, but the injunctions
and prohibitions of Arhatas and Buddhas that constitute
right and wrong. The earthly sovereign is an imperfect
being like ourselves and his authority is based on brute
force. Obedience to such authority is prudential and not
moral, being based on the hope of reward and fear of
punishment. But the authority of the Moral Law is
spiritual and not physical, and can be vested only in the
Seer, i.e., the Spiritual Expert that has attained perfection
by self-culture. The earthly king is as much subject to
the prescriptions of these moral experts, Arhatas or
Buddhas as other imperfect beings.

It is to be seen that the appeal here is to the verdict
of spiritual experts and not merely to sheer authority.
It is thus to be distinguished from the prudential
morality of the Chdrvdkas which is based on the hope of
reward and fear of punishment. At the same time no
eternally perfect being is recognised as in theism. The
authority of the Moral Law arises indeed from the

S. K. MAITRA

•3i6

spiritual perfection of the Arhatas and Buddhas who
possess the proper insiglit into things and thus are able
to prescribe the right modes of conduct, but this spiritual
perfection is itself an acquisition in time and not an
eternally accomplished fact as theists assume. T?he
objection that on this assumption the Arhatas would be
themselves without spiritual preceptors to guide them is
met by the conception of a chain of Arhatas and Buddhas
which is witliout beginning in time — a chain in which
the preceding Arhatas act as preceptors to their
successors,

(c) The NyAya-Vaisheshikas, the Ramiinujists and
other theists however contend that the Moral Standard is
the law of righteousness as prescribed by God who is the
Creator and Moral Governor of the world. Thus in the
“ Nydyaparishuddhi ” of Venkatesha we have : —

Right and .wrong are determined by the injunctions
and prohibitions of scripture. Like the commands of
the earthly king, these scriptural injunctions and prohi-
bitions are prescribed by God with a view to the gover-
nance of sentient beings and represent his beneficent
purpose. Hence right and wrong embody the conscious
purpose and intelligence of God, i.e., they arc not arbi-
trary prescriptions of the Divine Will but represent God’s
rational purpose and end in tliis world. Right is that
which the Divine Intelligence recognises as good and
beneficent and wrong is that which it considers pernicious
and evil. ( Dhannadharmau vihitanishiddhyakriyasddh-
yatayA abhimatau ajnavato rajna iva sarva prashasituh
ishvarasya anugrahanigrahakhyabuddhivishesharupau.)

Right and wrong are thus Buddhivesheshas, i.e., forms
of the divine purpose and not objective categories.
Further the divine purpose is not an arbitrary fiat of the
divine will, but the revelatibn of the divine intelligence.
Hence Yidhi as the command of God does not constitute

THE ETHICS OP THE -HINDUS

327

he Moral law but merely reveals it— it is not law-
making, hut law- declaring.

According to the Nydya-Vaisheshikas hovCever the
Divine Command as embodied in scriptural prescriptions
is not merely declaratory (jndpaka) of the moral
code but also constitutes it (kdraka). The analogy is
drawn from positive law Avhich depends on the will of
the sovereign. Moral causation is thus conceived after
physical causation and the authority of duty is regarded
as a form of physical impulsion or force.

Thus far we have considered the following theories
of the Moral Standard regarded as Personal Moral
Law, viz.,

* * • •

^ (a) Vidhi as the command of the king.

(b) Vidhi as anushasana, i.e., as declaratory of the
Seer’s experiences in the Pararaarthic plane.

(o) Vidhi as the Command of God conceived, after
positive law, as constituting and not merely declaring
or revealing what is right or wrong.

(d) Vidhi as God’s command regarded as revea ling
and constituting the Moral Law.

(e) There is yet another conception of Vidhi as the
Moral Standard, the view which finds favour With a
certain class of Veddntists. According to these Vidhi is
Brahma or the Absolute itself and not the mere prescrip-
tion of a superior or perfect person. Por the essence
of the, Vidhi lies in its obligatoriness as Moral Law which
means that Vidhi has Prdm^nya, validity or self-evidenc-
ing authority as Law which makes it binding on the
individual moral agent. But Vidhi could not validate
itself without being itself a self-validating experience,
for the validity of the valid is only this that it posits
itself in consciousness. Vidhi as Pramdna is thus Chidat-
inaka, i.e., a self-establishing experience whose authority
on the moral agent is nothing but its self-accomplished

S28

•S. K. MAITRA

character reflecting itself in the consciousness of the
individual as something to be accomplished. Hence
Vidhi is Srahraa itself which is accomplished (Siddha)
from eternity. In the consciousness of the individual it
appears indeed as Sddhya, as a thing to be accomplished,
but in so far as it validates itself it is essentially Prati-
bhashamdtra, mere position in consciousness. As a
matter of fact, the essence of PramAnya, validation, is
nothing but thjs position in consciousness and Param
Brahma, the self-positing Absolute Consciousness, is thus
the only Pramdna, the various cognitive processes being
regarded as Pramdna only by courtesy, their validity
being ultimately nothing but this self-evidencing Thought
which is the Absolute in the light of which they appear.
In so far therefore as Vidhi has Prdmdnya, validity or
authority, it is nothing but the self-accomplishing Abso-
lute Experience which presents itself as something to be
accomplished.

This is a new form of the conception of Vidhi as tlie
Moral Standard which is to be distinguished alike from
the conception of it as the prescription of a personal
being like God and from that of an Impersonal Law
without a lawgiver. It identifiies Vidhi with the Abso-
lute which is not a personal being but the self-establishing
suprapersonal consciousness that lights up all experience.
The authority of the Vidhi is nothing but the self-fulfilled
reality of the Absolute Thought presenting itself in empirical
consciousness as a thing to be realised in time. The close
analogy of this view with Shankara’s Transcendentalism
is obvious enough. But while Shankara conceives the
Transcendental Life as the negation of the empirical, the
latter being annulled altogether in the consciousness of
Brahma, it is urged here that the validity which attaches
to Vidhi in empirical consciousness is nothing but the self-
affirmation of the Absolute as self-validating experience.

THE ETHICS OP THE HINDUS 829

Hence according to this riew the empirical moral li^Te
reflects the nature of the Absolute in a way though it does
not manifest it in its completeness and pitrity, while
according to Sbankara the empirical life is the negation
of the transcendental life in Brahma which is to be
reached only by total cancellation of the moral life in the
state of Karmasanyasa or freedom from the bond of duty.
It is remarkable however that inspite of this underestima-
tion of the empirical life, the Shan^arites not only
recognise the value of morality in empirical life but also
offer the original and novel conception of a gradation of
moral standards and moral codes in accordance with the
ascending stages of the spiritual life of the individual.

(y) Thus according to Sbankara, the moral code as
constituted by the Vedic prescriptions is impersonal in
the Sense that the Communicator (Vaktd) of the Vedas
only declares the Law and does not create it by his fiat.
This Communicator is Ishvara, Brahmd or the Lord and is
thus to be distinguished from the Spiritual Expert or
Aptapurusha of Jainism and Buddhism. In fact, it is
eternally omniscient (nitya-sarvajna) and is also Srishti-
Sthiti-Laya-Kartd, the Creator, Maintainer and Destroyer
of the world, which theistic characters are lacking in the
Aptas and Arhats of Buddhism and Jainism. But the
Vaktd, the Communicator, of the Vedas, does not create
but merely promulgates the Vedas as they existed in a
previous cycle. Some of the Shankarites admit that some
of the scriptures have a personal souree sueh as Manu,
Mahdbhdrat, etc., but they are all traced back ultimately
to the impersonal (apaurusheya) Vedas. But even the
Vedas themselves are empirical, i.e., true in a Vyavahdrika
or relative sense and untrue in a Pdramdrthika or
absolute sense. They are .thus all Mithyd., untrue,
and ere to be cancelled, but the Vedic Mithyd is
to be used in overcoming the grosser or lower untruths,

- 42

830

S. K. MAITRA

and the Vedas themselves are to he transcended by
Brahmdtmaekatvavijndna, the realisation of the identi-
ty of the Sts'lf and Brahma. Now in the course of this
»>

process of Sadhand or discipline for liberation the
ethical standard may assume a different character
according to the particular stage of the sddhand or train-
ing of the individual. In the stage of the worship of
Saguna-Brahma or Qualified Absolute, the standard is
Ishvardjna, the Command of the Lord. In the more
advanced stage of Sddhana-chatushtaya when external

codes and external authority give way to internal sanctions
^ >•

Atmasantosh and Atmalabha may take the place of
Ishvardjna.

Thus according to Shankara even though ethical
codes and disciplines are relative and empirical, there is
an order obtaining in this sphere of illusion to which
the moral agent must conform through a gradation
of the moral standards according to the different
stages. The ultimate goal indeed is the transcendence
of the empirical moral life of the Absolute, but
this is to be realised by cancellation of the illusion of
the phenomenal life in successive stages in W'hich
the lower illusion is to be annulled by the higher
and subtler ones and tJie highest to be cancelled at last
by the intuition of the absolute. Tin's, it will be seen,
implies at once the transcendental unreality of the
ethical codes as well as their metaphysical and moral
necessity within the sphere of Illusion, It further
implies a gradation in the sphere of the illusory empirical
life in wdiich specific codes with their specific moral
standards have validity according to their proper sphere.
It thus differs from the Hegelian conception of a progres-
sive unfolding of the spiritual life in which the higher
stage does not simply annul the lower but re-affirms
the latter in a new synthesis by absorbing the element of

381 '

THE ETHICS OF THE HINDUS

truth ’contained in the lower view. It. further differs
from the Hegelian view in that while recognising a
certain order in the empirical life which must, be con-
formed to in subduing it, it makes it the absolute
negation of tlie transcendental which is therefore to be
reached not by the transfiguration of the empirical but
by its total cancellation in the intuition of Hrahman.

— The Standard as Impersonal Moral Law.

The moral standard is also conceived as Impersonal
Prescription in some systems of Hindu Philosophy, Thus
the Purvamimainsakas interpret Vidhi as Impersonal
Law, w^hich does not derive its authority ’ or force from
the will of a Personal Peing, but is authoritative in and
by itself independently of any personal origin. In fact
according to the Mimamsakas the reference to a Personal
source is absolutely unnecessary : Vidhi need not be
presented as the command of God in order to be
authoritative and may simply be a verity of the super-
sensuous order, a law without a law-giver.

INDEX

Abhilfisba — 198.

Absolute— 155, 237, 262, 268, 272-276, 327, 328
Absolute life-5, 81j 270, 273, 277.

„ according to Nydya — 5.

„ „ Rlim^nnja — 6.

„ „ Shankara — 5.

Activism — 279.

Adharma— 93, 94, 216, 217, 247.

Adhy&pana — 12.

Adhyayana — 12.

AdfshMrthaka duties — 19, 36, 93, 106.

Advaitabrahmasiddbi — 260.

Abimsa— 10, 11, 15, 17, 224, 285.

Akrodba — 8.

✓

Akinchanya— 230,

Akshamd — 201.

Amarsha — 201.

Ananda— 80, 267, 272.

Anandashruti — 253 .

Anupadhd— 10, 11.

Aparigraha— 223, 225.

Appayadikshita — 274.

Apram&da — 10.

Apurva— 85, 87, 95, 96, 104, 106, 172, 237, 238.
Aristotle — 209, 210, 297, 321.

Aristotelian Eudaemonism— 815.
Arthamimamsa— 1 20.

Aryadeva — 302.

Asambaddha— 216.

Ashrama, Duties of— 1, 12, 13.

Asbtasahasri— 151, 227, 821, 322.

INDEX

A8prh£-4-218, 2*0, 235.

Asrava — 229.

Asteya — 10, 11, 15, 17, 224, 285.

Avidyfi— 100, 276, 811, 819,

Aviveka — 100, 269.

Bandha, Doctrine of — 246.

Ballavdch&ryya — 273.

Bauddha— 97, 98, 100, 159, 160, 161, 258, 254, 825.

Benthamite calculns — 53, 287.

Bhaiksbya — IS.

Bhakti-5, 277, 279, 297.

Bh&matitik& — 279, 282.

BbUttas— 22, 89, 97, 104, 105, 118, 119, 122, 124, 140, 141,146,
148, 150, 160, 16.8, 172, 193, 240, 241, 261.
Bbattachintdmani — 31, 87, 79, SO.

Bhutahitatva — 10, 16.

BhutayajDa--14.

Bondage — 82, 258, 263.

Brahma— 107, 165, 158, 263, 267, 270, 271, 273, 276, 279, 317, 827,
328, 329.

Brahmacharyya — 10, 11, 15, 223, 230, 284.

Brahmav&da — 172.

Brahmayajna — 14.

Buddhists— 90, 91, 99, 190, 199, 210, 214, 215, 230, 2.84, 261, 262,
295, 309, 329.

Caste, Duties of — 12.

Ceremonialism — 98, 100-103, 106, 106.

Ceremonial Morality — 25.

Chandrakirti — 191, 231.

Charity — 12.

Chfirvtikas— 52, 63, 80, 81, 128, 129, 140, 141, 169, 160, 808-805,
807, 308, 309, 820, .825.

Chatuhsatikd — 302.

CheshUi — 30, 31.

Chikirshfi— 80-84, 40-42, 44, 61, 65, 198.

Chitsukhi— 178.

Chittashuddhi— 4, 26, 278.

Christian — 210, 214, 217, 235. ^

Conation, Negative and Positive end of — 252.

INDEX '

Conation, classification of — 28.

Conditional obligations — 19*22.

Conscience — 26, 84, 116, 116, 118, 161, 237, 240.

Consensus as, a moral standard — 300.

Oama — 8, 211.*

Ddna— 12, 217, 220, 286.

Dayd-218, 235.

Devafna — 284.

Devayajna — 1 4.

Dhairjya — 8.

Dharma— 7, 84, 90, 91, 92, 9-3, 94, 96, 97, 103, 104, 106, 107, 160,
172,174,215,817,229, 247.

„ as subjective — 92, 97, 101.

„ as objective— 92, 94, 95, 97.

„ according to Sdmkhya — 85.

„ „ Sbakyas — 85.

„ „ Arhats — 85.

„ „ Vaisheshikas — 85.

„ „ Mimdmsakas— 85.

„ „ Bhdttas — 85.

Dhi— 8, 16.

Dhydna — 294.

Dianoetic virtues — 8, 9, 108.

Dinakari — 27, 29, 80, 49, 50, 58, 55, 59, 60.

Dosbas — 285.

Dfsbtdrtbaka duties — 19, 86, 93, 106.

Dnbkha — analysis of — 195-196.

Conditions of — 196.

Destruction of — 247.

Effects of — 195.

Duty — analysis of — 84.

„ ^ classification of — 5-24.

„ „ according to Manu — 5-9.

„ „ „ Mimdmsaka — 19-22.

„ „ „ Prasastapdda — 9-19.

„ „ „ Bdmanujist — 22-24.

Dvesba— 40, 42, 43, 46, 50, 51, 53, 57, 60, 193, 204, 247.

„ analysis of — 200-202.

„ conditions of — 200.

INDEX 836

Dvesha^ springs of action under — 200-20].

Epicurean — 195.

Eternal happiness — 82, 251, 252, ^.61.

Ethical pessimism — 309.

Ethico-psychological classification of duties — 21-.

Ethico-spiritual Ideal — 246.

Ethico-theological classification of duties — 28.

Eudaemonism —

Aristotelian — 3 15.

Transcendental — 315 .

Eudaemonistic view of conscience — 116.

Freedom (Transcendental) — 69, 81, 82, 89, 99,100, 112, 115,220,
246, 263, 272.

Freedom of Reality — 6.

Free spirit — 9, 26.

Free will— 67, 68, 69, 78.

GAgfi-Bhatta— 81, 82, 39.

Gangesha — 82.

Gautamasut ra — 291.

Genetic view of moral life — 1, 18.

Gitfi— 108, 109.

God as Bhagav^ina — 22.

God as the Moral Ideal — 22.

Gradation of moral standards — 330-331.

Greek Ethics — 217.

„ Virtues — 235.

Green — 38.

Gunabhadra — 320.

Gurushushrnsb^ — 1 3,

Hegelians— 42, 315, 330, 331.

Hedonism —

„ ' Ch&rv^ka — 304.

„ „ criticised — 305-309.

„ Mechanical — 63.

„ self -deterministic -68.

Hindu classification of duties —

Compared with Platonic classification — 17, 18.

Special feature of — 23,

Hitavachana — 2 18.

INDEX

33S

lohchh^ —

„ Analysis of — 196-197.

„ Conditions of — 196.

„ Destruction of — 247.

„ Springs of action under — 1 98-200.

„ Two kinds of — 197.

Idealism — 250-251.

Ideal life — 276.

Ideal world — .819.

Imperative— 115,, 118-121, 123-127, l.SO-143, 148-152, 155, 158,
159, 161, 164-166, 173, 176, 180.

Impersonal Consciousness — :169, 270.

Impersonal Law — 126, 159, 160, 162, 172, 381.

Intellectualism — 279.

Intuition of the 'absolute — 5, 6, 259, 2G2.

IshtasfidhanaMjnfina— 34-36, 37, 40, 41, 44, 45, 56, 64, 66, 70, 76,
78-80.

Ishvarapranidlidna — 15.

Jaimini — 117.

Jaina— 159-161, 215, 226, 229, 230, 261, 265, 297, 298, 325, 329.
Jaina-K5rik£— 32 1 .

Jayanta— 180, 192, 202, 204, 206, 207, 300.

Jibanmukti — 107.

Jibanm ukti viveka — 2 1 0.

Justine, Platonic — 3, 17.

Kaivalya — 252, 259.

Kfima— 198, 205.

KHmyakarmas — 19, 21, 35, 36, 38, 61, 63-65, 69, 95, 96, 103, 105,
109, 136-138, 140, 163, 167, 278.

Kant— 21, 88, 39, 120, 298, 315, 316.

Karma— 15, 277, 285, 286, 291, 292, 296, 297.

„ moral value of —

99

99

according to Bauddha — 98.

99

"S,

99

Bhdttas — 103.

99

99

99

Prfi bhdkaras— * 103-105.

9 *

99

99

Nydyavaisheshikas — 1 01- 10

99

99

99

Rdm — 1 09- 110.

99

99

99

Shankara — 106-109.

99

99

99

Sfimkhya— 99-101.

INDEX

S37

Karma — moral valne of according to-r-Venkatesha 110 - 116 ,

Karmasannyisa-— 6, 109, 110,

Kfirunya— 198, 211.

Kfiryat^jnfina— 80-84, 87, 61, 62, 64, 70, 74, 70 .

Kathopanishad — 310.

Krodha— 200, 206.

Krtisfidhyatajnfina— 82-84, 39, 40, 43, 44, 66, 70, 71, 79 , 80.
Ksham4— 8, 16, 23, 230.

Kshatra, Duties of — 12.

KumSrila Bhatta— 102, 130, 122, 182, 188, 142, 174-179, 181, 182
184-186, 261-264, 288, 805.

Lokiichilrya — 22, 297.

Lokaprasiddhi — 800,

Lokash reya — 303.

Lokasthiti — 30], 302.

Lokasiddhi — 301 .
iioka-upadesha — 300.

Laug&kshibhilskara— - 120.

Laukika arthas — 93.

Laukika duties — 19, 36,

MAdhvas— 273, 296.

M adhyamikas — 2 62,

Midhyamik^vrtti — 191, 231,

MahdbhArata — 219, 303, 307, 329.

Mahdnirv^natantra — 303.

Maitri — 211, 212.

Mallisena — ',^65.

Maniprav^, — 318
Manu— 108, 109, 309, 829.

„ Classification of duties according to— 6-9.

Manushyayajna — 14.

Manyu — :201.

M^rdava — 230.

Martineau — 207,

M ath ur An Atha — 8 2 .

MAthuri — 83.

Meditation — 290-292, 294, 296.

Measure as a moral standard — 820.

Mill— 83.

43

INDEX

ass

f

Mim^msaka — 19, 21, 24, 86, 92, 93, 94, 97, 102, 162, 237.

„ classification of duties — 19-22.

Mithyd— ^16.

Mithyfijnfina — 204, P89, 290.

Moha— 202, 203, 204,207.

Moksha, according to Ballava— 273.

„ „ Bauddfaa — 253.

„ „ Mfidhva — 85, 274.

„ „ Mimamsd — 260-266.

„ „ Nyfiya — 248-255.

„ „ ' Patanjali — 253.

„ „ Rfimfinuja — 269-276.

„ „ Sfimkhya— 256-259.

„ „ Shankara — 266-269.

„ „ Vaisheshika — 247.

Moral earnestness — 10, 16, 88.

Moral Imperative,— 116, 118, 130, 139, 161, 162, 163, 164, 169,177,
179, 186, 238, 240, 264.

Moral Standard —

„ as Atmasantosh and AtmaMva — 309-319.

„ „ Custom and Tradition — 300-301.

„ „ End— 303-324.

„ „ Impersonal Moral Law— 331.

„ „ Law-^324-331.

„ „ Measure — 320-321.

„ „ Personal Moral Law — 324-331.

„ „ Social Category — 301-303.

Morality as relative and empirical — 238.

Moral watchfulness — 10, 16.

Muditfi— 211, 212.

Naiydyikas— 34, 37, 40, 46-48, 62, 62-64, 67, 72, 74-76, 77-78, 86,
104, 124-126, 128-131, 134-136, 140, 146, 148, 150, 162,
203, 239, 241, 248, 252, 253-254.

Naimittikakarmas — 19, 35.

Neo-Nai^fiyikas — 27, 47, 180.

Nirvtina-5, 255, 276.

Nishedhas-20, 137.

Nityanaimittika karmas— 19, 21,'61, 63, 64, 95, 96, 103, 105, 109.
Nityakarmas— 19, 35, 37, 38, 69.

INDEX

889

Niyamas — 15, 278.

Niyoga-~95, 118, 119, 188, 139, 142, 150-159, 160-162, 170-178, 242.
Niyogasiddbi — 264. ,

Nygya— 248-255, 268, 293, 294, 295.

Ny^yakandalitikd — 192-194, 196, 197, 247.

Nydyamanjari— 120, 124, 132, 137, 143-145, 192, 204, 215, 284,
287, 290, 800, iOl.

Ny&yaparishuddhi — 111, 326.

Ny fiyaratn dkara — 299.

Nyfiyavaishesbikas— 27, 86, 87, 90, 91, 97, 101, 102, 159, 161, 172,
173, 238, 261, 264. 269, 279, 282, 296, 326.

Objective Morality of Hindus — 4.

Objective Right — 152.

Obligation, analysis of — 126.

„ according to Chdrvfikas — 129-130. , ,

,, ,, Kumarila— -182-184.

„ „ Naiydyika — 130-132.

„ „ Frfibbdkara — 134.

Ontological pessimism — 307.

Organic activities — 28, 29.

Panchayajna — 14.

Paradravydbhipsi — 2 16.

Farad roba — 216.

Faricharana — 217, 220.

Farindma— -85.

Paritr5na— 217, 220, 285.

F&rthas&ratbimishra — 39, 85, 261, 264, 283, 299.

Parnsba — 2 1 6.

Patanjali— 5, 209, 210, 215, 220, 225, 253, 278.

Personal Moral Law — 324.

Pessimism — 256.

Pietism — 279.

Pityrna — 284.

Fitryajna — 14.

Plato— 3, 17, 18, 297, 816, 318, 319.

Pleasure —

analysis of — 193-195.
conditions of — 194.
kinds of — 194-195.

‘340

INDEX

t ,

Pleasure, standard as — SOS, 304.

Prabhttaras— 21, 30-40, 47, 60, 60-69, 71-76, 78-80, 94, 97, 103-106,
11§, 122, 124, 129, 134, 139, 140-142, 146, 150, 160-163,
167, 169, I7!i-.176, 176, 181, 182, 184, 186, 237, 288, 289,
240, 241, 242, 261, 284.

Pragmatism — 171,213.

Prakarauapauchikd — 173, 175.

Prakrti— 85, 86, 90, 256, 257, 278.

Pram^da — 205.

PrashastapMa— 9-19, 27, 28, 87, 192-194, 197, 198, 201-203, 207, 208.
Pratibimba — 258, &16, 317.

Pratisiddhamaitbuna — 216.

Pravrtti— 27, 29, 30, 31, 33, 34, 44-47, 49, 61, 79, 84.

Prerand~l05, 126, 135, 142-145, 151-154.

Purity of motive — 10, 228, 321-324,

Purusha— 85, 86, 90, 256, 257, 258, 278.

Purushdrtha— -267, 284, 286.

Quietism — 279.

R%a— 198, 204, 205.

R&jadharmdnusb5.sanaparva — 219.

R4m5nujist— 159, 161, 237-239, 247, 269, 273-276, 279, 282, 296,
326-326.

R5mdnu3a-5, 22-24, 106, 109, 114, 200, 270, 271.

Rdmakrsbna — 85.

Reflex activities — 28, 29, 49.

Relative duties — 1, 2, 7.

Re-realisation — 268.

Rousseau — 287.

^na — 284.

Rsbirna — 284.

Sacrificial ceremony — 14, 85.

S&db5rana dharmas — 1, 2, 8, 17, 101.

Saguna Brabma — 330.

Samantabbad ra — 3 2 1 .

S4m4nya9barmas — 9, 10.

S&mkbyar-16, 86, 90, 91, 97, 99, 100, 101, 102, 115, 180, 192, 288,
266, 278, 305.

Samuobobayav4da — 277, 281.

Sannydsa— 211.

INDBX

34r

Sarva-ved&nta-siddh&nta-saingraha — SIS.

Satyavachana — 10, 15.

Schopenhauer — 307.

Scriptural duties — 19, 25, 84.

Secular duties — 19, 25.

Self— 88, 254, 258, 259, 260, 264, 270, 271, 272, 273, 275, 276,
280.

Self-annihilation — 255, 256, 269.

Self-attainment — 809, 313-315.

Self-autonomy — 15, 25, 256, 266.

Self-knowledge— 107, 108, 178, 174, 178, 255.

.Self-purification— 26, 192, 246, 255, ‘289, 282.

Self-realisation — 15, 158, 261, 269, 809-319.

Self-restraint — 15, 265.

Self-satisfaction — 309, 313, 314.

Sexual continence— 8, 10, 284.

ShalikanStha— 173-175, 265.

Shaukara— 5, 16, 106, 108, 109, 115, 255, 262, 263, 266, 269, 274 ,
278, 281, 282, 296, 309, 311, 815-317, 819, 3 >8-880.
Shankaraved^nta- 16, 238, 239, 246, 263, 266, 293, 296.
Sh^istradipika — 39, 159, 177, 181, 261.

Sh^trika prescriptions — 98, 94, 95, 96, 97, 118, 114, 115, 116, 117,
118.

Sbavarabh^shya — 1 1 7 .

ShraddhA- 218, 235.

Shribhdshya — 270, 271.

Shridhara— 88, 190, 247.

Siddh4nta-chandrik4 — 85, 181.

Siddhdntalesha — 27 4.

Siddhdntamuktdvali— 27, 29, 30, 33, 39, 49.

Sikbdmani — 317, 318.

Shlokavdrtika — 305.

Socrates — 202.

Social Ethics — 1.

Social service — 9.

Socio-Ethical Classification — 24.

Spiritual Freedom — 276.

„ Ideal — 220, 246.

„ Life— 1, 277.

Si% INDEX

Springs of action, classified — 192.

„ according to Jayanta — 204-208.

,, ,r Nydya — 202-208.

„ „ Pgtanjali — 208-210.

„ „ Vaisheshika — 193-202.

„ „ V&tsydyana — 202-204.

„ „ Veddnta — 210-214.

„ under Desire — 198-200.

Stoics — 203, 209.

Subconscious morality — 234.

Subjective morality-'-4, 26.

Subodhini — 92.

Suddhadvaitam&rtanda — 274.

Suddhadvaita School — 273.

Svfidhyiiya — 15, 218.

Sy ddyadaman jari — 265.

Tapas — 15, 230.

Theism— 297.

Titiksh& — 211,

Tradition as a standard — 300.

Transcendentalism — 213, 315, 316, 828.

Transcendental Eudaemonism — 3 1 5.

Transcendental Freedom — 96, 99, 129, 130, 173, 199, 243, 247, 264.
Transcendental happiness — 267, 309, 313, 315, 317-319.
Transcendental life — 5, 86, 203, 237, 238, 250.

Transcendental shine — 86, 258.

Trshn^ — 204, 205, 207, 255.

Tyfiga— 230.

Udyotkara — 250, 307, 808.

Unconditional duties — 10?, 109, 110, 112, 113, 114, 183, 136, 187,
167, 170, 173, 178, 192.

Unconditional obligations — 19-22, 35, 38, 61, 64, 69, 70, 72, 255.
Unconscious morality — 234.

Universal duties — 7.

Universal Impermanence — 807.

Upadh&-^98.

Upadeshasahasri — 3 1 4.

Upanishads— 168, 174, 175, 176-1 '77. 809,

Upeksh^ — 211.

INDEX

m

V^chaspatimiBhra — 52.

Vairfigya — 198, 278.

Vaisheshika— 28, 202, 247, 248, 249, 276.

Vaishnavika — 200, 214, 276.

Vfinaprastha duties — 14.

Varna, Duties of — 1, 12, 101.

Varn&shramadhai ma — 2, 7, 101.

V^han& — 210, 211.

Vfitsalya — 28.

Vdtsyayana— 160, 192, 202, 203, 204, 215, 217.

Veddnta— 192, 212, 238, 247, 260-262, 305.

Veddntist — 80, 327.

Veddntaparibhdsha — 267, 268, 282, 317.

Venkatesha— 110, 111, 113, 114, 326.

Vidhi— 20,71, 116, 119, 121-127, 134, 136, 137-139, 141-143, 150,
163, 164, 169, 175, 180, 824, 326, 327,‘328.

Vidhivdkya— 92, 116-118, 122, 123, 142, 162.

Vidhipratyaya— -1 18.

Vidyd— 8, 16.

Vidyananda — 151, 227, 321.

Vidydranyasvdmi— 210.

Virtues, classification of — •215-235.

according to Bau<Idha — 230-235.

„ to Jaina — 226-230.

„ to Patanjali — 220-226.

„ to Vdtsydyana — 215-220.

Vijndnabhikshu— 51, 222, 223, 278, 306, 307.

Visbeshadharmas — 9, 11.

Vishvandtha — 27, 29, 30, 41, 43, 44, 50, 180, 190.
Vivaranaprameyasamgraha — 140.

Volition, analysis of — 27, 28, 30.

„ according to Frdbhdkaras — 80-39.

„ „ „ Naiydyikas — 89-83.

V yfaaddranyakaupan isbad — 310.

Vrbaspati — 304.

Vydsa — 209.

Vydsabhdsya— 192, 197, 215, 222-224.

Will, analysis of — 27.

Well-being— 300. 301, 304.

IKDEX

i(14

Will-to-live — 255-
Yog&chdras — 262.

Y&jana — 12
Yajna — 1 3.

Yamas — 15, 220, 278.

Yati, Daties of — 15.

Yoga — 5, 220.

Yogav&rtika — 223, 224.

Yogic intuition— 89.

Yogika morality — 224.
Y&mun&ch&rya — il i, 276, 282.

* It is'intended to adopt an up-to-date system of tratfliiiteration in
the next edition. In this edition

1.

&

stands for

2.

i

3.

u

»» ♦>

4.

u

IF, % ^

5.

ni

6.

t

- »

Zi

7.

t.li

3, V

8.

d

)) >)

Zs ^

9.

dll

•1 i>

Z, M

10.

ah

*♦ »>

11.

r

j» 1)

ERRATA

In all pages where they occur —

For

(1) PrabFtti,

Prabftta,

Prabarttaka, Prabarttana, etc.

(2) Nibftti, Nibarttaka, etc.

(3) Anuvandha,

Anavandlii;

Annvaddha, etc.

(4) valavatta,
valavad, etc.

t

(5) Frasastap^da

Read

(1) Pravrtti,

Prav{*tta,

Pravartakay
Pravartana^ etc.

{i) Nivrtti, Nibar-
taka^ etc.

(^3) Anubandha^

Anubandhi^

Anubaddba, etc.

(4) balavatta,
balavadi etc.

(5) Prashastapdda

i

ERRATA

w *

Pftgo.

Line.

Incorrect.

Correct.

2

14

Garhastya

Garbasthya

8

5

Dhairya

Dhrti

8

12

Indrit*

Indriya

10

13

krodha

krodha-

10

26

karmanam

karmanam

11

30

Sa aj)i

So^pi

12

35

f?vadrav\"a danam

svadravyadanam

15

15

shraddha-ehitta-prasjida . . .

shraddha = chitta-prasada

16

9

shraddlui

shraddha

17

35

aehoiirya

as toy a

22

32

sliakii

shaktih

28

4

sbakti

shaktih

23

5

diikhinsiin

duhkhinam

32

1

padarthaiiishtbayogyatci . . .

padarthanishthayogyata

32

15

betu

l)etnh

32

17

fihikiraha dvaia

chikirshadvara

34.

2

it CJin be

it can he,

41

19

vilamva

vilamha

41

21

ajanaktva

ajanakatva

42

31

iiitolleetualisn

intellectualism

45

31

pravarte

pravartate

47

5

raga

raga

47

17

shatrubadlia

shatrn vadha

47

2S

N(il)i/ds

Narf/ua

48

2

valvad

balavad

48

7

Nab) as

Navy as

50

27

valmtara

hahutara

.50

33

valuitara-sya

hahutarasya

53

19

valvaddvishta-

balavaddvishta

jnakatva

janakatva

71

35

though

til rough

89

9

begin ningi u time

beginning in time

8!)

21

knowledge

knowledge

96

7

an art ha

anartha

99

22

Vedie karma

Vedie karmas

104

0

Aj)uvva intrinsic

Apurva, intrinsic

validity or as

validity, as

104

19

Sliieyaokara

Shreyaskara

lOfi

23

desire; ij*.,

desire, i.a.^

107

27

Sadhanachatu

Sadhanacliatu-

108

IS

empiri

emjiiri-

109

karmasanyiisa

karmasannyasa

110

15

kevalakarmaruim

kevalakarm • nam

110

22

karmasanyftsa

karmasannyasa

no

31

Siiddha

Shuddha

no

35

judged

111

27-28

nmmukshanam

inumukshunam

112

19

tatssidhana apeksha-

tatsildharnipekshamanasya

manasya

teRRATA

a

P«Re.

Line.

lTioori*ect.

Correct.

113

24

nishpatte

nishpatteh

113

25

VrshtynnAdi

Vrshtyanriadi

113

15-26

SarvaiiyiipHsan^ni-
sh t ot patty 0 u pay i k a-e tc.

sarvary^'upasanSni-

shtotpattyaupayika-etc.

113

27

phalabhisanidhi

phal^bhisandhi

113

28

nifcyiinaimittikeir-

ekikrtya

nityaiiaimittikairekikrtya

116

27

ishtasadlianta

ishtasadhanatd

119

20

Lin adi

Lin-Jidi

119

11

Bhavane pratiyate

Bh^ivan^ partiyete

120

8

Sa arihabli^vana

So ^ rthabhavanashab-

denochyaie

120

10

Sa

Sa

120

15

Matprabrttyaniikulah
vy ajiaravan .

A1 atpravrttyan ukulavya-
paravau

120

19

sjidhyakankshayani

sJidhyftkjinkshayam

121

2*|.

akbyAtatva

fikhyatatva

123

4

Atmakuta...

Atm^ikuta

123

19

expereiuoe ...

experience

123

34

Linadibhyo

Lin-jidibbyo

124

1

itti

iti

124

1

briddhali ...

vyddliali

124

3

amradaii ...

{imradau

124

5

prabartamauah

pravarlainilnali

124

5

Samupaie ...

samupajate

124

6

Sashciia

Sa cha

1 .4

8

nasau

n^saii

124

10

atmakuta ...

atmakuta

124

12-13

ataeva pramanantara^ocha
radharma.

- ata eva na praman^ntar-
agocharah dharma

124

34

“ Ny ay-inanjari ’’

Nyayaman jari ”

127

12

anushteyatva

aimsbtheyatva

128

20

dukheiia ...

duhkhena

133

32

nityanaimittaka

nifyanaimittika

136

19 & 23

purushavuddhi-elc.

purushabudd h i-etc .

137

9

Vahye

Bfthye

137

9

lipsyftdi

lipsadi

’pi

137

12, 14

api

137

18

Tatpurane...

Tatpuranena

137

18

v^nchhatc tatoadhikam . . .

vanchliati tato’ dhikam

137

19

ki’iuldho arihanana-elc. ...

kruddho’arihanana-etc.

137

27

Purushavuddhi-etc.

purushabudd hi<etc.

142

34

kriya-etc. ...

kriya-etc.

143

1

adyah

adyah

143

2

kriya-etc. ...

kriya-etc.

143

3

— sambandhayo ,
t^ambandho ava —

— sambandhayoh samban*
dho *va-

144

14

lota

]ot

144

24

Jyapavishayaprayoga . . .

.Tyayovishayaprayoga

4

ERRATA

F*ige.

Line.

Incorrect.

Correct.

145

18

Prayajokahvyap&rah

Frayojakavy&pflrah

145

1C

J napakahvy &p4.rah

J ndpakavy&pdrah

145

2a

na b^.naspati

na hi vanaspatih

145

23

Nyaya-iXianjari^^)

Nyayamanjari ”)

145

31

Atmakuta Atma

Afmfikuta Atmd

149

6-17

...

road without „

149

7

Enam prabarteta

Evam pravarteta

149

8

lomattadi-ete.

ba]onmatt>^i-etc.

149

10

n^shankate va api . . .

nashankyate va pi

rajnoapi

149

11

rajnoapi

149

12

Vartamanapadesheapi . . .

Vartam^D^padesbe’pi
yatrAvagamyat^

153

10

prerana

prerana

156

4

yantrarurha

yantrarudha

156

10

vishayarurham

prabaftate

vishay^rudham

pravartate

157

27

p;i?nsha

purushah

158

15

preranariipa

preran Arupa

159

9

Vdhih

Vidhih

159

10

vodhayati

bodhayati

160

23

S&ksh4tkrtdharmanah . . .

Sdkshdtkrtdharro^nah

160

26

bai anavavuddha-etc.

vai anavabuddha-etc

160

27

avavodba-etc.

avabodha'Ctc.

160

28

vodhe akrtva

bodhe akrtva

164

6

sacrificial

sacrificial

168

29

Atmasvarupa-etc.

Atmasvarupa-etc.

169

19

from catogorical

form categorical

170

18

nishreyasa

nihshreyasa

170

24

^kshiptd

^kshipta

173

3

nishreyasa

nihshreyasa

173

8

purushfirfcha,

Prilbhdkara’s

purush&rthah,

Prabb^kara’s

174

3

174

32

khaluh

khalu

17 +

33

abhyudayasahdanebhyah

abhy udayas&dhanebhy ah

1/5

1

punar^barttateh

punarfivarttate

175

28

anartha

anarthah

186

8

injonctions

injunctions

187

32

falling in

falling into

188

25

consequence

consequence

188

27

aniishthiyamana

anushthiyamflnah

188

188

28

-prayojakavyapftra

question,

-prayojakavyilpflrah

question.

189

27

dliberate

deliberate

191

11

Devakuladi

DevakuMdi-

193

1

latter

later

194

15

sukha anutp&d^t

sukhanutpadilt

195

10

prakrsta

prakrshta

196

1

anavipreta-

anabhipreta-

ehrata

. 6 *

Page.

* Line.

Incorrect.

Correct.

196

2

anishatopa-

... anishtopa-

196

25

^tmamana-

... ^tmamanah-

]98

6

Avilasha

. . . Abhil^ha

198

15

sv^rthamanapeksha

... s virthamanapekshya
... antarnigud-etc.

198

23

anatarnignr-etc.

198

-fivirbhavita

, . . -fivirbhfivitfi

198

24

bhAva

. . . bhavah

198

28

kriyfivediit

. . . kriyftbhed&t

200

14

Bhagav&na

Bhagav&n

200

19-20

prajvalatmakh

praj val&tmakah

200

22

iitma-mana-

. . . &tfna-manah-

201

2

long-mediated

... long-meditated

201

3

chirauuvaddha

... chirfitbibaddha

201

4

apakara avashilna

. . . apakar&vas^na

201 8 & 12

antarnigar-ete.

... antarnigud-etc.

205

26

Devesha

Dvesha

206

15

manyu

... manyuh

208

23

p irvakah

... purvjikah

210

33

poutaneons

... spontaneous

211

1

Vasan^s

... VasanAs

211

2

shuvft, ashuvA

. . . shubh&, ashubh^

211

15

trom.

. . . from —

211

18

Suddha-

... Shuddba-

211

31

Sanyfisa

... Sannyasa

212

4

obvert

. . . overt

215

15

datail

... detail

2'6

31

instrumenral

... instrumental

221

34

-vandhya

. . . -bandbya

222

14

-svavodha-

-svabodba-

222

16

prabrtta na bhutopa-
ghataya

pravHta na bbutop)
ghdtfiya

223

3

-purvakem

-purvakam

223

18

Yogavartika

YogavSrttika

223

30

uprightnes

... uprightness

223

33

ashakti

... ^sakti

224

3

Yogavartika

. . . Yogavarttika

224

16

mahabratam-

mahdvratam-

227

8

k^rik

... karik^

228

12

oncers

. . . one’s

228

18

Sbukha

Sukha

231

8

Paribhaganvyam

, . , Paribhdg^nvyayam

231

26

paraona

... par^nna

232

13

praninam

... praninam

232

18

aviratilaksbanah

. . . aviratilaksbanah

236

28

detercnt

... deterrent

237

29

medintion

. . . mediation

239

3U

Prabh^kara *

Prftbbri,karas

249

31

bandhana sam^-

... bandharjasam^-

250

17

IJdyotkara

... Uddyotakara

6

ERRATA

Page.

253

253

255

255

256

257

258
258
260

260

261

262

262

262

263

263

263

264
264
267
267
270
270

271

271

271

271

272

273

274
274

274

275
275
275
280
282
256
288
288

290

291

292

Ljino. Incorrect.

8 helds

16 sukhashabdah prayo^jah

vahudhA

13 nut

4 latest

27 Soul-

12 annadi iipabho^ah

23 svavavika

33 Upadlii

6 both spiritual (ehidaehit-

14 Aehildamshena

26 jarhatvena

7 Pr^paneba

3 3 hityfi sam vit-ete. . . .

35 YogSebaras

3 uparama

1 7 bho^yab

22 vandhasya

10 v^,hyendriyas

12 Bbattas

5 Vedanta-paribhasha

9 svavrttitaya

23 i^ubject/’

24 should case to be the

thinking subject dis-
appears

10 svavyatiriktaoraka-
shaka

25 tasyfijnatvasms&ritva-
di-etc.

26 viparitjnanam

28 sarnsaritvam

13 Ananda

1 pratikuliitvasya

1 Suddhadvaitam^irtanda

29 avidyastaraaya-etc.

31 tadbhava-etc.

5 Avidya

1 1 -sadharmya

23 -gunanubhava

19 -kdlainasevamano

15 karmaniisthiiniit

15 Purushartha

4 Grhasta

22 grhastashnima

18 koasmai

16 Pravrtti Prattisandhaya

12 Jnanagni

Correct.

. held

suk hashabdaprayogah
bahiulb^

but

latent

Soul

an n ady upabhogah
svabhavika
Upadhi ^

both spiritual and non-
spiritual (chidachid-
Achidarnshena
jadatvena
Prapancha

hit va samvin-etc.

YogaehAras

ii para mail

bhogyah

bandhasya

b^hyeiidriyas

Bhattas

Vedanta-paribhfisha^’

svavrttitayd

subject should cease to be.’^
disappears

svavyatiriktapraktishaka

tasyajnatvasamsaritvadi-etc.

viparitajn^nam

samsaritvani

Auatida
pratikulatvasya
Shuddhadvaitamartanda
avidy ftstamay a-etc.
tadbhava-etc.

Avidyji

sadharmya

-gunanubhava

ktllair5,sevamano

karmanushthftnat

Punish arthas

Grliastha

grhasthashrama

ko\smai

Pravrtti pratisandhaya
Jnanagni

ERRATA

Page.

Line,

Incorrecf..

Correct.

295

2

darsana

darshana

296

17

Naislikarma ...

Naisbkarmya

299

11

Parthasara-

Partlia^ara-

301

3

Pirha

302

30

-stannstiim

-Siam tsim

302

31

valavaniva

balavaniva

303

Mah&nirvantantra

M ah sin i r v sin at antra

303

5

Shreya

Shreyah

303

14

Mahabhaiat

Mahabharata

304.

1!)

pi vet

pibet

304

30

Slokas. . .Vrhaspati

Shlokas. . . Brhaspati

305

15, 20,

%

n

Sloka-Vurtika

Shloka- Vsirttika

305

19

pirhit-

picjiv-

306

11

-Sidclhirnilsti

-Siddhirnsisti

307

(3

-dukhavashyaka-etc. . . .

-duhkhstvashyaka-etc.

307

17, 28,

33

IJdyotkara

TJddyotakara

307

18

Atyantika

Atyaniikah

308

12, 31

[Jdyotkara

Uddyotakara

308

18

-uimittata

-niniittatsi

308

14

A ( 1 ha ra or i\ s h ra.>’a.

Adluira or Ashraya

309

11

Atma-Santosha

Atmn-pantosha

310

3.4

V^rihadaranyaka

Upanisad

Hrhadsiranyaka

Upanishad

310

11

k am ay a

ksimaysi

310

29

Nishreyasam

Nihshreyasarn

311

11

nislireyasam

iiihshroyasam

3U

14

vadhnitali

badhnitah

311

18

asakyatvat

ii.shaivyatvsit

311

20

viimirha

vimindia

311

31

Sloka

Shloka

312

6

vivinokti dhira

viviuakti dhirah.

312

7

.^lireya

Shreyah

312

10, 19

Sliivva Freva

Shreyah Preyah

312

33

loka?

lokah ?

313

]

Slireyaselia

Shreyashcha.

313

6

Mpaviiddhih

Mpabnddhih.

313

»>

sadasad vivekfisarnarthat

Siidasad vi vekstssimart hy at

3J8 9, 2,8, \
30, 33 j

sloka

shloka.

313

12

Atma-sautosli

Atma-santosha.

314

•^5

Atmartla/pi

Atmartho’pi

315

7, 8, 9

Ediomonism ^

Eudaemonism

315

15

Aima-santosh

Atma-santosha

317

2, 5-G

“ Vedanta paribhasha”

“ Vedsintaparibhfisha'^

317

20

-ttnand- ... ,,,

-Snanda-

ERRATA

Pago.

Line.

•

Incorrect.

Correct.

818

4.

Tashyfim

... Tasy&m

318

5

-banit&di-etc.

... -vanitfidi-eto.

818

24

** Mamprabha

... Maniprabhd

320

4

santosh

... santosba

321

1

tadhetu-etc.

taddhetii-etc.

S2I

2

tatmatra-etc.

... tanmatr&-etc.

tm

12

atmasantosh

. . . Atmasantosha

322

29

achetanah . . .

... achetana

323

26

vedana

. . . vedan^

325

1, 16

Buddhas

. . . Bauddhas

825

14

puiyish^rtiia . . .

. . . purushftrthah

325

15

Lolsasiddha ...

. . . Lokasiddhah

326

29

sarva prash^situh

. . . sarvaprash&situb

327

1

he Moral law

... the Moral Law

329

7

Karmasanyasa

... Karmasannylisa

329

24

Arjiats

... Arhatas

32!»

29

Mafiilbh^rat

Mah^ibh^lrata

329

31

Vyavaharika

... Vyfivahdrika

330

12

Atmasantosh

... Atmasantosha.

330

21

realised

... realised

338

7

Ballavdch&ryya

... Ballabh^hdryya

334

10

Dhairjya

... Dhairyya

835

22

Bhagav&na

Bhagav^n

387

7

Krtis^dhyatajulina

. . . Krtisfid hy atdjnfina

387

28

Manipravfi

. . . Maniprabhd

838

6

Ballava

. . . Ballabha

338

20

AtmaUva . . .

. . . Atmalabha

342

13, 14

SuddhAdvaita

... ShuddhAdvaita

842

29

Udyotkara ...

... Uddyotakara

343

8

Vrisiiana

... Vdsanfi.

343

34

Vrbad-etc. ...

Brhad-etc.

343

35

Vrhaspati ...

Brhaspati

343

37

Vyasabh&sya

Vydsabhdshya

xvi

23

skreya

sit eyah